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This dissertation investigates a neglected, yet central component of nineteenth-
century visual culture in France, namely the proliferation of war imagery across a range 
of established and emergent visual forms including painting, printmaking, battle 
panoramas, illustrated newspapers and photography.  Far from mere reflections of the 
propagandistic aims of state power, representations of war produced between the First 
Napoleonic Empire and the Crimean War (1804-1856), the first major armed conflict to 
break out on European soil since the wars of the First Napoleonic Empire, depended on a 
wide range of belief systems beyond officially-sponsored political agendas.  Throughout 
this dissertation, I situate war imagery as a material and discursive platform which not 
only informed perceptions about war and peace, but also implicated a larger set of 
contemporary issues as diverse as the development of liberal political doctrines, 
imperialism, industrial modes of production and the interaction of early forms of mass 
culture with more established media such as painting over the course of the nineteenth 
century.  While art historical studies of representations of war have predominately 
focused on the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods  and on the paintings of Jacques-
Louis David and his students, the present study focuses on a corpus of works (and their 
xx 
 
relevant reproductions) by artists who have fallen outside the purview of the dominant 
interpretations of nineteenth-century artistic production in France, including the battle 
painters Louis-François Lejeune, Carle Vernet, Horace Vernet, the war artist Henri 
Durand-Brager and the panoramist Jean-Charles Langlois. In addition to focusing on the 
interrelations which existed between different media used to picture war, I identify a set 
of formal strategies used by artists to compose and picture armed combat in order to 
make it appear legible and engaging.  Through an array of archival and primary sources, 
including Salon criticism, government documents, diaries, letters and newspaper articles, 
I argue that the visual representations of war produced by these artists invited spectators 































An extraordinary photograph (Fig. 1.1) taken by Charles Nègre in 1857 depicts a 
man, whom the title identifies as an “apprentice of Charles Nègre,” gazing down at a 
print.  His rolled up sleeves and apron suggest his status as a worker.  The camera 
captures him as he takes a break from his endeavors to step outside to admire the object 
of his labor.  He turns to the side in an awkward pose with one leg crossed behind the 
other and angles the print toward the camera where it comes into remarkable focus.  The 
print in question is a photogravure made in Nègre’s studio based on a reproductive 
photograph (Fig. 1.2) by Robert Jefferson Bingham of Adolphe Yvon’s large-scale battle 
painting, the Capture of the Malakoff Tower (Fig. 1.3), exhibited at the Salon of 1857.  
Yvon’s enormous painting, which measured over 80 x 40 feet (600 x 900 cm), depicted a 
decisive battle from the Crimean War, the first major armed international conflict to 
occur on European soil since the Napoleonic Wars at the start of the century.  But the 
specifics of the painting and the heroics of the battle are irrelevant to the sets of viewing 
relationships which Nègre’s photograph constructs.  In depicting a photogravure based on 




to represent, in a reproductive medium, a viewer (the worker) looking at a reproduced 
image.  Through the mediating presence of a representation of war, the problem of 
reproducibility is thus figured as a chain of obliquely ordered signs - an allegory - of the 
relationship between spectatorship and visual production during the industrial age.1
The photographer’s interest in picturing this very specific kind of viewing 
encounter hails from the historical moment of the 1850s, a period that witnessed an 
unprecedented proliferation of modes of visual reproduction, including photography and 
photogravure.  Nègre’s inclusion of a reproduction of his photogravure of the Capture of 
the Malakoff Tower raises the question as to why he used a battle as the focal point of his 
image and not for example a photogravure of a decorative element from the Chartres 
cathedral or any of the dozens that were made in his studio during the same period.
   
2
                                                 
1 Paul de Man conceives of allegory as a form of representation whereby meaning is constituted out of 
distant, indirect relationships.  He states: “It remains necessary, if there is to be allegory, that the allegorical 
sign refer to another sign that precedes it.  The meaning constituted in the allegorical sign can then consist 
only in the repetition of a previous sign with which it can never coincide, since it is of the essence of this 
previous sign to be pure anteriority…allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin.” 
See Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of 
Contemporary Criticism (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1983), 207.  Steve Edward’s work 
on English nineteenth-century photography and labor identifies “allegorical reading” as the methodological 
basis for his project of exploring how photography’s discourses and practices were figured “in opposition 
to the workers’ world.” See Steve Edwards, The Making of English Photography - Allegories (University 
Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 14.  
  The 
answer lies in the particular valences that representations of war carried during the period 
pertaining to their mass availability in an astonishing range of visual formats.  
Representations of war not only filled the exhibition spaces of the Salon, but were also to 
be seen in the shop windows of print sellers, in the rotundas where panoramas were 
installed, and on the pages of luxurious folio books and illustrated weekly newspapers.  
Nègre’s photogravure of Yvon’s Malakoff, for example, was but one of six different 
2 For more on Charles Nègre’s photogravures see Françoise Helibrun, Charles Nègre, Photographe, 1820-
1880 (Paris: Réunion des Musées Nationaux, 1980).  I would like to thank Jacob Lewis for first bringing 




copies that were available for purchase in 1857 in a variety of reproductive media 
including photography, lithography and engraving.3
The well-known and oft-reproduced image of war that is the object of the 
worker’s gaze does more than picture a decisive battle in the Crimean War; it is in fact 
central to Nègre’s self-reflexive meditation on the process surrounding the production of 
reproductive images.  Beyond its subject matter, Malakoff embodied a set of material 
values connected to its status as a reproducible object made for dissemination on a large 
scale, a quality that nineteenth-century viewers would have associated with war imagery 
in particular.  By including the Malakoff photogravure within his image, Nègre signaled 
his professional eminence as a producer of photomechanical reproductive images, a mode 
of visual production that was rapidly undergoing commodification at the time.  The 
overall importance of Malakoff within Nègre’s photograph suggests that representations 
of war had more significance within the economy of nineteenth-century visual culture 
than has previously been acknowledged, extending beyond individual artistic 
achievement, stylistic evolutions and “documentary” value.  Though representations of 
war have been traditionally seen as functioning as a form of propaganda for the 
advancement of state power, this dissertation contends that they in fact signified 
materially and discursively within the larger historical framework of nineteenth-century 
France.   
   
The present study locates the significance of war imagery within a wide range of 
belief systems beyond officially-sponsored political agendas.   Its research and arguments 
                                                 
3 Stephen Bann’s work on the interrelationships among nineteenth-century media has served as an 
invaluable methodological guide for this study. See Stephen Bann, Parallel Lines, Printmakers, Painters, 




are based on a corpus of works (and their relevant reproductions) by a group of artists 
who have not featured prominently within art historical accounts of the period.  The 
artists examined in this dissertation, including the battle painters Louis-François Lejeune, 
Carle Vernet, Horace Vernet, Henri Durand-Brager and the panoramist Jean-Charles 
Langlois, were well regarded during their lifetimes and were widely discussed by 
nineteenth-century critics, yet remain on the margins of contemporary art historical 
inquiry.  This can be explained in part by the fact that these artists worked outside the 
tradition of grand manner history painting established by Jacques-Louis David and his 
students - a mode of artistic practice that has dominated art historical approaches to the 
study of visual representations of armed combat during the period.4
                                                 
4 Previous studies of nineteenth-century representations of war have emphasized the production of 
canonical works of art, most notably the large-scale history paintings made by Jacques-Louis David and his 
students under the patronage of Napoleon Bonaparte.  Christopher Prendergast’s examination of 
Napoleonic painting is an example of this tendency. Christopher Prendergast, Napoleon and History 
Painting: Antoine-Jean Gros’s La Bataille d’Eylau (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).  The majority of inquiries 
either focus on individual artists, as is the case with David O’Brien’s work on Gros, or on individual 
conflicts, such as Nina Anathanassoglou-Kallmyer’s examination of French artistic responses to the Greek 
War of Independence, Hollis Clayson’s study of Paris during the Franco-Prussian War and Ulrich Keller’s 
work on the Crimean War.  These studies have provided me with vital methodological models for 
evaluating the complex interrelations between contemporary military events and their visual representation.  
See David O'Brien, After the Revolution, Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting and Propaganda under Napoleon 
(University Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006); Nina Anathanassoglou-Kallmyer, 
French Images from the Greek War of Independence, 1821-1830, Art and Politics under the Restoration 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), Hollis Clayson, Paris in Despair: Art and Everyday Life under 
Siege (1870-71) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Ulrich Keller, Ultimate Spectacle: A Visual 
History of the Crimean War (New York: Routledge, 2001).  
  In addition to the 
“school” of Davidian classicism, the artists examined in this dissertation do not fit 
comfortably within other categories commonly used to conceptualize nineteenth-century 
artistic practice including romanticism or realism.  Instead of focusing on the exemplary 
movements and “styles” traditionally emphasized in art historical scholarship, the study 
of artists who represented armed combat and the range of their works across different 




interest of both artists and viewers in war as a mode of artistic practice and as a dominant 
cultural narrative over the course of the nineteenth century.  Moreover, during the fifty 
year period covered in this dissertation, visual representations of war became the site of 
an unprecedented intermingling between nascent mass cultural forms and more 
traditional modes of visual production, a problematic which the study of artists such as 
Carle Vernet, Horace Vernet and Henri Durand-Brager brings to the fore. 
In addition to its focus on a neglected body of visual works, the broad 
chronological frame of this dissertation, over a fifty year span between 1804 and 1856, 
encompasses a period of time which has been traditionally slighted by art historians.  
Despite the flourishing of art historical studies which focus on the French Revolution, the 
First Empire and the Second Empire in recent years, the periods of the Bourbon 
Restoration (1815-1830) and the July Monarchy (1830-1848) remain relatively 
understudied.5
                                                 
5 This general historigraphic trend has recently been challenged by several important studies by scholars of 
early nineteenth-century French art history.  Michael Marrinan’s Painting Politics for Louis-Philippe. Art 
and Ideology in Orleanist France  (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988), Beth Wright’s 
Painting and History during the Bourbon Restoration. Abandoned by the Past. (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Marie-Claude Chaudonneret’s L’État et les artistes : de la 
Restauration à la monarchie de Juillet (Paris : Flammarion, 1999) focus exclusively on the period between 
the fall of the First Empire (1815) and the Révolution of 1848.  While studies of this period remain 
relatively rare, there has been a spate of recent interest in Jacques-Louis David’s late career which extended 
into the 1820s.  See Philippe Bordes,  Jacques-Louis David: Empire to Exile, exh. cat. (New Haven : Yale 
University Press for the Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 2005), and the collection of essays in 
David after David: Essays on the Late Work, ed. Mark Ledbury (New Haven: Yale University Press the 
Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 2007).  Todd Porterfield’s Allure of Empire (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998) and Darcy-Grimaldo Grigsby’s Extremities: Painting Empire in Post-
Revolutionary France (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) also rely on an extended chronological 
frame to interrogate the visual politics of early nineteenth-century imperialism.  More recent studies which 
focus on a broad period of the early nineteenth-century beyond the Revolution and the First Empire include 
Satish Padiyar’s Chains: David, Canova and the Fall of the Public Hero in Post-Revolutinary France 
(University Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State Press, 2007) and Susan Siegfried’s Ingres: Painting 
Reimagined (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) . 
  By prioritizing the visual thematic of war across historical periods not 




the chronological segmentation which has dominated the study of France’s nineteenth-
century visual production.    
The pages that follow position representations of war within the context of the 
practices that surrounded their production and the political, social and cultural 
circumstances that informed their reception during the first half of the nineteenth century 
in France.  The period under consideration in this study, from the First Empire through 
the Crimean War, witnessed the proliferation of representations of war on an 
unprecedented scale, thanks in large part to modern modes of image making such as 
lithography, the panorama, illustrated newspapers and photography as well as more 
traditional media such as painting and engraving.  This profusion of war-related imagery, 
which began in the years immediately after the French Revolution, was not only the 
result of government patronage but was also due to the efforts of enterprising image 
makers working across nineteenth-century media who capitalized on public interest in 
France’s military endeavors.  In addition to the example of Nègre already discussed, 
Jean-Charles Langlois, a Napoleonic officer and student of the prolific battle painter 
Horace Vernet, erected panoramas from the 1830s through the 1860s that brought 
contemporary battles to life for the audiences who could afford to pay the entry fee.  
While government-sponsored large-scale battle painting became a ubiquitous fixture at 
Salon exhibitions and elicited a lively and often contentious critical discourse, 
representations of war also abounded as consumer goods that could be possessed for a 
price.      
These new patterns of dissemination and consumption which emerged during the 




achievements.   In reviews of battle paintings exhibited at the Salon, in contemporary 
accounts of the battle panoramas and other textual sources from the period, the viewing 
of representations of contemporary war was repeatedly likened to a participatory 
encounter with the military event.  This powerful illusion, often characterized by a 
willingness to temporarily forget the boundaries between representation and reality, 
between telling and showing, dominated the critical discourse of the period.  Textual 
descriptions of such viewing experiences were by no means limited to painting.  Etienne-
Jean Delécluze, a student of the painter Jacques-Louis David turned art critic, recalled the 
first time he saw an engraving of a contemporary French Revolutionary battle in 1792: 
“Though quite young, I remember the emotion that I felt after the first hostilities as a 
crowd of onlookers that I was a part of went to see an engraving at Martinet, on rue du 
Coq, that represented French soldiers fighting with the traces of a passing canon ball 
visible on of one their chests.”6
Delécluze’s description of viewing a print of contemporary battle as an 
impassioned encounter with the event itself vibrantly illustrates a discursive phenomenon 
that this dissertation situates in relation to a set of formal strategies deployed by a group 
  Amidst the fractious political chaos of 1792, which 
marked not only the start of a period of continuous warfare that would last nearly twenty-
five years but also the beginnings of the Terror, Delécluze characterized his viewing 
experience as a collective one, as part of a “crowd” of enthralled viewers in front of the 
window of a print shop.  
                                                 
6 Etienne-Jean Delécluze, Les beaux-arts dans les deux mondes en 1855 (Paris: Charpentier, 1856), 229-30.  
“Je me souviens de l’émotion que j’éprouvai, ainsi que la foule des curieux dont je faisais partie, quoique 
bien jeune, lorsque après les premières hostilités on allait voir chez Martinet, rue du Coq, une gravure 
représentant des soldats français combattant, et dont l’un avait sur la poitrine la trace du passage d’un 




of artists to encourage spectatorial engagement with representations of war.  In contrast to 
the history-cum-battle paintings produced during the First Empire by artists such as 
Jacques-Louis David and Antoine-Jean Gros where episodic details are subordinated to a 
single moment of narrative transcendence, the visual objects that are the focus of the 
present study represented contemporary battles in terms of a series of episodic and 
topographical details, elements traditionally eschewed by history painters.  Among other 
examples, I locate the series of battle paintings made by the military officer Louis-
François Lejeune (1775 – 1848) during the First Empire as important precedents for the 
work of the century’s most important battle painter, Horace Vernet (1789-1863), who 
depicted nineteenth-century battles as a series of salient episodic details and earned a 
reputation as the nation’s preeminent painter of war. 7
The prevalence of war as a subject for visual representation during a time in 
French history marked by several bloody revolutions and the ousting of governing 
regimes nearly every other decade was no coincidence.  In the post-revolutionary period 
when few people had the right to vote and take part in the official business of politics, 
when representative government was something that existed in theory only, 
representations of the French army’s exploits provided a pivotal point of contact between 
governing authority and the broader public.  Though decisions to go to war were made by 
governing elites, visual representations of these events, in the form of panoramas, 
   
                                                 
7 My understanding of episodic narrative structures in nineteenth-century French painting has been 
informed by Michael Marrinan’s work on the genre historique, a merging of genre and history painting that 
he considers to have emerged during the July Monarchy (1830-1848) to support the didactic aims of King 
Louis-Philippe’s official arts programme.  See Michael Marrinan, Painting Politics for Louis Philippe, Art 
and Ideology in Orleanist France, 1830-1848 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).  As Susan 
Siegfried has argued, the genre historique was not unique to the July Monarchy.  She dates its appearance 
to the Directory in response to the pressures of depicting contemporary events of the Revolutionary period. 
See Susan Siegfried, “Naked History: The Rhetoric of Military Painting in Postrevolutionary France,” The 




paintings, and prints, were addressed to a much wider audience.  In a period of political 
instability, war imagery provided a consistent and highly visible means of picturing an 
idealized extension of state power as well as its limits. 
As highly charged objects through which expectations and perceptions about the 
stability and strength of the nascent French nation could be articulated, the visual images 
under consideration in this study conjured the illusion of a shared set of political values 
by subsuming the authority of the state within the image of its military prowess.  This 
link between visual representations of the army’s exploits and the nation as a whole was 
ensured by important changes to the ideological identity of the French army during the 
early years of the Revolution from an aristocratic institution that fought for the King into 
a meritocratic one that waged war on behalf of the French people.8
                                                 
8 This is a classic argument about the impact of the French Revolution upon the nature of war.  Carl van 
Clausewitz, an officer in the Prussian and Russian armies during the Napoleonic Wars, made this important 
observation in On War, posthumously published in 1832.  See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael 
Howard and Peter Paret, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976), 591-592.  More recently, revisionist military historians have shown that despite the nationalization 
of warfare that the Revolution made possible, it was still difficult to recruit and retain soldiers who were 
committed to the cause of defending the Republic.  See S.P MacKenzie, “The armies of the French 
Republic and the War of the First Coalition, 1792-7,” in Revolutionary Armies in the Modern Era: a 
Revisionist Approach (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), 33-50; Alan Forrest, Conscripts and 
Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989).  Historian Manuel de Landa has discussed the new character of Revolutionary warfare in 
terms of a transformation in the army’s chain of command from the “clockwork” armies of the ancien 
régime into the Post-Revolutionary “motorized” armies.  The “motorized” French army was more flexible 
and mobile than ever before and gave more authority to individual platoon commanders.  See Manuel de 
Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (New York: Swerve Editions, 1991), 65-70.   
  This shift has 
occasioned several recent studies within the “new military history,” a historiographic 
trend within military history which seeks to bring cultural, sociological and other non-




war beyond their current isolation as a quaint subfield into a complex cultural and social 
framework.9
During the post-revolutionary period, war imagery, and battle painting in 
particular, constituted something akin to a self-portrait of government authority.  Far 
from a direct or transparent expression of military events, representations of war 
advanced a set of larger claims about individual political agency, national identity and the 
stability of the fledgling nation.  In this way, war imagery was not so much an a priori 
expression of power but rather an affirmation of its existence and an appeal for support.
    
10
It is the people’s support that lends power to the institutions of a country, and this 
support is but the continuation of the consent that brought the laws into existence 
to begin with. Under conditions of representative government the people are 
supposed to rule those who govern them.  All political institutions are 
manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as 
the living power of the people ceases to uphold them.
    
As Hannah Arendt has argued, modern government power is constituted through diffuse 
and unofficial forms of consent given by individuals in support of founding state 




For Arendt, public support produces state power and sanctions government to uphold 
laws and maintain institutions.  Within her theory, the counter-term to power is violence, 
which becomes a tool of governments that possess no power.  In light of this insight, I 
                                                 
9 For more on “the new military history,” see Joanna Bourke, “New Military History,”  in Palgrave 
Advances in Modern Military History, ed. Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott, Basingstoke (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 258-280.  See also: Torbjorn L. Knutsen, “Old, Unhappy, Far-off 
Things: The New Military History of Europe,” Journal of Peace Research 24 (Mar., 1987): 87-98. 
10 The cultural historian Keith Michael Baker has defined politics as the process through which competing 
groups make claims.  Political culture is “the activity through which individuals and groups in any society 
articulate, negotiate, implement, and enforce the competing claims they make upon one another and upon 
the whole.  Political culture is, in this sense, the set of discourses or symbolic practices by which these 
claims are made.”  Baker’s conception of political culture informs my own approach to the political 
dimension of war imagery as a cultural site of negotiation. See Keith Michael Baker, “Introduction,” in 
Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century ed. Keith 
Michael Baker (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4.  




understand war imagery as a compelling visual invitation to a broadly constituted form of 
consent that is essential for the legitimization and propagation of government power.  The 
visual and textual sources that I interrogate in this dissertation show that while 
representations of war often abetted the process of bolstering government authority, they 
sometimes they acted as a site of its contestation.  Indeed, the criticism that war imagery 
elicited often exposed the fact that the process of securing government power depended 
not on the inalienable authority of those who ruled, but rather upon the consensus of 
those who were ruled over.12
The most recent art historical account of French war imagery to deal with the 
entire period covered in this dissertation was written in 1889 by the art critic Arsène 
Alexandre, and spanned the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries.  The introduction of 
his Histoire de la peinture militaire en France reads like an apology for the critical 
fortunes of battle painting during his lifetime.
 
13  In the first paragraph, Alexandre gave 
voice to the critics: “We declare outright that military painting in France passes under the 
eyes of critics as not being painting at all; or implicitly, not good painting.”14
Despite its definition, the real “history painting” is not so much that which 
retraces episodes rehashed from Greek or Roman annals, but the painting of 
contemporary life, and, as a special chapter, battle painting, still smelling of gun 
  In the face 
of such skepticism, he justified his examination of military painting by claiming it as an 
authentic form of history painting:  
                                                 
12 Jurgen Habermas has examined Arendt’s notion of power as a “collective act of speech.”  See Jürgen  
Habermas, “Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power,” Social Research 44, no. 1 (1977): 6. 
13 François Robichon has written the most extensive account of war imagery from the late nineteenth 
century to date.  See François Robichon, La peinture militaire française de 1871 à 1914 (Boulogne-
Billancourt: Association des amis d'Edouard Detaille, B. Giovanangeli, 1998).  
14 Arsène Alexandre, Histoire de la peinture militaire en France (Paris: Henri Laurens, 1889), 1. “Nous 
déclarons tout net que la peinture militaire, en France, passe aux yeux de nombreux critiques pour n’être 




powder.  Even if it only had this documentary value, it would still be worth the 
effort to track its development and study its principle manifestations.15
 
 
Alexandre sought to rescue la peinture militaire from critical oblivion and insert it into an 
empirical history of art which consisted of tracking stylistic evolution and exemplary 
practitioners.  His overall goal was to situate war imagery within the hierarchy of genres, 
in this case right at the top, the position traditionally reserved for history painting.  This 
strategy helps to explain his omission from the book of Jean-Charles Langlois, a battle 
panorama painter who also exhibited battle paintings at the Salon; Alexandre explained 
that “we do not consider the panoramas to be art at all…we simply ask which museum 
has conserved the ones that are no longer in use.”16
A decade later, in his influential Du Romantisme au réalisme, Léon Rosenthal 
positioned nineteenth-century battle painting at the bottom of the cultural hierarchy.  
Using Horace Vernet’s monumental Capture of the Smahla (1845) as an example, he 
claimed that such paintings were mere illustrations, “deplorable to eyes sensitive to 
purely aesthetic joys.”
  He inscribed his objects of study, 
primarily battle paintings, at the top of an aesthetic hierarchy that depended upon an 
opposition between “high” and “low” categories of visual production, premised upon a 
separation between forms of Art (epitomized by battle painting) and the debased objects 
associated with consumer culture (Langlois’ panoramas).   
17
                                                 
15 Alexandre, La peinture militaire, 3. “La vraie ‘peinture d’histoire’ ce n’est pas tant, en dépit de la 
définition, celle qui retrace des épisodes remâchés des annales grecques ou romaines, que la peinture de la 
vie contemporaine, et, comme chapitre particulier, la peinture de batailles, celle sent encore la poudre. 
N’eût-elle que cette valeur documentaire, cela vaudrait encore la peine de retracer ses étapes et d’étudier 
ses principales manifestations.” 
  In so doing, Rosenthal followed the precedent set by Baudelaire 
16 Alexandre, La peinture militaire, 276-277.  “Nous ne considérons guère les panoramas comme des œuvre 
d’art…Nous demandons simplement quelle musée a recueilli ceux qui ne servent plus.” 
17 Léon Rosenthal, Du romantisme au réalisme, Essai sur l'évolution de la peinture en France de 1830 à 




in the 1840s, who had called Vernet “the complete antithesis of an artist” and a “frequent 
and agile masturbation, an irritation on the French epidermis.”18
Efforts such as theirs to distinguish “art” from “non-art” and to erect boundaries 
between spheres of culture falter under the methodological imperative of studying the 
broad contours of a category of visual production that demonstrates the permeability of 
such boundaries and their perpetual shifting and susceptibility to “border crossings.”
 While Rosenthal and 
Baudelaire’s criticism went against Alexandre’s project of securing a position of 
eminence for la peinture militaire within a traditional hierarchy of genres, these 
seemingly contrasting sets of claims are in fact symptoms of the same art historical 
problem, namely, the separation between domains of culture that has shaped the history 
of art.   
19
                                                 
18 Charles Baudelaire, Critique d'art, ed. Claude Pichois (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1992), 130.  
  
Through an interrogation of the relationships between visual representations of war, 
emergent forms of visual production and reproduction across a range of media and 
structures of political power during the first half of the nineteenth century in France, the 
19 The recent work of Jacques Rancière repudiates modernism’s separation of art from the heterogeneity of 
things exterior to it: “The idea of modernity is a questionable notion that tries to make clear-cut distinctions 
in the complex configuration of the aesthetic regime of the arts.  It tries to retain the forms of rupture, the 
iconoclastic gestures, etc., by separating them from the context that allows for their existence: history, 
interpretation, patrimony, the museum, the pervasiveness of reproduction…The idea of modernity would 
like there to be only one meaning and direction in history, whereas the temporality specific to the aesthetic 
regime of the arts is a co-presence of heterogeneous temporalities.” Jacques Rancière, The Politics of 
Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (New York: Continuum, 2004), 25- 26. 
Rancière historically locates the beginning of the “aesthetic regime” of the arts, a term he advocates in 
place of “modernity,” at the beginning of the nineteenth-century with the political failure of the French 
Revolution and the rise of Romantic aesthetics.  See Jacques Rancière, “Contemporary Art and the Politics 
of Aesthetics,” in Communities of Sense, Rethinking Aesthetics and Politics, ed. William Kaizen Beth 
Hinderliter, Vered Maimon, Jaleh Mansoor and Seth McCormick (Durham and London: Duke University 




present study seeks to delineate the rich modes of negotiation and interchange that 
characterized the “social practice” of visual culture during the nineteenth century.20
 
   
Chapter Summary 
My discussion of war imagery from the First Empire (1804-1815), which is the 
subject of my second chapter, is focused on a large, under-studied body of battle 
paintings, drawings and engravings made by several artists, including the military officer 
and painter Louis-François Lejeune, and his contemporary, Carle Vernet.  By bringing a 
rich body of visual and textual primary source material to light, I show how artists such 
as Lejeune and Vernet employed a pictorial rhetoric closely related to the one used in 
printed maps, atlases, and illustrated campaign memoirs from the period such as the 
Voyage dans la basse et haute Égypte (1802), written by Napoleon Bonaparte’s trusted 
advisor and future minister of the arts, Dominique-Vivant Denon.  This rhetoric was 
instrumental in productively engaging support for waging two decades of seemingly 
endless war, and in doing so, it set new standards for spectatorial engagement with 
representations of armed combat that would endure throughout the century.  
I position the broad public appeal of war imagery in relation to its increasing 
attachment to modern modes of image making such as lithography, various automatic 
drawing devices, photography and mechanized printing techniques which allowed 
representations of war to be reproduced with unprecedented speed and economy.  I 
contend that this emergent visual culture of war expanded the public’s opportunities to 
                                                 
20 I borrow this term from Althusser who borrowed it from Marx.  Social practice can be defined as “the 
complex unity of practices existing in a determinate society.” See Louis Althusser, “On the Materialist 




participate in France’s national military achievements as engaged viewers of its images. 
During the Bourbon Restoration (1815-1830), the governing regime that replaced the 
First Empire, war imagery abounded, thanks in large part to the nascent medium of 
lithography and the growing popularity of the aquatint process.  Despite strong official 
political reaction against the representation of such subjects, images of Napoleonic 
military events continued to appear at Salon exhibitions, in illustrated books and were 
sold (often illicitly) as individual prints – an issue explored in the third chapter of this 
dissertation.  For example, Horace Vernet, one of the most prolific artists of the 
nineteenth century, was allowed to show his large painting Napoleon Crossing the Arcole 
Bridge at the Salon of 1827.  Reversing the traditional relationship between media, 
Vernet’s painting re-worked a lithograph of the same subject that he had produced one 
year earlier for an opulent illustrated book on the life of Napoleon.  The painting was 
itself reproduced as an engraving that the artist “licensed,” and it circulated through 
several illicit counterfeit lithographs and engravings.  I show how this flood of 
Napoleonic imagery not only mediated the process of reconciling a nation at peace with 
France’s recent military past, but also served the political needs of a powerful group of 
opposition elites, including the future King Louis-Philippe and his coterie of advisors, 
whose brand of conservative liberalism would become official doctrine during the July 
Monarchy (1830-1848), the regime that succeeded the Bourbon Restoration.    
My project situates “power” as a diffuse phenomenon rooted in broad public 
support of government institutions for which war imagery could serve as a compelling 
and accessible visual expression.  In my fourth chapter, I examine the failure of King 




regime’s refusal to go to war with its European neighbors.  This provides the basis for a 
much needed rethinking of the relationship between art and politics during the period.  
Though war imagery has often been seen as reflective of political intentionality, I point to 
a lively critical discourse that understood the production of government-sponsored 
representations of war, including the battle paintings of Horace Vernet, as a material 
indicator of France’s waning military influence in Europe after Waterloo.  There was 
however, another form of large-scale war imagery that escaped critical disdain, the 
painted battle panoramas of Jean-Charles Langlois, understood to be outside of the sphere 
of the fine arts.  I show how these privately produced, for profit, monumental circular 
canvases garnered nearly universal praise as surrogates for the experience of modern 
warfare and challenged the illusionistic limits of battle painting.   
One of the aims of this dissertation is to investigate the epistemological structures 
that shaped the development of legitimizing categories of knowledge such as the 
“eyewitness” and “reportage” in relationship to visual representations of contemporary 
war during the nineteenth century. The final chapter of my dissertation situates these two 
concepts in relation to the dramatic shift of the patterns of dissemination and reception 
for war-related visual images occasioned by the Crimean War (1854-1856), the first 
major conflict to break out within Europe since the Napoleonic Wars at the beginning of 
the century.  The Crimean War was the first to be widely photographed and receive 
coverage in the nascent mass press.  By examining the coverage of the Crimean War by 
the major French illustrated daily newspaper L’Illustration, I characterize the modern 
discourse of “reportage” as a mode of commodity consumption as well as a 




the producers of the news.  While government-sponsored battle paintings exhibited at the 
Salon earned the scorn of critics, the abundance of war imagery in emergent media such 
as illustrated newspapers and photographs confirmed the strength of the nation’s 












War Imagery and the Visuality of Participation  
during the Consulate and First Empire 
 
 
Of Bloody Heads and Broken Maps 
The French Revolution’s eradication of the symbolic forms of the ancien régime 
in favor of a proliferation of new ones demonstrated the contingent relationship between 
visual representation and political culture.  This showed “that members of society could 
invent culture and politics for themselves.”1  Revolutionaries attempted to conjure a 
coherent system of symbolic meaning out of a host of new visual representations of the 
French nation including Hercules, Liberty, Marianne and Revolutionary martyrs.  Some 
of the most powerful signifiers of the Revolution took the form of fragments, which 
heralded the dissolution of the political authority of the symbols of the past.  As Linda 
Nochlin has observed, the French Revolution “constituted the fragment as a positive 
rather than a negative trope.  The fragment, for the Revolution and its artists, rather than 
symbolizing nostalgia for the past, enacts the deliberate destruction of the past.”2
                                                 
1 Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1984), 88.  
   The 
regicide of Louis XVI produced the most emblematic fragment of the Revolution by 
literally disembodying the traditional locus of political authority, France’s king.  A 1793 
2 Linda Nochlin, The Body in Pieces. The Fragment as a Metaphor of Modernity (London: Thames & 




print by the engraver Villeneuve, Food for Thought for Crowned Charlatans (Fig. 2.1), 
one of the emblematic prints of the Revolution, pictured the grisly aftermath of the 
guillotine’s scientifically egalitarian decapitation of Louis XVI.3
This literal fragmentation of France’s traditional source of political authority was 
accompanied by a shattering of other dominant institutions, such as the aristocracy and 
the clergy.  In the face of this breakdown of former systems of meaning and value, 
French military power emerged as a possible substitute set of beliefs capable of uniting a 
fractured and politically radicalized citizenry.
  His detached head, 
dripping with blood, represented a Revolutionary symbolic order defined by its lack of 
wholeness.   
4  War between Revolutionary France and 
the rest of monarchical Europe was not only instrumental for defending the French 
Revolution both inside and outside France’s borders, but was just as importantly a means 
of producing political consensus for the newly constituted French nation. According to 
historian François Furet, Revolutionary war acted as a “powerful instrument of political 
acceleration” to consolidate and advance the aims of the French Revolution.5
A print from 1797 (Fig. 2.2), produced during a period of weak government and 
continuous warfare under the Directory, which governed in the wake of the Terror, 
represented a form of fragmentation of an altogether different order from the print 
discussed earlier.  Here, a cut up map of Europe speaks to an alternate future for post-
Revolutionary France, distinct from the one portended by Louis XVI’s severed head.  
   
                                                 
3 For more on Villeneuve, about who little is known, see Annie Duprat, “Autour de Villeneuve, le 
mystérieux auteur de la gravure 'La contre-révolution',” Annales historiques de la Révolution française, no. 
3 (1997): 423-39. 
4 Jeremy Black, From Louis XIV to Napoleon: The Fate of a Great Power (London: University College 
London Press, 1999), 162-171.  





The print proposes that in the place of a literally and figuratively disembodied monarchy, 
France’s new social order could instead be fashioned through a militarized 
reconfiguration of its borders.  Four generals, Pichegru, Moreau, Hoche and Bonaparte 
unroll a life-size map, based on two maps by the mapmaker Jean-Baptiste Poirson that 
were available for purchase at the same shop that sold the print.  The print depicts 
Bonaparte and his generals literally refashioning the map of the French Empire, cutting 
apart and putting back together territory as though it were only a matter of tearing paper.  
Bonaparte dominates the composition, both in terms of his animated demeanor and the 
portion of the map he holds, by far the largest.  His section depicts the territory conquered 
during his Italian campaign, which secured his rise to prominence as a general during the 
Directory and later, as First Consul and in then 1804, Emperor of France.  An eagle, the 
symbol of France’s army, looms over the map of the German Empire, with a sword in his 
claw, hinting at France’s unrealized military ambitions for that part of Europe.   
During a period of nearly continuous warfare between 1792 and 1815, France 
extended its territory over the majority of Western Europe and justified its military 
intervention through the enlightenment ideals of the French Revolution.  Unlike Louis 
XVI’s head, the cut-up map of Europe was a post-revolutionary fragment capable of 
being put back together again.  Its shattered form could, as this chapter will argue, serve 
as the point of departure for rearticulating a new symbolic language based upon national 
military exploits to which an entire nation could lay claim.  France’s military 
engagements were accompanied by a steady stream of battle paintings, prints, books, 




seen in the aforementioned print, into a thrilling national event that could be experienced 
through a proliferation of visual objects.   
Though the scholarship on the visual representation of the Directory and First 
Empire’s military endeavors has often been understood through the large-scale history 
paintings of Jacques-Louis David and his students, I will attend to a related and no-less 
important body of visual imagery that opened up novel possibilities of spectatorial 
engagement with France’s territorial expansion.  Artists such as Carle Vernet and Louis-
François Lejeune specialized in a new mode of representing contemporary battles that 
was characterized by the depiction of episodic and topographical details, elements 
traditionally eschewed by history painters.  Their work, along with other forms of visual 
production across a range of media, encouraged political participation in national military 
exploits and was instrumental in productively engaging support for the waging of two 
decades of seemingly endless war.  This chapter explores the sets of belief structures and 
modes of spectatorship that came to be associated with a particular set of representations 
of contemporary war, premised on an empirical and truthful form of vision, which 
supported an illusion of participation on the part of a broad public in France’s military 
exploits. 
 
Revolutionary Confusion: the Representation of Contemporary War  
Warfare first gripped France in 1792 and continued nearly without pause until 
1815, with the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte at the battle of Waterloo.  These wars 
differed from their eighteenth-century predecessors in their reliance on popular 




nation; in exchange for citizenship rights, men agreed to give their life for their country 
by fighting in its wars.6
Henceforth, until the enemies have been driven from the territory of the Republic, 
the French people are in permanent requisition for army service.  The young men 
shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the 
women shall make tents and clothes and shall serve in the hospitals; children shall 
turn old linen into lint; the old shall repair to the public places to stimulate the 
courage of the warriors and preach the unity of the Republic and the hatred of 
kings.
  Between 1791 and 1794, the French army of the ancien régime, 
dominated by aristocratic officers and mercenary soldiers, was transformed into the first 
army of citizens recruited through a series of volunteer drafts.  French identity became 
conflated with armed conflict in a way that had not previously been possible when armies 
were composed of mercenary soldiers who fought for kings and for the aristocratic 
officers who recruited, paid and commanded them.  In August 1793, sans-culottes in the 
National Convention proposed a mass conscription, the levée en masse to which all 




The levée en masse was subsequently adopted by the Convention and recruited 
approximately 300,000 soldiers.  As the language of the decree made clear, 
Revolutionary war now implicated every man, woman and child in France.  Through 
language that denoted the physical devotion of every French citizen to the armed cause, 
their ideological devotion was implicated as well.   
Despite the fact that the French Revolutionary army was more democratic and 
meritocratic than the army of the ancien régime, the devotion of the new recruits to la 
                                                 
6 Siegfried, “Naked History: The Rhetoric of Military Painting in Postrevolutionary France,” 235. 
7 Keith Michael Baker, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, ed. John W. Boyer Keith Michael 
Baker, Julius Kirshner, University of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization (Chicago: University of 




patrie and their zeal for fighting has probably been overstated.  As the military historian 
S.P. MacKenzie has argued, “the image of the zealous citizen-soldier driving all before 
him, with love of liberty in his heart and the fire of revolution in his eye, as typical of 
French troops, was largely a Jacobin myth.”8  Military historians have noted that even 
after the early years of the Revolution and through the end of the First Empire, France’s 
armies were ill-equipped, undernourished, and poorly trained.9  The citizen-soldier 
ideology that attended Bonaparte’s armies did not mitigate the need to use harsh tactics to 
recruit soldiers.  Desertion was endemic.10  A shortage of muskets meant that soldiers had 
to fight their enemies up close with bayonets and pikes.11
Carl von Clausewitz, author of one of the most influential nineteenth-century 
military treatises, On War, understood firsthand the impact of the French Revolution on 
European warfare, for he had fought for Prussia and Russia against France in the 
Napoleonic Wars.  He contrasted so-called “cabinet wars,” conflicts waged by 
aristocratic officers and small mercenary armies from the seventeenth century through the 
eighteenth century, with the new character of post-revolutionary warfare:  
  The representation of the 
armed defense of la patrie was as important for motivating French Revolutionary soldiers 
to fight with antiquated weapons as it was for generating popular support of French 
citizens who did not enlist in the army. 
In 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination.  Suddenly war again 
became the business of the people – a people of thirty millions, all of whom 
considered themselves to be citizens…The people became a participant in war; 
instead of government and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation was 
                                                 
8 MacKenzie, “The armies of the French Republic and the War of the First Coalition, 1792-7,” 49.  
9 Paddy Griffith, The Art of War of Revolutionary France, 1789-1802 (London: Greenhill Books, 1998), 
39-62.  
10 For a rich account of the problem of desertion during the period, see Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters: 
The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire . 




thrown into the balance.  The resources and efforts now available for use 
surpassed all conventional limits; nothing now impeded the vigor with which war 




Clausewitz argued that this new brand of warfare extended participation in military 
events to a new contingent of non-combatants who would nevertheless play a role off the 
battlefield in the waging of war.  He recognized that the new nature of post-revolutionary 
war now implicated an entire nation’s resources, both in terms of material and ideological 
participation.    
This dramatic shift toward wars fought in the name of a nation instead of an 
aristocratic elite demanded a reconfiguration of the visual representation of warfare, 
which had not been officially encouraged in France since 1746, when the battle painter 
Joseph Parrocel was commissioned to represent the Conquêtes du Roi en Flandres under 
Louis XV.13
                                                 
12 Clausewitz, On War , 591-592.  
   In France, history painters represented contemporary warfare 
metaphorically, such as Charles Le Brun’s Alexander cycle, which honored the military 
achievements of Louis XIV through allegorical allusion to the feats of Alexander the 
Great.  Le Brun could not have directly depicted Louis XIV’s battles – to do so would 
have amounted to a transgression of the rules of academic artistic production which 
dominated French cultural life in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Within 
French academic theory, battle painting was considered a lower genre closer to 
portraiture and landscape painting; its necessary reliance on contemporary history placed 
13 William Olander, “Pour transmettre à la postérité : French painting and revolution, 1774-1795,” (PhD 




it outside of the elevated and erudite domain reserved for the representation of ancient 
and mythological history by history painters.  
French battle painting, when it was encouraged during the ancien régime, not 
surprisingly emphasized the achievements of the king over the episodic details which 
comprised the military event being represented.  King Louis XIV’s conquests were 
represented by Adam Van der Meulen, a Flemish artist who had found favor with the 
French court.  His paintings and tapestry cartoons were widely emulated during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in France, setting the standard for what would 
become the French tradition of topographical battle painting during the ancien régime.  
Van der Meulen relied on an iconographic formula of elevating the King in the 
foreground and placing a battle landscape in the background.  In Van der Meulen’s The 
French Army at Lobith (Fig. 2.3), King Louis XIV directs the course of battle that occurs 
in the middle and foreground.  He is set apart from the battle itself and is the 
compositional focus on the painting.  His white horse, pointing gesture and the light that 
concentrates around his horse signal Louis XIV’s status.  In terms of space, Van der 
Meulen prioritizes the foreground, while the middle and backgrounds, where the actual 
cavalry battle is taking place between the Dutch and French soldiers, appears compressed 
and schematic.  Such a compositional arrangement reflects the ideological imperative of 
representing battles during the age of “cabinet wars” – to depict the monarch’s eminence 
for a small, elite audience of aristocratic courtiers and military officers who were 
responsible for carrying out the king’s orders.  Accordingly, Van der Meulen’s painting 




topographical details of the battle – elements that could only serve to distract from the 
monarch’s importance.    
In contrast, the French Revolution required that artists discover a different visual 
language to represent warfare as the purview of an entire nation and by extension, the 
French citizenry as an idealized whole.  Despite the fact that the conventions of ancien 
régime battle imagery, epitomized by Van der Meulen’s Lobith, no longer corresponded 
to the conditions of Revolutionary war, artists still retained the figure of the commander 
in many of the earliest representations of battle from the period.  In a drawing by Jean-
Antoine Constantin, the Siege of Toulon (Fig. 2.4), the mounted officer is pictured on a 
hilltop, a placement consistent with the conventions of traditional French battle painting.  
Constantin was not present at the siege, where a young artillery major named Napoleon 
Bonaparte secured a Republican victory over Royalist and English forces by moving the 
canons to a strategically advantageous location above the Toulon harbor in December, 
1793.  In the absence of new conventions for representing Revolutionary war, Constantin 
mimicked Van der Meulen’s habit of placing the commander on a hill, overlooking the 
battleground below.  The drawing demonstrates the difficulty of completely disposing 
with the ancien régime tradition of battle painting despite a shift in the politics of 
Revolutionary warfare in France.    
The first decisive victory for the French Revolutionary army occurred in 1792 at 
the battle of Jemmapes.  The battle took place outside of Mons, Belgium against the 
Austrian army and occasioned a flurry of prints and newspaper articles.  One of the prints 
that issued immediately after, the Battle of Gemmape (Fig. 2.5), struggles to locate the 




of focusing on one point of authority, as in the tradition of Van der Meulen, the artist 
included several points of dramatic focus.  The commanding authority of the king has 
been replaced with two different commanding officers who look nearly identical to each 
other: one is pictured on a horse gesturing in a way similar to Louis XIV in Van der 
Meulen’s Lobith.  The other officer stands in the middleground, next to his mounted 
counterpart and points into the background.  The engraver’s recourse to multiple points of 
commanding authority betrays the unease that accompanied questions of political 
representation during the Terror, when the print was made. 
The radical newspaper Révolutions de Paris published its own engraving of the 
battle of Jemmapes (Fig. 2.6) to accompany its printing of General Dumoriez’s official 
dispatch to the minister of war.  As befitting the political coloring of the newspaper, the 
print almost entirely effaced any element of commanding authority in favor of masses of 
soldiers moving together.  According to the newspaper, the letter and the accompanying 
engraving required no editorializing: “The account alone of this memorable affair, the 
first pitched battle carried out by the soldiers of the republic, sufficiently honors all of the 
individuals who comprise the army.”14
In contrast to the orderliness of Dumoriez’s prose, the engraving represents the 
battle as a flurry of activity devoid of identifiable actors or particular episodic details.  
The caption to the engraving reads: “November 17, 1792, General Dumourier [sic] enters 
  Dumoriez’s letter narrated the events of the battle 
as a series of linear developments which culminated in entering the city gates of Mons 
and receiving the keys of the city.   
                                                 
14 Prudhomme, “Nouvelles des armées,” Révolutions de Paris 1792.  “Le récit seul de cette mémorable 
affaire, première bataille rangée qu’aient livrée les soldats de la république, fait assez l’éloge de tous les 




Mons after a battle without precedent in history.  The French have shown that they are 
worthy of fighting for liberty.”  The detritus from direct combat litters the foreground; 
columns of French soldiers in formation advance horizontally across the middleground, 
moving in an idealized harmony with one another.  General Dumoriez is not easily 
identifiable: he could be either one of the three men mounted on white horses.  Instead of 
focusing on the eminence of the commanding general, the engraving attends to the 
forward movement of a mass of men befitting the new conditions of warfare.  But in 
trading the hierarchical clarity of traditional French battle imagery for a focus on the 
army as a cohesive social unit, the Révolutions de Paris engraving represented the battle 
as an obscure mass of partial figures and made it difficult to view and understand the 
event.  As the radical phase of the French Revolution came to an end, artists began to 
experiment with new ways of depicting contemporary wars, forsaking the muddled, but 
egalitarian compositional style of the Révolutions de Paris engraving as well as the 
conventions of ancien régime battle painting. 
 
The Tableaux Historiques – From Revolution to Empire  
One of the first substantial attempts to depict contemporary war episodically 
during the Revolutionary period, with attention to a clear delineation of place and action, 
occurred in the pages of the Tableaux historiques de la révolution française.  The 
Tableaux appeared in several different official and counterfeit editions from 1791 




occurred.15  Engravings in each livraison, available through subscription, were 
accompanied by expert commentary intended to depict the contemporary events of the 
Revolution as a form of living history which belonged not to an elite set of actors, but to 
an entire nation.  The publishers of the Tableaux therefore took advantage of the 
Revolution’s rhetoric of social inclusivity to market the publication to a newly available 
demographic, “the people,” who were themselves actors in the very political and 
historical episodes depicted in its pages.  The first prospectus, which appeared in 1791, 
claimed that the commentary was furnished by “a man, a patriot, eyewitness, himself an 
actor in the main scenes…he has made use of the language of truth…For the narration, 
exactitude is the most important merit.”16
Twenty-six out of 148 engravings in the Tableaux depict military defeats, 
victories and sieges, including the battle of Jemappes and the Siege of Toulon.
  Though the texts which accompanied the 
engravings were written by several different authors over the course of publication, the 
claim made by the editors toward exactitude, truth and eyewitness fidelity constituted one 
of the work’s main selling points.   
17  The 
Battle of Jemappes (Fig. 2.7) is representative of the style employed by the team of no 
less than seventeen intaglio printmakers who collaborated on the publication using 
engraving and etching techniques.18
                                                 
15 Claudette Hould, “Revolutionary Engraving,” in Images of the French Revolution (Québec: Musée du 
Québec, 1989), 86-89.  
  It was made in 1795 and published in 1797 as the 
seventy-fifth image in the series, engraved by Pierre-Gabriel Berthault and based on a 
16 Philippe Bordes, La Révolution par la gravure : les tableaux historiques de la Révolution française, une 
entreprise éditoriale d'information et sa diffusion en Europe (1791-1817) (Vizille: Musée de la Révolution 
franc ̧aise, 2002), 15. “Un homme, un patriote, témoin oculaire, acteur lui-même dans les scènes 
principales…il n’a pas épargné le langage de la vérité…Pour la narration, l’exactitude est le mérite 
principale.” 
17 Ibid., 36.  




drawing by Jacques François-Joseph Swebach-Desfontaines.19
This mode of representing battles with attention to episodic and topographical 
particularities extended to other non-military subjects depicted in the Tableaux.  As a 
commercial publication which sought to turn a profit, the goal was to enthrall its audience 
with a textual and visual narrative of contemporary history that it would be willing to pay 
for.  The combination of expert commentary and engravings in the Tableaux proved to be 
a successful formula, if the longevity of the publication and the several counterfeit 
editions are any indication.  It is likely that the commercial success of the Tableaux was 
due in large part to the publication’s status as an object of historical knowledge which 
  In contrast to the cramped 
composition of the other versions of Revolutionary battle imagery discussed earlier, this 
version of Jemappes is comparatively empty. The events of the battle are distributed over 
the open space of the landscape.  Columns of tiny soldiers march in formation while the 
mounted commanders gallop in front of them, having just emerged from the right corner 
of the image.  A small man in the immediate foreground stands with his back to the 
viewer.  He directs his attention toward the action in the middleground, which in turn 
directs the viewer’s gaze back as well.  A lone log in the foreground also points to the 
dramatic action unfolding behind it.  The walled city of Mons occupies the background, 
its walls and church tower clearly articulated.  The specificity of the battle’s locale is 
emphasized along with a series of strategic occurrences, making the battle knowable and 
accessible through a proliferation of visual details.   
                                                 
19 The Battle of Jemappes was engraved by Berthault and finished by an etcher, Malapeau.  This 
collaborative effort was in keeping with the commercial structures of production for commercial engraving 
during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.  This is an issue discussed by Stephen Bann with regard 
to a later version of the Tableaux historiques de la révolution française, the Tableaux historiques des 
campagnes d’Italie.  See Bann, Parallel Lines, Printmakers, Painters, and Photographers in Nineteenth-




packaged the political and social chaos of the Revolution into a series of readable, visible 
and therefore knowable events.   
The success of the Tableaux historiques de la révolution française was parlayed 
into a related publication entitled the Tableaux historiques des campagnes d’Italie. It was 
published by Auber, the same publisher of the 1798, 1802, 1804 and 1817 editions of the 
original “Revolutionary” version.  This edition was probably conceived as a continuation 
of the first version and was announced in the immediate aftermath of Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s victorious Italian campaign of 1797.  In the span of a few years, the 
Tableaux historiques had transformed from a Revolutionary compendium of current 
historical events to a military one, implying a temporal and historical continuity between 
the French Revolution and the period of warfare subsequent to it.  The new volume 
reinforced the idea that France’s military conquests across Europe were rooted in the 
values of its Revolution.  This change was also appropriate to a nation whose 
Revolutionary government had been replaced by a militarized one under the authority of 
General Napoleon Bonaparte as First Consul in 1799.  The Tableaux marketed an illusion 
of participation in an epoch whose historical episodes were still being written – to read 
and view the publication, as the editors claimed, was to behold the continual forward 
march of historical events as they unfolded.  
 As with its predecessor, the Tableaux historiques des campagnes d’Italie 
promoted its commitment to exactitude and historical accuracy.  But unlike its 
antecedent, the military version touted its unique and esteemed artist, Carle Vernet, who 
provided the drawings that served as the basis for the engravings sold in the publication.  




the Ports de France.  He was inducted into the Academy in 1789 and became known as 
an excellent horse painter as well as chronicler of modern life with his print series Les 
Incroyables and Les Merveilleuses.  In 1806, just in time for the publication of the 
Tableaux historiques, he was given an official title by Bonaparte as the Premier peintre 
du dépôt de la guerre.  The Tableaux’s use of an acclaimed artist caused some confusion 
over whether the work should be considered as “art” or as “history,” an uncertainty which 
betrayed the problematic status of representations of contemporary military events as 
both objects of historical knowledge and works of art.   
The Journal général de la littérature de France classified the Tableaux under the 
category of “fine arts” in its fifth issue of 1806; in the next issue, the classification of the 
publication changed to “history.”  Within the “fine arts” category, the Tableaux were 
celebrated as a “perfectly executed work, and can perhaps be seen as the last word in 
typography.  M. Carle Vernet understood how to vary the subjects he had to depict with 
great talent.”20 But in the next edition of the Journal, the Tableaux were placed under the 
classification of history, noting “We place it instead in the 3rd class, under the title of 
History, because however magnificent the engravings are, they are nevertheless mere 
accessories to the text.”21
                                                 
20 “Quatrième classe. Beaux-arts,” Journal général de la littérature de France 1806, 153. “d’une exécution 
parfaite, et peut-être regardé comme le dernier terme de la typographie.  M. Carle Vernet a su varier, avec 
beaucoup de talent, les situations qu’il avait à peindre.” 
  Within the classificatory system of the Journal, the Tableaux 
belonged more to history than to the fine arts, despite the participation of Carle Vernet as 
the primary draftsman.     
21 “Troisième classe. Histoire,” Journal général de la littérature de France 1806, 171.  “Nous le reportons 
dans la troisième class, au titre de l’Histoire, parce que quelque magnifiques qu’en soient les gravures, elles 




Under the rubric of “history,” the Tableaux historiques des campagnes d’Italie 
were explicitly publicized as an authoritative and truthful source for contemporary 
military history, dedicated to the général en chef of the French Army, Napoleon 
Bonaparte: “The majority of the sites were represented on location, and drawn with the 
utmost exactitude by Carle Vernet, first painter of the Dépôt de la guerre.  Duplessi-
Bertaux, the Callot of our time, made the etchings and the plates were finished by the best 
artists in Paris.  The text contains the letters of the général en chef and his official 
rapports.”22
 
  The claim of exactitude depended on the fact that the prints were based on 
drawings made on the very site where the battles had taken place, promising viewers 
access to specific details about the topography of the land conquered by the French army 
that would have been considered as a form of privileged, or insider, information usually 
reserved for military personnel.  It was therefore the merit of exactitude, over and above 
any other aesthetic criteria, that the publication marketed as its chief value.   
The Ingénieurs-géographes and the Production of Cartographic and Topographic 
Knowledge 
The stated commitment of the Tableaux historiques to topographical specificity 
and narrative exactitude, more than clever selling points, allowed the publication to serve 
as a source of valuable information about France’s contemporary wars.  While the 
Tableaux constituted one of the earliest examples of post-revolutionary representations 
which claimed to depict war with topographic and episodic “exactitude,” a proliferation 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 172. “Les sites ont été la plupart pris sur les lieux mêmes, et dessinés avec la plus grande exactitude 
par Carle Vernet, premier peintre du dépôt de la guerre.  Duplessi-Bertaux, le Callot de nos jours, a fait les 
eaux-fortes, et les planches ont été terminés par les meilleurs artistes de Paris.  Le texte contient les lettres 




of imagery produced during the Consulate and the Empire advanced similar claims.  This 
body of imagery functioned epistemologically, as depictions of locale and action, free of 
the aesthetic markers of art associated with the French academic tradition of artistic 
production which shunned contemporaniety, the episodic and excessive topographic 
detail.  Commercial publications such as the Tableaux, which sought to depict historical 
events with a high degree of “exactitude,” shared much common with the body of visual 
imagery produced by the French army’s ingénieurs-géographes, who were responsible 
for producing visual documents for conducting military campaigns, including landscape 
vues of battlefields and maps of strategically important parcels of land.23  The ingénieurs-
géographes, attached to the topographical division of the French army known as the 
Dépôt de la guerre, followed the army on campaigns and provided visual documents to 
aid with reconnaissance.24
Though the government did not fund the production of battle paintings until 1801, 
its support of the ingénieurs-géographes began just after the outbreak of the 
Revolutionary wars in 1793.  In the absence of official government encouragement for 
painted representations of contemporary war, the maps and topographical landscape vues 
  Just as the claim toward fidelity of site and action constituted 
an attractive selling point for the Tableaux, the same set of claims informed the work of 
the ingénieurs-géographes albeit for a set of non-commercial purposes, the waging of 
war and the dissemination of its associated visual documents to a wide military and non-
military public eager to participate as spectators in the military feats of the French army.         
                                                 
23 I will henceforth use the French vue to characterize this particular form of battlefield landscape that was 
prevalent during the First Empire.  The English equivalent, “view” lacks the specificity connoted by the 
French term. 
24 The ingénieurs-géographes were created under Louis XIV 1696, but were not part of the military until 
1769.  In 1791, their ranks were dissolved but reinstated in 1793 without military rank, under the pressure 
of war and the need to produce maps.  In 1809, Bonaparte passed an official decree which once again made 




of battlefields produced by the ingénieurs-géographes provided an important source of 
reliable visual information about military campaigns and served as an important signifier 
of successful military conquest, as we have already seen in the fragmented map 
engraving discussed earlier.  The technical problems of map-making had been solved by 
the end of the eighteenth century and transformed the field from a science into a 
technology which could more easily be harnessed by the authority of the state.25  The 
availability of maps and other topographical information became crucially important for 
the success of the post-revolutionary French army, whose legendary mobility enabled 
them to outflank and outmaneuver opponents.26  Accurate, detailed maps were also 
required for moving tens of thousands of soldiers across foreign territories, for the 
construction of roads and for the effective use of detached divisions of skirmishers 
known as tirailleurs and field artillery, who placed their mobile guns at strategically 
chosen locations.27
An 1802 training manual intended for newly recruited ingénieurs-géographes 
enumerated the explicit connection between possessing cartographic knowledge and 
acquiring territory through military intervention: 
 
The security of a great State depends on how it makes use of its resources and 
powers, including perfect knowledge of the country where this State will exercise 
its force…Enlarged by victory with territories that nature has destined for her, she 
has worked to rejoin them, through geodesic operations, to the general map of her 
territory, like she attaches them to the Republic through the faith of treaties and 
                                                 
25 Anne Godlewska, “Napoleon's Geographers (1797-1815): Imperialists and Soldiers of Modernity,” in 
Geography and Empire (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell, 1994), 32. Godlewska’s important article argues that the 
ingénieurs-géographes were instrumental in the development of France as a modern, nationalized state.  
The connection between surveying and state power has also been made with respect to eighteenth-century 
French imperialism. See Jennifer Palmer, “Atlantic Crossings: Race, Gender, and the Construction of 
Families in Eighteenth-Century La Rochelle,” (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2008), 32-75. 
26 John Lynn, “Nations in Arms, 1763-1815,” in Cambridge History of Warfare, ed. Geoffrey Parker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 200-202 . 




the goodness of her administration.  Thus the Piedmont, the departments of the 
Maritime Alpes, of the Leman, of Mont-Blanc, of Mount-Tonnerre, of the Sarre, 
of the Rhine-Moselle, and of the Roer, will soon be a part of the map of France 
just as they are already part of her territory. 28
 
      
Cartographic representations of newly acquired territories, such as the ones listed above, 
visually represented political and military successes in the form of state-sponsored 
documents.  But as the French army conquered more territory under the Directory, 
Consulate and Empire, the ingénieurs-géographes had difficulty keeping pace.  Maps, 
costly and laborious to produce, could not be made fast enough to meet the demands of a 
quickly expanding French nation, a problem invoked by the training manual.  While the 
manual celebrated the expansion of French borders, the nation’s victorious army and the 
important role played by the ingénieurs-géographes in the endeavor of military conquest, 
it also acknowledged the lag-time between the acquisition of new territory and the 
production of cartographic documents, noting that these conquered territories would 
“soon” be added to the map of France.  Decisive battles may have expanded France’s 
borders in a matter of hours or days, but the visual representation of this change took 
considerably longer to appear in cartographic form.       
The French army needed maps to plan and carry out campaigns in a series of 
distant locales for which topographical information, such as the position of rivers and 
mountains, could determine the way a battle would be fought. Bonaparte’s corps of 
                                                 
28 Dépôt général de la guerre, Instruction sur le service des ingénieurs-géographes du dépôt général de la 
guerre (Paris: L'Imprimerie de la République, Thermidor an XI, 1802), 1-3.  “ La sûreté d’un grand État 
dépend trop de l’emploi plus ou moins utile qu’il sait faire à propos de sa force et de ses ressources, pour 
que la parfaite connaissance des pays où doit exercer cette force …Agrandie, par la victoire, de plusieurs 
départements que la nature semblait lui destiner, elle travaille à les réunir, par des opération géodésiques, à 
la carte générale de son territoire, comme elle les attache à la République par la foi des traités et les 
bienfaits de son administration. Ainsi le Piémont, les départements des Alpes-Maritimes, du Léman, du 
Mont-Blanc, du Mont-Tonnerre, de la Sarre, de Rhin-et-Moselle, et de la Roer, vont bientôt faire partie de 




ingénieurs-géographes worked tirelessly to respond to this need; expediency became the 
order of the day.  As Bonaparte stated, “taking twenty years to finish a map is to be 
working too much for the sake of posterity.”29
I hear with pleasure that you have found a considerable number of landscape 
engravers.  I am not formally opposed that you are turning them into map 
engravers, thus delivering them to a new genre.  Before anything else, we need 
maps, landscapes only being an accessory…I repeat to you, my dear Muriel, get 
as many engravers as you can, good and mediocre…This is what the Dépôt de la 
guerre  will be known for, the utility that the government and the military can 
gain from it.  Engravings are a luxury, and they must be made quickly so that we 
can benefit from them as soon as possible.
  A particularly revealing letter sent from 
the Director of the Dépôt de la guerre, General Nicolas Sanson, to the assistant director, 
Colonel Muriel, demonstrates that the pressure to make maps quickly may not have 
stemmed from purely operational concerns:  
30
 
    
Maps could not be made quickly enough to feed the military’s appetite for cartographic 
information; hence Sanson’s acknowledgment that landscape engravers would suffice in 
the place of more specialized map engravers.  The Dépôt de la guerre required engravers, 
and as Sanson indicated, they were even willing to accept mediocre ones.  While the 
Dépôt produced landscape vues to memorialize battles, their main concern rested with 
maps.  The focus of Sanson’s letter on engraving as a problematic obstacle to 
dissemination of cartographic knowledge hints at the importance of the Dépôt de la 
                                                 
29 P. Guiral, “Napoléon et la géographie de son temps,” in Mélanges Géographiques offerts au Doyen 
Ernest Bénévent, ed. G. Berger (Gap, France: Éditions Ophrys, 1954), 378. ““Mettre vingt années à 
terminer les cartes et des plans, c’est trop travailler pour la postérité.” 
30  Nicolas Sanson, Directeur général du dépôt de la guerre à Colonel Muriel, directeur adjoint, 1807, 
Correspondance de M. le colonel Muriel, directeur adjoint du dépôt de la guerre, 3M 247. Vincennes, 
France: Service historique de l'armée de terre. “J’apprends avec plaisir que vous avez trouvé un nombre tres 
considerable de graveurs de paysages.  Je n’oppose formellement à ce que vous preniez des graveurs de 
cartes, pour les livrer à un autre genre.  Il nous faut d’abord les cartes, les paysages n’étant qu’accessoire.  
Je vous répète, mon cher Muriel, accapares tous les graveurs que vous pouvez, bons et médiocres…Voila 
ce qui donnera de la représentation au Dépôt de la guerre, par l’utilité qu’en retira le gouvernement ainsi 
que les militaires.  Sur tout point de luxe dans la gravure, et que l’on fasse vite, afin qu’on en puisse jouir le 




guerre’s engraved maps beyond their important function in the planning and execution of 
campaigns.  Even Bonaparte, the highest ranking official in France, sometimes relied on 
hand-drawn maps (cartes manuscrites) when he requested documents from Dépôt de la 
guerre, often the only kind of maps available.31
Early in his military career, Bonaparte recognized the value of the work of the 
ingénieurs-géographes as a form of publicity for the military exploits of his regime.  As 
early as 1796, he took advantage of this graphic section of the Dépôt to create 
propaganda aimed at bolstering his reputation.  During his campaign in Italy, he 
personally selected the landscape artist Pietro Bagetti, who was reluctantly conscripted to 
work as an ingénieur-géographe until the fall of the Empire in 1815.
  Only through engraving could these 
maps be disseminated to a larger public, who likely valued them as symbols of a strong 
military and government, or at the very least as empirical assurance of the French army’s 
successes.  Moreover, the production of engraved maps functioned as a sign of the 
stability of France’s state military institutions in the form of an archive of cartographic 
knowledge with an aura of permanence and stability.  Whereas hand-drawn maps could 
be lost or easily destroyed, engraved maps stood a better chance of enduring.   
32
                                                 
31 Robert Lefebvre, capitaine d'état-major, “Étude sur le cabinet topographique de l'empereur Napoléon 
Ier,” Le spectateur militaire 6, no. 33 (Novembre, 1853): 239-42.  Bacler d’Albe, in a letter to Général 
Sanson, demanded the original hand-drawn reconnaissance maps noting that the Emperor “conçoit 
parfaitement que la mesure de tout copier est fort bonne en temps de paix ; mas la rapidité des ses marches 
ne lui pas permet d’attendre.”   
  Bonaparte 
understood that the new brand of national warfare as the “business of the people” 
produced great curiosity on the part of the public not only to read about his military 
exploits but to view them as well.  The civilian interest in maps, geography, and 
topography was also encouraged by print media such as newspapers and engravings, all 
32 Le Colonel Berthaut, Les Ingénieurs-géographes militaires. 1624-1831, étude historique, vol. 2 (Paris: 




under the strict control of censors during the Empire.  As one contemporary observer 
related in 1806,  
Since our armies have crossed the banks of the Niemen and the Duna, many 
newspapers in the capital have been charged with teaching us about the geography 
and topography of these sites where our brave legions carry our victorious eagles.  
At the same time, all of the print sellers on the banks of the Seine are covered 
with maps representing the theater of war.33
 
 
The dual function of the visual material made by the ingénieurs-géographes, as 
both an instrument of military reconnaissance and a form of publicity for the deeds of the 
French army, structured the career of one the more well-known ingénieurs-géographes 
who specialized in the productions of vues and maps, Bacler d’Albe.  Before joining the 
army as an ingénieur-géographe, Louis Ghislain Bacler d’Albe lived in Chamonix, where 
he produced picturesque alpine landscapes.  In 1796, the French army arrived in the 
region en route to Italy, which they would invade and conquer parts of.  Bacler d’Albe 
joined and made use of his landscape skills as an ingénieur-géographe in the army.  He 
quickly rose in the ranks to be appointed head of the ingénieurs-géographes for Italy.  In 
1804, Bonaparte promoted d’Albe as head of the ingénieurs-géographes in France and 
director of his cabinet topographique, where he would remain until 1814.  As the person 
in charge of furnishing the Emperor with maps during campaigns, Bacler d’Albe 
understood better than anyone the instrumental value of cartographic knowledge for the 
conduct of war.34
                                                 
33 Guiral, “Napoléon et la géographie de son temps,” 382-383. “Depuis que nos armées parcourent les 
bords du Niémen et de la Duna, plusieurs journaux de la capitale se sont chargés de nous enseigner la 
géographie et la topographie des lieux où nos braves légions portent leurs aigles victorieuses.  En même 
temps tous les quais sont tapissés de cartes représentant le théâtre de la guerre.” 
 
34 Lefebvre, “Étude sur le cabinet topographique de l'empereur Napoléon Ier,” 232. This illuminating article 
reproduces letters sent from Bacler d’Albe to Colonel Muriel and General Sanson at the Dépôt de la guerre 




“The Touch of an Eyewitness” 
Napoleon charged Bacler d’Albe with producing a map of the theater of war in 
Italy for which no complete or accurate map existed.35  The map, which was made for the 
Dépôt de la guerre, was engraved and sold in 1802 for the princely sum of 150 francs at 
Bacler d’Albe’s own shop.  This intersection between private commerce and government 
documents was made possible by a subscription that Bacler d’Albe took up to finance the 
costly process of engraving.  Bonaparte reportedly provided the bulk of the funding, with 
84,000 francs. But after publishing the first four livraisons of the map, the artist ran into 
financial difficulties and found himself 44,000 francs in debt, for which he was being 
sued by his creditors.  To avoid prison, the Dépôt de la guerre agreed to purchase 160 
copies and allowed Bacler d’Albe to retain the copper plates.36  The elaborate 
frontispiece for the thirty-sheet map (Fig. 2.8), complete with a vignette of Bonaparte 
communing with two scantily clad female allegorical figures, proclaimed the map’s 
author “Chef des Ingénieurs-Géographes du Dépôt Général de la guerre, Rue des 
Moulins, no. 542.”  The address denoted Bacler d’Albe’s own shop, and not the Dépôt 
général de la guerre, although the association between the two was no doubt intentional. 
The map was widely publicized and earned Bacler d’Albe widespread recognition as the 
preeminent contemporary cartographer in France.  One newspaper wrote: “This superb 
map is one of the most handsome monuments erected for the glory of the French 
armies.”37
                                                 
35 Anne Godlewska, “The Troubled History of the Survey of Italy,” An Atlas of Napoleonic Cartography in 
Italy, http://www.geog.queensu.ca/napoleonatlas/main_page.htm (accessed March 8, 2010). 
   
36 Berthaut, Les Ingénieurs-géographes militaires. 1624-1831, étude historique ,  246-247.  
37 “Géographie,” Journal typographique et bibliographique, 4 juin 1801, 270.  “Cette superbe carte est un 




The paper noted that a series of prints were also available for purchase at Bacler 
d’Albe’s shop.  They represented two battles, Lodi and the Crossing of the River Po, both 
from the Italian campaign, and one portrait of Bonaparte.  The battles were priced more 
reasonably at 12 francs each, compared with 150 francs for the map.  The portrait cost 
just 6 francs.  The engravings were published around 1800 and were also widely 
publicized in newspapers from the period.  In contrast to the prints published in the 
Tableaux or sold in other print shops at the time, Bacler d’Albe’s engravings had the 
virtue of being made by the hand of an ingénieur-géographe, an officially sanctioned 
expert observer of military operations. The fact that Bacler d’Albe was an ingénieur-
géographe would have lent a high degree of authority to the engravings, permitting them 
to be understood as transparent and truthful representations of military events.  The use of 
his title on the engravings and on the map, all sold at his personal shop, constituted a 
commercial strategy of dissemination.   
An anonymous writer in Journal général de la littérature de France even claimed 
that Bacler d’Albe’s status as an eyewitness was something which could be seen in the 
Crossing of the Po:  
This print is engraved with a great deal of care, and with major effect.  The 
original painting has the rare merit of combining a precious exactitude of style 
and detail with a rich and knowledgeable composition.  Drawn on the actual site 
of the battlefield, by a man who is both an artist and a member of the military, 
you can see everywhere the touch of an eyewitness.38
 
 
                                                 
38 “Gravures,” Journal général de la littérature de France 1800 (Fructidor, An VIII), 287. “Cette estampe 
est gravée avec beaucoup de soin, et a un grand effet ; le tableau original joint le mérite assez rare d'une 
exactitude précieuse de style et de détail, à celui d'une composition riche et savante. Dessiné sur le champ 





The engraving was based on a watercolor (Fig. 2.9) that Bacler d’Albe made on the site 
of the crossing of the river, an event which he witnessed in1798 in his capacity as an 
ingénieur-géographe.  It represented the French army in the process of crossing the river 
at the Italian town of Plaisance in the hopes of cutting off the supply chain of the 
Austrian army, positioned down river.  In the background, the massive French army, 
depicted as tiny, colorful stick-like figures, waits to cross.  Some are shown in the process 
of crossing, and disembarking on the riverbank in the foreground.  The watercolor 
therefore depicts the crossing as an event with multiple episodic stages.  The site is 
rendered with a high degree of topographic specificity, befitting Bacler d’Albe’s métier.   
The phrase “Peint sur le lieu par Bacler d’Albe” appears in the bottom left corner 
of the reproductive engraving (Fig. 2.10), which beyond a stronger contrast between 
clouds and sky, is consistent with the original watercolor.  If the author of the above 
passage could indeed “see everywhere the touch of an eyewitness,” it was due to a 
powerful combination of factors including the claim that the subject was depicted on the 
site (sur le lieu) where the battle took place, as well as the inclusion of episodic details 
and topographic particularities that were understood as authentic to the action and locale 
of the battle.  The “touch of an eyewitness” was therefore less a descriptor of a 
knowledgeable observer who witnessed a visible event than it was a set of 
representational strategies that could be deployed to lend representations a higher degree 
of epistemological value, which licensed them to be viewed as sources of knowledge 
about particular military events.  Moreover, seeing Bacler d’Albe’s status as an 
eyewitness as a visible quality in the engraving points to the discursive resonance of the 




reception of an image such as this would have therefore been informed by the crucial 
information that Bacler d’Albe had represented the scene sur les lieux.  
The category of the eyewitness is a longstanding one in France. As historian 
Andrea Frisch has compellingly argued, the discursive authority of the eyewitness 
emerged slowly and unsystematically from “an intersection of an outmoded feudal ethics 
and an embryonic nation-state in the age of print.”39  Frisch concentrates on the epistemic 
development of the authority of the eyewitness within a juridical context: as the system of 
justice changed in early modern France to become more “depersonalized,” so too did the 
standards of testimony evolve.  The witness, and no longer the judge, became the 
privileged domain of quasi-objective witnessing.  Her study demonstrates that the 
concept of the eyewitness is one shaped by the developing nation state and is not “a 
philosophical abstraction.”40
The term témoin oculaire had been in wide use since the eighteenth century, when 
it merited an entry in Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert’s Encyclopédie ou 
Dictionnaire universel raisonné des connoissances humaines.  For witnesses to be 
“ocular,” they needed to be not only contemporary to the events in question but also 
needed to be “on the actual site where the events occurred.”
   
41
There is more certitude because the [témoin oculaire] is more assured of the event 
and does not fear being contradicted by the narrative of an event or the 
circumstances of those who he has consulted.  Time and distance from the place 
where the event occurred considerably diminish historical certainty which makes 
  The témoin oculaire, 
according to the Encyclopédie, was the most authoritative of all types of witnessing: 
                                                 
39 Andrea Frisch, The Invention of the Eyewitness: Witnessing and Testimony in Early Modern France 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 12.  
40 Ibid., 13, 
41 “Témoin.” In Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des connoissances humaines, edited by 
Denis Diderot Fortunato Bartolomeo De Felice, Jean Le Rond d' Alembert, 1774, 347.  “qu'il ait été sur les 




us depend on a suite of narrations…But a contemporary ocular witness does not 
require this suite of narrations.  It is he who is witness for himself.  But if the 




Seeing an event take place absolved the témoin oculaire from relying on the “narrations” 
of others.  This is consistent with the importance of vision as a privileged vehicle of 
knowledge in the Enlightenment period.43
 
  Témoins oculaires supplied their own 
narratives and were themselves the source of knowledge precisely because of having seen 
the events take place.  In the Encyclopédie, a témoin oculaire referred mainly to a witness 
in a court case, but was understood as the most authoritative of all kinds of witness and 
extend well beyond judicial contexts.  The vision of an eyewitness was therefore thought 
to be direct and reliable. 
The Spectator as Witness 
Not surprisingly, written accounts of battles were often published by témoins 
oculaires, usually generals, who had participated in them.  These accounts were thought 
to carry more authority precisely because of the contemporary value that eyewitnesses 
commanded.  One of the best known official accounts of a Napoleonic battle published 
during the First Empire was Louis Alexandre Berthier’s Relation de la bataille de 
Marengo, published in 1805.  At the battle of Marengo, the French army led by the newly 
                                                 
42 Ibid. “son témoignage a alors plus de certitude ; car il est plus assuré alors de son fait, & ne craint pas 
d'être trompé dans la narration du fait ou des circonstances par ceux qu'il a consultés. Le tems & la distance 
des lieux diminuent considérablement la certitude historique; car l'un & l'autre nous met dans la nécessité 
de dépendre d'une suite de narrations…Mais un témoin contemporain & oculaire n'a pas besoin de cette 
suite de narrations. C'est lui qui est témoin à soi même. Mais si le témoin contemporain n'a pas été oculaire, 
son témoignage alors est moins certain.” 
43 For more on the discourse of vision during the Enlightenment, see Martin Jay, “Dialectic of 
Enlightenment,” in Downcast Eyes. The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought 




appointed First Consul, Napoleon Bonaparte, defeated the Austrian army, forcing it to 
retreat from Italy.  In addition to marking Bonaparte’s ascension to power as First 
Consul, the victory at Marengo also reaffirmed the notion that his legitimacy as ruler was 
based on his superior abilities as a military commander and not on despotic power-
grabbing.44
At the beginning of the Relation, Berthier included a brief dedication.  He wrote: “I am 
honored to present to your majesty a monument to the glory of Bonaparte and of the 
devotion that, on these fields which will forever be celebrated, so many brave [soldiers] 
witnessed, five years ago, France’s hero, the liberator of Italy.” 
  The fifth anniversary of the battle occasioned a lavish ceremony which took 
place on the battlefield during which Berthier, the minister of war, presented the newly 
crowned Emperor Bonaparte with the Relation de la bataille de Marengo.  The book 
featured five maps made by the ingénieurs-géographes, one landscape vue of the 
battlefield by Bagetti (also an ingénieur-géographe) and an engraved frontispiece based 
on a watercolor by Carle Vernet, whose work was also featured in the Tableaux.     
45   Under the short text, 
he included the following crucial information, which anchored the ceremony in time and 
place: “On the field of Marengo, 25 Prairial, anniversary of the battle.”46
                                                 
44 For more on this problem see Todd Porterfield and Susan Siegfried, Staging Empire: Napoleon, Ingres 
and David (University Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).  
  The engraving 
(Fig. 2.11) depicts Berthier, who stands on the ground, presenting Napoleon, mounted on 
a white horse, with a map.  A grenadier holds the map up in the direction of the 
Emperor’s gaze.  Berthier gestures toward it and Bonaparte in turn gestures back toward 
his minister of war.  The moment of presentation, rendered by Carle Vernet, is a series of 
45 Le Maréchal Berthier, Relation de la bataille de Marengo, gagnée le 25 prairial an 8 (Paris: 
L'Imprimerie impériale, 1805), i. “J’ai l’honneur de présenter à votre majesté un monument de la gloire de 
BONAPARTE, et du dévouement que, dans ces champs à jamais célèbres, tant de braves témoignèrent, il y 
a cinq ans, au héros de la France, au libérateur de l’Italie.” 




exchanges based around an authenticating cartographic document.  The outward facing 
map, Berthier’s turned back, a series of expressive gestures and the shallow, stage-like 
foreground invite viewers to participate in the moment of exchange.  In concert with the 
information in the dedication that the Relation was presented on the battlefield on the 
fifth anniversary of the battle, Vernet’s engraving serves as a corroborating visual 
witness, a témoin oculaire for Berthier’s act of formal, written, presentation to Napoleon.  
By representing Berthier’s dedication as a close-up episode in the process of taking place, 
Vernet’s engraving stages an opportunity for viewers of the image to witness the moment 
of official exchange.  Vernet’s engraving invites viewers to understand the image as an 
official document of a military event located in a specific time and place, providing a 
visual representation of up-close access to the event.   
What Clausewitz called “the peoples’ new share in these great affairs of the 
state,” allowed war to take on unprecedented social importance and licensed those in 
power to conduct war “untrammeled by any conventional restraints.”47
                                                 
47 Clausewitz, On War , 593.   
  The wars waged 
between 1792 and 1815 demanded not only an endless supply of soldiers but, as 
Clausewitz understood, a larger cultural apparatus of legitimation to support the war 
effort and the state institutions that waged it – the “peoples’ new share.” With regard to 
the production of visual representations of contemporary wars, it is important to define 
this apparatus of legitimation not in terms of the sheer number of images produced but 
rather through visual representation as a mode of social practice through which viewers 
could “participate” in these politicized military events.  Episodic and topographic 




clarity.  They carried the promise of an infallible form of vision, that of the expert 
observer, the témoin oculaire, whose representation of the particularities of a battle’s site 
and actions encouraged expectations that the complexities of a battle could indeed be 
grasped through vision alone.  This form of war imagery effaced the political 
complexities of France’s armed engagements and instead focused attention on the 
‘authenticity’ of the representation and the extent to which it permitted spectatorial 
engagement with the depicted battle.    
   
History Painting and Battle Painting 
The production of episodic and topographic prints which flourished after France 
became engaged in warfare with its European neighbors in the 1790s reflected a 
widespread interest in viewing representations of contemporary battles.  But it was not 
until 1801 that the Consular government, under the rule of Napoleon, officially 
encouraged France’s most esteemed artists, its history painters, to represent contemporary 
military events on a grand, painted scale.  As we have already seen, battle paintings 
occupied a low rung within the French academic hierarchy of genres which helps to 
explain why representations of war during and immediately after the French Revolution 
proliferated in prints, illustrated books and small-scale watercolors.  History painting, the 
most eminent and largest-scale of all the genres, was reserved for classical and 
mythological subjects intended to instruct and elevate viewers through timeless and 
morally aggrandizing examples.  History painters worked under a set of rigorous 




through a single defining narrative moment, subordinating extraneous details and 
episodes not directly in support of their unified and timeless narrative focus.   
Though contemporary battles had never been considered an appropriate subject 
for history painting, the French Consular government sought to force the two together for 
the sake of publicizing the government’s military achievements.  It was an awkward fit.   
In 1801, the government announced a competition for a large-scale history painting 
representing the Battle of Nazareth, a battle which Napoleon had won against all odds in 
1799 against the Turkish army in Egypt.  As David O’Brien has demonstrated, it was 
Bonaparte’s Minister of War, Alexandre Berthier, the author of the Relation de la bataille 
de Marengo, who encouraged the Ministry of the Interior to organize and implement the 
competition.48
Gros, a painter trained in the classical tradition of history painting, produced a 
sketch that was neither acceptable as a history painting nor as a topographical battle 
painting.
  The painting was to measure over seven meters in width, an 
unprecedented size for an unprecedented subject in history painting.  All ten of the 
submitted sketches were exhibited at the Salon of 1801 and a winner was chosen, a little 
known, young student of Jacques-Louis David, Antoine-Jean Gros.    
49
                                                 
48 O'Brien, After the Revolution, Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting and Propaganda under Napoleon , 54.  
  Because of this and the disorganization that characterized the arts 
administration of the Consular government, Nazareth was never made into a finished 
painting.  Gros’ sketch (Fig. 2.12) was criticized by critics for fusing the monumental, 
transcendent ethos of history painting with the particular feats of individual soldiers along 
with the features of the officers.  For the Nazareth competition, the government furnished 
the participating artists with a set of documents: a textual account of the battle’s general 




progression followed by a list of numerous particular episodes.  Artists could request a 
map of the battle from the Dépôt de la guerre drawn up by one of the generals who 
participated in it.  Though this was the first major opportunity for history painters to 
receive government support uncommon during the Revolutionary years, the degree of 
tight control maintained by the government over the subject matter was more stringent 
than it had been before the Revolution. 
Gros, more than any other artist, tailored his painting to the government’s official 
version of the battle and even went to the extreme of exhibiting a series of documents that 
he created underneath his final sketch at the Salon of 1801.  These documents (Fig. 2.13, 
Fig. 2.14) consisted of a textual account of the episodes depicted in the painting, a hand-
drawn replica of the map drawing by a general who participated in the battle and a 
topographical plan that represented the terrain included in the painting relative to what 
was not included.  The choice to include these documents must be understood within the 
context of the sketch itself.  In the Battle of Nazareth, dramatic action is compressed into 
the foreground with very little indication of the terrain, other than the inclusion of Mont 
Tabor in the left background.  Topographical detail is minimized in favor of a focus on 
particular human bodies in swirling combat – most of the landscape appears as a muddy 
cloud.  The clarity and order of episodic and topographic details that had come to 
dominate contemporary representations of war in print media were anathema to Gros’ 
Nazareth. The artist, as a history painter, did not want to burden his painting with the 
kinds of particularities that were the domain of maps and landscape paintings, minutiae 
which detracted from the task of representing the transcendent and epic aspects of a 




The documents that Gros included with his painting acknowledged and reinforced 
contemporary expectations that representations of battles should permit viewers to 
identify and “witness” a clearly defined series of episodes in an expertly rendered, 
“authentic” location.  To demonstrate his commitment to this set of expectations without 
actually making this a defining element in his painting, Gros used the documents to pick 
up where the painting had left off.  They topographically represented the terrain 
surrounding the battle and gave a large overview of the movement of troops, information 
not available in the painting.  The inclusion of these documents in the display of the 
Battle of Nazareth suggests that Gros recognized that the positive reception of his 
painting depended to some extent on the legibility of those episodes contained within the 
frame. The documents Gros included with the Battle of Nazareth therefore attempted to 
legitimate the painting outside the frame, with direct recourse to the kinds of official 
visual documents produced by the ingénieurs-géographes.   
While Gros needed official-looking topographic documents to legitimate his 
painting, another painter, Louis-François Lejeune, made such details the subject of his 
1801 Salon entry, the Battle of Marengo (Fig. 2.15).  Much smaller than Gros’ Nazareth 
and therefore not a history painting, the Battle of Marengo featured a vast overview of the 
battle, with small figures distributed throughout the foreground, middleground, and 
background.  Working outside of the grand manner of history painting but still painting a 
historical subject, Lejeune’s painting had more in common with the prints contained in 
the Tableaux and those based on vues produced by ingénieurs-géographes such as Bacler 
d’Albe.  In contrast to the Battle of Nazareth, the Battle of Marengo situated the battle 




close-up skirmishes in the foreground, columns of soldiers clashing in the middleground, 
and more soldiers about to enter into the fray in the background.  Topographical details 
such as a church tower and a mountainous horizon in the background added to the 
illusion that the painting constituted an exacting record of the fighting as well as the 
terrain.  While Gros’ Nazareth was castigated by critics, the reaction to Lejeune’s Battle 
of Marengo was more positive: he received numerous favorable reviews and was even 
awarded a prix d’encouragement in the amount of 3,000 francs by the government.50
The positive reception of Lejeune’s painting was informed by two important 
pieces of information disseminated in the guidebook for the Salon of 1801 - the artist’s 
status as the aide de camp to the Minister of War, Alexandre Berthier, and Lejeune’s 
participation in the battle of Marengo.  His painting was therefore made by the hand of a 
highly informed témoin oculaire, which likely ensured its reception as a reliable and 
“authentic” representation of the event which promised to give viewers access to a series 
of particularizing details that could only be provided by an eyewitness.  In contrast to 
Gros’ Nazareth, whose legitimating details came from physical sources external to the 
painting, the “truth” value of Lejeune’s Marengo was guaranteed by the signature of the 
artist himself.  Along with a plethora of episodes and detailed attention to the articulation 
of the landscape, conventions which also characterized prints of contemporary war at the 
time, Lejeune’s status as an expert observer of contemporary battles ensured that his 
painting could be interpreted as visibly possessing the “touch of an eyewitness.”  
Lejeune’s style of painting and the series of claims it promoted quickly found favor with 
a public eager for representations of war that seemed to offer seemingly unmediated and 
   
                                                 




clear depictions of armed conflict.  The artist would later brag in his memoirs, published 
well after the First Empire, that he was able to exhibit a painting in each of the Salons 
from 1798 until 1812.  He produced at least eight battle paintings during the Napoleonic 
Empire and became a fixture of Salon exhibitions.  Lejeune’s manner of battle painting 
successfully located a pictorial language which allowed his work to operate as a site of 
dynamic interplay between officially sanctioned documents of war and affective and 
orderly depictions of the events and site of a battle.  Despite the fact that his paintings 
would not have been considered history paintings, or perhaps because of this, they 
promoted a form of spectatorial engagement which licensed them to be understood as 
transparent and “true” depictions of contemporary battles owing largely to a successful 
set of pictorial strategies embraced by Lejeune to translate expert eyewitness vision into 
battle painting.  
 
The Value of Maps and Vues: Histoire des guerres des gaulois  
 As we have already seen, the pictorial mode of Lejeune’s Battle of Marengo was 
more akin to the landscape vues of the ingénieurs-géographes and engravings in the 
Tableaux historiques than to the genre of history painting.  The artist’s status as an aide 
de camp to the Minister of War, Alexandre Berthier, and an eyewitness of the battle 
allowed his painting to be understood as a source of authentic eyewitness information.  
While the value of his work as both artistic object and object of knowledge benefitted the 
reception of Lejeune’s paintings within the rarefied Parisian art world, it also carried over 




 In 1803, the publication of the Histoire des guerres des gaulois et des français.    
en Italie was announced in the catalogue of the official bookseller of the École 
Polytechnique and the École des Ponts et Chaussées, Librarie Bernard, 31 Quai des 
Grands Augustins.  The opulent multi-volume book, written by Joseph Servan, général 
de division, featured five separate volumes (sold together) about French military history 
from the ancient feats of the Gallic King Bellovesus, circa 600 B.C.E. through the present 
day.  The military events from 1797 onwards filled an entire book, a few short years of 
history for one-fifth of the Histoire. The book was eventually published in 1805, in 
several different editions at different price points.  Three different editions contained all 
volumes of the book as well as the atlas, which included twelve maps and the two 
engravings by Lejeune; it ranged in price from sixty-seven to 150 francs depending on 
the quality of paper one desired.  A more modest abridged edition featured the last 
volume of the Histoire which described the French army’s conquest of Italy from 1797 
and thereafter.  It came with only four maps but sold for the more affordable price of 
eighteen francs.  The atlas was not sold separately and could only be acquired through the 
purchase of the complete edition.   
The announcement for the book’s imminent publication devoted the vast majority 
of its space to what must have been the most anticipated part of the book and ostensibly 
its most attractive selling point, the atlas which contained a series of engraved maps and 
vues.  It was to consist of 
new maps of Gaul, France and both ancient and modern Italy, in four maps; 
Corsica and Sardinia, based on precious material drawn by Lapie and engraved by 
Tardieu.  It also includes the picturesque description of the Battle of Marengo and 
of the Passage of the Mont Saint-Bernard, in two sheets drawn by Lejeune, 








The description of the maps and “picturesque descriptions” contained in the atlas 
emphasized that both types of visual material were based on authoritative sources.   
Lejeune’s status as someone who “shared in the glory” of Marengo and the 
crossing of the Mont Saint-Bernard indicated the special value of his engravings as did 
the fact that his battle painting of Marengo was exhibited at the Salon of 1801.  His two 
engravings in the atlas of Histoire des guerres des gaulois et des français en Italie were 
therefore made by someone who was both an expert eyewitness and a nationally 
recognized artist.  The engraving of the Battle of Marengo (Fig. 2.16) is an approximate 
reproduction of the painting exhibited at the Salon of 1801; the engraver Pierre-Philippe 
Choffard took some liberties with the placement of soldiers in the landscape and 
condensed Lejeune’s expansive landscape.  Other than the descriptive legend in the 
booklet which accompanied the atlas, the reproduction of Marengo is entirely 
decontextualized from its former display at the Salon.  The atlas version pictorially 
corroborates the information about the battle of Marengo in the text of the book as well as 
displayed on the preceding maps, and simultaneously takes advantage of Lejeune’s 
double status as both publicly recognized artist and expert military eyewitness.  This 
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shows that his work operated within a broad cultural sphere, functioning as evidence of 
the particularities of a battle in the context of a publication which sought to delineate an 
official history as well as a ‘truthful’ visual representation in the Parisian Salon.   
The maps in the atlas, we are told in the description, are based on “precious 
material.”  Bernard’s 1805 announcement, printed after the book’s publication, provided 
the information that Pierre Lapie, the maker of the maps, was a captain in the ingénieurs-
géographes.  This meant that the “precious material” upon which the maps were drawn 
consisted of cartographic documents conserved at the Dépôt de la guerre, a fact that 
would have bolstered the authority of the publication’s visual material.  To add to the 
allure of special access to important “precious” material, the text of the atlas also informs 
the reader that some of it has never been published before.52  The twelfth map, the one 
which was sold separately from the book, represented the French Reserve Army’s 
campaign in Italy (Fig. 2.17).  The most elaborate of the twelve included in the atlas, it 
not only indicated the order of battle for Marengo and for the passage of the Mont Saint-
Bernard, but also included a topographical vue of the latter on the bottom left corner 
“taken on the day when the army landed in Italy.” 53
The Histoire received a series of glowing reviews in the press, including one by 
Joachim Le Breton, a writer for the Décade philosophique, one of several newspapers 
dedicated to culture which emerged during the First Empire.
   
54
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  After lavishing praise 
upon Servan’s text, he turned his attention to the merits of the atlas: “The atlas deserves 
53 Notice abrégée des principaux livres de Bernard,  (Paris: Bernard Libraire de l'Ecole Polytechnique et de 
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special mention: Zanoni and Bacler d’Albe have provided maps of Italy that have been 
rightfully praised, but they are quite rare and very costly.  In the atlas that we announce 
here, the material of these two skilled geographers has been brought together at a lower 
cost for the public.”55
The publication of the Histoire des guerres des gaulois et des français and the 
valuable atlas included with it occurred just after Napoleon Bonaparte decided that a 
greater number of government-produced maps should be disseminated to the public.  Up 
until 1803, only high-ranking members of the military had regular access to the maps 
made by the ingénieurs-géographes.  After this point, Bonaparte, in an effort to 
  For Le Breton, the atlas was valuable because it disseminated 
knowledge to a wider public than the more costly maps that were available.  As we have 
already seen, Bacler d’Albe’s map of the theater of war in Italy sold for 150 francs.  It 
was possible to purchase the entire Histoire and the atlas for sixty-seven francs; one 
could even buy the map of the Italian campaign for eighteen francs.  What this shows is 
that the demand for official cartographic material that represented land conquered by the 
French army ran high.  Its unavailability and costliness added to the value of the atlas of 
the Histoire des guerres des gaulois et des français.  Lejeune’s participation in the 
publication benefitted the public reception of his work (would have underscored his 
status as an expert observer) and demonstrated the flexibility and fluidity of its meaning 
within a broad cultural arena where accurate visual representations of the French army’s 
conquests based on expert, eyewitness vision were particularly sought after.   
                                                 
55 Joachim Le Breton, “Histoire. Histoire des guerres des gaulois et des français en Italie “ Revue, ou 
Décade Philosophique, Littéraire et Politique, no. 30 (1805, 30 Messidor, An XIII): 145. “L’atlas mérite 
une mention particulière : Zanoni et Bacler d’Albe, ont donné des cartes d’Italie justement estimées ; mais 
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standardize cartographic language across military and civilian domains and publicize the 
exploits of his military, made military maps available to a wider civilian audience.56  But 
even with the new availability of maps, including those published in the Histoire des 
guerres des gaulois et des français en Italie, the price would have been prohibitive for the 
vast majority of the French population.  With the average salary for a worker around nine 
francs per month, maps would have been an unaffordable luxury.57  As a further obstacle 
to wide public dissemination of maps, many were considered confidential state secrets.  
Such was the case with the cartographic survey of Egypt, undertaken during Napoleon’s 
ill-fated invasion of the country but not published until the 1830s.58
 
 
Mapping, Vision and Landscape 
Beyond the use of military maps as an instrumental technology of warfare, they 
were, as we have already seen, highly prized sources of visual information about the 
territorial conquest by the French army for a non-military public.  Maps shared this 
prized cultural status with engraved vues of battles made by eyewitness observers and 
battle paintings with similarly distinguished authors. Images such as these played a 
crucial role in articulating the topographic and cartographic results of French imperialism 
to civilians who had not taken part in the military conquest of foreign territory but who 
desired nevertheless to take part in these national exploits through visual representations.  
Visual engagement with representations of war thought to possess the “touch of an 
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eyewitness” promoted a powerful political illusion of visual access and participation in 
national military events.  This chapter will now turn its attention to ways in which 
representations of the topographical specificities of land conquered by the French army 
contributed to the illusion of participation with particular attention paid to the battle 
paintings of Louis-François Lejeune.  In the series of battle paintings made by Lejeune 
and exhibited at the Salons of 1804 and 1806, the soldier-artist made use of a pictorial 
mode that viewers would have associated with maps and vues.  The bonds between these 
instrumental, official visual materials and Lejeune’s oeuvre provided a context for his 
paintings to be valued as “truthful.”  
Critics understood Lejeune’s paintings as truthful renderings of the site where a 
battle had taken place largely because people knew that he was a soldier and therefore an 
expert eyewitness observer.  The knowledge of Lejeune’s professional status shaped the 
way that critics viewed the formal elements of his paintings, promoting the belief that 
eyewitness vision was something which could be translated in pictorial terms into a battle 
painting.  Not surprisingly, Lejeune’s occupation as a military man took the form of a 
pictorial language that critics associated with maps:     
Lejeune combines the exact and geometric rendering of places and battle, in one 
word, the truth of action, with all of the magic of picturesque effects.  He had to 
reformulate the rules of painting in order to be a man of war and man of art at the 
same time.  Up until now there have been those who have traced battle plans in 
the manner of map makers, who produced exactitude without illusion.  Or in the 
case of painting, there was illusion without exactitude.59
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As this critic understood, Lejeune’s paintings were not maps.  But they successfully 
translated the pictorial authority of maps, their “exact and geometric rendering” of the 
site where a battle had taken place, into a battle painting with “picturesque” effects.   
Lejeune’s close professional association with the Minister of War, Alexandre 
Berthier, would have permitted him easy access to the numerous maps produced by the 
Dépôt de la guerre.  In fact, Lejeune’s military personnel dossier is filled with numerous 
letters to superiors requesting an elevation to a rank that would allow him access to the 
documents housed at the Dépôt.  In 1800, he wrote to Berthier: “I ask that you employ 
me to work at the Dépôt de la guerre so that I can obtain the necessary information for 
the historical work I am doing to honor the government.”60  A year later, he wrote to 
Berthier yet again, asking to be elevated in rank “at the necessary level so as not to be 
distracted from the work that I have taken up again on the collection of paintings on the 
principal battles won by the French armies at which I was present.”61
Three out of the four paintings exhibited by Lejeune at the Salons of 1804 and 
1806 represented subjects from Napoleon’s 1798 Egyptian campaign which preceded the 
general’s rise to power as First Consul.  Though the campaign was an unqualified 
military disaster, it benefitted the General Bonaparte’s standing back in France through a 
  Just as Lejeune’s 
status as a member of the military benefited the reception of his paintings, his status as an 
artist worked in his favor when it came to securing the favor of his military superiors.  
                                                 
60  Louis-François Lejeune à Alexandre Berthier, Louis-François Lejeune à Alexandre Berthier, 1800, 2 
Pluviôse, an 8, Dossier Lejeune, 8YD1417. Vincennes, France: Service historique de l'armée de terre. “et 
en me faisant employé au Dépôt de la guerre, afin que j’y puisse recevoir les renseignements qui me sont 
nécessaires pour le travail historique dont j’ai fait hommage au gouvernent.”   
61 Louis-François Lejeune à Alexandre Berthier, 1801, 3 Frimaire, an 9. Dossier Lejeune, Vincennes, 
France : Service historique de l’armée de terre.  “avec l’ordre nécessaire pour n’être point distrait du travail 
que j’ai repris, de la collection des tableaux des principales batailles gagnées par les armées françaises et 




proliferation of visual representations across a range of media, including large-scale 
history paintings by Antoine-Jean Gros and Anne-Louis Girodet.  The Salon of 1804 
featured Gros’ General Bonaparte Visiting the Plague Victims of Jaffa, which 
represented Bonaparte as a Christ-like healer of his sick troops.62
Bonaparte’s conquest of Egypt was accompanied by an elaborate scientific 
mission to discover, classify and study the flora, fauna, ancient monuments and 
contemporary customs of Egypt.  The findings of the hundreds of scientists, draftsmen, 
and other experts would be used to publish the Description de l’Egypte in 1808 as a 
luxurious multi-volume folio monument to the imperial ambitions of France.  As Edward 
Said has argued, the scientific mission conceived of Egypt as a passive object to be 
studied.  The project provided a benevolent cover for French military intervention and 
obscured the true rationale for invading Egypt, territorial conquest.
  In contrast to the 
aggrandized Emperor depicted in Gros’ painting, Lejeune focused his attention on 
representing the Egyptian campaign as a series of historical events that honored the 
institution of the French military and not only its esteemed leader.  At the Salon of 1804, 
Lejeune exhibited the Battle of Aboukir (Fig. 2.18) and the Battle of Mont Tabor (Fig. 
2.19).  In 1806, he showed the Battle of the Pyramids (Fig. 2.20).  Like his Battle of 
Marengo, Lejeune’s three Egyptian campaign battle paintings paid particular attention to 
topographical specificities of the landscape.   
63
                                                 
62 For more on Gros’s relationship to Napoleonic propaganda, see Todd Porterfield, The Allure of Empire, 
Art in the Service of French Imperialism, 1798-1836 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 53-61.  
See also O'Brien, After the Revolution, Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting and Propaganda under Napoleon .   
   Moreover, when 
63 Despite Edward Said’s and Linda Nochlin’s efforts to situate orientalism in its proper imperialistic 
context, there is a prolific body of scholarship which celebrates Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign for its 
contribution to the supposedly neutral and objective science of Egyptology.  One blatant example of this 
tendency is The Discovery of Egypt, Artists, Travelers and Scientists.  In the introduction Lise Maniche 




Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798, no accurate map of it existed.  As an extension of the 
civilian scientific mission, the French army’s ingénieurs-géographes undertook a 
geographic survey.64  Once finished, the geographic survey of Egypt comprised a three-
sheet geographic map and a forty seven-page topographic map, an unusually large size.65  
The format of the survey speaks to the important spatial dimension of the conquest of 
Egypt.  Whereas Napoleon’s armies encountered armed resistance from Egyptians and 
found the country logistically difficult to conquer, the survey presented the French 
military with an opportunity to master the land symbolically through the practice of 
mapping.66
An anonymous print made shortly after Napoleon’s failed military conquest of 
Egypt (Fig. 2.21) represents the collusion between mapping and France’s military 
intervention in Egypt.  Bonaparte, First Consul, Standing on the Tallest Egyptian 
Pyramid, shows Bonaparte standing on the top of a pyramid, with his back is turned away 
from the viewer, toward the vast, empty landscape that recedes into the background.  To 
underscore the impressive height of the pyramid, the print shows only the very tip of the 
pyramid and a series of figures looking out from it into the vast landscape in the 
background.  This highly unusual point of view creates a space where the viewer’s gaze 
is on the same level with the viewers on the pyramid, establishing a powerful illusion of 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
memorable way that these were the forerunners of generations of scholars who rediscovered for us one of 
the greatest civilizations of antiquity.”  See Linda Nochlin, “The Imaginary Orient,” in The Politics of 
Vision. Essays on Nineteenth-Century Art and Society (Oxford, U.K.: Westview Press, 1989), 33-60; 
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1979); Fernand Beaucour, Yves Laissus and 
Chantal Orgogozo, The Discovery of Egypt, Artists, Travelers and Scientists (Paris: Flammarion, 1990), 7.   
64 Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815 (London: University College London Press Unlimited, 
1994), 200.  
65 Godlewska, The Napoleonic Survey of Egypt, A Masterpiece of Cartographic Compilation and Early 
Nineteenth-Century Fieldwork , 8.  
66 As Godlewska points out, “the atlas was based on field surveys carried out through the duration of the 
expedition wherever and whenever the troops were available to defend the surveyors from the hostility of 




what it is like to stand on top a pyramid and gaze outward into an expansive landscape.  
Bonaparte is shown using a telescope to look out into the landscape.  An aide de camp 
standing next to him holds a map and points out in the same direction.  A group of men to 
Bonaparte’s right look through another viewing device at the pyramids in the distance.  
Another man, whose uniform and activity designate him as an ingénieur-géographe, is 
seated, intently sketching the landscape in front of him.  Two men to the right also 
participate in these activities of looking: they point, also gesturing at the land in the 
distance.  Here, the violence of military intervention is subsumed into the activity of 
looking at and recording the particularities of an expanse of land.  The various 
instruments employed for this purpose in the print, whether a telescope, a map, a pointing 
finger, or an intently sketching ingénieur-géographe, all underscore the importance of 
long-range, accurate vision in the practice of imperial conquest.     
As W.J.T. Mitchell has argued, the discourse of imperialism is premised as much 
upon the imperative of literal territorial expansion as it is upon the representation of this 
fact in figurative, visual terms:  
Imperialism conceives itself precisely (and simultaneously) as an expansion of 
landscape understood as an inevitable, progressive development in history, an 
expansion of “culture” and “civilization” into a “natural” space in a progress that 
is itself narrated as “natural.” Empires move outward in space as a way of moving 
forward in time; the “prospect’ that opens up is not just a spatial scene but a 
projected future of “development” and exploitation.67
 
 
Mitchell’s argument implicates the genre of landscape painting but could be equally 
appropriate for maps as well as battle painting, which both involve the visual 
representation of expanses of land in varying scales and vantage points.  His focus on the 
                                                 
67 W.J.T. Mitchell, “Imperial Landscape,” in Landscape and Power, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago: 




importance of the spatial dimension of the discourse of imperialism with regard to visual 
representation also helps to explain the prized status of maps during the period.  Maps, 
like landscapes and topographic battle paintings, suggest spaces where bodies can gain 
access to, and in the case of representations of recently conquered land, they also function 
as a metaphor for military power.   
Lejeune’s Egyptian campaign battle paintings, which pay particular attention to 
the topographical features of parcels of land subject to the violent intervention of the 
French army, depict the business of imperialism as a matter of territorial possession made 
possible through a form of uninhibited, expansive vision.  His focus on the topographic 
specificity of battlefields also lent his paintings a high degree of epistemological 
authority and connected them to the tradition of vues and maps based on eyewitness 
observation.  It is possible that Lejeune would have had access to the unpublished 
geographic survey of Egypt for his three paintings of the Egyptian campaign, the Battle 
of Aboukir, the Battle of Mont Thabor and the Battle of the Pyramids, but it is more likely 
that these paintings are based on a well-known non-military source, Dominique-Vivant 
Denon’s Voyage dans la basse et haute Égypte, first published in 1802, the year when 
Denon was also appointed as director of the central museums of France.  Trained as an 
artist and printmaker, Denon ingratiated himself with Josephine and was asked by 
Bonaparte to take part in the Egyptian campaign with the hundreds of other map makers, 
scientists, and artists.68
                                                 
68 Judith Nowinski, Baron Dominique Vivant Denon (1747-1825): Hedonist and Scholar in a Period of 
Transition (Rutherford, N.J.: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970), 76-78.  
  He followed the military expedition through Egypt and sketched 




His sketches were engraved when he returned to Paris and they accompanied the 
text in which he described Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt.  At the end of the book, 
Denon explained that his publication was based on authentic, eyewitness experience and 
attested to its truth-value:  
I have tried in this book to give my readers the idea of this very important country 
and the memories that I have retraced; I have tried to present its forms truthfully, 
its color, and the character that is unique to it; I have tried, as an eyewitness, to 
convey all of the details of a grand and singular campaign that was the principal 
part of this famous expedition!  If I have attained this goal, I will have achieved it 
through the advantage of having drawn and described everything from nature.69
 
 
Denon’s designation of himself as an eyewitness, like Lejeune’s status as an aide-de-
camp, provided readers with a justification for his claims of truthfulness.  To add to the 
publication’s value as an object of knowledge, in addition to Denon’s engraved drawings, 
it was also richly illustrated with maps and battle plans drawn by ingénieurs-géographes.     
 Three of the illustrations in Voyage dans la basse et haute égypte are devoted to 
the battle of Aboukir, the same battle that Lejeune represented for the Salon of 1804 (Fig. 
2.18).  The battle of Aboukir was Napoleon’s final victory in Egypt after a series of 
defeats in a campaign which was disastrous for the French army and for the tens of 
thousands of civilians and enemy soldiers who were slaughtered during the three years of 
French presence.  Bonaparte undertook the invasion of Egypt as a means of cutting off 
the British from their trade route with India but found himself cut off from his supplies 
                                                 
69 Vivant Denon, Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Egypte, pendant les campagnes du général Bonaparte 
(London: M. Peltier, 1802), 347-348.  “Je suis parvenu à donner à mes lecteurs l’idée d’un pays si 
important par lui-même et par les souvenirs qu’il retrace ; si j’ai pu lui présenter avec vérité ses formes, sa 
couleur, et le caractère qui lui est particulier ; si enfin, comme témoin oculaire, je vous ai fait connoitre les 
détails d’une grande et singulière campagne, qui faisoit partie principale de la vaste conception de cette 
expédition célèbre !  Si j’ai atteint ce but, je le devrai sans doute à l’avantage d’avoir tout dessiné et tout 





after a defeat in the first battle of Aboukir in 1798.  The battle represented by Denon and 
Lejeune is the second, victorious battle of Aboukir against British-allied Turkish forces 
which took place on July 25, 1799 and directly preceded Napoleon’s election as First 
Consul.   
Denon produced a battle plan of the Battle of Aboukir (Fig. 2.22), including a key 
with a guide to deciphering the symbols featured on the map.  He included a textual 
description of the battle, itself borrowed from the official government representation of 
Bonaparte’s Egyptian campaign written by General Berthier, Lejeune’s superior, lending 
the illustrations a greater authoritative weight.  His book also featured three more 
engravings of Aboukir including an up-close representation of the fort at the end of the 
peninsula, a bird’s eye view of the peninsula, and a vue of the battle.  Denon’s bird’s eye 
view of the peninsula of Aboukir (Fig. 2.23) represents the land protruding into the 
foreground and receding into the background in a similar way to Lejeune’s representation 
of the land in his painting of the same site.  The key difference is that Lejeune has taken 
Denon’s landscape and reversed it.  In the painting, the peninsula projects back into the 
distance from a bird’s eye view (Fig. 2.24).  In Denon’s engraving, the land is shown at a 
similar angle, but the fort is in the foreground.  Though Denon claimed that all of his 
engravings were done “d’après nature,” this view in particular would have been 
physically impossible to render through eyewitness vision alone.  The only way to view 
the peninsula at Aboukir from this angle would have been from a boat, approaching the 
land.  But Denon’s elevated view would have only been possible to see from a position 
high above the water.  The peninsula of Aboukir, in both the painting and the engraving, 




allowed, transforming the land into an idealized territory to be visually seized in one 
totalizing glance.   
Because of the detailed articulation of the land from a long-range perspective 
above and out to sea, the idealized bird’s eye vantage point of the Aboukir peninsula in 
the engraving and in the painting border on the cartographic.  But strangely, both versions 
of the peninsula are also topographic, in that they reveal the particularities of the land’s 
surface including the architecture of the fort, waves, boats and individual trees. The 
merging of cartographic and topographic features of the Aboukir peninsula into a single 
image permits an omnipotent gaze to perceive two very different conventions of 
representation as though they were one sweeping, naturalized point of view.   
This stages a viewing encounter above and beyond the idealized conditions 
enjoyed by the observers perched atop the pyramid in the print, Bonaparte, First Consul 
on the Tallest Pyramid in Egypt.  In the print, these viewers are privy to an unobstructed 
view of the Egyptian landscape that extends into a distant horizon line.  But they are not 
high enough to perceive the geographic outlines of the territory they intend to conquer.  
This is the job reserved for the ingénieurs-géographes who are shown intently sketching 
and surveying with the end goal of producing a cartographic representation of the land 
they behold.  Alternatively, Lejeune’s painting of the Battle of Aboukir, based on 
Denon’s engravings, conjures an illusion where viewers are granted access to an 
unlimited imperializing gaze which trumps the phenomenological limits of the mapping 
technologies used by the ingenieurs-geographes in the print.  Though Lejeune’s Aboukir 




far beyond those conventions to conjure the illusion of impossibly powerful, long-range 
vision. 
 
The Affect of the Episode  
Lejeune’s merging of topographic and cartographic visual modes does not entirely 
explain why his paintings were valued as authentic representations of contemporary 
armed combat.  His use of discrete episodes to narrate the key incidents of the battle was 
equally important for the reception of his work.  It was in fact Lejeune’s depiction of 
battle in a simultaneously episodic and topographic mode which caused his paintings to 
be understood as complete and authentic transcriptions of battles.70  For example, when 
he reviewed Lejeune’s Salon of 1806 entry, the Battle of the Pyramids, the art critic 
Pierre-Jean Baptiste Chaussard could hardly contain his enthusiasm over the painting’s 
tour de force illusion of depicting a battle in all of its entirety: “From one look, one sees 
everything: no episode has escaped one’s vision, not a single detail; everything can be 
found here without confusion.  The skilled painter has rendered an exact account of 
everything; he has perfectly calculated his lines, his plans, his Order, his composition; 
and everywhere a perfect clarity.”71
                                                 
70 This is a point emphasized by Susan Siegfried.  See Siegfried, “Naked History: The Rhetoric of Military 
Painting in Postrevolutionary France.” 
  In addition to Lejeune’s status as an officer in the 
French army, Chaussard’s belief in the exactitude of Lejeune’s painting was supported by 
the series of disparate episodes distributed throughout the composition which depicted 
the events of the battle with an eye toward clarity and order.  The scattering of episodes 
71 Chaussard, Le Pausanias français: ou, description du Salon de 1806, 217. “Pour obtenir plus d’espace, 
l’Artiste a pris son point de vue de fort haut, de manière que d’un regard on embrasse tout l’ensemble : il ne 
lui échappe pas un Épisode, pas un Détail; tout s’y trouve, et s’y trouve sans confusion ; le Peintre habile 
s’est rendu un compte exact de tout ; il a parfaitement calculé ses Lignes, ses plans, son Ordonnance, sa 




in his paintings made war appear as something that could be contained, ordered, and 
understood through vision alone.  
When critics wrote about Lejeune’s paintings, they often remarked upon the large 
crowds gathered around them.  As one critic who reviewed the Salon of 1804 warned, “if 
you like battles, then you will try, if you are able, to break through the crowd to see the 
paintings of Lodi, Mont Thabor, and Aboukir by Lejeune.” 72
                                                 
72 Exposition au Salon du Louvre, 1804, Collection Deloynes, Paris: Département des estampes, 
Bibliothèque nationale de France.  “Si vous aimez les batailles, vous tâcherez, si vous pouvez, de percer la 
foule pour voir de plus près et pour ajourer celles de Lodi, du Mont Thabor, et d’Aboukir par Lejeune.”  
  The popularity of the 
paintings was related to their approachability in terms of both scale and the episodic 
treatment of their subject matter.  In contrast to the monumental history paintings made 
by Lejeune’s contemporaries on view at the Salon of 1804, including Gros’ celebrated 
General Bonaparte Visiting the Plague Victims of Jaffa, Lejeune’s battle paintings were 
much smaller, which would have automatically designated them outside the genre of 
history painting in terms of both scale and content.  Monumental history paintings such 
as Jaffa commanded attention in an exhibition space through their scale and their 
narrative organization around a single unified action; the various episodes that appeared 
in history paintings were subordinated to this single moment of narrative transcendence.  
Lejeune’s smaller battle paintings, on the other hand, made use of a visual language more 
in line with prints and the lower genres of landscape and portraiture.  They encouraged an 
entirely different, and arguably more open-ended, form of visual engagement that 
revolved around the proliferation of episodes and the absence of a heroic center of focus.  




figure of Bonaparte, Lejeune’s paintings focused their attention on the multiplicity of 
participants in a battle and on the series of episodes which occurred therein.      
As we have already established, Lejeune’s battle paintings were more closely 
related to the genre of battle vues, such as those made by the ingénieurs-géographes, than 
to the academic genre of history painting.  But even in vues produced during the period, 
the episodes of the battle were often subordinated to the expansive landscape in the 
background or only a few episodic moments of the battle were included.  The later is the 
case with the vue of the battle of Aboukir (Fig. 2.25) that Denon included in his Voyage.    
The scene was sketched d’après nature by Denon and engraved by Jean Dupleiss-
Bertaux, who specialized in prints of contemporary events.  In this horizontally oriented 
engraving, there is little emphasis on the dramatic recession of the peninsula and more of 
a focus on the episodes of the battle.  The horizontal format allowed Denon to extend the 
field of action across an expansive foreground where the action takes place.  The moment 
Denon represented is the same one Lejeune chose for his painting.  As Denon explained 
in his text, “the flags and the gathered booty all offer an image of a complete victory.  
Bonaparte with his aides is, at this very moment, at his post by the fountains which we 
have just taken from the Turks; the Pasha, wounded and taken prisoner, is brought before 
Bonaparte.”73
                                                 
73 Denon, Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Egypte, pendant les campagnes du général Bonaparte  “les 
drapeaux, les trophées apportés, tout offre l’image d’une victoire complète.  Bonaparte avec son état major 
se trouve en ce moment au poste des fontaines, qu’on venoit d’enlever aux Turcs ; le pasha, blessé, et 
prisonnier, est amené devant lui.”  
  These episodic details are completely absent from the two other 
engravings of the battle included in the Voyage discussed earlier which focus on the 
topography (Fig. 2.23) and grand overview of the battle plan (Fig. 2.22).  Whereas Denon 




long-range topographical view of the site with the episodic action into one painting.  To 
view Lejeune’s painting of Aboukir was to gain access to the battle in terms of its 
temporal and spatial location.   
Denon’s vue of the battle relies on minutely small figures to depict the episodic 
actions.  The most important event of the battle, the capitulation of the Turkish Pasha to 
Bonaparte, occurs in the left foreground; he is the wounded figure being led toward the 
figure sitting on the horse who is supposed to be Bonaparte.  These figures are far too 
small to signify as actors in a dramatic battle.  They stand in for the figures featured in 
Denon’s textual narration of the battle but their actions cannot be accessed as salient 
close-up episodes.  Though Denon’s vue of Aboukir does not provide this kind of close 
encounter with the events of the battle, the author did understand the emotional impact of 
seeing war up-close.  In the text of his Voyage dans la basse et haute égypte, he mused 
“O war, how you make for brilliant history!  But seen from up close, how hideous you 
become, no longer able to hide the horror of your details!” 74
Lejeune’s painting of the same battle, like his other battle paintings, did depict 
war as a series of enthralling and often horrifying details.  Though it focuses on the same 
  In Denon’s engraving of 
the battle of Aboukir, the horrors of war are subordinated to a series of operational 
actions seen from a safe vantage point removed from the thick of the fray - the loading 
and firing of the canons, the raising of muskets, the capitulation of a high-value prisoner.  
But the “horror of details” described by Denon as something he encountered as an 
eyewitness in Egypt are nowhere to be found in his vue of the battle.     
                                                 
74 Vivant Denon, Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Egypte, pendant les campagnes du général Bonaparte 
(London: M. Peltier, 1802), 157.  “O guerre, que tu es brillante dans l’histoire! Mais vue de près, que tu 




narrative moment as in Denon’s battle and borrowed from some of Denon’s visual 
material published in his Voyage, Lejeune’s Aboukir plunges the viewer into a series of 
close encounters with salient episodic events.  The small scale of the painting in 
conjunction with its hovering bird’s eye vantage point would have made the scene 
particularly inviting by promoting an illusion of visual mastery of an entire armed 
encounter, both in terms of the land to be conquered as well as the episodes which occur.  
As we have already seen, both visual and textual eyewitness accounts of battles 
were highly prized sources of knowledge about contemporary military events which took 
place in distant locales during the period.  Such eyewitness accounts were usually limited 
to written texts such as relations de bataille, vues made by the ingénieurs-géographes 
and related-cartographic material.  Lejeune’s battle paintings, on the other hand, forged a 
path between these kinds of official materials and the representation of war as a form of 
artistic production outside of the conventions of history painting.  The fact that his 
paintings were exhibited in the Salon and understood as “art” but were quite obviously 
not history paintings, permitted a novel form of spectatorial engagement that was 
understood to be based both on aesthetic affect as well as the visualization of eyewitness 
knowledge normally reserved for official documents.   
In the 1804 Salon guidebook, we are told exactly which part of the battle is 
depicted: “On 7 Thermidor, the army engaged in battle.  The first enemy line was 
defeated as well as the village that covered the second line.”75
                                                 
75 Pierre and Seydoux Sanchez, Xavier, Les Catalogues des Salons des Beaux-Arts, I (1801-1819) (Paris: 
L'échelle de Jacob, 1999), 85-86. 
  The text provides an 
overview of the action in the middleground and background, such as General Murat’s 




Turkish army to jump into the water in an attempt to seek refuge on boats that have 
already left the harbor.  The text then elucidates the details in the foreground in a separate 
section after this general overview.  We learn that “in the foreground, M. Larrey dresses 
the wound of General Fugières who has lost an arm.  General Bonaparte surveys the line, 
accompanied by General Alexander Berthier and his officers.” 76
In contrast to the aggrandizing language of history painting, Lejeune gives very 
little visual or textual priority to his representation of Bonaparte save for an inscription at 
the bottom of the painting - “Bonaparte, General en Chef.”  While he and Berthier are 
slightly set apart from the rest of the figure groups, they are not in any way the heroic 
focus of the battle.  In fact, Lejeune’s sense of humor surfaces with his choice of the 
motif (Fig. 2.26) that anchors the composition in the center foreground: a single, 
meditative camel gazing out at the viewer. Within the Battle of Aboukir, a camel signifies 
as powerfully as a commanding general.  This evenness of pictorial attention in the 
foreground is significant and is part of what made Lejeune’s battle paintings so 
compelling to critics and spectators.  It is also what permitted his pictures to be read 
outside of the rules of history painting.   
   
The composition of the painting is divided into registers, with a distinctive 
foreground, middleground and background.  In the absence of a heroic focus of action 
and a hierarchy of pictorial order, the eye is given the illusion of freedom to wander 
freely throughout the composition.  Spectatorial engagement with Lejeune’s battle 
paintings depends on the process of uncovering these disparate episodes scattered 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 86. “Sur le devant, M. Larrey panse le général Fugires qui eut un bras emporté.  Le général 




throughout the composition.  In this way, individual eyewitness accounts of war could be 
enacted each time a viewer participated in the process of uncovering an episode.   
The foreground reads like a horizontal frieze of episodes (Fig. 2.27) spread out in 
such a way that the eye cannot rest on a single one for long.   A fallen tree to the right of 
the camel leads to a figure group of captured Turkish soldiers and their French captors 
(Fig. 2.28).  Directly to the right of this group, isolated scenes of action take place: a 
Turkish soldier on the ground single-handedly fights a mounted French soldier as his 
Turkish comrade ducks to get out of the way of the raised sword; directly to their right, 
two French soldiers ride on camels and drink water.  In the heat of the battle, heroic 
action is depicted next to commonplace incidents.  The soldier with the water jug tips it 
over, dramatizing the degree of his thirst.  His companion gestures toward him, no doubt 
a plea to leave some for him.  In another characteristic nod to the humorous expressivity 
of animals, the camels ridden on by the soldiers are not left out of the narrative action; 
their heads turn toward each other, and the mouth of one stays slightly open as if 
engaging in a conversation with his companion.  The “conversant” camels are oblivious 
to the violent episode occurring right next to them: a French and a Turkish soldier in the 
midst of a violent struggle to the death. Lejeune depicts the moment just before the 
French soldier thrusts his bayonet into the Turkish soldier’s mouth.  Lejeune’s apparent 
lack of concern for glorifying moral grandeur permits spectators to apprehend war in a 
way to which they would not ordinarily have been privy in a history painting from the 
period.   
The importance of this process of uncovering the episodic action is best 




for enterprising eyes. A piece of fabric, perhaps the remnant of a tent, has fallen on top of 
a cactus.  Under it a barely visible soldier, perhaps French, holds a gun.  He constitutes 
the one human figure who gazes directly out at the viewer.  The act of discovering the 
figure who is literally under cover in the foreground signals an entire chain of 
“uncoverings” that allow viewers to participate in witnessing the chain of events which 
comprise the battle.   
 
Being There: Transparency and the Eyewitness Episode 
Lejeune took an active role in cultivating a belief that the episodic and 
topographic details depicted in his battle paintings were based on eyewitness experience, 
a fact that, according to critics, accounted for the throng of spectators who reportedly 
surrounded his paintings at Salon exhibitions.  This was accomplished through textual 
claims he made in the Salon livrets and through his manner of signing his paintings.  It 
was generally assumed that Lejeune had participated in the battles that he represented.  
This was true of The Battle of Marengo from the Salon of 1801, but not for the majority 
of battles he represented during the Empire.  He was not present at the battles depicted in 
any of the works he exhibited at the Salons of 1804 and 1806, a fact obscured by their 
entries in the official Salon guide.  In a striking publicity move, Lejeune claimed that the 
Battle of Mont Thabor, the Battle of Aboukir, and the Battle of Lodi were painted 




persisted in the Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, to state incorrectly in 1843 
that Lejeune had served in Egypt.77
Lejeune’s signature on his paintings was often accompanied by his rank.  In the 
Battle of Aboukir, after the date and name of the battle, Lejeune publicized his métier: 
“Lejeune, officier du génie.”  The Battle of the Pyramids, Lejeune’s 1806 Salon entry, 
was signed, “Lejeune, Chef de bataillon, au corps impérial du génie.”  Critics evaluated 
his work in direct relation to his personal experience on the battlefield, which was 
thought to have given Lejeune the ability to represent battle with the highest degree of 
fidelity.  In this sense, his status as an outsider to the art world worked to his advantage.  
As one critic, writing in 1804, noted, “It is easy to recognize that he has had the [military] 
camps for his atelier and the battlefield as a model.”
   
78
This belief in Lejeune’s representations of battle as indicators of personal war 
experience is part of a larger historical development which valued personal, 
individualized experience as a source of knowledge.  Lejeune’s personal experience in 
battle imbued his paintings with a high degree of authority, licensing them to be valued as 
sources of first-hand knowledge about the waging of war.  As Peter Dear has argued, our 
basic understanding of what constituted “experience” underwent a profound change 
during the course of the seventeenth century.  The modern notion of experience was 
predicated on individualized, particularized events and not on universal commonplaces, 
as it had been under what Dear conceives as the Aristotelian model of experience.  He 
 
                                                 
77Michaud, “Louis-François Lejeune,” in Biographie Universelle Ancienne et Moderne (Paris: Delagrave et 
compagnie, 1843), 43.  Lejeune’s personnel dossier, conserved at the Service Historique de l’Armée de 
Terre clearly indicates that Lejeune did not serve in Egypt: Dossier Lejeune: 8Yd1417.  
78 Le Salon de 1804, Collection Deloynes. Paris :Département des Estampes, Bibliothèque nationale.  “Il 




writes that “experiences in the Aristotelian sense were…usually constituted as statements 
of how things happen in nature, not as statements of how something had happened on a 
particular occasion.”79  As Dear argues, personal experience began to constitute a way to 
“establish expertise.”80  This reconceptualization of experience contained broad 
ramifications for the production of knowledge; personal expertise cultivated through first-
hand experience could be seen as value-free or transparently accurate.81
By and large, critics focused on the direct encounter with war that Lejeune’s 
battle paintings were thought to provide.  As the art critic Chaussard noted when 
reviewing Lejeune’s 1806 Salon entry, the Battle of the Pyramids, “lucky citizens can 
enjoy the spectacle of a battle without exposing themselves to danger, and even children 
and families can imagine themselves before the view of the actions of their fathers or 
their relations.  They will follow all these events with their eyes…Everything is correct, 
everything is truthful; one takes part in the action.”
  The high-esteem 
held for knowledge gained through personal experience is an important key for 
considering how Lejeune’s battle paintings were received by contemporary critics and 
audiences. 
82
                                                 
79 Peter Dear, Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 125.  
  When he turned his attention to a 
reproductive engraving of Lejeune’s 1801 Salon submission, the Battle of Marengo, the 
critic found that the affective power of his painting translated seamlessly into a print 
medium.  The reproductive print by Coiny (a different engraving from the version 
80 Ibid., 84. 
81 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact, Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and 
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 70-72.  
82 Chaussard, Le Pausanias français: ou, description du Salon de 1806 , 215-216. “d’heureux citadins 
pourront jouir du spectacle d’une bataille sans en courir le danger, ou plutôt des enfants, des familles 
s’enflammeront à la vue des actions de leurs pères et de leurs proches.  Ils suivront de l’œil, pour ainsi dire, 




included in Histoire des guerres des gaulois en Italie) “is the exact representation of the 
object, that is to say the truth, history, of which we thus become eyewitnesses.”83
The fact that Lejeune’s paintings were not history paintings seemed to work to 
their advantage when it came to licensing spectators to believe in their truth value: “There 
is nothing here that can be studied, combined, or calculated in a studio…All of these 
details are too real for the imagination to compose them or for the spirit to intuit them; 
one must have seen them to render them with such truth.”
  This 
idea that Lejeune’s paintings allowed spectators to “take part in the action” produced a 
powerful illusion of access and participation through which viewers could assume the 
position of eyewitnesses and enact their own encounters with France’s military exploits.  
This freedom of viewers identified by period sources to move in and out of the battle and 
to engage with the actions as eyewitnesses came to dominate the expectations around 
contemporary battle painting throughout the nineteenth century.  As we shall see in the 
chapters that follow, these kinds of values become particularly important for the work of 
Horace Vernet, the century’s most prolific battle painter.  
84
                                                 
83 Ibid., 596. “C’est ici la représentation exacte de l’objet, c’est à dire la vérité, l’histoire, dont nous 
devenons alors témoins oculaires.” 
 The supposed transparency 
with which his paintings represented war also guaranteed a crowd of viewers gathered 
around them, something frequently cited in the critical discourse.  At the Salon of 1806, 
as with previous exhibitions, critics often made reference to these crowds: “Even though 
this composition is of a genre less elevated than the [works by Gros and Hennequin], and 
that its small dimension makes it more landscape than history, [this painting] is always 
84 Arlequin au Muséum, ou critique en vaudeville des tableaux exposés au Salon,  (Paris: Brasseur aîné, 
1806), 23. “Ce n’est pas là de ces choses étudié, combiné, calculé dans un atelier…Tous ces détails sont 
trop vrais pour que l’imagination les compose, ou que l’esprit les devine; il faut les avoir vus pour les 




flooded with a large number of spectators who enjoy contemplating, outside of harm’s 
way, a spectacle made to strike every imagination.”85  Another critic, after praising the 
aesthetic merits of the elevated genre of history painting, pointed out that such 
representations “are not faithful representations.  Military men do not recognize their 
maneuvers.”86 He argued that Lejeune’s battle paintings were honored by a “row of 
spectators three deep” because of their commitment to representing the soldiers “in the 
order and in the positions they had at the moment of the combat.”87
The above critic’s reference to the fact that Lejeune’s paintings allowed soldiers 
to recognize the combats they had taken part in was not an isolated one.  As if to prove 
the fact that Lejeune’s battle paintings constituted faithful eyewitness transcriptions of 
the events of a battle, critics regularly deferred to the rhetorical authority of soldiers when 
they reviewed his paintings.  While examining Lejeune’s Battle of Mont Thabor, 
exhibited at the Salon of 1804, a critic “eavesdropped” on a soldier explaining the 
painting to a friend:   
   
See there, said a soldier to his friend, see there, on the right, that mountain that 
rises like a cut-off cone?  That’s Mont Thabor…I was there and it’s there where I 
was wounded; I fought well and Buonaparte knew it and gave me the legion of 
honor…I’m no good at painting but this picture is true; so natural, the sites and 
the houses are so well imitated that I feel like I’m still there.  My heart is beating 
like I’ve just heard a gun go off and I’ve just had the horror of getting wounded 
and it was not due to fear that it beat this way then.88
                                                 
85 C., “Salon de 1806, 1er article,” Mercure de France, 27 septembre 1806, 602. “Quoique cette 
composition soit d'un genre moins relevé que les deux précédentes, et que par la petitesse des dimensions 
elle appartienne plutôt au paysage qu'à l'histoire, elle est toujours assiégée d'un grand nombre de 
spectateurs, qui aiment à contempler à l'abri du danger, un spectacle fait pour frapper toutes les 
imaginations.”    
  
86  “Suite de l’examen des tableaux,” Collection Deloynes. Paris : Département des Estampes, Bibliothèque 
nationale de France.  “…Ne sont pas des représentations fidèles, les militaires ne reconnaissent pas leurs 
manœuvres.”   
87 Ibid. 
88 “Lettre adressée à Messieurs Les rédacteurs du journal des sciences, de littérature, et des arts, ” 
Collection Deloynes, Paris : Département des Estampes, Bibliothèque nationale de France.  “Vois-tu, disant 





This text stages an eyewitness experience in front of The Battle of Mont Tabor with great 
rhetorical effect.  We are privy to the information that this particular soldier was 
wounded during the course of the battle whose representation he beholds.  For this 
soldier, the experience of standing in front of Lejeune’s painting is all too real: his rapidly 
beating heart is the product of a visceral reaction to the events depicted in the painting.  
The implication is that the representation is so extraordinarily real that it causes the 
soldier to relive the experience of the battle he is gazing at.  The critical identification of 
soldiers as arbiters of a battle painting’s truth-value suggests that critics were looking for 
license to read these representations as transparently truthful.  Soldiers were called upon 
to function as eyewitness experts capable corroborating the authenticity of the battle 
painting in question beyond reproach.  Thus, the consistent allusion to soldiers provided a 
means for critics to verify their opinions that battle painting could translate the 
experience of war on canvas.   
The soldier’s active identification with the painting, casually overheard by the 
snooping critic, provides what can be called an “evidential context” to support the critic’s 
own opinion. 89
                                                                                                                                                 
tronqué ? C’est le mont tabor…; j’y étais, j’y fus blessé, je m’y conduisis bien, Buonaparte le sut et je suis 
de la légion d’honneur… Je ne me connais pas en peinture mais ce tableau est vrai ; si naturel, les lieux, les 
maisons sont si bien imités, (386) qu’il me semble y être encore.  Tiens, mon cœur bat comme lorsque 
j’entendis sonner la charge, et que j’ai eu l’honneur d’etre blessé et ce n’était pas de peur qu’il battait 
alors.” 
  After overhearing the soldier’s impassioned eyewitness testimony, the 
critic evaluates the episodes and concludes that “all of this is so truthful that there is 
89 Simon Schaffer, “Self-Evidence,” in Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion across the 
Disciplines, ed. Arnold I. Davidson James Chandler, Harry Harootunian (Chicago: University of Chicago 




nothing left to desire.”90  He then attempts to move away from the painting in order to 
evaluate another one but finds that he is unable to do so.  As he walks away from it, he 
discovers that “you cannot step away from this painting without turning around to look at 
it some more.”91
The belief that Lejeune’s paintings directly pictured the experience of war effaced 
the subjective hand of the artist and his submission to a system of artistic conventions. 
But occasionally, the recognition of his participation in a larger system of artistic 
conventions challenged the powerful illusion propagated by his supposedly transparent 
images.  In the middle of the foreground of the Battle of Aboukir, just behind the central 
camel, two bodies, Turkish and French, lay motionless atop one another (Fig. 2.29).  In a 
motif that anticipates what Darcy Grimaldo Grigsby has called the compositional 
“fulcrum” of Girodet’s Revolt of Cairo, painted six years later, Lejeune depicted the 
grisly aftermath of the decapitation of a French solider.
  The responses of the critic and the soldier are thus both focused on the 
body’s reaction to the painting before them.  For the soldier, it is his beating heart; for the 
critic, it is his professional compulsion to look.  Such corporeal reactions can be 
understood as an index for the dynamic experience of viewing one of Lejeune’s battle 
paintings.  These sorts of responses, along with the ones discussed earlier, suggest a 
mode of active viewing that allows for the events depicted in the landscape to be 
interpreted as transparently real and not the result of artistic imagination.     
92
                                                 
90 “Lettre adressée à Messieurs Les rédacteurs du journal des sciences, de littérature, et des arts, ” 
Collection Deloynes, Paris : Département des Estampes, Bibliothèque nationale de France.   “Tout cela est 
d’une vérité, d’une vigueur qui ne laissent rien à désirer.”   
  His bodiless head sits in front 
of the dead Turkish soldier’s hand.  This headless French body felicitously intersects with 
91 Ibid. “Plus on voit ce tableau, plus on veut le voir : on ne s’éloigne pas sans retourner la tête pour 
l’admirer encore.” 
92 Darcy Grimaldo Grigsby, Extremities: Painting Empire in Post-Revolutionary France (New Haven: Yale 




a large cactus, a plant Lejeune used as an authenticating example of Egyptian flora.  The 
space between the soldier’s decapitated neck and the cactus discloses the difficulty 
Lejeune may have encountered in rendering this episode of violence as a close-up painted 
detail.  Whereas Girodet avoided this problem with a carefully placed helmet where the 
bloody neck of his decapitated French soldier would have appeared, Lejeune seems to 
have initially offered it up to view.   
In an early etched state of a reproductive engraving of Aboukir (Fig. 2.30), 
however, this same detail of the headless neck is not blocked by the cactus that appears in 
the painting.  A letter to the etcher of this print, dated one month before the opening of 
the Salon of 1804, confirms that the print was made before the painting could have been 
altered.93  Thus, we can assume that in its original state, the painting probably featured 
the headless body in plain view.  In its present state, the upper part of the cactus that 
intersects with the headless body’s neck is covered in thickly applied paint and 
differently shadowed its other parts, suggesting indecision over revealing the entire 
bloody neck or covering it up with local plant life.  For a form of battle painting which 
was widely understood as directly transcriptive, this passage of muddy, thick paint 
between cactus and bloody body constitutes an area in the painting where Lejeune’s 
alleged fidelity the representing the battle would have come up against the conventions of 
artistic decorum.94
                                                 
93 “Lettre LX, Lejeune à Desaulx,” Nouvelles archives de l'art français 26 (1900): 9-10. The letter is dated 
August 5, 1804.  The Salon of 1804 opened one month later.   
   
94 It is impossible to tell when the painting would have been altered to cover up the decapitated  neck.  
After the Salon of 1804, this painting was displayed in the Salon des Maréchaux in the Tuileries palace.  
After the fall of the First Empire, the painting was returned to Lejeune and was not sold to the state until 
1861.  My hypothesis is that the painting was altered for its display in the Salon des Maréchaux by 
someone other than Lejeune.  Careful inspection of the painting reveals that an unsteady hand applied a 




There are several reasons which might explain why a decapitated French soldier 
went unmentioned in the press. It is likely that prevailing standards of etiquette may have 
prevented critics from discussing a moment of violent trauma inflicted on a French body; 
the discourse prioritized Lejeune’s paintings as transparent depictions of the course of a 
battle which were not subject to the demands of any set of conventions other than the 
imperative of truth.  That is, to acknowledge that Lejeune’s selection of episodes was 
based on any other criteria besides the events of the battle would have challenged their 
status as transcriptions of the events they purported to depict.  For many critics, Lejeune’s 
battle painting did not tell or narrate, so much as show war in all of its multivalent details 
as it really occurred.  The decapitated body depicted in Lejeune’s Aboukir showed a form 
of grisly violence which had no corresponding linguistic grounding in the discourse of 
early nineteenth-century battle painting.  This is the kind of violence that, as Simone Weil 
wrote in 1941, “turns anybody who is subject to it into a thing.  Exercised to the limit, it 
turns man into a thing in the most literal sense: it makes a corpse out of him. Somebody 
was here and the next minute, there is nobody here at all.”95
 
  At stake in these battle 
paintings is the illusion of the nobility of war – if death must happen in clashes between 
armies, this body of imagery affirmed that the loss of human life occurred within a 
circumscribed arena of meaning with regard to masculine heroism and national duty.  The 
horror of war, as Weil emphasized and Lejeune hinted at, is the specter of becoming an 
object separated from any form of larger signification.    
                                                                                                                                                 
was a stickler for directly observing his plant life; in the letter to Dessalux, he implored the etcher to go the 
Jardin des plantes in Paris to study the Egyptian palm tree and cactus so that they would look realistic in 
the reproductive engraving of Aboukir.      





By the time Napoleon crowned himself Emperor in 1804, the foreign and 
economic policy of France had become inextricably tied to waging imperial wars of 
expansion across Europe and North Africa.  France’s military achievements, as the 
purview of an entire nation, provided a dependable and compelling point of contact 
between citizens and the state.  The support of France’s war efforts entailed the support 
of the state, a fact that elevated the political importance of representations of 
contemporary wars and made them an expedient expression of state power. 
This chapter has focused on a body of visual imagery that was produced during 
the early years of the First Napoleonic Empire, a period when other continental armies 
struggled to keep pace with France’s military might.  This changed in 1807 at the Battle 
of Eylau, an event Lejeune witnessed. Bonaparte’s Grande armée was fought to a draw 
and for the first time during the Empire, the French public had to contend with the 
possibility of a major, crushing loss.96  Lejeune was asked to supply an eyewitness 
drawing of the battlefield detritus which would later be depicted by Gros in his history 
painting of the battle.97
                                                 
96 Michael Marrianan argues that Gros challenged Napoleon’s political authority by creatively engaging 
with the official documents that Denon provided.  While he does not discuss Lejeune’s drawing or 
engraving, he uses Lejeune as an example of an artist complicit with structures of Napoleonic power.  
While I concur with this observation, I also think that it is important to attend to the modes of spectatorship 
that Lejeune’s paintings enabled as well as the sets of claims and belief structures that such “complicity” 
depended upon.  See  Michael Marrinan, “Literal/Literary/'Lexie': history, text, and authority in Napoleonic 
Painting,” Word & Image 7, no. 3 (1991). 
  The drawing was engraved (Fig. 2.31) by the Dépôt de la guerre 
which would have given it a greater aura of official authority.  For the first time in 
Lejeune’s career as an artist, he was asked to represent a near-defeat.  The image 
97  Lejeune’s drawing (Musée du Louvre) and the subsequent reproductive engraving fit the description 
given by Denon for the concours for Eylau which Gros would win.  It is likely that Gros would have seen 
the drawing and may have used it for his painting.  See Dominique-Vivant Denon, L'oeil de Napoléon, ed. 




represents Napoleon in the process of giving medical attention to wounded Russian 
soldiers, an episode which would have deflected attention away from the specter of 
French defeat.  The same day as this event was to have taken place, Bonaparte also 
conducted a review of the troops.  In addition to the cries of “Long live the Emperor!,” 
soldiers also reportedly called out for “peace and bread.”98
The battle paintings made previously by Louis-François Lejeune served as a 
pictorial analogue to the impression of a strong French army, which in turn implied the 
strength of the nation, its institutions and leaders.  With their simultaneous attention to 
the particularity of the land being conquered and their focus on a proliferation of episodic 
details, Lejeune’s battle paintings produced an idealized space of war that promoted an 
illusion of visual mastery over a set of military events which now implicated every man, 
woman and child in France.  To behold one of Lejeune’s battle paintings in the space of 
the Salon, surrounded by a crowd of fellow spectators, was to be treated to a picture of 
war which spoke to the strength of an entire nation.   
   
The transparency that so many critics associated with Lejeune’s battle paintings, 
and wanted to see in them, speaks to way in which the clear visibility of Napoleonic 
military exploits could articulate the health of France’s government.  This helps to 
explain the enthusiasm over Lejeune’s battle paintings at public exhibitions.  As a painter 
of France’s armed victories, Lejeune’s paintings helped to uphold a contingent system of 
belief which maintained power structures in post-revolutionary France.   
                                                 











Representing War during Peacetime:   
Paradoxes and Proliferation during the Bourbon Restoration 
 
 
War Imagery and the Legacy of the Restoration 
Art historians have contended that the Bourbon Restoration (1815-1830) marks a 
period when the representation of Napoleonic military imagery practically disappeared.  
This was asserted in 1914 by the art historian Léon Rosenthal and has been echoed in 
recent scholarship.  In the space of one sentence, Rosenthal denied the possibility of 
representing the recent military past in painting during the period.  “The Restoration did 
not nourish military painting and more or less eliminated subjects pertaining to national 
contemporary history.”1  More recently, Michael Marrinan has argued that imagery 
associated with Napoleon was “kept clandestinely alive in the popular arts during the 
years of the Bourbon Restoration rule.”2
                                                 
1 Rosenthal, Du romantisme au réalisme, Essai sur l'évolution de la peinture en France de 1830 à 1848 
, 79. “La Restauration avait donné peu d’aliments à la peinture militaire et supprimé pour ainsi dire, 
l’histoire contemporaine nationale.” 
  The notion that Bourbon authorities 
systematically repressed representations of recent military events has established itself as 
the orthodox interpretation.  Many of the pictures of war that were produced have been 
identified with a set of radical, oppositional politics which served as a beacon for 




“liberal” dissent against the Bourbons, who, in this binary scheme, have been framed as 
reactionary and repressive.3
These interpretations of images of the recent Napoleonic past and the 
contemporary consequences of the fall of the First Empire would seem to be confirmed 
by the policies of the Bourbons during the early years of the Restoration when Bourbon 
officials attempted to purge public and private spaces of any visual or textual material 
that related to the Revolution or the Empire, including paintings, busts of Napoleon, 
songs and even catechisms about the former Emperor.  Officials enacted a policy of what 
was called at the time oubli and mise-en-place, a “compulsory” forgetting of the past 
twenty-five years of Revolution and Empire, in order to put the new regime into place.  
The aim of these iconoclastic policies was as historian Sheryl Kroen has argued, 
“effacement not only from the public landscape but from the very memory of the 
population of any alternatives to legitimate monarchy.”
  
4
One of the great paradoxes of nineteenth-century French art production is that 
despite the political will of the Bourbon Restoration government against representing the 
recent Napoleonic past, such imagery flourished.  While there is no question that 
paintings and prints of imagery related to Napoleon and military engagements of the First 
Empire could function as signs of political opposition to the Bourbons, this chapter will 
   
                                                 
3 Michael Marrinan and Nina Anathansoglou-Kallmyer have both interpreted the Restoration oeuvre of two 
of the period’s most important artists, Théodore Géricault and Horace Vernet in light of the “liberal 
opposition” to the Bourbons.  See Marrinan, Michael. “Vivre en marge. Géricault et la vie militaire.” In 
Géricault: Dessins et estampes des collections du musée de l'Ecole des beaux-arts, edited by Emmanuelle 
Brugerolles. Paris: Ecole nationale supérieur des beaux-arts, 1998 ; Anathanassoglou-Kallmyer, Nina. 
“Imago Belli: Horace Vernet’s L’Atelier as an Image of Radical Militarism under the Restoration.” The Art 
Bulletin 68 (1986): 268-80, Anathanassoglou-Kallmyer, Nina. “Sad Cincinnatus: le soldat laboureur as an 
image of the Napoleonic veteran after the Empire.” Arts Magazine 60, no. 9 (1986): 65-75.  
4 Sheryl Kroen, Politics and Theater. The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 1815-1830 




suggest that this body of war-related imagery, far from being a marginal and partisan art, 
was in fact central for producing a common discursive ground for a diverse public to 
come to terms with the chaotic social and political upheavals of the previous twenty-five 
years of Revolution and war.  In the absence of political consensus during the period of 
Bourbon rule, war imagery proposed that there was such thing as a shared national past.  
By the end of the period, visual representations of Napoleonic war had gained the favor 
of a powerful group of elites who were critical of the Bourbon government though not 
formally opposed to it, and who would later put it into the service of their own 
government regime under the July Monarchy (1830-1848).  This chapter suggests that 
one reason for the proliferation of war-related imagery during the Restoration was the 
relative openness of Napoleon as a subject for visual representation after his fall from 
power.  Despite strong official political reaction against the representation of Napoleonic 
subjects, images related to France’s recent military past continued to appear at Salon 
exhibitions, in illustrated books and, as prints.   
  
“Things Seen:” The End of Empire  
 Though war raged all over the European continent from 1792 until 1815, the 
inhabitants of Paris had not yet seen the grisly spectacle of war in their own city.  This 
changed in 1814, when the Allies invaded Paris, leading to Napoleon’s first abdication 
and exile.  The succession of events between 1814 and 1815 included Bonaparte’s 
abdication, return from exile, successful battle against the allies at Montmirail, and 
subsequent defeat at Waterloo, which provided a series of opportunities for Parisians to 




in the windows of print-sellers, by 1814 war had arrived in real form.  Battles broke out 
in the city between French forces loyal to Bonaparte and the allies.  Processions of 
wounded French soldiers returned from battle and allied soldiers occupied the city at 
various intervals between 1814 and 1815.   
A series of three drawings made by Etienne-Jean Delécluze, a former student of 
Jacques-Louis David, represented these events which marked the tumultuous end of the 
First Empire.  Two of the drawings depict the return of wounded French (Fig. 3.1) and 
Russian soldiers (Fig. 3.2) after the Battle of Montmirail in 1814.  A third drawing 
showed a scene from 1815: the encampment of allied soldiers who remained in Paris to 
assure the successful second return of the Bourbons after Napoleon’s defeat and final 
abdication after Waterloo.  All three of these drawings carry a notation on the bottom 
left-hand corner, vidit, which in Latin means things seen.  Delécluze’s inclusion of the 
notation is significant for it attests to his own status as an eyewitness observer of these 
events.   
Phrases such as vidit, d’après nature and peint sur les lieux were routinely 
included in contemporary battle imagery during the First Empire to make such 
representations appear as truthful, eyewitness depictions of war.  Whereas history 
painters were expected to idealize and transcend the brute particularity of important 
historical events and hence excluded any such notation from their works, artists who 
represented contemporary war in lesser genres including engraving and small-scale battle 
painting embraced the episodic details of a combat and used these notations to bolster 
their claims of depicting the event faithfully.  Delécluze, drawing what he saw and 




degree of veracity for his representations.  By using the notation vidit, Delécluze departed 
from the classicizing rules of history painting in which had had been trained.  It is 
important to consider his motivation for doing so.     
By the time Delécluze made these drawings at the end of the First Empire, the 
representation of contemporary military scenes had become a fixture of artistic 
production for history painters and artists such as Lejeune and Carle Vernet who worked 
in lesser genres more closely related to landscape than to the grand genre.  The fact that 
the arts in general, and especially history painting, had taken to depicting contemporary 
history for the political benefit of Napoleon Bonaparte was bemoaned by partisans of the 
French classical tradition of painting opposed to tainting  the genre of history painting 
with lowly subjects of contemporary history.  With Napoleon’s firm control of the arts 
during the First Empire, government-sponsored commissions for history paintings were 
almost exclusively devoted to national, contemporary subjects such as battles, triumphal 
entries into cities and the signing of treaties.  Artists who had been trained to represent 
classical Greek and Roman subjects, such as Jacques-Louis David, Francois Gérard, and 
Pierre-Narcisse Guérin, accommodated contemporary subjects into their practice and 
many, such as Antoine-Jean Gros, staked their reputation on representing Napoleon’s 
heroic endeavors.  In the eyes of many critics during the Restoration, the First Empire 
had caused history painters to compromise their artistic standards for the benefit of 
Napoleon’s propaganda machine.5
                                                 
5 For an excellent discussion regarding the regret that Antoine-Jean Gros experienced for having 
represented contemporary history on a monumental scale during the First Empire, see Chapter 6 of  
O'Brien, After the Revolution, Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting and Propaganda under Napoleon , 190-236. 




Few critics felt stronger about maintaining the classical Davidian tradition than 
Etienne-Jean Delécluze, the author of these drawings.  In fact, when his peers welcomed 
commissions from Napoleon’s government throughout the First Empire, Delécluze 
renounced painting altogether and refused to accept any state-sponsored commissions.  
For Delécluze, the classical tradition had compromised its rigorous system of values 
based on Greco-Roman traditions, abandoning them for the temporary favor of the 
government.  Reflecting on the First Empire in his journal, Delécluze wrote in 1827 that 
“the emperor and his regime fatigued me daily.  The habits of adulation to which men of 
letters and artists had become accustomed were anathema to me.  Little by little I lost 
courage, and I gave up the exercise of my art, painting.” 6  In the absence of commissions 
from the government or other individuals, Delécluze occupied his time by copying the 
Marie de Medici cycle by Peter-Paul Rubens at the Luxembourg Gallery “with the idea of 
reforming my studies which had been directed toward antiquity, to give them a more 
modern varnish.”7
                                                 
6 Etienne-Jean Delécluze, Journal de Delécluze, 1824-1828, ed. Robert Baschet (Paris: Editions Bernard 
Grasset, 1948), 373.  “L’empereur et le régime impérial me fatiguaient journellement.  Les habitudes 
d’adulation que les gens de lettres et les artistes avaient contractées m’étaient antipathiques.  Peu à peu je 
perdis courage, et je renonçai en quelque sorte à l’exercice de mon art, la peinture.” 
  Delécluze’s notion of the modern was an exclusively artistic one, 
epitomized by his imitation of the Baroque manner of Rubens at the Luxembourg, and a 
function of his rigorous attachment to the model of Greco-Roman antiquity as the true 
source for painting.  It was inconceivable that art could accommodate contemporary 
subject matter such as Napoleonic battles, which had in his opinion contributed to the 
ruinous state of history painting during the first part of the nineteenth century.   
7 Ibid.  “dans l’idée de reformer mes études qui avaient été dirigées vers l’antiquité, pour leur donner un 




During the Restoration, critics were free to express their hostility toward 
contemporary military events as a subject for serious art, something they could not do 
under Bonaparte.  One critic, writing in 1819, was relieved to see a lack of batailles 
modernes in the Salon exhibition.  He then reflected upon the way that battles had taken 
over the Salons of the First Empire: 
Then, when it was permitted to represent only battle scenes and our eyes were 
fatigued by the eternal aspect of carnage, of death, and of ruins, in the middle of 
which stood the cold and ferocious soldier, numb to these horrors…Painting and 
Europe have been both liberated and the arts here applauded, like humanity, at the 
downfall of the common oppressor.8
 
   
For this anonymous critic, the representation of Napoleonic war was synonymous with an 
enslavement of the arts for purely political and militaristic ends.  Like many of his peers, 
he understood battle painting as a politically partisan, divisive genre, no longer necessary 
after the cessation of hostilities.  In a time of peace, the representation of war had no 
place.   
Delécluze never publicly exhibited his three drawings of contemporary military 
events surrounding the fall of the First Empire, neither did he show them in any Salons, 
nor have them reproduced in print form.  They remained out of sight. Nevertheless, the 
drawings are unusually well documented, owing to a description of them that Delécluze 
gave to the curators at Versailles as part of the bequest to the Château de Versailles a year 
before his death in 1862.9
                                                 
8 “Sur quelques tableaux du Salon,” L’Ami de la religion et du roi, journal ecclésiastique, politique, et 
littéraire, November 10 1819, 415.“Depuis il ne fut plus permis de représenter que des scènes de batailles, 
et nos yeux étoient fatigués de l’eternel aspect du carnage, de la mort, et des ruines, au milieu desquelles 
s’élévoit la figure froide et farouche d’un soldat insensible de ces horreurs…La peinture et l’Europe ont été 
affranchies l’une et l’autre, et les arts ont applaudi, comme l’humanité, à la chute de l’oppresseur 
commun.” 
  Delécluze, for example, described in detail one of the 
9 Xavier Salmon, Trésors cachés, chefs-d'oeuvre du cabinet d'arts graphiques du chateau de Versailles 




drawings depicting wounded French soldiers returning from the Battle of Montmirail 
(Fig. 3.1), Bonaparte’s last victory during his temporary return to power after his first 
exile: 
February 17, from two to three o’clock, the wounded of the French Imperial 
Guard, some of whom had participated in the Montmirail affair, made their entry 
in Paris along the boulevards, making their way to toward the Invalides 
hospital…A mother supports her son, a soldier of the young guard, who is 
recognized by his dog.  Behind, a young man, pulling a limping horse by the 
bridle upon which sits a grenadier whose head is wrapped in a bloody 
rag…Beyond this sad and imposing procession, in the back of the picture, appear 
curious onlookers on foot and in carriages, moved by the spectacle so different 




Delécluze’s letter describing each scene reads like a description of a battle painting lifted 
out of a Salon catalogue.  Like the battle paintings described in the Salon livrets, 
Delécluze’s drawings would become a part of France’s historical record and needed to be 
treated accordingly.   
Though Delécluze emphasized the contemporaniety of his subject matter through 
the mention of vidit in the bottom left-hand corner of the drawings, he attempted to 
impart hints of the antique to the procession, as befitted his aesthetic convictions.  As an 
artistic subject, the procession recalled the iconography Roman triumphal arches as well 
as friezes on ancient Greek temples such as the Parthenon.  The horizontal orientation of 
the drawing, like an antique frieze, provided Delécluze with an opportunity to imbue the 
line of French soldiers returning victorious from the battle of Montmirail with an air of 
                                                 
10 Ibid.  « Le 17 février, de deux à trois heures, les blessés de la garde impériale française, dont une partie 
avait pris part à l’affaire de Montmirail, firent leur entrée à Paris et suivirent les boulevards, se dirigeant 
vers l’hôtel des Invalides…Une mère soutient son fils, soldat de la jeune garde, qui est reconnu par son 
chien.  Derrière, un jeune garçon, tirant par la bride un cheval boiteux sur lequel est un grenadier à cheval, 
dont la tête est enveloppée d’un linge ensanglanté…Au delà de ce triste et imposant cortège, au fond du 
tableau, sont des curieux à pied et en voiture, émus par un spectacle si différent de celui gai et joyeux qu’on 




solemn moral grandeur.  Moreover, Delécluze even made reference to a famous episode 
from Homer’s Odyssey in the middle of the drawing (Fig. 3.3), where a dog runs up to a 
wounded soldier and wags his tail in recognition of his returned master.  The incident 
recalls the moment where Ulysses, absent for twenty-eight years is recognized only by 
his faithful dog Argos.11
Delécluze’s recourse to a subdued form of classicism in all three of his drawings 
may have been an attempt to elevate what he probably perceived as an ill-advised subject 
for serious artistic practice.  But even as he tried to redeem these contemporary military 
scenes, the appearance of the term vidit in all three of these drawings also provided a 
convenient hedge against the perceived lowliness of the subject.  By asserting his position 
as a dispassionate observer of the events he depicted, Delécluze affirmed their status as 
mere historical documents and not as ambitious works of art, something which may have 
led him to donate to them to the historical museum at Versailles and not to the great 
repository of fine art, the Louvre.  In contrast to the works of art displayed at the Louvre 
or even at the Luxembourg (reserved for living French artists) during the Second Empire, 
Versailles was reserved for subjects pertaining to French national history and was 
understood as a less artistically eminent collection.   
   
Delécluze’s notation of vidit on each drawing to designate a mode of 
representation distinct from the beau idéal reveals the profound problem that 
contemporary subjects posed to the aesthetic hierarchies of the classical tradition.  
Having bemoaned the slavish devotion of history painting to Bonaparte’s political agenda 
under the First Empire, he thought the situation no better after the Bourbons assumed the 
                                                 





throne in 1815: the willingness of painting to accommodate the subjects of contemporary 
political circumstance continued unabated.  The former pupil of David thought that by 
taking on contemporary political subjects, “painting was now nothing more than a 
compliant art, ready to aid the new arrivals, just as it had served the one who had just 
fallen.”12
After the definitive return of the Bourbons in 1815, ambitious history painters no 
longer received State commissions to represent battle on history painting’s monumental 
scale as they had during the Empire.  Painters who had flourished under Bonaparte’s 
patronage of national military subjects found themselves free to return to depicting 
classical subjects.  Charles Landon, a conservative critic who supported the return of the 
Bourbons, wrote that under Bonaparte, “all kinds of talent became tributaries and 
instruments of his ambition.  Pity those, who by cupidity or to advance on the road of 
favor, perhaps out of necessity, dedicate themselves to a constant work of flattery.”
  For Delécluze, the classical tradition of painting became degraded under the 
pressure of taking on politically opportune subjects, be they Bourbon or Bonapartist.  The 
only way for the Davidian tradition to renew itself would be through the representation of 
timeless, classical subjects. But as the unexhibited drawings make clear, the 
representation of contemporary events, especially military ones, during the period of 
prolonged peace after Waterloo provided many artists with a means of engaging with a 
form of modern, lived experience that classicism forbade.       
13
                                                 
12 Delécluze, Journal de Delécluze, 1824-1828, 374.  « La peinture n’était plus qu’un art complaisant, prêt 
à aider les nouveaux venus, comme il avait servi à soutenir celui qui venait de tomber. » 
  
The Bourbon government touted itself as a peacekeeper, and in fact it delivered the 
13 C.P. Landon, Annales du musée et de l'école moderne des beaux-arts (Paris: Imprimerie de Chaignieau 
Ainé, 1814), 34. “tous les genres de talens devinrent les tributaires et les instruments de son ambition.  
Plaignons ceux-qui, par cupidité ou pour s’avancer dans le chemin de la faveur, peut-être aussi par la dure 




French people from twenty-five years of war and unified them in peace.  Artists who had 
earned their reputations under the Empire by representing Napoleon’s military 
achievements turned to subjects more favorable to the Bourbons, including contemporary 
Bourbon deeds, medieval French history and religious painting.   
Antoine-Jean Gros is the famous example of an artist who readily left 
contemporary military subjects behind. He spent the Restoration years attempting to 
recapture the essence of a classical tradition that he now saw as having become, partly 
through his own earlier painting, degraded under the pressure of depicting the military 
glories of one man.  As David O’Brien has argued, the artist felt himself responsible for 
the downfall of classicism and tried to repair the damage by dedicating himself to 
classically inspired subjects.14  Gros saw that history painting’s status as the most 
esteemed of all genres was diminishing; he tried, without success, to take on classically-
inspired subjects and resuscitate the Davidian ideal.  His Salon of 1822 submission, 
Bacchus and Ariadne (Fig. 3.4) was widely regarded as a critical failure.15
 
  With David 
exiled to Brussels for having voted the execution of Louis XVIII’s brother, Louis XVI, in 
1793, Gros took over his studio and became the logical progenitor of the Davidian 
classical tradition. Artists such as Gros, Girodet, Guérin and Gérard who had matured 
during the First Empire now found themselves competing in Salon exhibitions with a 
generation of younger artists for whom Davidian classicism was an outmoded and even 
irrelevant language.   
 
                                                 
14 O'Brien, After the Revolution, Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting and Propaganda under Napoleon, 192-208.  




Regime Change and Mapping 
 
This move away from military subjects in official art corresponded to the 
weakening of France’s military institutions during the Restoration.  As historian Paddy 
Griffith has argued, the Bourbons were “suspicious” of the French army and sought to 
limit its power, a desire shared by other European powers supportive of France’s newly 
founded peacetime government.16  Under the terms of the Second Treaty of Paris, signed 
on November 20, 1815 after the Hundred Days, France was required to pay a heavy 
indemnity (700 million francs) and fund the occupation of 150,000 allied troops from 
Russia, Prussia, England and Austria for a period of three to five years at the cost of 150 
million francs.17  The heavy financial burden placed on France by Europe’s powers in 
conjunction with foreign occupation meant that the new French government’s army 
would no longer pose a threat to achieving peace within Europe.  Over half of the French 
army was sent home, with officers and soldiers put on half-pay, or demi-solde.  By 1817, 
the French army was a shadow of its former self and numbered no more than 117,000 
men.18
Along with works of art pillaged by the French during the First Empire, the Allies 
also demanded the restitution of their maps and related intelligence materials seized 
during the course of the French army’s campaigns.  In an attempt to conserve copies of 
the cartographic documents that Napoleon’s army had taken from the conquered 
territories before the Allies could repossess them, Louis XVIII authorized the engraving 
   
                                                 
16 Paddy Griffith, Military Thought in the French Army, 1815-1851 (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester 
University Press, 1989), 12.  
17 Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, The Bourbon Restoration, trans. Lynn Case (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1967), 129.  




and publication of every map in the Dépôt de la guerre for which it possessed the original 
copper plates in April 1814.  In the same month, the Allies took back over 800 volumes 
from the library of the Dépôt de la guerre, surveying equipment, “all the maps they could 
find and the printing paper.”19  As a part of the terms of the Second Treaty of Paris which 
were harsher than those of the First Treaty of Paris, drawn up before Napoleon’s return 
from exile, France’s territory was reduced from its 1792 borders, which included 
territories conquered by the Revolutionary army, to its 1790 limits.  In concert with the 
redrawing of France’s borders, the treaty also stipulated that all of the maps in France’s 
possession that represented these ceded territories also had to be given to the Allies, even 
if they had been made by the French ingénieurs-géographes.20  Under the terms of the 
peace treaties of 1814-1815, the archives of the Dépôt de la guerre, which had played an 
integral role in France’s military successes and stood as a monument to them, were 
dispersed all over Europe.  These once carefully guarded state secrets were now shared 
knowledge between powers.21
 In addition to the instrumental value of maps for carrying out military campaigns 
during the First Empire, they were prized as accurate sources of information that 
permitted a mode of informed spectatorship of the army’s conquests of distant territories.  
As we have already seen, a proliferation of visual representations across a range of media 
translated the epistemological authority of maps into an artistic mode which promised the 
illusion of visual access to France’s military combats in terms of troop movements, 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 392.   
20 Ibid. 413.  
21 According to Colonel Berthaut in his invaluable account of the Ingénieurs-géographes, several important 
maps and their copper plates were hidden away in private homes from the Allies during the period of 
restitution, including the copper plates for the map of the French Empire. See Berthaut, Les Ingénieurs-




heroic actions and topographical accuracy.  But with France’s imperial ambitions 
eliminated by the nation’s defeat and the exile of its former leader, the reception of these 
forms of war-related imagery changed.  In the new era of post-Waterloo peace, there 
were no more campaigns to follow or territorial acquisitions to behold.  Accordingly, 
battle paintings such as Lejeune’s were especially vulnerable to critiques about the 
subservience of art to contemporary political circumstance.  Whereas many critics 
regretted history painting’s foray into Napoleonic subject matter but understood that it 
was out of financial and political necessity, Lejeune had represented such lowly 
contemporary themes out of choice.  For many critics, this was an unforgivable 
transgression.     
 In particular, it was against Lejeune’s manner of representing a battle as a source 
of topographical knowledge that Restoration critics took direct aim.  Jacques-Nicolas 
Paillot de Montabert, a former student of David’s, published an important multi-volume 
treatise on painting in 1829.22
Needing to find in a battle painting the exactitude of a journalist, tactical research, 
the scrupulous history of the event, the faithful topography of the site, the servile 
imitation of costumes, even the image of the atmosphere the day and hour of the 
combat, all of these demands, I say, are the result of ignorance of the properties of 
art; all of these laws are the remnants of barbarism.
  In one section, Paillot de Montabert lambasted what he 
saw as the new fashion in battle painting:  
23
 
       
                                                 
22 The literature on Montabert is scant.  In 2007, he was the subject of an exhibition in his native Troyes.  
See Jacques-Nicolas Paillot de Montabert, Troyes 1771-1849, Peintre et théoricien de l’Art, Troyes, 
Musée Saint-Loup, 5 mai-9 septembre 2007.   
23 Jacques-Nicolas Paillot de Montabert, “Des tableaux de batailles,” in Traité complet de la peinture 
(Paris: J.-F. Delion, 1829), 434. “Exiger qu’on retrouve dans un tableau de bataille l’exactitude de gazetier, 
les recherches tactiques, l’historique scrupuleux de l’éventement, la fidele topographie des lieux, l’imitation 
servile des costumes, l’image même de l’atmosphère au jour et à l’heure de ce combat, toutes ces 
demandes, dis je, sont le résultat de l’ignorance des propretés de l’art ; toutes ces lois sont un reste de 




The kinds of battle paintings he had in mind were without a doubt Lejeune’s.  With the 
fall of the First Empire and no military campaigns to follow, Lejeune’s paintings 
appeared to many critics as bereft of artistic value.  Paillot de Montabert, like Delécluze, 
a former student of David and partisan of the Davidian classical tradition, protested 
against what he saw as a kind of servile dedication to representing a battle in too much 
empirical detail.  He denigrated the specific type of battle painting associated with 
Lejeune:  “If the painter wants to wrestle with the ingénieur-géographe, then he will not 
be, let us repeat, neither engineer, nor painter, nor geographer; if he overly researches the 
exactitude of the uniforms, of the hats, then he will become cold and insipid.”24  The 
reference to the ingénieur-géographe alluded to the reliance of painters like Lejeune on 
documents furnished by the Dépôt de la guerre to compose their paintings.  Delécluze, 
writing about battle painting, accused topographic battle painters “under the pretext of 
giving a clearer idea of the position, of marches, and the evolution of an army, of 
spreading small figures on an immense terrain.  What this does is to visibly degenerate 
their paintings, as I’ve said, into topographical maps.”25
 
  
Painting Napoleonic Battle after Napoleon at the Salons of 1817 and 1819 
 
Despite the absence of official support for battle painting and the sigh of relief 
many critics breathed that such subjects no longer dominated the most important part of 
exhibitions, the “genre of battles” continued to exist, and even flourished under the 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 434-435. “Si le peintre vue lutter avec l’ingénieur géographe, il ne sera, répétons-le, ni peintre, ni 
ingénieur ; s’il recherche trop l’exactitude de forme des habits, des chapeaux, il pourra devenir froid et 
insipide.” 
25 Etienne-Jean Delécluze, “Beaux-arts, Salon,” Journal des débats, politiques, et littéraires, 30 Septembre 
1824, 4. “Les peintres de batailles en particulier, sous prétexte de donner une idée plus juste de la position, 
des marches et des évolutions d’une armée, sèment de petites figures sur un immense terrain, ce qui fait 




Bourbons.  Though the political change of 1814-1815 rendered obsolete the monumental 
mode of battle painting-cum-history painting as practiced by Gros and others, smaller-
scale iterations appeared with regularity at Restoration Salons.  Their critical reception 
demonstrates that the meaning of war-related imagery underwent something of a 
transformation during the period.  No longer charged with the ideological imperative of 
representing particular conflicts for the benefit of a government or ruler, they instead 
reinforced the divide between the peaceful post-Waterloo present and the recent bellicose 
past.  One of the first artists to adapt battle painting to the change in ideological 
circumstances after Waterloo was Louis-François Lejeune, the painter whose dedication 
to topographical battle painting was widely decried by critics.  In his paintings exhibited 
at the early Salons of the Restoration (1817 and 1819), Lejeune traded his characteristic 
long-range topographical landscapes and his focus on the maneuvers of the entire army 
for an emphasis on his personal war-time experiences removed from the grand annals of 
decisive battles from the First Empire.  Though for an entirely different set of reasons 
than Delécluze, Lejeune sought refuge in “things seen” as a way of avoiding the 
problematic subject matter of contemporary military encounters.   
The Salon of 1817, the first official Salon exhibition of the Restoration, featured 
an anonymously exhibited battle painting entitled Vue du monastère et des taureaux 
antiques de Guisando, sur les bords de l’Alberge, en Castille (Fig. 3.5).  The Salon 
booklet gave a lengthy description of the painting, noting that “the author has transported 




attacked by eight hundred Guerrillas of Don Juan Médico.”26  This mention of the 
author’s participation in the depicted events provided viewers with enough information to 
determine the identity of the painter as Louis-François Lejeune.  The critics who chose to 
review the anonymous painting instantly recognized its author’s characteristic rendering 
of a battle in terms of discrete, piquant episodes and local color: “This able artist has 
maintained anonymity; but there is not a single person who does not recognize him as the 
brave military man who painted the Battle of Marengo a few years ago.”27
Lejeune’s decision to exhibit the painting anonymously demonstrates his clear 
understanding that the political tide had turned against exhibiting a Napoleonic military 
scene in the Bourbon-sponsored Salon exhibition.  To negotiate the new political climate, 
he adopted a strategy of naming, or rather non-naming, which also extended to the title of 
the painting.  Unlike the battle paintings he exhibited during the First Empire, he avoided 
giving his anonymous Salon of 1817 entry a title that identified a battle.  Instead, he 
called it a “vue,” presenting it as a landscape of an exotic Spanish locale complete with a 
monastery and large-scale bull sculptures.  Despite the purported anonymity of the author 
and the innocuous title, it was sufficiently clear who the author was and what the painting 
depicted.  As a result, Lejeune’s painting was apparently removed by Bourbon officials 
   
                                                 
26 Les Catalogues des Salons des Beaux-Arts, I (1801-1819), ed. Pierre Sanchez and Xavier Seydoux (Paris: 
L'échelle de Jacob, 1999), 288. “L’auteur a transporté dans ce paysage, l’événement qui lui est arrivé le 5 
avril 1811, lorsqu’il fut attaqué par huit cents hommes des Guérillas de don Juan Médico.” 
27 Toussaint Bernard Emerich-David, Institut national d'histoire de l'art, 8h 1902 (2), no. 6 “Beaux-arts, 
Salon, Sixième Article,” Epreuves du moniteur 1817. “Cet habile artiste a gardé l’anonyme ; mais il n’est 
personne qui ne le reconnaisse pour le brave militaire qui a si bien peint, il y a quelques années, la bataille 




from the Salon after being up long enough to be enthusiastically reviewed by a handful of 
critics.28
Just as during the First Empire, critics understood Lejeune’s paintings as direct 
transcriptions of the events they depicted.  As one critic characteristically noted, “the 
variety of the incidents surpasses the imagination, and all of the scenes are terribly 
truthful.”
   
29  Lejeune included several markers of topographical specificity including a 
monastery in the background and the famous bull sculptures left by the Neolithic 
Celtiberians.  These massive bulls puzzled some viewers, causing a critic to remark 
humorously that “at first glance, one does not recognize that these are made by the hand 
of man; and I heard someone say around me that these were the local animals.”30
While the topographic specificity and the proliferation of episodic actions were 
consistent with Lejeune’s style and allowed the anonymous painting to be attributed to 
him, the View of Guisando is unlike any of his previous works.  It focused less on 
collective military actions during the course of an important battle and more on 
individual, heroic action, notably that of the painting’s author.  In fact, in a painting full 
of discrete episodes, it is the incident featuring Lejeune that is the center of the dramatic 
  A 
combat between the French convoy and the Spanish guerillas occurs in the right 
foreground in a compressed space. The left side of the composition opens up into a lush, 
green landscape complete with mountains and a rainbow.    
                                                 
28 Etienne Jouy, “Beaux-arts,” in Mercure de France (rédigé) (Paris: L'Administration du mercure, 1817), 
354.  In his Salon of 1817 review, Jouy states in a footnote that “ce tableau vient d’être momentanément 
enlevé du salon, par une délicatesse tout à fait politique.”  This may help to explain why the painting was 
reviewed by some, but not all critics.   
29 E.F.A.M. Miel, Essai sur les beaux-arts et particulièrement sur le salon de 1817 (Paris: Didot, 1817), 
355. “La variété des incidens surpasse l’imagination, et toutes les scènes sont d’une affreuse vérité.”  
30 Ibid., 356. “Au premier coup d’œil, on n’y reconnait pas des ouvrages faits de main d’homme ; et j’ai 




action.  An area of inexplicable light shines down on the focal point of the painting in the 
middle of the foreground: the author, in the center, is completely stripped of clothing 
while a guerilla’s foot covers his genitals (Fig. 3.6).   The artist’s nudity was explained in 
the livret as the result of having been attacked and robbed by the guerillas.  The 
confrontation between the guerilla and Lejeune is also a highly sexualized one which 
plays upon ethnic difference, characterized in the painting as a contrast between 
Lejeune’s pale white skin and the guerilla’s brownness.  In fact, the guerrilla’s skin tone 
nearly matches the color of the Lejeune’s horse that lies underneath his former master, 
also a victim of the attack.   
This intermingling of bodies may have been an attempt to elevate the subject 
matter through an emulation of the conventions of the grand genre.   Lejeune’s surprising 
representation of himself as a heroic male nude is reminiscent of the central scene in 
Girodet’s Revolt of Cairo (minus its elevated gravitas and its larger scale).  At the left 
edge of the action in the foreground of Lejeune’s painting, another nude man is about to 
have his throat slit and next to him dogs devour a human carcass.  For the purposes of 
retrospectively exhibiting a Napoleonic subject in the Salon of 1817, Lejeune may have 
decided that a personal war-time incident filled with dramatic gestures, male nudes, 
ancient sculptures and an exotic landscape was more appropriate than representing a 
purely military maneuver as he had done during the First Empire.   
Lejeune followed suit with his 1819 Salon entry, View of the Attack on the Grand 
Convoy, near Salinas (Fig. 3. 7), which many critics incorrectly inferred was also based 
on his personal experiences during the French army’s ill-fated attempt to conquer Spain 




joined up with the Grande armée, which was preparing for the invasion of Russia.31  The 
subject of the painting, which alluded to Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat in Spain, gave the 
artist an opportunity to align himself with France as a defeated nation under the 
Bourbons.  Unlike his Salon of 1817 painting, Lejeune’s Salinas was not removed by the 
censors, indicating that the military defeat of Bonaparte may have been a more acceptable 
subject in 1819.  Delécluze devoted several pages to Lejeune’s Salinas in his review of 
the Salon of 1819 and was one of many critics who incorrectly assumed that the artist had 
witnessed the attack:   “Monsieur Lejeune, deeply moved by an event he witnessed, and 
keeping a crowd of heroic actions in his memory of which he wanted to perpetuate the 
memory, was led to pile up a countless quantity of figures in his composition.”32
The painting depicts an incident in which a convoy led by French soldiers 
transporting the women of the court of Joseph Bonaparte and English prisoners to France 
was attacked by Spanish rebel soldiers.  As a way to shift attention away from the 
militaristic subject matter of the painting, Lejeune focused on the reaction of civilians, 
notably aristocratic women, to the attack.  This was not the only painting of noble female 
heroics at the Salon of 1819: Antoine-Jean Gros exhibited his Embarkation of the 
Duchess of Angoulême, a classicizing history painting which featured Louis XVI’s 
daughter fleeing France after Napoleon Bonaparte’s return from exile in 1815 and the last 
  
Delécluze marveled at the artist’s ability to produce a harmonious composition despite 
the presence of so many episodes. 
                                                 
31 Louis-François  Lejeune, Memoirs of Baron Lejeune Aide-de-Camp to Marshals Berthier, Davout, and 
Oudinot, vol. 2 (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1897), 146.  On May 26, 1812, the day after 
the Salinas convoy attack took place, Lejeune arrived in Posen, Poland.   
32 Etienne-Jean Delécluze, “Beaux-arts, onzième lettre,” Lycée français ou mélanges de littérature et de 
critique 3 (1820): 134. “Monsieur Lejeune, vivement frappé par un événement dont il a été témoin, et 
conservant dans sa mémoire une foule d’actions héroïques dont il désire perpétuer la mémoire, a été 




work of a contemporary political subject that the artist would undertake.33
The armed combat between French, English and Spanish soldiers is dramatized by 
the evocative reactions of the women in the painting.  In the middle foreground, light 
shines down on two well-heeled women in a carriage who gesture toward the guerillas.  
In the foreground (Fig. 3.8), a finely dressed woman wields a rifle and fights back the 
attackers.  To their left (Fig. 3.9), a woman whose baby has fallen on the ground throws 
her arms up in horror, a scene that could have been taken directly out of David’s Sabine 
Women. As in Lejeune’s 1817 painting of Guisando, there are nods to the French 
classical tradition.  In the right bottom corner of the painting, Lejeune has included a 
Belisarius figure (Fig. 3.10) in the form of a blind French soldier being guided to safety 
by a young boy.  In both of these paintings, Lejeune attempted to reconfigure a pictorial 
mode for depicting the military events from the First Empire for an audience no longer 
enthusiastic about following the marches and positions of Napoleon’s defunct army.  His 
recourse to close-up actions in the process of occurring, instead of a sweeping, 
topographic overview of the combat, would become a central concern of the nineteenth 
century’s most important battle painter, Horace Vernet, who helped ensure the durability 
of contemporary warfare as a subject for modern art.     
  In concert 
with Gros’ painting, Lejeune represented a subject that Bourbon censors would have been 
receptive to seeing.   
  The “crowd” became even more prevalent as a figure in Salon criticism of 
Lejeune’s paintings during the Restoration than it had been during the Empire. Nearly 
every critic who reviewed the paintings in 1817 and 1819 remarked upon the presence of 
                                                 




a large crowd and many incorporated the crowd’s presence into their reviews.  The critic 
Edme Miel saw that Lejeune’s Guisando attracted an exceptionally large crowd: “one 
thinks that images like this should necessarily attract a crowd, always insatiable for 
strong emotions; no painting has ever had such a crowd as this one.”34  Other critics refer 
to the crowd as an obstacle to viewing the painting: “When we perceived that the crowd 
around the View of Guisando was a little less large, we could approach it.”35  Even 
Emerich-David, writing in the official government newspaper Le Moniteur, singled out 
Lejeune’s painting as the one in the Salon that was “sought by the crowd with the most 
eagerness.”36
Reference to the crowd allowed critics to distance themselves from the admiring 
masses, by contrasting the latter’s uncritical thirst for violent war imagery with their own 
critical faculty of balanced and informed judgment.  Etienne Jouy, who would later 
become one of Horace Vernet’s most ardent supporters, did not share the enthusiasm of 
the painting’s admirers for the violent episodes:  “Do not be mistaken, it’s not the 
sparkling beauties that earn such a prodigious amount of spectators; it’s due to the choice 
  For critics writing on Lejeune’s painting at a time when the subject of 
Napoleonic war was widely regarded as both unfashionable and politically suspect, the 
popularity of the paintings provided a convenient rationale for reviewing Lejeune’s work 
that allowed them to distinguish their elevated tastes from those of the public.   
                                                 
34 Miel, Essai sur les beaux-arts et particulièrement sur le salon de 1817  “On pense bien que de telles 
images ont dû attirer la foule, toujours insatiable d’émotions fortes ; aucun tableau n’a eu un tel succès 
d’affluence.” 
35 Jouy, “Beaux-arts,” 355. “Nous nous aperçûmes que la foule un peu moins grande, autour du Monastère 
de Guisando, nous permettait d’en approcher.” 
36 Emerich-David, “Beaux-arts, Salon, Sixième Article.” “De tous les tableaux du salon, c’est celui que la 




of a revolting action that the author has obtained an enthusiastic success.”37  The violence 
depicted in the painting was, according to the critic, the cause of its popular success; the 
more dignified critic admired the painting’s other attributes, which were more artfully 
rendered.  “When the crowd has sufficiently contemplated these horrors, unfortunately 
historical, the connoisseurs will stay to calmly admire this magnificent landscape.”38
This rhetorical separation between the overly enthusiastic masses and the 
disinterested critics with regard to the representation of military events of the recent past 
constitutes a turning point in the reception of war-related imagery after 1815.  Such 
representations would continue to command public attention and adulation during 
peacetime, despite falling out of favor politically and critically.  In contrast to the period 
of the Restoration, war imagery during the First Empire was tied to engage public support 
for Bonaparte’s war effort, providing a point of contact between citizens and the most 
visible government institution in France, the military.  Writing against a battle painting 
could too easily be understood by Napoleonic officials as a critique of the regime itself 
since its referents were inextricably bound up with the political legitimacy of 
Bonaparte.
   
39
                                                 
37 Jouy, “Beaux-arts,” 356. “Ne vous y trompez pas cependant, ce ne sont pas les beautés dont elle étincelle 
qui lui valent un aussi prodigieux concours de spectateurs ; c’est au choix d’une action révoltante, que 
l’auteur est redevable du succès d’enthousiasme qu’il obtient.” 
  With the fall of the First Empire and the Bourbon regime’s attempt to limit 
the representation of France’s recent history, critics were suddenly free to disclose their 
distaste for battle painting, which they did.  But paradoxically, this freedom to criticize 
battle painting openly called attention to its enduring relevance as an area of visual 
production despite the fact that it no longer served an official political purpose.  As a 
38 Ibid., 355. “Quand la foule aura suffisamment contemplé ces horreurs, malheureusement historiques, les 
connaisseurs resteront pour admirer plus froidement ce magnifique paysage.” 
39 Richard Wrigley, The Origins of French Art Criticism from the Ancien Régime to the Restoration 




direct consequence of Bonaparte’s fall from power, the representation of Napoleonic war 
was no longer directly tied to a particular political configuration, which in turn made its 
meaning more fluid than it had been under the First Empire.  As we shall see, during the 
Restoration, imagery related to the First Empire was not necessarily synonymous with 
adoration of Napoleon’s government, his policies, or a coherent political agenda, whether 
Bonapartist or liberal.  
 
Napoleonic Imagery: Ambivalence and Contradiction 
In the absence of Napoleon’s political and military authority, a “legendary” 
Napoleon was able to proliferate.  This “legend” was an amorphous political 
phenomenon but was not actually based on a set of coherent politics.40  It was most 
closely allied with what has been called the “liberal” opposition to Bourbons, a 
heterogeneous group of loosely affiliated political ideologies including “republicans, 
Bonapartists, constitutionalists, parliamentary democrats and even revolutionaries” to 
which I will turn in the next section of this chapter.41
                                                 
40 For more on this diffuse cultural phenomenon see Sudhir Hazareesingh, The Legend of Napoleon 
(London: Granta, 1999).  
  While the diffusion of Napoleonic 
war imagery was without question partly linked to the “liberal” opposition to Bourbon 
rule, there are other factors in play.  One of these is what Stephan Bann has characterized 
as the “desire for history” and the rise in historical self-consciousness that occurred 
during the Restoration.  For Bann, the “desire for history” during the 1820s is best 
understood as a popular and widespread phenomenon that materialized itself across 
different domains of culture in all of Europe and particularly in France.  This 
41 David Skuy, Assassination, Politics, and Miracles. France and the Royalist Reaction of 1820 (Montreal 




popularization of history for a wider public outside of the educated elite took the form of 
the historical novel à la Walter Scott, historical museums, a profusion of paintings that 
represented scenes from medieval history and the Renaissance with shining clarity, and a 
new generation of Romantic historians, among them Prosper de Barante, who felt that 
history could be “exact and serious” as well as “true and lively.”42
While Bann focuses his analysis on the Restoration-era obsession with medieval 
French history, a historical appetite for the recent Napoleonic past was equally pervasive 
across different domains of culture.  The taste for Napoleonic imagery during the 
Bourbon Restoration was in part the result of a desire to try to make sense of the 
tumultuous events of the very recent past, including the Revolution and the Empire.  It 
would be a mistake to equate visual representations of the Napoleonic military past 
produced during the Bourbon Restoration with a coherent set of political commitments.
   
43
  Delécluze, as David’s student and a defender of the classical tradition, furnishes 
one of the best examples of the kind of ambivalent and contradictory range of meanings 
that military images of Napoleon accommodated during this period.  Writing in his 
  
Bereft of the political intentionality it had been invested with only years earlier, this body 
of imagery met with ambivalence, tinged with regret and nostalgia.  To view an image of 
Napoleonic war during the Restoration was to take stock of the momentous changes of 
the past in relationship to the peaceful present.   
                                                 
42 Prosper de Barante, Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne de la Maison de Valois, 6th ed. (Paris : Furne, 
1842), xxvii.  Cited in Stephen Bann, Romanticism and the Rise of History (New York: Twayne Publishers, 
1995), 22.  
43 Nina Anathanassoglou-Kallmyer has written widely on the links between liberal political commitment 
and Napoleonic imagery during the Restoration; she contends that this imagery was indeed a powerful focal 
point for oppositional politics during the period.  See Nina Anathanassoglou-Kallmyer, “Liberals of the 





journal in 1828, he described an engraving based on a large-scale drawing of a military 
review in 1800 made by Jean-Baptiste Isabey and Carle Vernet.  While he did not divulge 
the title, it is surely the Review of Quintidi (Fig. 3.11): 44
It’s the review of Buonaparte, First Consul, in the court yard of the Tuileries, in 
1800…This engraving is extremely interesting.  However far removed it is from 
perfection with regard to art [sous le rapport de l’art], each person, taken 
individually, is rendered with great truth…The bearing and attitude of Bonaparte 
as well as his traits are rendered with an extreme fidelity.  I acquired this 
engraving, and when I gaze upon it, it is as though I am taken back to 1800, that I 
am present at these reviews that were then the object of conversations and the 
curiosity of all of Europe, and that, comforted from the memory of the crimes of 
the Revolution that threatened us still, everybody, upon seeing Bonaparte 
conqueror of foreign lands, ready to erect a dam against domestic factions, sees 
again a political happiness that Napoleon never gave us.




Delécluze was no fan of Napoleon’s politics and deeply opposed the way that he 
controlled the arts for his own political benefit.  In his journal he reflected that “there has 
perhaps never been a Frenchman of our time more than myself who has more sincerely 
bemoaned the misfortunes that Buonaparte brought upon France.”46
                                                 
44 For more on this drawing, see Tony Halliday, “The Embodiment of Strength: Depicting a General as 
Civil Leader,” in Conflicting Visions : War and Visual Culture in Britain and France c.1700-1830 ed. John 
Quilley and Geoff Bonehill (London: Ashgate, 2005), 169-187.  
  And yet, despite his 
extreme distaste for the government and political legacy of Bonaparte, an engraving of 
his military review engendered in Delécluze a reflection on the past and mediated his 
relation to it.   
45 Delécluze, Journal de Delécluze, 1824-1828, 329-30.  “C'est la revue de Buonaparte, premier consul, 
dans la cour des tuileries, en 1800…Cette gravure est extrêmement intéressante. Quoiqu'il s'en faut bien 
qu'elle soit parfaite sous le rapport de l'art, (330)chaque personnage, pris en particulier, est rendu avec une 
grande vérité… Le port et l'attitude de Bonaparte aussi bien que ses traits sont rendus avec une fidélité 
extrême. J'ai fait l'acquisition de cette gravure, et, quand je jette les yeux dessus, il me semble que je suis 
reporté à 1800, que j'assiste à ces revues qui faisaient, alors, l'objet de la conversation et de la curiosité de 
toute l'Europe, et que, soulagé du souvenir des crimes de la révolution qui menaçait encore, tout le monde, 
en voyant Buonaparte vainqueur de l'étranger et prêt à opposer une digue aux factions de l'intérieur, revoit 
un bonheur politique que Napoléon ne nous a pas donné.” 
46 Ibid., 375. “Il n'y a peut-être jamais eu un français de notre époque qui ait plus que moi sincèrement gémi 




Interestingly, Delécluze denied the engraving the status of “art” and describes its 
merits in terms of the truth-value of the personages depicted.  As we have already seen, 
Delécluze’s notion of the “document” implied direct and truthful observation of 
contemporary events, as it did with his own drawings of wounded French and Russian 
soldiers from 1814.  The “fidelity” that Delécluze observed in the engraving was a 
powerful enough rhetorical device to transport him back to 1800, to support his 
projections of himself into the recent past: “it is as though I am taken back to 1800, that I 
am present at these reviews.”  Delécluze’s imaginative projection of himself as a witness 
to the military review is remarkably similar to the claims made by Salon critics who 
reviewed Lejeune’s battle paintings during the First Empire, when they wrote about being 
transported to the site of the battle depicted in the painting.  In both cases, authenticating 
details, understood to be indicators of a high degree of fidelity to people, places, and 
events, moved these writers to imagine that they could experience the events of the past 
anew.  This evocative rhetoric of participating in an event via a visual representation 
depended upon a willingness to believe in an image’s transparency: that it pictured the 
event as it actually had occurred.   
In Delécluze’s interpretation of the engraving’s authenticating details, the critic 
recognized that visual representations of the recent Napoleonic past which pertained, on 
the one hand, to the hopes invested in Bonaparte as the inheritor of the French Revolution 
and, on the other hand, to the eventual, retrospective disappointment in his reign.  Upon 
gazing at the engraving, Delécluze imagined himself watching the military review as it 
happened.  But in the course of his reflection, he realized the discrepancy between the 




the passage cited above, Delécluze engaged in a historical reckoning between the image 
of the heroic young general of Brumaire and the Napoleon of the Empire and its 
aftermath.  The engraving provided Delécluze with a springboard back in time to 1800 
but it also necessitated a confrontation with the historical divide between these two 
different versions of Bonaparte, the young hero and the mature despot.  By Delécluze’s 
own account, Napoleon of 1828 was one and the same with “the tyranny that he had 
established.”47
Delécluze’s reflection suggests his deeply ambivalent relationship with the recent 
Napoleonic past.  No partisan of Bonaparte, Delécluze nevertheless identified visual 
representations of Napoleonic military events as part of his lived experience during a 
time of social and political upheaval.  In the same text, Delécluze explained that he relied 
on images as a basis for recalling his participation in the momentous events of the past 
three decades:  
  It is the sight of the engraving which allowed its writer to identify these 
two different and coexisting understandings of the recent past, recalling the hopeful hero 
as well as the despot.  The engraving enacted a self-conscious form of historical 
interpretation that facilitates a reflection on two wildly incongruous versions of 
Napoleon, the hero and the despot, so that the two can be accommodated at once.  
All of these artistic productions, the Oath of the Tennis Court, Marat and Le 
Pelletier, the Military Review of the First Consul, the Emperor at Tilsit and at 
Wagram, are like memories of dreams that suddenly awaken the spirit.  I would 
need a sustained and solitary reflection to make myself believe that I participated 
in the Federation of 1790 on the Champ de Mars, that I saw Louis XVI, 
Robespierre, Barras, Buonaparte, Napoleon, Louis XVIII, and that I am only 45 
years old.48
                                                 
47 Ibid., 374. “la tyrannie qu'il avait établie.”   
 
48 Ibid., 330. “Toutes ces productions des arts, le jeu de paume, Marat et Le Pelletier, le consul passant la 
revue, l'empereur à Tilsit et à Wagram, sont comme des souvenirs de rêves qui se réveillent tout à coup 





The works of art that he cites, made by David, Isabey, Carle Vernet, and others, function 
like the engraving to facilitate the author’s understanding of his position as a 
contemporary viewer looking back at a recently elapsed historical moment.  These visual 
objects function in parallel to the author’s own personal experience of having seen the 
illustrious group of historical actors whom he cites, making sure to separate 
“Buonaparte” the hero from “Napoleon” the deposed tyrant.  Delécluze’s relationship to 
these images of the past is mediated through his own status in the contemporary historical 
moment of 1828.  The images are not used as the basis for nostalgic rumination or 
polemics.  Rather, they prompt him to take account of his role as a subject in the 
tumultuous recent past.  Military imagery of the Napoleonic period was not only the 
material for “liberal” and Bonapartist sentiment but also for historical reflection.  As 
such, it occupied an area of ambivalent and often contradictory meanings.  Assigning this 
imagery an oppositional, anti-Bourbon, or even Bonapartist range of meaning misses out 
on the fluidity of its signification in the absence of Bonaparte as a political authority 
figure.  Delécluze’s Journal provides an insightful example of how Napoleonic military 
imagery could simultaneously bear divergent meanings for an individual viewer.          
Delécluze represents one voice among many from this period that recognized the 
value of Napoleonic military imagery as a powerful historical mediator between past and 
present; his reflection demonstrates how even a harsh critic of Bonaparte’s policies could 
positively value Napoleonic military imagery.  Another significant and revealing example 
of the uneven relationship between images of Napoleon the military hero and a hostile 
                                                                                                                                                 
j'ai assisté à la fédération de 1790 au champ de mars, que j'ai vu Louis XVI, Robespierre, Barras, 




opinion of his politics during the Restoration period is found in the memoirs of Louis-
Jérôme Gohier.  Like Delécluze, Gohier was an active critic of Napoleon’s policies 
during the Empire; he served as the President of the Directory up until Bonaparte’s coup 
d’état on 18 Brumaire forced him and the other members of the Council of 500 from 
power.  Gohier, whose political career was profoundly and negatively impacted by 
Bonaparte’s rise, was more qualified than most commentators to offer criticisms of the 
former Emperor’s reign.  As a committed Republican, Gohier felt that Bonaparte had 
betrayed the ideals of the Revolution for his own, personal political ambition.  His 
opinion of visual representations of Napoleon as a military hero is therefore important to 
understanding their multiple and often unexpected valences.   
In a portion of his memoirs where he writes about the question of “Bonapartists, 
What are they?,” the issue is addressed with direct recourse to visual representations: 
The artists who, instead of…pulling out some obscure monk from the cloister 
where he is buried, consecrate their brush, their chisel, their burin to transmitting 
for posterity that highest achievements of our braves; all those who honor the 
patrie and all who respect it, are in no way Bonapartists; they are French, and in 
immortalizing their country, immortalize themselves.49
 
 
Gohier immediately distinguised the representation of national subjects from political 
intention.  The representation of national subjects associated with Bonaparte does not 
necessarily indicate a political opinion; such subjects, according to Gohier, are more 
nationalistic than political.  The separation between partisan politics and honoring la 
patrie is crucial to understanding Gohier’s own political orientation, which can be 
                                                 
49 Louis-Jérôme  Gohier, Mémoires de Louis-Jérôme Gohier, Président du Directoire au 18 Brumaire, vol. 
II, Mémoires des contemporains pour servir à l'histoire de France, troisième livraison (Paris: Rossange 
Frères, 1824), 319. “Les artistes qui, au lieu de se traîner à la suite de Le Sueur, pour arracher quelque 
moine obscur du cloître où il s’est enseveli, consacrent leur pinceau, leur ciseau, leur burin, à transmettre à 
la postérité les hauts faits de nos braves ; tout ce qui honore la patrie et tout ce qui la fait respecter, ne sont 




described as one of moderation, against the radicalism of the French Revolution and the 
authoritarian rule of Bonaparte.  For Gohier, visual representations which reminded 
viewers of their French national identity were capable of erasing the kinds of partisan 
divisions that had dominated French politics since the Revolution.  Hence, he advocated 
that artists depict “braves” (soldiers) and not officers or the figure of Bonaparte.  He 
argued that images of Napoleonic war, understood as an idealized, collective endeavor of 
the nation, could perform a valuable role of fomenting national identity in the wake of 
decades of political divisions.  For Gohier, this body of imagery erased political factions 
and enabled a broadly conceived public to picture themselves as French above all else.   
 Accordingly, Gohier scoffed at the Bourbon’s proscription of Napoleonic war 
imagery, arguing that such imagery would actually help shore up the former Emperor’s 
status as a despot in the public imaginary and in turn, help to ensure social stability.  He 
tells the story of a print that a “trembling” print seller clandestinely showed him.  It was 
an aquatint by Jean-Pierre Marie Jazet based on Horace Vernet’s painting The Tomb of 
Napoleon (Fig. 3.12).  He described it in detail and considered the actual effect it will 
have upon viewers:  
In the distance, resplendent with glory, the shadows of the brave who died while 
defending their country’s liberty, and they seem to say: JUST AS FOR US, THIS 
IS HOW IT WILL ALL END FOR YOU! What an apotheosis!  Ah!  Far from 
proscribing this, far from covering it with a veil, offer it up for all to see, and the 
sensations it will cause, the profound reflections that it will give birth to, will 
teach all of the enemies of the liberty of peoples what remains of the one who was 
the most powerful despot, the most absolute on earth.  One can therefore have in 
their possession the print of this terrible apotheosis without being a Bonapartist.  
A large number of our braves miss the warrior who led them to victory; but, 
French above all, they would be indignant if they were asked to serve a new tyrant 
of their country.50
                                                 
50 Ibid., 320-21. “Dans un lointain resplendissant de gloire, les ombres des braves morts en défendant la 






Gohier’s reading of the print focuses almost entirely on Napoleon as a fallen despot.  The 
soldiers in the image serve as levelers of the Emperor’s former grandeur and authority; 
according to Gohier, they stand in as reminders of a more common, as opposed to 
extraordinary, fate.  The image, according to such a reading, is didactic above all else, 
capable of representing Bonaparte’s mortality and casting him as a mere man who meets 
the same death as the soldiers who fought for him.  Bonaparte died in 1821 on the island 
of St. Helena where he was in his second forced exile.  His death provoked a sudden 
profusion of imagery that has been traditionally understood as fueling his “legend.”  As 
we have already seen, the political and social implications of this “legend” were neither 
coherent nor exclusively emblematic of an oppositional, “counter-discursive,” political 
positions.  Gohier supported the Bourbons and was adamant that a monarchy was the 
only form of government capable of unifying a divided France.   
Horace Vernet’s painting, which Gohier called the “apotheosis,” is listed in the 
artist’s account books as the Tombeau de Napoléon.  It was painted in 1821 and sold for 
3,000 francs to Gabriel Delessert, a wealthy banker who would later become Prefect of 
Police during the July Monarchy.  A copy of the painting (now in the Wallace Collection) 
was also sold for the same lofty sum to Jacques Lafitte, another member of a successful 
banking family.  Vernet made 500 francs from selling the rights to have the painting 
engraved by Jazet, who would earn his reputation translating Vernet’s paintings into 
                                                                                                                                                 
FINIR !  Quelle apothéose !  Ah! Loin de la proscrire, loin de la faire couvrir d’un voile, offrez-la à tous les 
regards, et que les sensations qu’elle fera éprouver, que les réflexions profondes qu’elle doit faire naître, 
apprennent à tous les ennemis de la liberté des peuples ce qui reste à celui qui a été le despote le plus 
puissant, le plus absolu de la terre.” “On peut donc avoir en sa possession l’estampe de cette terrible 
apothéose sans être un bonapartiste.  Un grand nombre de nos braves regrettent le guerrier qui les a 
conduits à la victoire ; mais, Français avant tout, ils s’indigneraient si on leur proposait de servir un 




prints.51  Delessert and Lafitte were both close associates of the duc d’Orléans, the future 
King of the French, Louis-Philippe, who was one of Horace Vernet’s most important 
patrons during the Restoration and July Monarchy.52
Nobody could have been more aware of the fluidity of meaning for these subjects 
than Horace Vernet.  For example, the duc de Berry, the next in line for the Bourbon 
throne, purchased two of Vernet’s Napoleonic-themed genre paintings, the Wounded 
Trumpeter (Fig. 3.13) and the Dog of the Regiment (Fig. 3.14), in 1820.
  Far from radicals, the duc 
d’Orléans and his coterie of associates believed, like Gohier, in the fundamental need for 
a strong government, but were weary both of absolutism and the excesses of the 
Revolution.  For this loosely allied group of bankers, politicians, and nobles, who were 
opposed to the Bourbon regime but were committed to maintaining some form of 
monarchy, representations of Napoleonic and Revolutionary war provided a visual 
language that could signify as a broadly based, and publicly attractive, set of political 
ideals.   
53
                                                 
51 Armand Dayot, Les Vernet, Joseph, Carle, Horace (Paris: Armand Magnier, 1898), 200-201.  Dayot 
provides an account book that lists the vast majority of paintings, lithographs, and engraving permissions 
that Horace Vernet sold throughout his career.  Though there are occasional misspellings and incomplete 
information, it is an invaluable resource for any scholar examining Vernet’s oeuvre.   
  Both of these 
paintings were widely known through reproductive engravings and had been reviewed by 
52 In a nineteenth-century biography on Delessert, his biographer characterizes Delessert’s liberalism as 
“intelligent et modéré, par un sentiment profond des principes de stabilité et de conservation qui font la 
force et le vie des gouvernements et des sociétés, par un désir ardent et sincère de provoquer ou de soutenir 
la réalisation de toutes les améliorations matérielles, morales, et politiques, nécessaires pour le bonheur et 
la prospérité de [son] pays.” See J. Tripier Le Franc, M. Gabriel Delessert (Paris: E. Dentu, 1859), 43-44.    
53 Dayot, Les Vernet, Joseph, Carle, Horace 200.  The duc de Berry paid 5000 francs for both paintings.  
He is listed in the account books as the duc de Berny, probably as a result of an original misspelling or an 
incorrect transcription of the manuscript.  A few months later, the Duc was assassinated while attending the 
Opera by Pierre Louvel, who acted alone in an attempt “to extinguish the Bourbon line.”  For more on the 





critics. They contributed to the spread of imagery of the recent military past beyond a 
limited circle of liberal elites.   
 
Horace Vernet and the “Nouvelle École” 
Horace Vernet produced his largest and most expensive paintings for the duc 
d’Orléans.  In 1822, the duc cemented his relationship with the painter by commissioning 
four battle paintings, for which he paid the high price of 10,000 francs each.  The Battle 
of Montmirail, the Battle of Jemmapes, the Battle of Hanau and the Battle of Valmy were 
made between 1820 and 1824.  In addition to securing the patronage of the second most 
powerful Bourbon in France, Vernet gained the adoration of “liberal” critics as a result of 
the controversy caused by the rejection of two of his paintings, the Barrier of Clichy and 
the Battle of Jemmapes, from the 1822 Salon exhibition, due to their politically 
problematic content.54  In response to the rejection of these two paintings from the Salon, 
Vernet mounted a private exhibition in his studio that featured forty-five of his paintings, 
drawings and prints, many of which represented Napoleonic military subjects.55
                                                 
54 For an extended account of the controversy, see Marie-Claude Chaudonneret, L'Etat et les artistes. De la 
Restauration à la monarchie de Juillet (1815-1833) (Paris: Flammarion, 1999), 102-105.  Chaudonneret’s 
exacting archival research has helped to dispel the once dominant understanding of Vernet as a victim of 
conservative politics with regard to his private 1822 exhibition.  According to Chaudonneret, Vernet used 
the rejection of his two paintings to help style himself as an academic outsider and rebel with regard to the 
conservative politics that dominated the Salon.  While he guaranteed himself a reputation as a rebellious, 
subversive painter, Chaudonneret maintains that he “exploited” the refusal of the Battle of Jemmapes and 
the Barrier of Clichy for his personal gain.  This understanding of Vernet’s Restoration oeuvre differs with 
the one promoted by Nina Anathanssoglou-Kallmyer in a group of several essays written during the 1980s.  
In particular, see Nina Anathanassoglou-Kallmyer, “Imago Belli: Horace Vernet’s L’Atelier as an Image of 
Radical Militarism under the Restoration,” The Art Bulletin 68 (1986). See also Anathanassoglou-
Kallmyer, “Liberals of the world unite : Gericault, his friends, and La Liberté des peuples.” 
  This 
55 I have found no evidence that Vernet charged visitors to enter his private exhibition as David had done 
with the Sabines in 1799.  Unlike David, Vernet had cultivated a wide group of patrons and, if his account 
books are any indication, he did not need to make money from the exhibition, which was for the sake of 
publicity as much as it was out of protest to the jury’s decision to censor the Barrier of Clichy and the 




private exhibition became a cause célèbre among political opponents of the Bourbons and 
established Vernet’s reputation as the painter par excellence of Napoleonic subjects in the 
face of Bourbon censorship.   
For the next Salon in 1824, Vernet exhibited an exceptionally large number of 
paintings, over twenty, including the majority of the works he displayed in his private 
1822 exhibition with the exception of the Battle of Jemmappes.  In the official Salon 
guidebook, listed after Equestrian Portrait of the Duc d’Angoulême, and a painting of a 
royal hunt, was the notation “Plusieurs tableaux, même numéro.”  These were no doubt 
the numerous paintings from Vernet’s 1822 private exhibition.  As Marie-Claude 
Chaudonneret has shown, it was due to the sustained efforts of Count de Forbin, the 
Director of Museums under the Bourbons, that several paintings of Napoleonic military 
subjects by Vernet and Lejeune were exhibited at the Salon of 1824 against the wishes of 
the king’s Interior ministers.56   Though the artist had already established a reputation for 
himself during the early years of the Restoration and through his private exhibition of 
1822, Vernet’s participation in the Salon of 1824, with Forbin’s assistance, led to the 
recognition on the part of several important critics that he, along with Eugène Delacroix, 
was a founding member of what was called the nouvelle école, also designated at the time 
as Romanticism.57
                                                 
56 Chaudonneret, L'Etat et les artistes. De la Restauration à la monarchie de Juillet (1815-1833), 104-08.  
  In particular, Vernet’s battle paintings were singled out as evidence of 
the artist’s independence from the Davidian tradition of history painting, then maintained 
in Paris by Gros.  The attention paid to his battle paintings in 1824 allowed this 
supposedly moribund genre to take on a new kind of meaning as an example of the 
57 Vernet’s submission to the Salon of 1817, the Battle of Tolosa, met with a warm critical reception.  This 
was due to Vernet’s novel treatment of his subject matter and also to the fact that the battle was medieval 




nouvelle école of painting which had successfully severed its ties to the academic 
tradition of history painting.  Horace Vernet’s battle paintings were therefore not only 
acceptable to a new generation of critics but an exciting part of artistic practice beyond 
what Stendhal called the “tyranny” of David.  
Vernet’s submissions to the Salon of 1824 were enthusiastically reviewed by 
critics.  The artist was identified as being one of the progenitors of a new kind of painting 
that traded the classical ideal for subjects inspired by contemporary tastes, including the 
recent military past in the case of Vernet.  Though Vernet represented historical subjects, 
it was widely affirmed that he was not a history painter in the traditional sense of the 
term.  As Delécluze remarked in his review of the Salon of 1824,   
The modern school appears to be formed after the justified successes that M. H. 
Vernet, its founder, has obtained.  This artist, who observes our mores so well, 
and that I have willingly called a painter of high comedy, is never trivial, is 
always true, but lacks elevation…He takes man as he is, reproduces him with 
truth, with spirit; I will repeat that the works of M. H. Vernet are painted 




For Delécluze, Vernet was the founder of a new modern school of painting which 
represented its subjects with “exact truth,” that is to say, in a manner that was far 
removed from the beau idéal of classical French painting.  Vernet specialized in 
depicting his own times as they appeared, including contemporary figures and their 
                                                 
58 Etienne-Jean Delécluze, “Beaux-arts, Salon,” Delécluze, “Beaux-arts, Salon,” 1 Septembre, 1824, 1.  
“L’école toute moderne qui semble s’être formée depuis les justes succès qu’a obtenus M. H. Vernet, son 
fondateur.  Cet artiste, qui observe si bien les mœurs, et que j’appellerois volontiers un peintre du haut 
comique, n’est jamais trivial,  est toujours vrai, mais manque d’élévation…Il prend l’homme tel qu’il est, le 
reproduit avec vérité, avec esprit, ce qui me fait répéter que les ouvrages de M. H. Vernet sont de la 




habits, something which Delécluze understood in theatrical terms as “comic.” 59
For many critics, Vernet’s turn away from the ideals of classical history painting 
in favor of contemporary subjects was the most important achievement of the new 
manner of painting.  His paintings, they argued, faithfully pictured contemporary 
circumstances in a way that appeared to be immediately intelligible to viewers.  As 
Adolphe Thiers contended, the French classical tradition of painting was akin to a weight 
on Vernet’s free spirit.  Vernet’s inspiration came from his contemporary surroundings, 
not academic authority:  
   
Vernet’s treatment of his subject matter differed from Delécluze’s own drawings of 
Allied and French soldiers from 1814 and 1815, in which the critic attempted to strike a 
balance between his status as a detached observer of “things seen” and classicizing 
elements such as flowing drapery and dramatic gestures that the former student of David 
had been trained to include.  Vernet, on the other hand, did not share Delécluze’s 
allegiance to neoclassical standards.  Instead of adapting the representation of a 
contemporary event to the conventions of history painting, he created a new visual mode 
of depicting contemporary life in painting that defied existing categories of artistic 
production.     
Nothing ties him down, because nothing can limit his talent, with the exception of 
the grand historical ideal, which he could attain if he desired to; but it would be 
impossible for him to dedicate himself to it with a character like his own; he has 
been too moved by what surrounds him to abandon the times, habits, and 
contemporary subjects to move himself towards the ideal of grand antique 
subjects.60
                                                 
59 The “comic” used by Delécluze to describe Vernet’s work was distinct from the “tragic.”  These two 
terms were part of traditional aesthetic theories  based on literature and extended to painting.  Throughout 
his lengthy career, the “comic” was often used to characterize Vernet; he was often compared to the 
vaudeville theater playwright, Eugene Scribe and to the Franconi Brothers circus.  
    
60Adolphe Thiers, Adolphe Thiers, critique d'art, Salons de 1822 et de 1824, ed. Marie-Claude 





Thiers, who would later become the minister of Education under the July Monarchy (and 
was already a close associate of Vernet’s patron, the duc d’Orléans), promoted the idea 
that history painting in the grand manner would only slow Vernet down.  This clever 
argument flipped on its head a French aesthetic hierarchy that placed history painting at 
the apex, and proposed a new set of criteria that situated contemporary subjects at the top.  
For Thiers, Vernet led the nouvelle école of painting because he determined his own 
criteria and had no use for the old ones.  Vernet’s paintings, in contrast to the serious, 
highly studied genre of history painting, allowed the artist to express his unbounded 
talent for representing his immediate, contemporary surroundings free from the strictures 
of academic tradition.    
Of all the paintings that Vernet displayed in the Salon of 1824, the Battle of 
Montmirail (Fig. 3.15) was the one that garnered the most critical attention, and was 
almost universally adored, even by a classicist like Delécluze.  The battle, fought in 
February 1814, was part of Napoloen’s Six Days campaign where the overwhelmingly 
outnumbered Grande armée, retreating from the disastrous Russian campaign, defeated 
the Allies in a series of battles of little overall strategic importance.  The Allied armies 
still arrived in Paris in March of that same year, resulting in Napoleon’s first abdication.  
The battle of Montmirail was therefore an event which precipitated the downfall of the 
First Empire and the installation of the First Restoration government, a military subject 
that would have been palatable to Royalist sympathizers.   
                                                                                                                                                 
talent, excepté le grand idéal historique, auquel il aurait pu atteindre s’il l’eut tenté ; mais il était impossible 
qu’il s’y dirigeât avec une organisation comme la sienne ; il était trop frappé de ce qui l’entourait, pour 




The expansive horizontal format of Montmirail, along with the three other battle 
paintings in the series (Hanau, Jemmappes, Valmy) provided a broad overview of the 
landscape and the movements of troops across the foreground and middleground.  This 
compositional strategy is similar to the one employed by his father, Carle Vernet and by 
Louis-François Lejeune, a painter with whose work Vernet would have likely been 
familiar.   As in works made by these artists during the First Empire, Vernet positioned 
viewers at a hovering bird’s eye angle slightly above the action and depicted the battle in 
terms of its salient episodes distributed throughout the composition with particular 
attention to the details of uniforms and weapons.  This pictorial devotion to the 
particulars of a battle was understood by critics during the First Empire and the 
Restoration as conveying valuable knowledge about modern military encounters.  Vernet, 
not a career military man like Lejeune, nevertheless borrowed the same set of 
conventions that Lejeune had used to stage the illusion of an eyewitness expert vision of 
a military event.  It seems to have worked.  As Delécluze remarked in 1824, “By seeing 
[Vernet’s] works, one can experience a course in strategy and gain a complete 
understanding of life in the camps.”61  Other critics found the same to be true: “It seems 
that M. Horace lives in the camps: one would think that he was on the field, painting in 
the moment of action.” 62
Though Vernet and Lejeune shared a common commitment to depicting 
contemporary military engagements in terms of a proliferation of details about site, 
  
                                                 
61 Etienne-Jean Delécluze, Journal des débats, littéraires et politiques, 1 Septembre 1824, 1.  “En voyant 
ses ouvrages, peut-on faire un cours de stratégie et prendre une connaissance complète de la vie des  
camps.”  
62 Une société de gens de lettres, L'année française, ou mémorial des sciences, des arts et des lettres (Paris: 
Crapelet, 1825), 105. “Il semble que M. Horace vive dans les camps : on croirait qu’il est sur le terrain, et 




actions and weapons, Vernet’s battle paintings at the Salon of 1824, and especially 
Montmirail, were celebrated as triumphs of art, a claim seldom made on behalf of 
Lejeune’s work, even during the First Empire, and probably influenced by his status as a 
military officer first and foremost.  Moreover, technical infelicities in Lejeune’s paintings 
such as the flatness of figures were readily forgiven by critics who valued his battle 
paintings for the knowledge they imparted rather than their artistic ambitions.  Horace 
Vernet’s vocation, in contrast, was that of an artist, a fact underscored by his family 
name.  In the Battle of Montmirail, Vernet’s technical skill manifests itself largely 
through the atmospheric, foreboding sky and clouds which hover over the battle.  The 
beautifully rendered sky helps to reinforce the expansiveness of the terrain and also lends 
a degree of emotional affect to the scene.   Vernet’s choice to make his battle painting 
more of a landscape than a monumental figure painting ensured that it would be taken 
seriously as an ambitious work of art by critics.  Montmirail effectively restored battle 
painting to its traditional status within the hierarchy of genres, as a historical landscape 
rather than as a form of history painting.       
In his review of the Salon of 1824, Stendhal seized on Montmirail as a triumph of 
the new tendency in painting, writing that “I’ve seen two or three thousand painted 
battles; I have seen two or three in reality, and this allows me to proclaim the one of 
Horace Vernet to be a masterpiece…There is more truth and nature in just the sky of this 
painting, than in twenty landscapes to which the connoisseurs are devoted.”63
                                                 
63 Stendhal, “Salon de 1824,” in Mélanges III, Peinture,, ed. Ernest Abravanel (Geneva: Cercle du 
Bibliophile, 1972), 9. “J’au vu deux ou trois mille batailles en peinture ; j’en ai vu deux ou trois en réalité, 
et cela me suffit pour proclamer un chef d’œuvre, celle de M. Horace Vernet… Il y a plus de vérité et de 
nature, dans le ciel seulement de ce tableau, que dans vingt paysages consacrés par l’admiration des 
connaisseurs. “ 




Stendhal, the new tide of European culture was turning.  Whereas classicism clung to 
outmoded conventions that limited artists to a narrowly conceived repertoire of subjects 
and styles no longer relevant to modern times, Vernet’s Montmirail exemplified the new 
school of painting, free from the constraints of an academic system.   
In a revealing passage, Stendhal compared Vernet’s Montmirail with David’s 
Intervention of the Sabine Women and concluded that  
The battle of M. H. Vernet is worth more than the battle of David.  What 
sympathy can a French person feel, who has given a few blows of the saber 
during his life, for people that fight completely naked? The most common sense 
indicates that the legs of such soldiers would soon be completely covered in 




Stendhal ridiculed David’s pretension of representing authentic Roman warriors in his 
Intervention of the Sabine Women, a painting he would have been able to view at 
Luxembourg museum.65
What is romantic in painting is the Battle of Montmirail, this masterpiece of 
Horace Vernet…The romantic in all the arts, is who represents the men of today, 
and not of these heroic times so far removed from us, and who probably never 
  He humorously contrasted David’s fidelity to the rigorous 
strictures of history painting with the material conditions of modern warfare (which 
audiences were familiar with by 1824) to take David to task for making a painting that 
failed to acknowledge its own times.  In comparing Vernet’s Montmirail to David’s 
Sabines, Stendhal constructed an argument in favor of a new school of painting, which he 
called romantic.  For Stendhal, Vernet depicted battle in a vernacular visual language that 
resonated with contemporary viewers as being from their own time: 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 81-82. “A talent égal, la bataille de M.  H. Vernet vaudrait mieux que la bataille de M. David. 
Quelle sympathie  peut sentir un Français, qui a donné quelques coups de sabre en sa vie pour des gens qui 
se battent tout nus ? Le plus simple bon sens indique que les jambes de tels soldats seraient bientôt tout en 
sang, et, dans tous les temps, il fut absurde d’aller nu au combat.” 




existed.  If one wants to go through the effort of comparing these two battles that I 
have just cited, and especially the quantity of pleasure that they give to the 
viewer, one will be able to form a clear idea of what is romantic in painting. 66
 
 
The genre of battle painting, thought by many critics at the beginning of the Restoration 
to be on the brink of extinction, was understood by both Thiers and Stendhal as a means 
of challenging the aesthetic authority of Davidian painting.  Far from a marginal subject 
during the Restoration, the representation of military subjects from the recent past 
provided contemporary audiences with a readily recognizable, and according to Stendhal, 
pleasurable, picture of themselves in a way that David’s naked warriors could not.  In this 
way, Vernet’s Battle of Montmirail not only depicted a particular historical event, but 
also spoke to the retrospective historical self-consciousness that was prevalent during the 
period.   
The fact that Vernet’s battle paintings were not grand manner history paintings 
worked to their advantage.  Instead of attempting to make contemporary military events 
conform to the rigorous standards of history painting as David and his students had done 
during the First Empire, Vernet employed a visual language more akin to topographic and 
episodic battle painting, understood as a lower genre.  Because Vernet eschewed the 
conventions of Davidian history painting, he enjoyed freedom from its predetermined set 
of rules.  Working outside of the tradition of neoclassicism, it appeared that Vernet’s only 
imperative was to depict contemporary subjects with unwavering fidelity – something 
                                                 
66 Stendhal, “Salon de 1824,” 81.  Ce qui est romantique en peinture, c’est la Bataille de Montmirail, ce 
chef d’œuvre de M. H. Vernet…Le romantique dans tous les arts, c’est ce qui représente les hommes 
d’aujourd’hui, et non ceux de ces temps héroïques si loin de nous, et qui probablement n’ont jamais existé.  
Si l’on veut se donner la peine de comparer les deux batailles que je viens d’indiquer, et surtout la quantité 






that critics also associated with battle painters such as Louis-François Lejeune and his 
father, Carle Vernet.  This independence from academic artistic rules was, for Stendhal, 
part of the painter’s appeal to a broad public of contemporary viewers and was an integral 
component of the value of his work.  Moreover, as Stendhal pointed out, Vernet’s artistic 
liberty translated into an economic one: he was the only artist working in 1824 who 
“enriches himself through his talent and in a manner absolutely independent from the 
budget of the State.”67
 
 Vernet’s perceived status as an artist who determined his own set 
of rules and worked outside of official patronage contributed to his attractiveness for the 
liberal-leaning elites who patronized him throughout the Restoration and were themselves 
in search of a break with a set of predetermined rules.  
War and Politics: Napoleonic Painting after Napoleon 
The dominant interpretation of Horace Vernet’s Restoration oeuvre contends that 
his depiction of Napoleonic military subjects demonstrates his fidelity to what has been 
called “radical militarism.”68
                                                 
67 Ibid., “Au fait, quel est le seul peintre qui, en 1824, s’enrichisse par son talent et d’une manière 
absolument indépendante du budget de l’état ? M. Horace Vernet.” This is not exactly true.  Vernet was 
regularly patronized by the ruling Bourbons during the Restoration. The Maison du Roi purchased Vernet’s 
Joseph Vernet, attaché à un mât in 1822 for 6,000 francs.Vernet also painted Charles X passant une revue 
au Champ de Mars in 1824 and was paid the lofty sum of 9,950 francs.  These figures are published in 
Dayot, Les Vernet, Joseph, Carle, Horace 202-05.   
  According to this appraisal of Vernet’s work, “radical 
68 Nina Anathanassoglou-Kallmyer, “Imago Belli: Horace Vernet’s L’Atelier as an Image of Radical 
Militarism under the Restoration,” The Art Bulletin 68 (June 1986): 268-280.  Kallmyer refers to Vernet as 
a “Bonapartist,” but the meaning of the term was highly variable then and now.  Calling Vernet a 
“Bonapartist” therefore depends on what we mean by the term.  I take “Bonapartism” to refer to a political 
effort to restore France to an Empire (preferably headed by a descendent of Napoleon Bonaparte) after 
1815.  The political historian Frédéric Bluche has used the two terms “Bonapartism” and “Napoleonism” to 
distinguish between political commitment to restoring the Empire and the flowering of the “myth” of 
Napoleon.  He argues that Bonapartism “should be only understood in a political sense,” whereas 
“Napoleonism,” refers to a more nebulous phenomenon through which the legend of Napoleon took shape.  
Bluche claims that the two terms were used interchangeably during the nineteenth century, but that 
twentieth-century authors have tended to keep them separate. See Frédéric Bluche, Le bonapartisme. Aux 




militarism” is closely allied with the politics of liberal opposition to the conservative 
policies of the Bourbon government.  Vernet’s Atelier (Fig. 3.16), painted in 1821, and 
displayed in his private exhibition of 1822, and then again in the official Salon of 1824, is 
thought to demonstrate the artist’s commitment to liberal politics: the various military 
accoutrements, the presence of Napoleonic veterans on half pay, all within an atmosphere 
where the mix of artists and writers carry on with a reverent nostalgia for the Imperial 
past.  This painting, like others in Vernet’s oeuvre from the period, has been interpreted 
as signs of a “liberal” political engagement against the Restoration government.  But as 
we have already seen, the connection between the representation of Napoleonic war 
during the Restoration and political commitment cannot be automatically extrapolated 
from this kind of imagery: the term “liberal” had very little to do with a progressive, 
leftist, political engagement.  This has led to a larger assumption that Napoleonic military 
imagery from the period was necessarily associated with a set of radical “Bonapartist” 
                                                                                                                                                 
recently, Sudhir Hazareesingh has argued that the two terms cannot be easily separated: “Bonapartism and 
the legend can appear as not only fundamentally different phenomena, but also as inversely related…On 
the one hand, the myths about Napoleon cannot be understood except in fundamentally political contexts – 
as attitudes shaped by deliberate Napoleonic propaganda; as expressions of firmly held values; and as 
beliefs which had measurable, practical consequences.  On the other hand, the sheer intensity of the legend 
had a direct bearing on politics, often blurring the boundary between ‘history’ and ‘myth, between actual 
events and their subsequent perception and representation.” See Hazareesingh, The Legend of Napoleon, 5-
6.   Hazareesingh’s notion of the interrelationship between the two terms also reflects a more open 
definition of “politics” beyond official political institutions, extending to the realm of language and culture.  
Vernet seems to have cultivated a broad circle of friends and patrons during the Restoration who 
represented a wide spectrum of political beliefs including the Comte de Forbin, the duc d'Orléans, Jacques 
Laffitte, Théodore Géricault, the Duchesse de Berry, etc.  Rather than focusing on Vernet’s political 
commitment as a “Bonapartist,” I understand his Restoration-era oeuvre in terms of its ability to signify 
across a plurality of political ideologies: this also helps to explain why Vernet’s reputation soared during 
the Restoration; while it may have signified as radical for some (and perhaps even for himself pace 
Kallmyer), his work also operated between different political registers.  This is why the Duchesse de Berry 
could purchase Vernet’s Dog of the Regiment and the Wounded Trumpeter and not be taken as a 
Bonapartist for doing so.  In other words, I understand Vernet as a painter of consensus, one reason why the 
duc d'Orléans and other “liberals” embraced his work.  Kallmyer has cited Vernet’s Second Empire 
biographers to support her argument regarding Vernet’s personal politics. However, it must be noted that 
biographers writing on Vernet during the Second Empire were interpreting his Restoration oeuvre from the 
point of view of a period when it was not only permissible, but encouraged, to idealize representations of 




politics despite the fact that representations of Bonaparte as military hero were not 
automatically associated with a positive understanding of his reign.  Horace Vernet’s 
representations of Napoleonic military subjects were valued by a group of men for whom 
the reign of Bonaparte was a cautionary tale and yet, they commissioned representations 
of his military accomplishments as a way of articulating their political ideals.  
These confusions suggest that it would be useful to address what it meant to be a 
“liberal” during the Restoration. The word libéral came into use in France at the end of 
the seventeenth century to describe a quality of generosity and openness; the word also 
designated “that which is worthy of a free [individual], for example, education libérale 
and arts libéraux.”69  The word changed from a moral concept into a political one shortly 
after 1789 and became more widely used during the Restoration.70  To provide a succinct 
definition of the political connotations of the word is a risky endeavor: the closer one 
comes to grasping it as a unified concept, the blurrier it becomes.  As historian David 
Skuy has argued, despite their complex heterogeneity and their lack of coherent political 
doctrines, Restoration liberals were united in the belief that the French Revolution “had 
not been about the Terror, but about the Declaration of Rights of Man; it was not the Law 
of Suspects, but liberté, égalité, fraternité.  By extension, the Empire was not about 
Napoleonic tyranny. It exemplified through its military glory the greatness of the French 
nation.”71
                                                 
69 Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, “Liberalism, Nationalism and Socialism: The Birth of Three Words “ 
The Review of Politics 32, no. 2 (1970): 151. 
   
70 Ibid., 152. 




“Liberalism” during the first half of the nineteenth-century signified a range of 
possible meanings without a fixed set of political values.72  According to Lucien Jaume, 
who has examined the discursive evolution of French liberalism throughout the 
nineteenth century, its objective is to “reconcile, if possible, the rights and liberties of the 
modern individual with the legitimacy of the sovereign State.”73  Jaume argues there is 
not one form of “liberalism” but rather, many different “families.”  During the nineteenth 
century, one of the most powerful of these “families” is what historians have called 
“conservative liberalism.”74  To be this kind of liberal during the Bourbon Restoration 
would have meant being in favor of a constitutional monarchy and maintaining a 
suspicion of absolute power, the kind exercised by the ruling Bourbons during the period.  
However, this kind of liberal discourse was not hostile to governing power.  On the 
contrary, it sought to ground the power to govern in strong institutions that buttressed the 
power of the state and in turn, severely limited individual agency.  The liberty of the 
state, idealistically and rhetorically constituted as a collective body, took precedence over 
the liberty of the individual.75
                                                 
72 For a brief discussion on the difficulty of using the term with regard to politics during the first half of the 
nineteenth century in Europe, see James Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978), 5-6.   
  This notion of the collective, idealized social body struck 
a powerful chord with French “liberals” during the Bourbon Restoration.  With the 
historical shadows cast by the divisive Revolution and Bonaparte’s years of warfare, 
73 Lucien Jaume, L’Individu Effacé, ou le paradoxe du libéralisme français (Paris : Librarie Fayard, 1997), 
16.  
74 Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1994), 
215-219. Hazareesingh writes that conservative liberals “had no inherent love of liberty.: they opposed 
absolutism essentially because of its wastefulness and inefficiency, and also because its frozen social 
hierarchies seemed to offer little scope for the upward mobility of impatient and enterprising social 
groups…the enhancement of social equality through redistribution was firmly disavowed.”    
75 For an extended discussion of the what Jaume calls the “doctrinaire” approach to liberal discourse see his 
chapter entitled “Un  libéralisme élitaire.  Guizot et les doctrinaires,” in L’individu effacé, ou le paradoxe 




images that purported to represent a collective body were especially attractive to people 
who comprised the ruling elite of the French state.   
   
Vernet’s Napoleon Crossing the Arcole Bridge 
More than many of Horace Vernet’s paintings of Napoleonic military subjects, 
Napoleon Crossing the Arcole Bridge clarifies how his work became associated with the 
political causes of the duc d’Orléans, the future King Louis-Philippe.  Napoleon Crossing 
the Arcole Bridge is a painting that calls attention to the ways that representations of 
Napoleonic war after Napoleon could picture and promote a plurality of political 
ideologies during the Bourbon Restoration.  This painting, as we shall see, played a role 
in figuring a particular kind of liberalism at a time when its values were still in the 
process of being articulated. As such, this picture of war is especially compelling because 
it not only embodied a set of political values, but also played an active role in constituting 
them.   
Napoleon Crossing the Arcole Bridge  (Fig. 3.17) is a large painting, eight and 
half feet wide and six and a half feet tall, large enough to be considered a history 
painting. Though the Bourbons often censored public representations of Napoleon, the 
painting made it past the censors and appeared in the Salon of 1827.  And despite the fact 
that the painting lacked a title in the official livret, there was no way for viewers to avoid 
the overtly Napoleonic subject matter, with the man himself pictured in the center of the 
composition, carrying the tri-color flag across the bridge.   
Horace Vernet was made a member of the Institut de France in 1826, and had 




submit his works for approval by the Salon admission jury.76
As David O’Brien has recently demonstrated, Gros’s painting (Fig. 3.18) helped 
Napoleon to cultivate an image of a self-sacrificing, courageous, citizen soldier.
  Moreover, Vernet had the 
support of the French museum director and Bourbon political appointee, Auguste de 
Forbin, who is pictured in Vernet’s Atelier.  Forbin would have had the authority to allow 
Vernet’s painting to gain admission into the Salon and had tried to gain admission for 
earlier paintings that were threatened with rejection.  Napoleon Crossing the Arcole 
Bridge depicts an episode of the earliest phase of Revolutionary wars, when Napoleon 
was still a general.  In 1796, during the Italian campaign, Bonaparte, along with General 
Augereau, led French troops over a bridge in Arcole, Italy in an ill-fated attempt to defeat 
the Austrian Army on the other side.  The battle lasted two days after the bridge crossing 
and resulted in a French victory.  The episode became an integral part of Bonapartist 
mythology, aided importantly by its stirring representation by the young Antoine-Jean 
Gros shortly after the battle.   
77
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  Quick 
to recognize the propagandistic value of the painting, Napoleon himself paid for it to be 
engraved, thus ensuring its diffusion to a large audience.  The print was enormously 
successful and was issued in multiple editions.  In painting his own version of Arcole, 
Horace Vernet directly incorporated formal aspects of Gros’s iconic image, such as the 
position of Napoleon’s head, turned three-quarters to the right, and the opposing leftward 
direction of his march, to the left.   
77 David O’Brien, After the Revolution, Antoine-Jean Gros, Painting and Propoganda under Napoleon 




In formal terms, Vernet’s painting is even more indebted to Charles Thévenin’s 
portrait-cum-history painting of the other general present at the battle, General Augereau 
(Fig. 3.19).  Thévenin’s painting combines a full-length depiction of Augereau with 
anecdotal details of the event: the desperation of the young drummer boy, the fallen 
soldier directly underneath the general, and the shattering wooden post in the middle 
foreground.  Vernet enlarged this scene, flipped the composition around so that 
Bonaparte crosses the bridge in the other direction, and included a great deal more 
episodic detail.  These details do more than merely describe the specifics of the event; 
they suggest its presentness, that it is actually in the process of occurring.  Vernet 
transformed the broken wood fence in the foreground of Thévenin’s composition (Fig. 
3.20) into a moment of explosion, with splinters flying high in the air (Fig. 3.21)  A 
soldier to right of the shattered post covers himself from the debris while the soldier just 
in front of it is caught in a moment of free-fall; the man’s gun flies into the foreground, 
toward the viewer’s space, which is already threatened by the soldier whose wounded 
head protrudes forward.   
In the painting, flying objects, exploding wood, and falling bodies receive as 
much attention as the man in the middle of the composition who carries the tattered flag.  
In sharp contrast to Thévenin’s General Augereau, who marches out on his own and 
towers above a compressed group of identical-looking soldiers behind him, Vernet’s 
figure of Napoleon is incorporated within a large group, his stature comparable to the 
lower officers who surround him.  Bonaparte is placed within the group, and yet, his 
choice to charge across the bridge makes him the exception to it.  Like Thévenin, Vernet 




the reaction of the soldiers behind Napoleon and directly engages them in the dramatic 
action of his choice to lead the charge.  The soldiers standing behind Bonaparte are 
suspended in a moment just prior to action: the drummer boy looks up to Napoleon, his 
pose, with one leg stepping forward, suggesting his readiness to charge across the bridge. 
(Fig. 3.22) The general behind Bonaparte gestures to the men near him, encouraging 
them to take part.  These details tell us that the instant represented in Vernet’s picture is 
the one right after Bonaparte has decided that he will lead the charge but just before his 
men have decided to accompany him.  Thus, the picture temporally fixes this momentary 
gap between heroic action and group accord.  The effect is to make Napoleon Crossing 
the Bridge at Arcole less about the heroics of one man, and more about his dynamic 
leadership and power within a group of individuals.   
Horace Vernet’s painting was made in 1826 for Jacques Lafitte, one of the most 
powerful bankers in France from the time of the First Empire until his death in 1844 
during the July Monarchy.  Before and during the revolution of July 1830, he was a 
devoted advisor to the duc d’Orléans (the future King Louis-Philippe) and was 
instrumental in helping him secure the throne.  Laffitte paid Vernet the staggering sum of 
10,000 francs for the painting in 1827, the same amount that the future King, the duc 
d’Orléans, paid for large-scale battle paintings commissioned from Vernet during the 
Restoration.78
This particular brand of liberalism was not an official doctrine, but rather a series 
of political principles that favored a constitutional monarchy whose authority, in ideal 
  The political ideology that helped the duc d’Orléans secure his power in 
1830 can be loosely described as “conservative liberalism,” a term discussed earlier.   
                                                 




terms, derived from the consent of the polity. It was in no way a progressive or radical 
political position but rather one that was deeply suspicious of popular sovereignty and 
direct representative government in general.  François Guizot, a future minister under 
King Louis-Philippe and a close associate of Jacques Laffitte, argued that power, 
properly channeled into the hands of those who truly deserved it, could be the ultimate 
guarantor of personal liberty.  According to Guizot, power should be granted to “the 
bravest, the cleverest, the one who convinces us that he is the most capable of exercising 
it and of satisfying the common interest, of accomplishing everyone’s thought.”79
The presentness of the action in the painting invites the viewer to participate in 
witnessing these events unfold and moreover, to make a decision regarding who is the 
most fit to lead and in turn, as Guizot put it, “accomplish everyone’s thought.”  The 
multiple points of dangerous action signal to the viewer that to enter the scene is to risk 
extreme physical harm: throughout the composition, soldiers are either dead or dying.  
Sharp objects fly through the air.  Faced with all of these moments of physical violence 
that are depicted in the process of occurring, Napoleon’s decision to charge across the 
bridge makes his leadership appear all the more heroic.  Like these soldiers, the viewer 
beholds the action and is encouraged to come to the same conclusion as to who should 
cross the bridge first. Thus, Napoleon Crossing the Arcole Bridge represents a moment 
when Napoleon’s status as a leader is in the process of becoming.  But crucially, it is also 
  Thus, 
for conservative liberals like Guizot, and his coterie of associates like Laffitte, Delessert, 
and the duc d’Orléans, those who govern do so through the accord of the people and act 
on their behalf to “accomplish everyone’s thought.”     
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a moment when the men standing behind him are in the process of deciding to go along 
with him. Some within the group hesitate; others such as the general directly behind 
Napoleon encourage the men to move across the bridge.  Although Napoleon is the focal 
point in the middle of the composition, the group of soldiers dominates the right half.   
Unlike the soldiers in Thévenin’s painting, Vernet’s soldiers are not only more 
pictorially important, but they are also highly individualized.  In short, the soldier group 
plays a crucial role in the drama of the painting to the point where the relationship 
between those who lead and those who consent to being led is shown to depend upon 
both parties. Napoleon needs them to follow him as much they need him to lead them 
across the bridge.  His position of power is not made evident through his superior stature, 
as it is with Thévenin’s painting of General Augereau.  Rather, Napoleon’s capacity to 
lead is demonstrated through his courage, which instead of being some intangible or even 
metaphorical quality, is made palpable through the material presence of demonstrable 
moments of danger distributed throughout the composition.   
Horace Vernet understood how to translate didactic clarity into pictorial form.  
The composition is peppered with the red, white, and blue colors of the tri-color flag, 
most noticeably in the clearly delineated uniforms worn by the men and the tattered flag 
itself.  In fact, Vernet pays just as much attention to the formal details of sartorial display 
as he does to the articulation of the multiple instances of violent action.  This helps 
explain why, for example, the dead soldier protruding into the foreground is not overly 
horrifying to behold.  We read his immobile body as dead and yet, the intricate details of 
his costume, down to the spurs on his boots and the gold button on his bag, receive as 




style of visual representation whereby the drama of violence becomes subsumed in an 
intricate play of surface details and tour de force visual effects.   
In painting Napoleon Crossing the Arcole Bridge, Horace Vernet reconfigured an 
event from Revolutionary history to suit the needs of conservative liberals during the 
Restoration.  Though it is Napoleon who crosses the Arcole bridge, this sanitized image 
of organized and entertaining heroism helped to cultivate a set of political values that 
would serve the interests of the future king Louis-Philippe and his advisors, including the 
owner of the painting, Jacques Laffitte.  The painting, like the text cited earlier, promotes 
the notion that the authority of those who rule is granted by an idealized collective body.  
This particular conception of political authority would become ideologically important 
for conservative, bourgeois liberals as a mean of justifying their ascension to power 
during the July Monarchy.  At the head of this loosely affiliated group of aspiring 
politicians was the duc d’Orléans.  In an effort to differentiate himself from the absolute 
authority of the restored Bourbons, the Duc d’Orléans’s authority was figured as 
emanating from the people he sought to govern. This enabled his government to position 
itself as a benevolent regime and paradoxically, to embolden the authority of the state at 
the expense of the liberty of the individual.80
Writing in 1824, Gohier, the former republican head of the Directory government, 
offered his appraisal of how the liberty of the French nation could be guaranteed: “The 
catastrophe that ended the despotism of Bonaparte has made us feel the necessity of a 
constitutional government that no faction can shake…if the destinies of peoples are in the 
   
                                                 
80 One important example of how the liberty of the individual was sacrificed to the authority of the state is 
censorship during the July Monarchy.  See Richard Terdiman, “Counter-Images: Daumier and Le 
Charivari,” in Discourse/Counterdiscourse, The Theory and Practice of Symbolic Resistance in 




hands of those who govern them, the stability of a throne rests on the interest that the 
people have in supporting it.”81  Napoleon Crossing the Arcole Bridge is a fitting answer 
to the hopes of the republican, turned supporter of constitutional monarchy.  The painting 
represents a group of soldiers who are in the act of giving their accord to follow their 
leader over the bridge.  As Gohier pointed out in 1824, three years before the making of 
Arcole, the stability of a government depended upon the will of the people to uphold its 
power.  In Arcole, Vernet appropriated a Napoleonic military theme to function as a 
powerful synecdoche for the political aspirations of “liberal” constitutional monarchists 
during the Bourbon Restoration.  As such, the painting serves as a valuable reminder that 
images of Napoleonic war made during the Bourbon Restoration signified broadly, across 
the political spectrum. Their value for conservative liberals like Gohier, the duc 
d’Orléans and Lafitte only grew during the July Monarchy, when Napoleonic military 
imagery gained official favor with the French government.82
 
  
Horace Vernet and Restoration Print Culture 
Vernet’s rapid rise to artistic prominence during the Restoration was due in large 
part to the dissemination of his war-related paintings in reproductive print form.  The 
circulation of his prints reinforced critics’ notion of Vernet’s popular appeal and 
specifically associated him with the representation of military subjects for a broad public, 
outside of the domain of the French classical tradition.  When Salon critics reviewed 
                                                 
81 Gohier, Mémoires de Louis-Jérôme Gohier, Président du Directoire au 18 Brumaire, 325. “La 
catastrophe qui a terminé le despotisme de Bonaparte a d’ailleurs assez fait sentir la nécessité d’un 
gouvernement constitutionnel qu’aucune faction ne puisse ébranler..si les destinées des peuples sont dans 
les mains de ceux qui les gouvernent, la stabilité d’un trône repose sur l’intérêt qu’ont les peuples à le 
soutenir.”  
82 For an extended consideration on the role of official Napoleonic imagery during the July Monarchy, see 




Vernet’s paintings, they often remarked upon the visibility of their reproductions: “The 
Barrier of Clichy, the Soldier Laborer, and all of these warriors, aged in combat, 
reproduced in aquatints and lithographs, decorate the living rooms, the bedrooms, and the 
modest shelter of the old soldier who has become father and citizen.”83
The Barrier of Clichy (Fig. 3.23) was one of the two controversial paintings that 
had been rejected by the jury of the Salon of 1822 for its provocative content, the defense 
of Paris against the allied troops after Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in which the artist 
participated.  The painting was exhibited in Vernet’s private protest exhibition of 1822, 
and then at the official Salon of 1824; it was widely circulated in aquatint form, engraved 
by Pierre Marie Jazet, who reproduced Vernet’s paintings in engraving and aquatint 
throughout Vernet’s lengthy career.  Critics who reviewed Vernet’s work at the Salon of 
1824 did not have to describe the Barrier of Clichy precisely because, as they pointed 
out, “the beautiful engraving of M. Jazet made all of Paris familiar with it.”
  The critic 
inferred that Vernet’s prints crossed class boundaries between “salons” and “modest 
shelters.”  The presumed presence of Vernet’s prints in different kinds of classed spaces 
seemed to confirm his status as a “national” artist and provided evidence that images 
which invoked France’s recent military past constituted a sort of common ground among 
people who had lived through the political tumult of the Revolution and First Empire.   
84
                                                 
83 A. Barginet, “Beaux-Arts, Salon de 1824, IIe article,” Panorama des Nouveautés Parisiennes, 2 Octobre 
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84 Une société de gens de lettres, L'année française, ou mémorial des sciences, des arts et des lettres , 105. 
“Nous ne parlerons pas de la Barrière de Clichy ; tout Paris a vu ce tableau à l’exposition de M. Horace en 
1822, et la belle gravure de Jazet l’a fait connaitre.” Delécluze, in the Journal des Débats on October 5, 




Though reproductive prints of Vernet’s paintings were, with few exceptions, 
reproduced as aquatints by Jazet, the emergent medium of lithography provided Vernet 
with the opportunity to produce his own original print editions; his lithographs made 
during the Restoration became crucial to securing his status as an artist who freely 
operated between different domains of culture, beholden to no rules except for the ones 
he set for himself.  Vernet, like many artists during the early years of the Restoration, 
including Gros, his father Carle Vernet and Girodet, began to experiment with 
lithography just as it came into social use in France after Waterloo.  Throughout the 
Restoration, lithography’s status as a print medium was hotly debated.  Lithography was 
considered both a produit de l’industrie and a component of the fine arts.  The Salon of 
1817 was the first to feature lithography, though it was classified in the catalogue as a 
produit de l’industrie. By 1824, had earned its own section in the catalogue as a 
component of the beaux-arts.  Despite the official status of “art” conveyed upon 
lithography in 1824, it still lacked the historically eminent status that engraving had 
assumed as early at the seventeenth century in France.   
The connection between war and lithography began shortly after the medium’s 
discovery in Bavaria by Aloys Senefelder, who first used it as a reproductive printing 
process to copy sheet music in the 1790s.  Napoleon’s minister of arts, Dominique-
Vivant Denon, visited Munich in 1809 and reportedly met Senefelder in his atelier and 
made a series of lithographs including a representation of La Sainte Famille en Egypte. 85
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Though Denon was enthusiastic enough to try his hand at the new print medium, he did 




suggested that Denon may have been wary of the medium’s potential for rapid 
dissemination, a risk that engraving did not carry with it. 86
Another important early connection between lithography and war also occurred 
shortly after France’s victory at Austerlitz in 1805.  Louis-François Lejeune, the officer 
and battle painter, was on his return from Germany when he stopped in Bavaria, where he 
was received by the king who directed him to Senefelder’s atelier.  Lejeune described the 
experience of visiting the atelier in his memoirs:  
  The more laborious and 
costly medium of engraving was more easily controlled by the State, as engravers 
required funding to produce their works.  It was conceivable that with lithography, the 
means of production could easily be taken away from his and Bonaparte’s control.   
The results obtained by the [lithographs] appeared to me incredible, and they 
wished me to try my hand at the work…I made a sketch with their crayons on one 
of their stones.  I then left them, and an hour later, to my great surprise, they sent 
the stone to me with twenty impressions of my design.  I took these proofs with 
me to Paris, and showed them to the Emperor, who at once recognized the 
immense value of the invention, and he told me to follow it up, but I found very 
few people disposed to aid me, and other affairs soon called me away.87
 
 
Both Denon and Lejeune were instantly impressed with the new medium, but it was not 
until 1816 that lithography came into widespread use in France.  The medium’s early 
connection to war would continue to grow throughout the period of the Bourbon 
Restoration; artists were drawn to it for precisely the same reasons that hindered its 
introduction into First Empire France, that is to say, the ease and speed of making prints.   
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The newly popularized medium of lithography allowed for images to be reproduced more 
rapidly than by the more laborious process of engraving.   
The rapidity of lithographic production is an important aspect of how images of 
Napoleon were spread during the Restoration, which allowed the Napoleon of legend to 
prosper.  At this historical moment, there is an unmistakable convergence between the 
reproductive technology of lithography and the fluidity of the meaning of Bonaparte as a 
cultural sign.  As we have seen, the representation of Napoleon, specifically his 
association with military grandeur, was subject to a multiplicity of readings after he was 
no longer in power.  Without Napoleon as the principal and dominating referent of war 
imagery that he had been during the First Empire, he became a cultural sign capable of 
taking on multiple, and often contradictory connotations – a process aided by the 
emergent media.   
The variability of Napoleon Bonaparte as a bearer of meaning finds a material 
analogue in the example of the circulation of Vernet’s Napoleon Crossing the Arcole 
Bridge in print form.  Vernet’s painting of Arcole, shown in the Salon of 1827, was first 
conceived as a lithograph around 1822, commissioned for a large illustrated book entitled 
La vie politique et militaire de Napoléon.88
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and by early 1827, Arnault had already published an octavo-format version of his Vie de Napoléon which 
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lithographs from the original edition.  Vernet’s two lithographs for the folio version appeared in the first 
volume of the Vie, along with one by Théodore Géricault, La marche dans le désert.  Géricault’s 
lithograph, according to a recent exhibition catalogue, was published between 1822 and 1823, suggesting 
that Vernet’s two lithographs would have been published around the same time, a full three years before the 
painting would have been made.  See Théodore Géricault. The Alien Body: Tradition in Chaos, ed. Serge 
Guilbaut, Maureen Ryan, and Scott Watson (Vancouver: Morris and Helen Belkin Art Gallery, University 
of British Columbia, 1997), 199.   
  The book’s author was Antoine-Vincent 




1790s; he was appointed to the Ministry of the Interior after Brumaire and then made 
general secretary of the University for the duration of the Empire.  He was removed from 
his post by the Bourbons in 1816, and then went into exile in England, but returned to 
France in 1819.  In 1829 he became secrétaire perpétuel of the French Academy.  In his 
will Napoleon left Arnault a generous 100,000 francs, which the author may well have 
used to finance the publication of the book.89  Following Napoleon’s death in 1821, the 
Vie was published through subscription as a folio between 1822 and 1826.  The text 
narrated the principal events of Napoleon’s life, starting with his childhood through his 
second and final exile on St. Helena.  Each section of the text, referred to as a “tableau” 
was accompanied by a lithograph.  Vernet contributed two illustrations, as did Géricault, 
another artist who experimented early on with the new medium.90  As Arnault claimed in 
his introduction, the book was intended to be an unbiased, politically neutral source of 
historical information about Bonaparte:  “the events, scrupulously gathered together, are 
told with exactitude…We offer the material for a judgment but not the judgment itself.”91  
The posturing of the book as a politically colorless historical work likely ensured that it 
would meet with the approval of the Bourbon censors.92
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90 For more on Géricault’s contributions to Arnault’s book, see Michael Marrinan, “Vivre en marge. 
Géricault et la vie militaire,” in Géricault: Dessins et estampes des collections du musée de l'Ecole des 
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jugement, en non un jugement tout fait.” 
92 As a former close associate of Bonaparte, Arnault revered him as a historical figure, a political actor and 
as a gifted general.  But this did not make Arnault a “fervent Bonapartist,” as it has been claimed in one 
recent exhibition catalogue.  There is no evidence to suggest that Arnault engaged in any Bonapartist 
political activities during the Restoration.  As this chapter has argued, admiration for Napoleon did 
necessarily translate into political commitment.  As Frédéric Bluche has argued  in Le bonapartisme: aux 
origines de la droite autoritaire 1800-1850,  the writings of Arnault and his close friends including Jouy 
and Jay (who favorably reviewed Horace Vernet’s 1822 protest exhibition and published it as a pamphlet) 




In Vernet’s account books, two payments of 1500 francs are recorded for the 
lithographs that he contributed to what is designated as Vie de Napoléon, a high amount 
for an individual lithograph which reflected the ambition of Arnault’s book.93  Vernet 
contributed three lithographs which represented in order of their appearance, the 
Childhood of Napoleon (Fig. 3.24), in which a young Bonaparte directs the tactics of a 
snowball fight among his peers in his schoolyard, the Passage on the Arcole Bridge, and 
the Return from Syria.  The nineteenth section of the book featured a description of the 
battle of Arcole, illustrated by Vernet’s lithograph (Fig. 3.25).  The presence of this 
lithograph, likely published three years before the painting of the same subject was made, 
presents a striking reversal of the traditional generative roles played by painting and 
reproductive printmaking.  Rather than reproducing Vernet’s painting, the Arcole 
lithograph drove its production.94
                                                 
93 Dayot, Les Vernet, Joseph, Carle, Horace 203-04.  For example, Vernet was routinely paid between 150 
and 500 francs for each of his lithographs that he made for the publisher Delpech.  The entries in the 
account books have allowed me to date Vernet’s lithographs for this book to approximately 1822-1823.  
While Vernet contributed three lithographs to the volume, only two payments for the Vie de Napoléon are 
to be found in his account books.  
  The drama of group accord, which was crucial to the 
painting’s articulation of conservative liberal governing ideology, is also visible in the 
lithograph.  As in the painting, the Napoleon in the lithograph holds a flag and lunges 
forward despite the physical intervention of a soldier just under him.  A larger group in 
the back is split between those who stay behind and those who charge ahead.  The 
element of danger is also an important element of the lithograph, which serves to 
dramatize the decision facing the soldiers to cross the bridge or not.    
94 This reversal, though atypical, was not unprecedented.  William Olander has shown that during the 
French Revolution, the production of prints of contemporary history far outpaced the production of 
paintings of the same events. Charles Thévenin’s print of the Prise de la Bastille predated his painting by 





For Vernet, the historical event of Bonaparte crossing the Arcole Bridge was 
defined not by the heroism of one man, but the willingness of others to follow him in 
spite of great personal danger.  The lithograph, like a preparatory study, gave Vernet the 
opportunity to experiment with the formal dynamics of the negotiation between 
Bonaparte and his soldiers.  But unlike a preparatory study which would have remained 
private, the lithograph of Arcole was made expressly to be disseminated.  The 
relationship between the painting of the bridge crossing and its lithographic antecedent 
implies a form of leveling among media that was an integral part of Horace Vernet’s 
artistic practice over the course of his career.95
For his painting of Arcole, Vernet heightened and extended the drama of group 
accord visible in the lithograph.  The deliberations of the soldiers in the group in the 
right-middleground are more pronounced as are the protestations of the soldiers already 
on the bridge.  Vernet also made the danger of crossing more palpable by including a 
proliferation of tour de force visual effects such as the soldier falling off the bridge and 
the splitting wood, both of which are not present in the lithograph.  Moreover, whereas 
the bridge in the lithograph features a railing, in the painting it is absent.  This dramatizes 
the ease with which Napoleon or his soldiers could fall into the water. Another crucial 
difference separates the painting from the lithograph, namely the flag carried by 
Bonaparte.  In the painting, it is the tricolor, suppressed during the Restoration but 
  The ease with which he worked between 
media, with little regard for traditional aesthetic hierarchies, helped Vernet earn a 
reputation for incredible facility.    
                                                 




nevertheless tolerated, whereas in the lithograph, it is the flag of the 51st demi-brigade de 
ligne.96
As Arnault later remarked in his memoirs, published in 1833, the massive folio 
volume was not a best-seller, for which he blamed two groups of malfeasant publishers 
who had “borrowed” from it: “It is not widespread in commerce, but is very well known 
by the compilers [compilateurs] who thought it useful to take advantage of, and to 
foreigners who thought it advantageous to use it for counterfeit versions.”
   
97
Arnault’s accusation against foreign counterfeiters was justified.  The foreigners 
in this case were Belgian.  In 1825, right after the publication of the elaborate illustrated 
folio edition of Vie politique et militaire, another historical account of Napoleon’s 
military feats appeared in Brussels, “adorned with twelve engravings.”  The third edition 
of Précis de Napoléon du Consulat et de l’Empire, published by J.B. Dupont, directly 
copied at least ten of the lithographs in Arnault’s Vie.
 The 
compilateurs that Arnault invoked most likely refer to the hundreds of authors who, 
recognizing the popularity of Napoleonic history books, produced texts that were simply 
a compilation of stolen source material.  The “foreigners” who made counterfeit versions 
of Arnault’s book constitute the other problematic group of publishers.  
98
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appears to be white.  The change to a white flag away from the historically precise flag of the regiment may 
have been related to the 1827 seizure of Vernet’s first lithograph, the Childhood of Napoleon.  The white 
flag was probably a precautionary measure taken by the publishers of the next edition of the Vie de 
Napoléon to ensure that the Arcole lithograph would not be seized as well.  For a description of the seizure 
and the appeals made by the publishers, see : “Nouvelles politiques,” L'ami de la religion, journal 
ecclésiastique, politique et littéraire, 22 décembre 1827, 188. 
  The lithographs are 
97 Antoine Vincent Arnault, Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire, vol. IV (Paris: Librarie Duféy, 1833), 402. “[Elle] 
est peu répandu dans le commerce, mais elle est très connue des compilateurs qui ont cru utile de la mettre 
à contribution, et des étrangers qui ont cru avantageux d’en donner des contrefaçons.” 
98 This edition of the book is not owned by the Bibliothèque nationale de France and is extremely rare.  




unapologetically translated into engravings and are more abstract and less detailed than 
the originals.  Of the ten counterfeited engravings, two are after Horace Vernet, 
Napoleon’s Childhood and Arcole.  This unauthorized copy of Vernet’s Arcole (Fig. 
3.26) lithograph is unsigned and features the same composition, though the lines are 
heavier and the details more spare.   
This rapid multiplication of Vernet’s lithographic illustration of the battle of 
Arcole does not end with its Belgian counterfeiters.  The painting, displayed in the Salon 
of 1827, was also subject to a process of repeated and slightly altered copying.  Vernet 
frequently turned to the engraver, Pierre Marie Jazet, to reproduce his paintings.  Jazet 
paid Vernet 500 francs to the rights to reproduce Arcole in the form of an aquatint; the 
first proof was published in 1829 in a large, folio format (Fig. 3.27).  The engraving 
replicates the drama of group accord from the painting and captures the exacting detail of 
the uniforms, the exploding wood, and the blood of the wounded soldier who protrudes 
into the foreground.  Like Vernet’s original lithograph that appeared in Arnault’s history 
of Napoleon, Jazet’s aquatint was also copied and sold with a few minor adjustments by 
the engraver Jean-Francois Charon (Fig. 3.28) and others, too numerous to cite.  It is 
impossible to tell whether the Charon engraving is based on the painting or on Jazet’s 
reproductive engraving, although it is more likely that Charon would have needed a 
printed copy of the image to produce his own version.   
The fluidity of meaning that accompanies images of Bonaparte during the 
Restoration is directly related to the proliferation of his image in forms that are out of the 
control of authors, publishers and official administrators. The process of disseminating 
                                                                                                                                                 
the McGill University Library.  J.S. and Touchard-Lafosse Saint-Amant, M.M, Précis de Napoléon du 




Arcole across different kinds of media demonstrates that the image had a life well beyond 
its appearance in the Salon of 1827.  The initial lithograph, the subsequent painting, the 
final aquatint reproduction, and the bevy of unauthorized copies of Arcole make it clear 
that by the mid-1820s in France, Napoleonic imagery constituted a pervasive 
phenomenon not tied to any one political constituency or supreme referent.   
 
Lithography and the Sensibility of Immediacy  
Though lithography is itself a mechanical, highly mediated process, the medium 
was understood early on as a direct rendering of the hand of the artist, an expedient 
alternative to the laborious process of engraving.  Lithography during the Restoration was 
more than just a new print medium – it was understood as a direct and transparent form 
of print making, as distinct from engraving.  The period understanding of lithography 
motivated artists such as Vernet, Géricault and Nicolas-Toussaint Charlet to use their 
crayons to depict subjects that did not fit easily within established categories of artistic 
production such as contemporary battles, the social conditions for veterans of the First 
Empire, the urban poor and dispossessed. As with Horace Vernet’s battle paintings, 
deciphering the meanings of these lithographs did not require a formal education and 
erudite understanding of “art,” though the objects themselves were understood as a form 
of artistic expression.  The body of war-related lithographs from the Restoration provides 
yet another example of the increasing acceptability of contemporary war as a subject for 
artistic engagement, this time as a direct expression of the artist’s creative impulses in the 




The earliest official reaction to the medium in France occurred in the Academy’s 
1816 Rapport on lithography.  The 1816 Rapport sur la lithographie betrays the early 
confusion over the status of the medium and a basic quandary over what the end result 
should be called.  Lithographs are called “Les gravures, ou plutôt les dessins,” 
“engravings or more like drawings,” somewhere in between original drawing and the 
familiar and established process of engraving.99
For as many who possess the precious gift of creation, or at the very least who are 
initiated into the secrets of the art of drawing, there are so many copyists who can 
only follow the traces of painters, and who can only arrive at a sort of perfection 
by mechanical means.  It is only this class of laborious artists, worthy, but hardly 
equipped to understand the resources of art, for whom lithography can do some 
wrong.
  The report framed lithography as a 
welcome relief from the tedious process of engraving with its replacement of the 
sensitive burin by the more flexible crayon and ink.  The most positive and promising 
quality inherent in the medium was its supposed ability to transpose the waxy drawing on 
the stone onto a sheet of paper without the intervention of mechanical processes.  The end 
product was therefore more faithful to the lithographer’s hand.  But this supposed 




At its best, lithography could allow talented artists to promote the Academy’s revered art 
of drawing, thought to be the primary building block of great history painting.  But in the 
hands of a lesser artist, that is to say an artist who worked hard but lacked the skill of 
                                                 
99 “Rapport sur la lithographie, et particulièrement sur un recueil de dessins lithographiques, par M. 
Engelmann” in W. McAllister Johnson, French Lithography, The Restoration Salons, 1817-1824 
(Kingston,Ontario: Agnes Etherington Art Centre, 1977), 23. 
100 Ibid., 36. “Pour quelques graveurs qui possèdent le don précieux de créer, ou tout au moins qui sont 
initiés dans tous les secrets de l’art du dessin, combien cet art ne compte-t-il pas de copistes qui se bornent 
à suivre les traces de peintres, et qui ne peuvent arriver à une sorte de perfection que par les moyens 
mécaniques.  C’est à cette seule classes d’artistes laborieux, estimables, mais peu propres à entendre les 




drawing, lithography could present problems for the beaux-arts.  This sense of propriety 
over the new medium in its Rapport and the trepidation over the possibility of less adept 
copyists using lithography attest to the Academy’s stake in controlling its diffusion and 
practice at a time in France when the prized academic genre of history painting stood on 
increasingly unstable ground.101
 The association between lithography and immediacy was one that became 
attached to the medium very early on in its development.  This belief was not limited to 
the Academy.  The value of immediacy was often discussed by both the medium’s 
harshest critics and most enthusiastic supporters as its defining feature:  
   
Lithography, this genre of engraving so rapid, so popular, expands the art of 
drawing: the advantage of possessing, with this ingenious process, the work itself 
of the painter, his touch, his genius is, without any intermediary expression, 
warmly admired by its enthusiasts; the caustic and loose pencil of our artists 
captures what we ridicule today, the scenes of popular and military habits 
[moeurs], and the comic episodes furnished by the big city.102
 
 
 Lithography’s value was conceived of as an unmediated link to the artist’s hand, style, 
and more importantly, esprit.  One of the most pervasive ideas within the early critical 
writing on the medium contended that the operation that transformed an artist’s intimate 
drawing into a lithograph was direct, almost automatic.  For many, the process of 
lithography produced a more honest, truthful image relative to the distance between 
artists and their final lithographic product: 
                                                 
101 For an extended discussion of the situation of history painting in the first years of the Bourbon 
Restoration and in particular, Géricault’s relationship to it, see “Coda,” in Thomas Crow, Emulations, 
Making Artists for Revolutionary France (London: Yale University Press, 1995), 279-299.  
102 Une société de gens de lettres, L'année française, ou mémorial des sciences, des arts et des lettres ,  
150-151. “La lithographie, ce genre de gravure si expéditif, si populaire, donne un nouvel essor à l’art du 
dessin : l’avantage de posséder par ce procédé ingénieux l’œuvre même du peintre, sa touche, son génie, 
son expression sans intermédiaire, est vivement apprécié par les amateurs : aussi le crayon caustique et 
léger de nos artistes saisit-il les ridicules du jour, les scènes de mœurs populaires et militaires, et les 




Lithography, we have said, has become the means of improvisation that has 
allowed artists to indulge their natural verve, to immediate observation of nature, 
and in spreading the art of drawing, has increased the public’s taste for art, and 
has given the artists [dessinateurs] the taste for truth.103
 
 
This commonly held understanding contended that lithography was a printing process 
seemingly without process, a direct transcription of the artist’s thoughts.  The notion that 
lithography was more truthful because of a lack of mediation between the artist and the 
subject represented is key to understanding the ways in which such images were valued.  
If lithography was thought to erase the boundaries between artists’ thoughts and their 
visible, material expressions, then lithography was especially suited to Horace Vernet.  
Critics often discussed his paintings using language that was similar to way that 
lithography was understood as an unmediated expression of the artist’s hand:   
For all his verve, originality, and energy, he can rival anything that art has 
produced up until the present.  In fact, with all of these imaginative qualities that I 
have described, he has also received, as though by inspiration, the talent to draw 
with an extraordinary control and facility.  Nothing therefore confines him in his 




This notion of Vernet’s incredible ability to transmit his thoughts rapidly and directly 
from brush to canvas, without any kind of mediation, was widely held during the 
                                                 
103 Adolphe Thiers, “De la Lithographie et de ses progrès,” La Pandore 259 (30 Mars 1824), in McAllister 
W. Johnson, French Lithography, The Restoration Salons 1817-1824 (Kensington, Ontario: Agnes 
Etherington Art Centre, 1977), 47.  “La lithographie, avons-nous dit, est devenue un moyen 
d’improvisation qui a permis aux artistes de se livrer à leur verve naturel, les a ramenés à l’observation 
immédiate de la nature, et qui, en répandant davantage les productions du dessin, a augmenté chez le public 
le gout de l’art, et chez les dessinateurs le gout de la vérité.” 
104 M, Revue critique des productions de peinture, sculpture, gravure, exposées au Salon de 1824 (Paris: 
J.G. Dentu, 1825), 93-94. “Mais dans quelle partie de l’art M. Horace Vernet s’est-il le plus distingué ? Je 
ne crains pas d’affirmer avec tout le monde que c’est dans la peinture dite de genre, et dans la peinture des 
batailles.  Dans ces parties, il peut rivaliser pour la verve, l’originalité et l’énergie, avec tout ce que l’art a 
produit de mieux jusqu'à présent.  En effet, avec toutes les qualités de l’imagination que j’ai décrites, il a 
reçu en outre, comme par inspiration, le talent de dessiner avec une fermeté et une facilité extraordinaires.  
Rien ne l’arrête donc dans ses conceptions, et depuis long-temps l’exécution chez lui est presque aussi 




Restoration and indeed, continued to be asserted throughout the five decades of his 
career.   
Even among lithography’s biggest detractors, the lithographs of Charlet and 
Vernet were singled out for praise.  For example, the anonymous author of a book of 
criticism on the 1824 Salon exhibition held the medium in very low regard: “The 
multitude of productions, be they immoral or vulgar, which lithography has produced, the 
weapon that it has lent and continues to lend to factional passions, and moreover its 
weakness have almost inspired in me a distaste for this entire art.”105  The critic’s disdain 
for the medium knew no bounds; throughout the entire article, he launched a series of 
scathing reproaches.  “Even painters have neglected their works to produce these little 
scraps of paper which will soon go from the print seller’s window to the dust of his 
boxes.”106
The harshness of this criticism makes it all the more puzzling that the critic 
singled out the work of Vernet and Charlet as exceptions to this rule.  For the critic, the 
merits of their lithographic productions were directly tied to the medium’s expediency 
and immediacy as guarantors of the artists’ direct expression:  “All the better that the 
Vernets, Charlet and others use lithography to render the amusing bursts of their spirit.  A 
genre that demanded more care would cool their verve and dim their originality.”
  The invectives waver from accusing the medium of enflaming political 
passions to accusing it of being a passing fad.   
107
                                                 
105 Ibid., 290. “La multitude des productions, soit immorales, soit grossières, auxquelles la lithographie a 
donné le jour, l’arme qu’elle a prêtée et prête encore aux passions de partie, puis enfin sa faiblesse même 
m’ont inspiré presque un dégout pour cet art tout entier.” 
  
106 Ibid., 291. “Des peintres mêmes ont négligé leurs ouvrages pour produire des petits chiffons de papier 
qui sont passés rapidement de l’étalage du boutiquier à la poussière de ses cartons.” 
107 Ibid., 290.  “Que les Vernet, les Charlet et autres se servent de la lithographie pour rendre les saillies 
spirituelles de leur esprit, rien de mieux.  Un genre qui exigerait plus de soins refroidirait leur verve et 




Thus, in the proper hands, lithography can actually serve as a vehicle for rendering 
interior creative esprit.  In this case, such a belief is made possible through the critic’s 
idea of lithography as a material externalization of the artist’s interior creative impulses, 
the “creative burst” of the artist captured for the privileged viewer in the form of a 
lithograph. 
Within the context of France in the 1820s, the critic’s allusion to political 
“passions” probably refers to opposition against Bourbon rule, the polarizing political 
issue of the period.  The Bourbon government discouraged any representations of 
Napoleon and any military subject related to him and punished some offenders, such as 
the Pellerin firm in Epinal, with fines and prison time.108
                                                 
108 Jean-Charles Pellerin was convicted in 1816 of “housing and merchandising seditious representations of 
Napoleon Bonaparte and the Imperial Army.”  He was tried and sentenced to six months prison, a six 
hundred franc fine and was held responsible for the cost of the trial.   For more on censorship and the 
Pellerin firm, see Barbara Ann Day-Hickman, Napoleonic Art: Nationalism and the Spirit of Rebellion in 
France (1815-1848) (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1999), 36-47.  The contrast between the 
government’s treatment of Vernet and their treatment of the Pellerin publishing firm is noteworthy. 
Whereas Vernet was allowed to exhibit several paintings of Napoleonic subjects and reproduce them as 
prints, Pellerin broadsides were regarded by the government as more dangerous, perhaps because they were 
intended for a rural audience in the provinces. 
  However, as we have seen with 
the case of Vernet’s Arcole, there were countless exceptions to this policy on display in 
the Salons, the bookshops, and the print seller’s windows during the Bourbon 
Restoration.  Subjects related to the Napoleonic military were part of a politically 
problematic category for the Bourbon regime but they were still widely circulated.  
However, neither Charlet, nor Vernet were fined or imprisoned for any of their 
lithographs that dealt with subjects related to Napoleonic war.  As historian Robert 
Goldstein has demonstrated, Restoration censorship can be characterized by its uneven 




giving artists complete freedom up until that point.109
By focusing on the marvels of direct expression and artistic “verve,” the critic 
exempted Charlet and Vernet from his denigration of the medium in general.  But what is 
puzzling about this appraisal of Charlet and Vernet is how it implicitly ignores the 
political nature of their imagery in favor of issues of originality and amusement.  Indeed, 
to confront the politically charged subject of Napoleonic veterans, Charlet and Vernet 
often made use of humor.  In one typical lithograph by Vernet (Fig. 3.29), a disabled 
Napoleonic veteran plays “horsie” with a little girl posed on his functional leg, while his 
other leg is a wooden stump.  Wooden legged veterans were something of a theme for 
both lithographers as they appeared in several lithographs by Charlet.  In one (Fig. 3.30), 
two young children tell an aged veteran, “They say you were born with a wooden leg.”  
Visibly moved, the old soldier gestures at his leg and speaks.  He sits on a bench attached 
to what could be a monument to battle, complete with a sculptural frieze depicting a 
cavalry charge.  The frieze, which depicts war in terms of a heroic clash of forces, serves 
as a counterpoint to the veteran’s disability and the naïveté of the children.  Charlet 
employed a veil of humor to acknowledge the discrepancy between France’s recent 
military past and the conditions of life in the peaceful present.  The military triumphs of 
the past were serious business (epitomized by the inclusion of the frieze), but in Charlet’s 
lithographs, their seriousness was temporarily challenged through the comic, understood 
here in terms of the naïve line of questioning by children.  This comic element, “a 
  While lithographs such as those 
made by Vernet and Charlet could function as signs of dissent against the ruling order, it 
is problematic to assume that this was their only or most important significance.   
                                                 
109 Robert Justin Goldstein, Censorship of Political Caricature in Nineteenth-Century France (Kent, Ohio 




distanced and sustained engagement with the world in its negativity,” opened up the 
possibility of recognizing the contemporary consequences of history as an enduring part 
of everyday lived experience.110
Two lithographs made by Charlet depict the viewing of lithographs as a social 
activity.  Not surprisingly, soldiers are an important element within the social space of 
viewing lithographs.  The Merchant of Lithographic Drawings (Fig. 3.31) shows the stall 
of a lithograph vendor, who is pictured slumping, possibly napping, while two soldiers 
examine the numerous lithographs.  A second lithograph (Fig. 3.32) represents a 
storefront of print shop beset by a gaggle of diverse social types all actively gazing and 
pointing at the lithographs on view.  Soldiers are again featured prominently.  Carle 
Vernet, Horace Vernet’s father, also made a lithograph (Fig. 3.33) which depicted the 
storefront of the Delpech lithograph shop.  It too showed the experience of looking at 
lithographs as a form of social interaction.  Adolphe Theirs, who was a supporter of 
Vernet’s painting, noted in an article the phenomenon of diverse groups of people 
viewing lithographs:  
  
The public was grouped in front of a boutique, and contemplated the numerous 
lithographs that decorated it with the exquisite pleasure that brings them gay and 
biting truth, truth easy to understand, truth frozen in front of them, and often 
inspired by them…How men of different habits, morals, and spirits, stopped 
together before a soft sketch, and despite the diversity of their tastes, laugh 
nevertheless about the same subject, with the same sentiments and humorous 
pleasure.111
                                                 
110 Alex Potts, “The Romantic Work of Art,” in Communities of Sense. Rethinking Aesthetics and Politics, 
ed. Beth Hinderliter, et al. (Durham Duke University Press, 2009), 58. 
 
111 Adolphe Thiers, “De la Lithographie et de ses progrès,” La Pandore 259 (30 Mars 1824), in W. 
McAllister Johnson, French Lithography, 46. “Le public s’est groupé  devant la boutique des étalagistes, et 
a contemplé les nombreuses lithographies qui les décorent avec la volupté que lui procure la vérité gaie et 
piquante, la vérité facile à comprendre, la vérité prise autour de lui, et souvent empruntée à lui-même. Que 
de classes, que de rangs confondus parfois en présence d’une charmante caricature de Charlet ou d’Horace 





Thiers delighted in lithography’s accessibility to different groups of people outside of the 
official space of the Salon and understood such scenes as evidence of the possibility of 
establishing social cohesion despite apparent class differences.  As a theoretician of what 
would later become known as “conservative liberalism” and a future President of the 
Third Republic in the bloody aftermath of the Paris Commune, Thiers had a political 
interest in the production of consensus.  While there is no doubt of lithography’s radical 
political potentiality in the hands of an artist like Charlet during the Restoration, it was 
nevertheless already being recuperated for the staging of the illusion of social equality by 
those who wielded power in France.       
 
Conclusion 
It was precisely this sort of cultural and class leveling which Baudelaire attacked 
in a section of his article, “Some French Caricaturists,” published between 1857 and 
1858, devoted to a scathing critique of Charlet.  Baudelaire criticized Charlet for 
pandering to national sentiments, for producing art that was pleasing to the masses: “A 
drawing by Charlet is rarely a truth; it is almost always a caress directed at the preferred 
caste. There is nothing beautiful, good, kind, spiritual, only the soldier.”112
                                                                                                                                                 
croquis, et malgré la diversité de leurs goûts, riant néanmoins du même sujet, avec le même sentiment de 
plaisir d’hilarité.” 
  For 
Baudelaire, Charlet had created a body of work that repeated clichéd national sentiments 
to the point of rendering them insipid.  Charlet was not alone in this tendency.  The other 
figure Baudelaire associated with this sort of watered-down flattery of public enthusiasm 
112 Baudelaire, Critique d'art , 207. “Un dessin de Charlet est rarement une vérité; c’est presque toujours 
une câlinerie addressée à la caste préférée.  Il n’y a pas de beau, de bon, de noble, d’aimable, de spirituel, 





for war was Horace Vernet.  The poet routinely chastised Vernet throughout the 1840s 
and 1850s, after the artist had gained official government favor.  While their work may 
have signified as a rallying point for those who wished to challenge the legitimacy of the 
Bourbon government during the Restoration, it also served a wider ideological purpose, 
as a body of visual imagery through which a common national past could be visualized 













“We no longer produce anything but battles in a time when we no longer 
fight:” The (Over)production of Official War Imagery  
during the July Monarchy 
 
 
Introduction: The July Monarchy and the Proliferation of War Imagery 
 A critic reviewing the dozens of battle paintings at the 1837 Salon exhibition 
paused to consider what separated the paintings he saw before him from the ones made 
during the First Empire under Napoleon Bonaparte.  The majority of the battle paintings 
on view were commissioned by King Louis-Philippe to fill the galleries of the historical 
museum at Versailles, which was the July Monarchy (1830-1848) government’s 
ambitious attempt to garner public support through a didactic presentation of the nation’s 
history.  Though these representations of war were intended to honor France’s history of 
military achievements as a living part of its contemporary national identity, the 
preponderance of freshly made battle paintings of past events suggested a troubling 
discrepancy to the critic.  Ever since the treaties of 1815 that marked the end of the First 
Empire and of the nation’s status as an international military superpower under Napoleon 




Europe and prevent “regional multilateral great power conflicts” from breaking out.1
One imagines a battle [painting] commissioned when sprits were filled with the 
great deeds it signaled, when the sound of success was on everybody’s mouths, 
and wonder and admiration in every heart.  One imagines Napoleon charging 
Gros with representing the exploits of Nazareth or Eylau, and one is not surprised 
to see so much ardor and interest…One images Gérard retracing the day of 
Austerlitz when this victory shook all of Europe.  Even more, it is now that all 
these men, all these triumphs, have grown in the memory of the people.  For 
them, Napoleon has the stature of a demi-god, and his battles are the combats of 
giants; and our artists seek with difficulty to idealize these figures and these 
memories.  This is why the battles that will garnish the walls of the palace of 
Versailles are generally without interest. 
  In 
contrast to the battle paintings commissioned during the Revolution and First Empire, a 
period of continuous warfare and mass mobilization, the July Monarchy’s official 
embrace of military imagery occurred amidst a period of prolonged intra-European peace.  
This issue shaped the criticism of battle painting during the July Monarchy.  As the critic 




For this critic, and many other during the period, battle painting became an impossible 
endeavor when set against recent French history’s “combats of giants.”  From the vantage 
                                                 
1 This is the term used by the political scientist Sandra Halperin to characterize large-scale international 
conflicts such as the Napoleonic Wars.  She argues that the period from 1815 to 1914 witnessed few of 
these kinds of wars because, “Europe’s monarchs and aristocracies feared that another major conflict within 
Europe would call into use the mass armies that, during and immediately after the Napoleonic Wars, had 
triggered revolutionary upheavals and threatened to destroy the social order.” She contends, however, that 
the period should not be understood as a peaceful one, owing to internal, civil struggles that occurred 
throughout nineteenth-century Europe.  See Sandra Halperin, War and Social Change in Modern Europe: 
The Great Transformation Revisited (London and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 384, 
119-120.  
2 “Salon de 1837, 5e article, peinture,” L'Artiste, no. 9 (1837): 113-14. “On conçoit une bataille commandée 
alors que les esprits sont pleins des hauts faits qui l'ont signalée, alors que le bruit du succès est dans toutes 
les bouches, que l'étonnement et l'admiration sont dans tous les cœurs.  On conçoit Napoléon chargeant 
Gros de représenter les exploits de Nazareth ou d'Eylau, et l'on n'est pas étonné de voir dans l'œuvre de 
l'artiste tant de fougue et d'intérêt…On conçoit Gérard retraçant la journée d'Austerlitz, alors que cette 
victoire ébranlait l'Europe entière. Bien plus, c est que maintenant tous ces hommes, tous ces triomphes ont 
grandi dans la mémoire du peuple. Pour lui, Napoléon a la taille d'un demi-dieu, et ses batailles sont des 
luttes de géants ; et nos artistes cherchent à peine à idéaliser ces figures et ces souvenirs. Voilà pourquoi les 




point of the peaceful present, the battle paintings on view at the Salon of 1837 appeared 
as empty, even futile gestures toward a grander, increasingly remote past.     
In place of these memorable military contests that dominated the beginning of the 
century, King Louis-Philippe, the “Napoleon of peace,” forged a path of political stability 
and economic expansion.3
In 1840, the age of France’s military power gained symbolic closure with the final 
burial of Napoleon’s body, exhumed from its grave on the island of St. Helena, in a 
specially constructed tomb at the Invalides, the French military hospital.  At the urging of 
Adolphe Thiers, Louis-Philippe’s prime minister, a ship was dispatched to retrieve the 
Emperor’s body and an elaborate procession was staged upon the ship’s reentry into 
  War was understood by Louis-Philippe, many of his ministers 
and other European heads of state as a destabilizing force which threatened the delicately 
maintained intra-European détente.  The mass mobilizations that came with large-scale 
international combats also brought with them the specter of revolution, something that 
European courts and the July Monarchy in particular, wanted to avoid.  The July 
Monarchy’s policy of maintaining peace was often attacked as an indication of an 
inveterate weakness, a sign that the King, viewed as an archetypal bourgeois, did not 
want to sacrifice the growth of profits for the sake of engaging in armed conflict with 
other European powers.  As we shall see, the charge that France’s reputation as a 
militarily redoubtable power was being sacrificed for the sake of protecting financial 
interests was one to which the July Monarchy government was particularly vulnerable.   
                                                 
3 Heinrich Heine ironically called King Louis-Philippe the “Napoléon de la paix.”  See  Heinrich Heine, 





France and the arrival of the body in Paris.4  Though the public spectacle was originally 
conceived as a way of “exploiting the Emperor’s popularity in France,” it also 
unwittingly symbolized the end of an era.5  That is how Heinrich Heine, an especially 
astute observer of French culture in the 1830s, understood the burial:  “The emperor is 
dead and with him, the last old fashioned kind of hero has been extinguished.  The new 
world of shopkeepers [épiciers] breathes easy, as though having been relieved of a 
brilliant nightmare.  On the imperial tomb rises a new bourgeois and industrial era which 
admires an entirely different kind of hero, such as the virtuous Lafayette or James Watt, 
the cotton spinner.”6
When he came to power during a bloody three day revolution in July 1830 that 
ousted the Bourbon king Charles X, Louis-Philippe publicly staked his legitimacy as a 
ruler on his past military achievements and his devotion to French military glory.  The 
regime trumpeted its commitment to French military action for the sake of popular 
support but dedicated itself to peace with France’s neighbors; this produced a political 
conundrum from the start.  A proclamation made to the Chamber of Deputies on 
December 30 by Jacques Laffitte, who was one of the duc d'Orléans supporters in his 
ascension to the throne, put this problematic duplicity on display:  
   
                                                 
4 Richard Burton, “Vendôme/Invalides: The Paris of the Bonapartes (1802-1871),” in Blood in the City. 
Violence and Revolution in Paris (1789-1945) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 78-80.  For more 
on the construction of Napoleon’s tomb at the Invalides, see Michael Paul Driskel, As Befits a Legend: 
Building a Tomb for Napoleon, 1840-1861 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1993).  
5 Hazareesingh, The Legend of Napoleon , 155.   
6 Heine’s reference to James Watt as a “cotton spinner” came from the improvements Watt made to the 
Newcomen steam engine which was subsequently applied to the cotton gin.  Heine, Lutèce: lettres sur la 
vie politique, artistique et sociale de la France , 161. “L’empereur est morte.  Avec lui s’est éteint le 
dernier héros selon l’ancien goût, et le nouveau monde des épiciers respire à l’aise, comme débarrassé d’un 
cauchemar brillant.  Sur la tombe impériale s’élève une ère bourgeoisie et industrielle, qui admire de tout 




France will not permit the violation of the principle of non-intervention, but she 
will try her best to prevent compromising a peace that could have been saved.  If 
war becomes inevitable, it needs to be proven to the world that we did not want it 
and that we only did it because we were placed in a position between war and 
abandoning our principles…We will continue to negotiate, but while negotiating, 
we will arm ourselves.  In very little time, we will have, beyond our fortifications, 
500,000 men in battle, well armed, well organized, well commanded; one million 




The passage starts out in steadfast commitment to maintaining peace and claims war as a 
last resort.  In case France should be compelled to engage in armed combat with another 
state (importantly, the passage refers to European states), it would only be out of absolute 
obligation and not choice.  The passage then takes a curious turn from non-intervention to 
a bold embrace of armed power:  five hundred thousand men in the army, one million in 
the National Guard, and the power of the king could be ushered into battle “in very little 
time.”  The split personality of the passage, half non-interventionist, half bellicose, serves 
as an apt characterization of July Monarchy’s relationship to war.  It was important for 
Louis-Philippe to represent his commitment to arms in symbolic terms, and at the same 
time avoid plunging France back into a state of permanent war with its European 
neighbors.   
The government’s commitment to peace meant that representations of war were 
asked to perform an urgent, if not impossible task: to represent France’s military 
                                                 
7 Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, ed. M.J. Madival, vol. XLIV (Paris: Société d'Imprimerie et 
Librairie administratives Paul Dupont, 1887), 701. “La France ne permettra pas que le principe de non-
intervention soit violé, mais elle s’efforcera d’empêcher que l’on compromet une paix qui aurait pu être 
conservée.  Si la guerre devient inévitable, il faut qu’il soit prouvé à la face du monde que nous ne l’avons 
pas voulue et que nous ne l’avons pas faite que parce que l’on nous plaçait entre la guerre et l’abandon de 
nos principes……nous continuerions à négocier, mais en négociant, nous armerons.  Sous très-peu de 
temps, nous aurons, outres nos places fortes, cinq cent mille hommes en bataille, bien armés, bien 
organisés, bien commandés ; un million de gardes nationaux les appuieront, et le roi, s’il en est besoin, se 




achievement as an enduring component of contemporary civic life within a climate of 
extended peace and political will against waging the kinds of wars that defined the early 
nineteenth-century.  While official war imagery has often been seen as reflective of 
political intentionality, this chapter will show that the government’s efforts to use 
representations of war to elicit public support ultimately exposed the regime’s duplicitous 
attitude toward war and peace.  As I will argue, instead of proving the government’s 
devotion to France’s contemporary military glory, the phenomenon of war imagery’s 
overabundance became the unintended subject of a lively critical discourse which 
focused on its material proliferation as much and sometimes more than on its subject 
matter.  These critical rumblings suggested that the government was substituting material 
proliferation of war-related imagery in place of actual heroic military engagement, and in 
fact it was.    
During the eighteen years of the July Monarchy’s reign, officially commissioned 
visual representations of war proliferated on an unprecedented scale and across a startling 
variety of media, far eclipsing their production during the First Empire.  To give some 
sense of the magnitude of this effort, over 173 paintings of military subjects were shown 
at Salon exhibitions during the July Monarchy from 1836 to 1838, eclipsing in just three 
years the 143 paintings of war-related subjects exhibited over the entire ten-year course 
of the First Empire.8
                                                 
8 These statistics are based on the listings of exhibited works in the Salon catalogues.  Not included in this 
tally are portraits of generals or French rulers including Napoleon Bonaparte and Louis-Philippe d'Orléans.  
I counted 143 war-related subjects for the Salon exhibitions held from 1804 – 1814 and 173 for the three 
Salon exhibitions held between 1836 and 1838 during the July Monarchy.    
  While the official art of the July Monarchy has traditionally been 
understood as propaganda in support of the regime’s political intentions, I argue that an 




the proliferation of official war imagery opens up new possibilities for understanding the 
relationship between art and politics during the period.     
Government expenditures on war-related visual representations took the form of 
large-scale publicly oriented projects, most notably Louis-Philippe’s historical museum at 
Versailles for which hundreds of battle paintings were commissioned and its associated 
print publication, the Galeries historiques de Versailles, the unrealized goal of which was 
to reproduce every single object displayed in the museum.  These ambitious endeavors 
worked together as part of the same strategy of material abundance across different forms 
of media and technologies of visual reproduction, a phenomenon that I will account for in 
the pages that follow.  This chapter accordingly considers the meaning of war imagery 
filling the historical museum at Versailles and its related publication not as successful 
propaganda for the government’s political aims but rather as a set of material claims 
grounded in a proliferation of visual objects.   
During the July Monarchy, critical invectives were especially targeted at battle 
painting; they focused not only on its overabundance but also on its mediocrity. The 
genre of battle painting became a symbol of the failure of history painting in general and 
called into question its ability to project a set of collective, civic values under a new 
government.  There was however, another form of large-scale war imagery that escaped 
critical disdain, the painted battle panoramas of Jean-Charles Langlois.  After examining 
the proliferation of officially-sponsored war imagery, this chapter will show how these 
privately produced, for profit, monumental circular canvases garnered nearly universal 
praise as surrogates for the experience of modern warfare and challenged the illusionistic 




the period’s most important battle painter, Horace Vernet, attempted to reinvigorate the 
genre of battle painting.  He responded to critical challenges to the genre by translating a 
set of formal and material characteristic of the panorama to suit a new form of battle 
painting for France’s contemporary military combats in Algeria, widely understood at the 
time as a weak substitute for the intra-European warfare of the First Empire. 
 
The Affect of Horace Vernet’s Battle Painting: Before and After 1830 
During the Bourbon Restoration, the duc d'Orléans and his coterie of supporters 
were able to make use of Napoleonic military imagery to align themselves against the 
ruling Bourbon regime.  The future king’s decision to commission four major battle 
paintings from Horace Vernet in 1820 provided him with a subtle way of setting himself 
apart from official power during the Restoration.  Vernet’s reputation as a rebellious, 
politically oppositional artist had been created in 1822, when one of the four battle 
paintings Louis-Philippe had commissioned from him, the Battle of Montmirail, was 
rejected from the Salon exhibition by government officials, as mentioned earlier.  Taking 
advantage of this very public slight, Vernet mounted a private exhibition in his studio of 
the rejected painting and many other works based on Napoleonic subjects.9
                                                 
9 Chaudonneret, L'État et les artistes. De la Restauration à la monarchie de Juillet (1815-1833 , 102-105.  
  The private 
exhibition sealed his reputation as the foremost painter of the recent Napoleonic past.  
Though Vernet’s depictions of France’s former military exploits were not explicitly 
aligned with organized political opposition to the regime, they nevertheless became 




When Louis-Philippe became king in 1830, he attempted to take advantage of the 
politicized connotations of Revolutionary and Napoleonic military events to legitimize 
his authority and lay claim to a broad base of popular support for his regime.  A 
proclamation issued on the eve of his assumption to the throne made direct reference to 
one of the military campaigns that Horace Vernet had represented for the future king 
during the Restoration, the Battle of Jemmapes: 
A republic would threaten to divide us terribly and would isolate us from the rest 
of Europe.  The duc d’Orléans is a prince who is devoted to the ideals of the 
Revolution.  The duc d’Orléans has never fought against us.  The duc d’Orléans 
was at Jemmapes.  The duc d’Orléans carried the tricolor into battle, and only the 
duc d’Orleáns can wear its colors now; we will not have any others.  The duc 
d’Orléans has committed himself: he agrees to the kind of constitution we have 
always wanted and accepted.  His crown will come from the French people.10
 
 
The proclamation was authored by a group of wealthy opposition liberal elites who 
supported the duc d'Orléans’ ascension to the throne. It was hastily composed at the home 
of Jacques Laffitte, the patron of Horace Vernet’s largest battle painting made during the 
Restoration, Napoleon Crossing the Bridge at Arcole (1826).  Alluding to Louis-
Philippe’s participation in illustrious battles of the Revolution and Empire suggested his 
devotion to la patrie without aligning him with any particular social group or any defined 
political agenda. This savvy political use of the wars of the Revolution and Empire to 
legitimize the ruling authority of Louis-Philippe also marked an important shift in terms 
of the ideological work that official representations of war were asked to perform after 
1830.  As the proclamation confirmed, France’s recent military exploits no longer 
functioned within the context of an opposition politics as they did during the Restoration.  
                                                 
10 “Déclaration des députés faisant appel au duc d’Orléans,” in Louis-Philippe, l'homme et le roi, 1773-





For the first time since the treaties of 1815, representations of Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic war were put into the service of bolstering public support for a ruling 
government.   
Charles Blanc, a committed socialist and critic of the July Monarchy, saw through 
the proclamation’s attempt to collapse France’s past military triumphs with the new 
Orleanist political establishment.  In his Histoire de dix ans Blanc was incredulous: “By 
speaking of the tricolor flag and of Jemmapes to a crowd with little concern for political 
forms, the concern was to elevate the chosen member of the bourgeoisie through this 
national sentiment which the victories of the Republic and Empire had so powerfully 
exalted.  Finally, the sovereignty of the people was invoked, the better to destroy it: old 
ruse of the cowardly ambitious.”11
Writing retrospectively in 1847, his contempt for the regime was colored by 
events such as the 1834 massacre of elderly men, women and children by National Guard 
troops on the rue Transnonain.  The event, which was connected to a series of working 
class insurrections that occurred in Paris and in the provinces from 1830-1834 was 
memorialized in a lithograph by Honoré Daumier and was aggressively censored by the 
  Blanc’s frustration revolved around the inability of 
the majority of French citizens to understand the references to France’s past military 
glory as “political forms” that were being put into the service of a government which 
sought to limit the power of the people whom it supposedly served.   
                                                 
11 Louis Blanc, La révolution française, l'histoire de dix ans, vol. 1 (Bruxelles: Meline, Cans, et 
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formes politiques, on intéressait à l'élévation de l'élu de la bourgeoisie ce sentiment national qu'avaient si 
puissamment exalté les victoires de la république et de l'empire. Enfin on invoquait, pour mieux la détruire, 





By 1830, this affective response to representations of France’s military past 
lamented by Blanc was something that critics had come to associate with Horace 
Vernet’s battle paintings from the Restoration.
  Blanc contended that excitement over war imagery obscured the 
government’s true intentions of marginalizing the rights of workers and enriching 
France’s ruling classes.  Within this line of thinking, it was in the political interests of the 
July Monarchy for representations of war to continue to elicit the same enthusiastic 
responses as they had since the Revolution.   
13
Like many commentators before him, Charles Lenormant, a close friend and 
associate of the powerful July Monarchy minister François Guizot, and author of an 1833 
book on contemporary artists, Les Artistes Contemporains, understood Horace Vernet’s 
battle paintings in terms of the enthusiastic responses they garnered at exhibitions.
  For the first Salon exhibition of the July 
Monarchy, in addition to several classically-inspired paintings that he sent from Rome 
where he was serving as the director of the French Academy, Vernet presented two of the 
battle paintings commissioned by Louis-Philippe in the 1820s, the Battle of Jemmapes 
and the Battle of Valmy. This not only publicly recalled Vernet’s close bonds with the 
new regime but also affirmed the new artistic politics of the July Monarchy, which 
officially welcomed the representation of Napoleonic military subjects in the hopes of 
forging social cohesion and a stable government.   
14
                                                 
12 David Kerr, Caricature and French political culture, 1830-1848: Charles Philipon and the Illustrated 
Press (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 110-114.  
  His 
review of the Salon of 1831 contended that Vernet’s Jemmapes and Valmy produced 
13 For more on the critical discourse surround Horace Vernet during the Bourbon Restoration, see Chapter 2 
of this dissertation.    




what he called a “revolution in the arts,” which he characterized as a new kind of viewing 
relationship made possible through Vernet’s departure from the norms of the French 
classical tradition.  “The crowd became accustomed to seeking out its own emotions in a 
painting of six feet, thrilled to see itself represented without bombast and almost without 
poetry, or at least without the only form of poetry that the French nation has ever known 
and does not allow for the painting of contemporary events except as a theatrical 
apotheosis.”15
One of Horace Vernet’s most outspoken critics, Gustave Planche, doubted that 
Vernet’s battle paintings would continue to provoke the kinds of impassioned responses 
  By “theatrical apotheosis,” Lenormant referred to the history paintings of 
contemporary Napoleonic subjects made during the First Empire by the students of 
Jacques-Louis David.  In contrast to these celebrated paintings and the “poetry” they used 
to depict contemporary events, Vernet’s depictions of the same type of subjects were 
smaller in scale and avoided the high-minded visual rhetoric associated with French 
neoclassical painting.  Instead of a single moment of narrative transcendence of a god-
like hero (usually Bonaparte) typical of First Empire history paintings of military 
exploits, Vernet made use of a spread-out episodic narrative structure in which many 
actors simultaneously participated in the battle.  In his battle paintings on view at the 
Salon of 1831, the triumphs of the French army were depicted as socially inclusive, 
collective deeds, befitting a government which had come to power on the heels of a 
popular revolution.   
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s'habitua à chercher ses émotions dans une toile de six pieds ; elle s'enthousiasma d'elle-même représentée 
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from viewers that they had during the Restoration.  As Planche argued, after the July 
Revolution Vernet’s work became unmistakably allied with the ruling government and no 
longer carried the oppositional charge it once had.  “One remembers how Jemmapes and 
Valmy were banned during the last Restoration, and how the public, always eager to 
express its opposition to the foolish fears of power, did not hesitate to appear in droves at 
the studio of the artist.”16  In his review of the Salon of 1831, Planche homed in on the 
change in political fortune of Vernet’s military imagery and connected it directly to the 
Revolution of 1830.  “Confess it frankly,” he wrote, “the memory of the enthusiasm with 
which we granted, or contributed to the success of M. Horace Vernet shames our taste [in 
art].  We have applauded, adored, and recommended him like a political pamphlet.”17
With changed political conditions and a new regime in place, Planche asserted 
that Vernet’s battle paintings had acquired new meaning:  
   
Everything has been said about the merit of these compositions; but everything 
that has been said would not be worth saying today.  The political merit has 
completely vanished…The glory of our last thirty years is no longer forbidden; 
we can talk about it at ease.  The king, in the solemnities where he has spoken 
directly to us, has not hesitated to recall the great military events that M. Horace 
Vernet has retraced.  How has he retraced them?  That is the only question that 
one can pose today.18
 
 
Just as the fall of Napoleon had in 1815, the Revolution of 1830 revealed that the 
meaning of battle painting was entirely contingent upon political actuality as well as on 
                                                 
16 Gustave Planche, Etudes sur l'école française (1831-1852), vol. 1 (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1855), 14.  
“On se rappelle que Jemmapes et Valmy furent proscrits sous  la dernière restauration, et que le public, 
toujours empressé de manifester son opposition aux craintes si souvent et si ridiculement niaises du 
pouvoir, ne manqua pas de se porter en foule à l’atelier de l’artiste.” 
17 Ibid., 15. “Avouons-le franchement : le souvenir de l’empressement avec lequel nous avons consenti, ou 
concouru, au succès de M. Horace Vernet fait honte à notre gout.  Nous l’avons applaudi, adoré, préconisé 
comme un pamphlet.”   
18 Ibid.  “Tout a été dit sur le mérite de ces compositions ; mais tout ce qu’on a dit ne serait plus bon à dire 
aujourd’hui.  Le mérite politique s’est complètement évanoui….La gloire de nos trente dernières années 
n’est plus proscrite ; on en parle à son aise.  Le roi, dans les solennités où il s’adresse directement à nous, 
n’hésite pas à rappeler les beaux faits d’armes que M. Horace Vernet a retracés.  Comment les a-t-il 




the public’s shifting opinion of war.  During the Bourbon Restoration, the prohibition of 
Revolutionary and imperial war imagery had produced a political charge made possible 
through contemporary political circumstances, and not necessarily by the images 
themselves.  By 1831, Horace Vernet’s battle paintings had become emblems of Orleans 
political authority and no longer signified for Planche as reminders of stifling Bourbon 
prohibitions of military glory.   
Despite doubts that visual representations of the recent military past, and Vernet’s 
in particular, no longer carried an affective charge after the July Revolution of 1830, the 
July Monarchy embraced war-related imagery as a means of positioning itself as a 
benevolent authority dedicated to France’s citizens.  Louis-Philippe continued to 
commission battle paintings from Horace Vernet as he had during the Bourbon 
Restoration, with one crucial difference.  After 1830, the scale of Vernet’s paintings 
increased dramatically.  The four battle paintings that established Vernet’s reputation 
during the Restoration, Jemappes, Montmirail, Valmy, and Hanau were all small-scale 
works relative to the larger scale traditionally reserved for history painting.  Critics had 
lauded Vernet for painting contemporary military events in a diminutive scale. In the 
words of one enthusiastic supporter, the artist had “thankfully reduced national history 
painting to its true proportions: the French army uniform is not at all picturesque enough 
to be painted in a large format.”19
                                                 
19 The subtext of this praise for Vernet’s small battle paintings is a criticism against history painters during 
the First Empire, who embraced contemporary military subjects at the behest of Napoleon at the expense of 
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After Louis-Philippe assumed the throne, contemporary military subjects took on 
gigantic proportions; the largest paintings made by Vernet during the July Monarchy not 
only dwarfed his earlier work but also surpassed the size of the history-cum-battle 
paintings made by Jacques-Louis David and his students during the First Empire.  For 
example, Vernet’s Battle of Montmirail measured 178 x 290 cm - smaller than a typical 
First Empire battle painting made by a history painter, such as Antoine-Jean Gros’ 
Napoleon Visiting the Battlefield of Eylau (1807) which measured 521 x 784 cm.  
Vernet’s largest painting made for Louis-Philippe during the July Monarchy, the Capture 
of the Smahla (1845) measured an astonishing 489 x 2139 cm.  The precipitous growth of 
the physical proportions of Horace Vernet’s battle paintings after 1830 was an indication 
of the changed status of the artist’s main patron, Louis-Philippe, who went from a figure 
of opposition under the preceding Bourbon regime to the ruler of the July Monarchy with 
the coffers to support an ambitious public arts program.  The main point here is that the 
productive energy invested in representations of war took on a compensatory function as 
a means of filling the gap left by the absence of large-scale international conflicts.  As we 
shall see, the monumental scale of Horace Vernet’s battle paintings during the July 
Monarchy was just one facet of this productive effort, which extended to an entire logic 
of production across a range of domains of artistic practice.   
The proliferation of representations of war under the July Monarchy government 
was not so much a demonstration of Louis-Philippe’s power as a monarch, as an appeal 
for support that lay at the heart of the political philosophy of the regime.  For Louis-
Philippe and his ministers, the sovereignty of government power derived from gaining 




sovereign insofar as he maintained a level of consent to exercise his powers.  François 
Guizot, whose well-developed theory of sovereignty informed the political operations of 
the July Monarchy, claimed that the expansion of government power depended upon 
seeking out and opening channels of communication with the public.  According to 
Guizot, public works and institutions were indispensable for bringing people into direct 
contact with their government.  In the History of the Origins of Representative 
Government (1821-1822), Guizot affirmed that, “representative government does not 
attribute sovereignty as inherently residing in any one person - all its powers are directed 
to the discovery and faithful fulfillment of that rule which ought ever to govern their 
action; the right of sovereignty is only recognised on the condition that it should be 
continually justified.”20
Within the governing experiment that was July Monarchy liberalism, public 
expressions of government authority in the form of large-scale battle paintings projects 
like those commissioned from Vernet opened up valuable channels of political 
communication between government power and the people; they were the motor which 
drove the people’s recognition of government’s right to rule.  For the leaders of the 
conservative liberal regime of the July Monarchy, the visual language of war offered an 
expedient mode of forging a broad base of public support for the sake of extending the 
reaches of governing power.   
   
Alexis de Tocqueville, liberal statesman and democratic political theorist who 
supported the July Monarchy, succinctly summarized why the French liberal state 
required the symbolic evocation of war: “I do not wish to speak ill of war: war almost 
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always broadens a people’s mental horizons and elevates its character.  In some cases it 
alone can prevent the excessive development of certain inclinations naturally produced 
by equality and must be considered the necessary remedy for certain inveterate diseases 
to which democratic societies are liable.”21
 
  For Tocqueville, war served a purpose for the 
modern state akin to a medicine.  War was curative, and even essential to curing the 
social ills in society.  The production of war imagery was integral to maintaining the 
stability of the July Monarchy’s new experiment in representative government even as 
the regime sought to eliminate the outbreak of large-scale international conflicts within 
Europe.  The paradoxical need to acknowledge and flatter France’s militaristic identity 
while maintaining internal stability explains the proliferation of government-sponsored 
war imagery during the period.   
Battle Paintings for the Musée historique at Versailles: “We no longer produce 
anything but battles in a time when we no longer fight.”  
 In 1832, the newly appointed King Louis-Philippe d'Orléans began to renovate 
the dilapidated Château de Versailles into a massive French history museum to serve as a 
powerful political symbol of the recently established constitutional monarchy.  The 
project of transforming Versailles into a public, educational space constituted the 
regime’s most visible attempt to engage its citizenry through what it hoped would be a 
visually stimulating and accessible official version of history.  Upon its completion in 
1837, the museum boasted over 4,000 works of art, many of which had been 
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commissioned especially for the space.  Louis-Philippe originally sought to finish the 
entire museum in less than two years, with a projected opening date of 1834. However, 
the ambitions of the project grew and the museum was not inaugurated until July 1837.22 
This massive public works project, paid for by Louis-Philippe’s liste civile, embodied one 
of the most fundamental governing philosophies of the coterie of doctrinaire liberals who 
had helped the regime come to power, namely the importance of bringing its citizens into 
contact with publicly oriented manifestations of governing authority.23
The important ideological role accorded to war imagery during the July Monarchy 
was made clear by its prominence at the historical museum of Versailles.  Various types 
of pictures filled the galleries of the historical museum, ranging from large-scale battle 
paintings to smaller scale genre paintings, sculptures and watercolors.  Louis-Philippe 
requisitioned for the museum many of the previously made history-cum-battle paintings 
by Gros, Gérard, and Girodet and also commissioned hundreds of new battle paintings 
from contemporary artists, including Horace Vernet.  The small-scale watercolors were 
commissioned from the Dépôt de la guerre and were executed by artists working for the 
Dépôt, under the orders of its director, General Pelet.  Louis-Philippe also requisitioned a 
large collection of watercolors made by the ingénieurs-géographes during the First 
Empire from the iconographic collection of the Dépôt de la guerre; these formed the bulk 
of the Galerie des aquarelles.
   
24
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89.  
  In the museum, representations of military exploits were 
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cobbled together, thus assembling genres of art that had traditionally been understood as 
distinct.   
Dozens of painters were given commissions for battle paintings, with twenty-nine 
paintings ordered for the Gallery of Battles alone.  Of all of the renovations at Versailles, 
the Gallery of Battles was the most extensive.  Plans for this section of the museum 
began in 1833.  An entire wing of the building measuring 120 meters long and 13 meters 
wide was reconfigured to make room for thirty-three large-scale battle paintings (Fig. 
4.1).  This was a vast space for the display of illustrious military events.25  The 
chronological span of the battles covered two millennia, beginning with the battle of 
Tolbiac of 424 and ending with the battle of Wagram of 1809.  Napoleonic battles feature 
prominently in the Gallery, with five out of the thirty-three battles dedicated to battles 
directed by Bonaparte.  As Thomas Gaehtgens has shown, the archival evidence indicates 
that the choice of the battles kept changing throughout the four years of work on the 
gallery with no clear iconographic or political agenda guiding the selection.26
Previous studies of the historical museum at Versailles have focused on its 
uniqueness as a space for historicist illustration of national events of the French past.  
According to Michael Marrinan, the space enacted a “simulation of historical narration” 
and disarmed any political traces from the image of Napoleon or from parts of France’s 
radical past.
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See also,  Michael Marrinan, “Historical Vision and the Writing of History at Louis-Philippe's Versailles,” 
in The Popularization of Images, Visual Culture under the July Monarchy, ed. Petra ten-Doesschate Chu 
and Gabriel P. Weisberg, The Princeton Series in Nineteenth-Century Art, Culture, and Society (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 113-143. Marrinan’s highly original and exhaustive study of the official 




museum at Versailles represented France’s history as an accessible, publicly-oriented 
narrative in keeping with the regime’s political agenda, with aesthetic criteria involving 
style, “school” and genre largely neglected. 28
Nearly all of the battle paintings commissioned by Louis-Philippe for the 
historical museum first appeared at Salon exhibitions before being taken to their final 
destination at Versailles.  Critics understood that the battle paintings displayed before 
them were destined for the museum and evaluated them with this fact in mind.  The critic 
writing for the Journal des artistes was shocked by the sheer number of battle paintings 
on display at the Salon of 1836:  
  Though the history museum at Versailles 
offered the regime an opportunity to use visual imagery to its own political advantage, 
there is no question that contemporary art critics recognized that the official version of 
history displayed before them failed to measure up to the perceived eminence of its 
referents.  The quantity of battle paintings on view at Salon exhibitions prior to and just 
after the inauguration of the historical museum in 1837 gave physical expression to the 
perception that France’s best days were firmly located in the past.   
The first observation that strikes one when entering the Salon, is that the totality 
of paintings ordered for the Musée historique de Versailles are battle subjects, 
subjects taken from all periods of our annals.  We would have imagined that the 
historical museum would not only have contained the painted history of our 
combats, but that everything that could have immortalized our kings, ours 
lawmakers, our great citizens, in whatever rank they occupied, would be in the 
domain of this vast and important collection.  It appears that this is not the case; 
the livret resembles a military guidebook, where armed events are catalogued in a 
number around 300: We no longer produce anything but battles in a time when we 
no longer fight. 29
                                                                                                                                                 
to ensure that officially produced art properly represented the imperatives of the regime.  His study of the 
regime’s political artistic agenda has informed my own reading of the reception of these official works of 
art.   
 
28 Marrinan, “Historical Vision and the Writing of History at Louis-Philippe's Versailles,” 139.  
29“Salon de 1836, 3e article,” Journal des artistes, no. 11 (1836): 163.  “La première observation qui frappe 





For this critic, there were far too many battle paintings at the Salon of 1836.  He puzzled 
why the history of France should be presented almost exclusively in terms of its battles.  
The paradox of the relative peace that reigned over Europe and the presence of such a 
large number of battle paintings was not lost on the critic.  The absence of international 
armed combat between nations that had defined the early part of the nineteenth century 
made the material presence of so many battle paintings appear incongruous and 
excessive.  The couplet at the end of the paragraph, “We no longer produce anything but 
battles in a time when we no longer fight,” demonstrates the critic’s awareness of the 
disparity between the state’s material encouragement of image-based war and its lack of 
enthusiasm for actual armed combat.  The physical profusion of so many battle paintings 
struck the critic as more important than the historical subjects those paintings 
represented.   
The couplet that the critic used to dramatize the discrepancy between the high 
number of battle paintings on view and the absence of large-scale international armed 
conflict appeared in several other sources from the period.  In Alexandre’s Lenoir’s 
review of the Salon of 1837, he wrote:  “I have even more paintings to examine, but I 
overhear in front of all these mediocre paintings headed for the Versailles gallery: Do we 
                                                                                                                                                 
sont des sujets de bataille, sujets pris à toutes les époques de nos annales.  Nous avions imaginé que le 
Musée historique ne contiendrait pas uniquement l’histoire peinte de nos combats, et que tout ce qui a pu 
immortaliser nos rois, notre magistrature, nos grands citoyens, dans quelque rang qu’ils aient vécu, était 
dans le domaine de cette vaste et importante collection.  Il paraît qu’il n’en est pas ainsi ; le livret ressemble 
à un répertoire militaire, où  des faits d’armes sont catalogués au nombre de deux à trois cents : On ne fait 




only make battles in a time when we no longer fight?”30  One year later, the critic writing 
for the Journal des artistes dismissed battle painting as “an occupation that has become 
quite vulgar since we no longer fight.”31  Alphone Karr used the phrase to mock the 
battle paintings on display at the Salon of 1840:  “As for battles, only one is ever painted 
and it’s always the same.  A battle always represents a place and a moment where no one 
fights, or rather where one no longer fights.”32  The phrase was also deployed in a 
vaudeville play from 1837 about a bourgeois master painter, Crouton, Master of his 
School or a True Artist-Painter: “Here are a hundred combats for Versailles/ In truth the 
French people / Have never seen so many battles/ Since there has been peace.”33
More surprising than the pervasive use of this refrain as a way of underscoring the 
disproportionate number of battle paintings in Salon exhibitions relative to the peace 
within Europe is its original source: a section of an 1819 vaudeville by the same 
playwrights as Crouton about the proliferation of a form of war imagery in an altogether 
different medium, lithography:  “Long live lithography!/ It’s the rage all over;/ Large, 
small, ugly, pretty,/ The crayon retraces everything./ The entire boulevard/ Is now a 
Salon/ Where without even posing,/ Everyone finds themselves on display!/ The walls 
are covered/ With soldiers and noble feats/ One sees only battles/ Since we have had only 
 
                                                 
30 Alexandre Lenoir, “Mémoires, le Salon de 1837,” Société des études historiques 33 (1837): 111. 
“J’aurais encore bien des tableaux à signaler; mais j’entends dire devant toutes ces toiles médiocres, 
destinées à la galerie de Versailles : On ne fait donc plus que des batailles depuis qu’on ne se bat plus ?”    
31 “Salon de 1838, 5e article,” Journal des artistes, no. 12 (1838): 162. “métier devenu bien vulgaire depuis 
qu’on ne se bat plus.” 
32 Alphonse Karr, “Musée du Louvre,” Les guêpes  (mars 1840): 66. “Pour ce qui est des batailles,—on 
n'en peint qu'une, toujours la même.—Une bataille représente toujours un endroit et un moment où on ne se 
bat pas,—ou bien où on ne se bat plus.”   
33 Marie-Emmanuel Guillaume Marguerite Théaulon de Lambert and Jules Joseph  Gabriel de Lurieu, 
Crouton chef d’école ou le peintre véritablement artiste. Tableau en un acte. Représenté pour la première 
fois à Paris, sur le Théâtre des variétés le 11 avril 1837 (Paris: Nobis, 1837), 14. “Voilà cent combats pour 





peace.”34  According to the art critic Charles Blanc, these lines were “overheard 
everywhere” during the Restoration, the period when the medium of lithography came 
into social use in France.35
As the critical embrace of the couplet underscored, Louis-Philippe’s attempt to 
construct a richly illustrative, didactic space to showcase France’s military triumphs was 
overshadowed by the material problem of overabundance.  One artist in particular 
became emblematic of this problem, Horace Vernet.  He painted three of the five 
  Whereas the original source warmly made light of the 
proliferation of lithographic prints of France’s military feats appeared all over city streets, 
the disdain of critics who invoked the overabundance of battle painting during the July 
Monarchy was much more pointed.  By virtue of lithography’s properties as a relatively 
inexpensive, expedient and small-scale form of visual reproduction, abundance was one 
of its defining characteristics.  In this original context, the phrase described with a 
detached ironic air the egalitarian circulation of war-related lithographs in spaces outside 
the reaches of official culture.  Lithographs, by their very reproductive nature, were 
expected to abound. But as singular and unique works of art, battle paintings were not.  
The pervasive appropriation of a phrase originally used to describe the proliferation of a 
reproductive medium by critics of battle painting during the July Monarchy demonstrates 
how the material values attached to lithography during the Bourbon Restoration provided 
a handy rhetorical model for figuring the troubling excess of a more traditional medium, 
painting. 
                                                 
34 Jules Édouard Bouteiller, Histoire complète et méthodique des théâtres de Rouen, vol. 2 (Rouen: Giroux 
et Renaux, 1867), 78.  “Vive la lithographie !/ C’est une rage partout : / Grands, petits, laide, jolie,/ Le 
crayon retrace tout./ les boulevards tout au long/ A présent sont un salon/ Où, sans même avoir posé/ 
Chacun se trouve exposé ! / On tapisse les murailles/ De soldats et de hauts faits, / On ne voit que des 
batailles/ Depuis que l’on a la paix.”   




Napoleonic battles for the historical museum’s Gallery of Battles: Iéna, Wagram, and 
Friedland (Fig. 4.2).  All were displayed at the Salon of 1836 and solicited equally 
scathing criticism.  Each painting represented marginal episodes from each battle but did 
not represent actual combat.  All three depict Napoleon on horseback, giving orders or 
receiving information about the battle.  They present Napoleon as a rational decision 
maker who is unquestionably in a position of authority over the battle, but they stop short 
of depicting combat.  In a period when the absence of war from French contemporary life 
was routinely commented upon, Vernet’s decision to represent war devoid of heroic 
combat did not go unremarked.  Critics took note of the absence of armed conflict and 
excoriated Vernet for removing the dramatic excitement of battle from the frame: “The 
three so called battles of Iéna, Friedland, and Wagram, by Horace Vernet, are three new 
forms of proof of the facility and rapid execution of the modern fa presto, but that is 
all.”36
Gustave Planche, who had never been a supporter of Horace Vernet, joined the 
chorus of critics who understood the military imagery destined for Louis-Philippe’s 
historical museum in terms of its physical excess.  Vernet’s paintings epitomized this 
tendency.  In his review of the Salon of 1836, Planche attacked Vernet for his excessive 
output. Seeing past the subjects Wagram, Iéna, and Friedland, Planche focused instead 
on the square footage of canvas that Vernet covered.  France’s military glory was 
overshadowed by the bombast of proportion that grew out of Vernet’s speed of 
execution: 
   
                                                 
36 “Exposition de 1836, 3e article,” Journal des artistes, no. 11 (1836): 165.“Les trois soi-disant batailles 
d’Iéna, de Friedland et de Wagram, par M. Horace Vernet, sont trois nouvelles preuves de la facilité et de la 




M. Horace Vernet occupies an immense space in the Salon this year, and not only 
has he covered hundreds of square feet, but then, if one must believe his friends 
and panegyrists, he required, to achieve this incredible task, less time than the 
weaver needed to cross the threads of the canvas.  It appears that the author has 
the ambition of becoming the official supplier to the royal museums.37
 
 
Vernet’s production of battle paintings is likened to the canvas-maker’s production of 
canvases.  Planche implicated Vernet in a mode of production of objects rather than art: 
the notion of artistic production is elided entirely from the passage; he is a “supplier.”  
The focus is instead upon Vernet as a maker of utilitarian things, not as the eminent 
painter of France’s military glory.   
When Vernet’s paintings moved from the Salon to Versailles, the criticism 
remained virulent.  That is, although the viewing context changed, the critical problems 
remained intact. 
The three paintings of Horace Vernet that end this long series of high 
achievements of our ancestors and our contemporaries have been severely enough 
judged at the last Salon, and nevertheless they contain beautiful things; but these 
are not battles; they are episodes of the life of the Emperor and it is regrettable 
that the painter of the Sano-Sierra [sic] did not otherwise conceive these three 
great days, Iéna, Friedland, and Wagram.  Unable to surmount the difficulty up 
front, perhaps he thought he needed to get around, so to speak, translating on such 
small canvases such large pages of our military history.38
 
 
                                                 
37 Planche, Etudes sur l'école française (1831-1852), 330. “M. Horace Vernet occupe un espace immense 
au Salon de cette année, et non seulement il a couvert de peinture plusieurs centaines de pieds carrés, mais 
encore, s’il faut en croire ses amis et ses panégyristes, il lui a fallu, pour achever cette prodigieuse besogne, 
moins de temps qu’au tisserand pour croiser les fils de la toile.  Il paraît que l’auteur ambitionne la 
fourniture générale des musées royaux.” 
38 “Musée historique de Versailles,” La Vogue, 20 juillet 1837, 1. “ Les trois toiles d’Horace Vernet qui 
terminent cette longue série des hauts faits de nos ancêtres et de nos contemporains ont été assez 
sévèrement jugées au dernier salon, et cependant elles renferment de grandes beautés ; mais ce ne sont pas 
là des batailles, ce ne sont que des épisodes de la vie de l’empereur, et il est à regretter que le peintre de la 
bataille de Sano-Sierra [sic] n’ait conçu autrement ces trois grandes journées, Iéna, Friedland, et Wagram.  
Peut être a-t-il cru devoir tourner pour ainsi dire, ne pouvant la vaincre en face, la difficulté de traduire, sur 




The critic’s acerbic irony is evident: each of Vernet’s three paintings is quite large (465 x 
543 cm); calling them “small” was a thinly veiled way of saying that it was Vernet who 
had made them appear this way through his choice of insignificant anecdotal details.  As 
most critics had remarked when viewing the paintings at the Salon, these three paintings 
did not represent battles at all; they were marginal episodes far removed from the drama 
of armed combat.  The impact of that discrepancy to this critic was to demand an even 
larger format than the one Vernet used: the events represented in the paintings made 
France’s illustrious battle history appear inconsequential and called attention to the gap 
between the historical grandeur of the event and its pictorial appearance.  For the critic, 
Vernet’s representation of these three muted narrative moments was evidence that the 
painter had failed to accommodate the true grandness of these Napoleonic battles.  
Significantly, the critic’s understanding of Wagram, Iéna, and Friedland as historical 
events is expressed through the concept of their material size; yet again, their failure to 
represent war rests in a refusal of the subject matter to be contained within the size of the 
frame. 
Vernet’s failure to represent the battle vividly represents a larger problem during 
the period, namely the vast difference between the received idea of the Napoleonic 
military past and its visual painted expression.  Battle painting’s inability to contain the 
historical importance of its depicted events resulted in a critical discourse that focused on 
the problem of scale.  This idea that past military achievements were so important that 
they simply could not be contained in any gallery space became a critical cliché in the 
reviews of the Salon of 1836.  Louis-Philippe’s ambitious project of constructing a 




of the genre of battle painting to represent a cherished idea of the grandeur of war. 
Instead of demonstrating military prowess, the battle paintings at Versailles displayed in 
starkly material terms the impossibility of conjuring military glory through visual 
representation.   
 The critical rancor caused by the proliferation of battle paintings in 1836 and 
1837 coincided with a new low point for France’s military morale.  France’s conquest of 
Algeria, begun in 1829 and extended when Louis-Philippe came into power in 1830, was 
going very poorly.  A series of highly publicized defeats had marred France’s attempt to 
establish a permanent colony.  The retreat of the French army at the walled city of 
Constantine had created a fervor in the press.  The officer in charge of Algeria, General 
Clauzel, was blamed by both the press and the government for France’s inability to 
maintain a stable presence in Algeria.  The exchange between the shamed Clauzel and the 
government became a public affair, eagerly followed by the press.39
The malaise within contemporary France was explicitly connected to France’s 
military decline and the sense that the once great conquering nation no longer played any 
important role in determining international politics.  Ximénès Doudan was a close 
advisor to the family of Louis-Philippe’s powerful minister of public instruction, and 
later of foreign affairs, Victor de Broglie, who famously dismissed Algeria as a “box at 
the opera.”
  This only amplified 
the perceived disjuncture between France’s contemporary lack of military glory and the 
overblown display of military imagery at Versailles.    
40
                                                 
39 H.A.C. Collingham, The July Monarchy, A Political History, 1830-1848 (London: Longman, 1988), 248-
249. 
  Doudan was therefore well placed to comment upon France’s military 




history during the July Monarchy.  His duties as tutor to the Broglie family included 
discussing the latest state and international developments with them.  In many of his 
letters to the family, he commented on the lack of glory that had been in such ample 
supply during the Revolution and Empire.  For Doudan, the grand deeds and characters of 
the past created a contemporary stupor in French society: 
How the shadows extend over everything so fast !...There is no more Revolution 
or Empire.  There is no longer anyone who knew Mirabeau, had personally seen 
Bonaparte returning from Italy, given advice to the Emperor and discussed with 
him all of these gigantic plans, of which there is nothing left but at the Versailles 
museum.  We have not done great things ourselves, but we have seen fall 
generations much stronger than us.41
 
  
Doudan sensed an acute lack of heroics in French contemporary life; the grands hommes 
of the Revolution and Empire were now either ailing or dead.  Instead of heroic military 
encounters, France was now engaged in the unheroic endeavors of strengthening its 
economy through private enterprise and of maintaining the détente among Europe’s 
courts.  Versailles was like a mausoleum of France’s storied past: instead of inspiring 
contemporary generations, the museum stood as the material embodiment of an eclipsed 
era.   
 
Guiding Visitors: Musée Historique de Versailles and the Scale of Reproduction 
The critical problems that plagued the historical museum at Versailles implicated 
visual media beyond painting.  Printed guidebooks of the historical museum were 
important for the way that the project was understood and provided a larger public with 
                                                 
41 Letter XL in Ximénès Doudan, Mélanges et lettres, vol. 1 (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1876), 223-224.  
Comme l’ombre s’étend vite sur tout!...Il n’y a plus de Révolution et d’Empire.  Il n’y a plus personne qui 
ait connu Mirabeau, vu familièrement Bonaparte revenant d’Italie, conseillé l’Empereur et discuté avec lui 
tous ces plans gigantesques, dont il ne reste plus rien qu’au musée de Versailles.  Nous n’avons pas fait 




the opportunity to gain access to the collection without taking the train or hiring a 
carriage to go out to Versailles. Yet these guidebooks also played a crucial role in 
signaling the material failure of the museum.  Though the publication of the official 
museum guidebooks has been seen as mere accessory to the historicist project of the 
museum, it constitutes an important object of inquiry in its own right.   
The political ideology underlying the ambitious project for the historical museum 
at Versailles was closely linked to the belief that representative government power 
needed continually to justify itself in order to maintain authority.  The importance of 
publicizing projects and institutions informed Louis-Philippe’s decision to give the 
retired military engineer and inventor with no artistic background, Charles Gavard, an 
exclusive contract to reproduce every object displayed in the museum in a massive 
publication entitled Galeries historiques de Versailles, which would serve as the official 
guidebook.  The production and controversial reception of Gavard’s Galeries Historiques 
de Versailles highlights the pitfalls of the July Monarchy government’s attachment to 
publicity as a political strategy.42
Louis-Philippe recognized that his museum could only be a valuable tool for 
bolstering his authority insofar as reproductions of its collections could be disseminated 
to as wide an audience as possible.  More to the point, these guides would have been 
aimed at a predominantly middle class audience capable of paying a minimum of 50 
    
                                                 
42 Michael Marrinan examined a different historical museum guidebook, Jules Janin’s Versailles et son 
musée, which appears to have been commercially related to Gavard’s guidebook.  He called attention to the 
ways in which historical museum guidebooks allowed Louis-Philippe’s icono-political agenda of historical 
narration to be enacted through a complex interaction between historical prose of the text and the 
historicized visual objects on display. See Marrinan, “Historical Vision and the Writing of History at Louis-




centimes per week, the cost of the cheapest edition (Fig. 4.3).43 The guide was published 
at the king’s own expense and for the alleged purposes of immortalizing the museum 
through the long-lasting medium of engraving.  Louis-Philippe is reported to have 
confided in Gavard that his museum “is not eternal, a fire or a revolution could destroy it 
without leaving a trace; but the scattered sheets of your large book are sheltered from 
these opportunities for destruction.”44  Sensitive to the possibility of future revolutions or 
the specter of natural disaster, Louis-Philippe sought a more stable means of ensuring the 
legacy of his historical museum in the form of Gavard’s publication.  When the historical 
museum at Versailles was unveiled to 1,000 government-invited attendees on April 26, 
1837, Gavard was provided with a small room to sell advance copies of his publication, 
thus demonstrating the close ties between the government and Gavard’s publication.45
Charles Gavard gained fame in 1830 for his invention of a new perspective-based 
drawing machine, the diagraph.  Through an elaborate system of interconnected 
mechanical parts, the diagraph allowed users to manipulate a pencil along a point that is 
kept in constant relation to what the eye beholds (Fig. 4.4).
 
46
                                                 
43 The daily wage for a worker during the July Monarchy was approximately 3.50 Francs.  For the vast 
majority of France’s working class population, this price would have been prohibitive.  Louis-Philippe’s 
historical museum was aimed at a distinctly bourgeois audience, which helps to explain why Gavard’s 
diagraph, as an emblem of modern technological “progress” would have been especially attractive to Louis-
Philippe.    
  To make the instrument 
work, one looked through a lens fixed on the object to be copied, and guided a small 
handle to trace the lines seen through the lens.  These drawings then served as the basis 
44 V. de Mars, “Chronique de la quinzaine,” Revue des deux mondes  (1851). “Mon ouvrage n’est pas 
éternel, une incendie, une révolution peut en détruire sans en laisser des traces ;  mais les feuillets épars de 
votre grand livre sont à l’abri de ces chances de destruction.” 
45  “Inauguration du palais et des galeries historiques de Versailles,” Journal des artistes, no. 13 (1837): 
206. “M. l’intendant général de la liste civile, toujours empressé de favoriser les belles entreprises, a mis à 
la disposition de M. Gavard, chargé de reproduire par la gravure ce monument vraiment national, une salle 
où se vendront les livraisons des Galeries historiques de Versailles.” 
46 David Tomas, Beyond the Image Machine, A History of Visual Technologies (New York: Continuum, 




for the reproductive engravings in the publication, and were transferred to steel plates 
using another machine that Gavard had perfected, the pantograph.  Gavard’s diagraph 
deskilled the art of graphic reproduction, which had long been the domain of highly-
trained reproductive engravers.  It also decreased the amount of time it took to reproduce 
works of art as engravings.47
  Gavard’s diagraph provided a rough sketch quickly without having first to make 
a reduced-size copy of the original work as a model for an engraver.  The inventor 
emphasized the diagraph’s relative speed in the first pages of each edition of the Galeries 
historiques de Versailles, which also served as a form of publicity for the drawing 
machine itself and its illustrious inventor, Charles Gavard: 
  The fact that Gavard, and not a publisher who specialized 
in reproductive engraving, was awarded the monopoly to reproduce the contents of 
Versailles was a sign of the July Monarchy government’s commitment to publicity as one 
of the bases of maintaining and extending governing power.   
Never has there ever been a reproduction simultaneously more original, more 
meticulous and more complete of a more immense, more vast and more complete 
monument…this immense work, that would have demanded 50 years of patience 
and labor, will be accomplished in less than four years, as little time as it took 
King Louis-Philippe to finish the new Versailles.48
 
    
Gavard even advertised his diagraph in the publication, letting his readers know that it 
was available for purchase at his shop.   
                                                 
47 For the special status of reproductive engraving in France during the nineteenth century, see Bann, 
Parallel Lines, Printmakers, Painters, and Photographers in Nineteenth-Century France .  
48 Charles Gavard, “Prospectus,” in Galeries historiques de Versailles, dédiées à S. M. la reine des français 
(Paris: Imprimerie d’Eugene Duverger, 1837), 2. “Jamais reproduction plus originale, plus minutieuse et 
plus complète à la fois n’aura été faite d’un monument plus immense, plus vaste et plus rempli partout 
…ainsi cette œuvre immense, qui eût demandé cinquante années de patience et de travail, sera accomplie 
en moins de quatre ans, aussi peu de temps que le Roi Louis-Philippe lui-même aura mis à achever le 




The Galeries Historiques de Versailles was published in three different formats, a 
small 50 centime booklet, a 2 franc 50 centime folio, and finally an opulent 5 franc folio 
edition.  From 1837 through 1841, one or two new volumes became available every 
Thursday.  The prospectus at the front of every livraison announced the intentions of 
these multiple editions: “This book is before all else destined to be popular; however, 
next to the edition made for everybody we will have a separate edition, where all of the 
magnificence of printing, of paper, of ornament, will be applied with a profusion that we 
will call a ROYAL profusion.”49
The differences in quality between the engravings in the various editions were 
immense.  In the cheapest, 50 centime edition, a reader would receive historical 
explanations of works of art housed in the museum accompanied by two line engravings 
made entirely with the diagraph, hence, little more than engraved outlines.  The more 
costly editions featured the historical text plus four engravings made by the hand of a 
hired reproductive engraver, filling in where the diagraph had left off.  Jacques-Louis 
David’s Bonaparte Crossing the St. Bernard Pass was reproduced in all editions.  In the 
50 centime edition, the painting was reduced to a simple line drawing (Fig. 4.5) with very 
little, if any, involvement on the part of an engraver.  The more labored engraving of 
  This class-based system of distribution, ranging from 
“popular” to “royal,” established a hierarchy of editions.  By calling the most expensive 
edition a “royal” one, Gavard effectively tied the language of elite social rank to a 
publication that was in actuality a nascent mass cultural product, democratically available 
to anyone who could afford to pay 50 centimes. 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 2. “Ce livre est avant tout destiné à être un livre populaire ; mais cependant à coté de l’édition faite 
pour tout le monde nous aurons une édition à part, où toutes les magnificences de l’impression, du papier, 




David’s painting, with its more convincing illusion of depth and subtle tonal gradations 
(Fig. 4.6), was only included in the more expensive versions of Gavard’s publication.  
The underlying primary goal of Gavard’s publication was dissemination; for an extra fee, 
consumers could obtain the luxury version, which built upon the contour delineated in the 
cheaper edition. 
When word of Gavard’s monopoly reached the press, a firestorm ensued.  The 
Journal des artistes, a periodical that had traditionally represented and defended the 
interests of artists, was aghast: 
How does the administration, now after a period of long research, long 
hesitations, end up conferring the reproduction of the museum of Versailles to an 
instrument instead of conferring it to able artists?  Is this with the intention of 
killing artists while at the same time killing the arts?...This system of reproduction 
should have been renounced; it would have been original without any doubt, and 
sometimes successful, but will offer an incomplete, discordant work, and will be 
at the same time an invitation to engravers to go throw themselves in the 
river...And what of the government?  Has it really decided to dethrone art, and to 
place its scepter, twisted and false, in the hands of industrialism?50
 
  
The conflict that arose between the Journal and the Versailles publication pitted the 
artistic claims of reproductive engraving against what was perceived as the vulgar and 
materialistic proliferation of Gavard’s sub-standard reproductions which the journal 
referred to as industrialism.  The Journal des Artistes criticized the July Monarchy 
government for turning over the reproduction of Versailles to a machine:  “The monopoly 
                                                 
50 “Le Diagraphe et le musée de Versailles,” Journal des artistes, no. 25 (1836): 397. “Maintenant, 
comment se fait-il que l’administration, après de longues recherches, de longues hésitations, finisse par 
confier à un instrument la reproduction du musée de Versailles, au lieu de le confier à des artistes habiles ?  
Est-ce donc dans l’intention de tuer les artistes en même temps que l’art ?...il a fallu renoncer à un système 
de reproduction qui, sans doute, aurait eu de l’originalité, et , parfois, du bonheur, mais qui eût offert un 
ensemble incomplet, discordant, et eut été en même temps une invitation aux graveurs d’aller se jeter à la 
rivière… A quoi donc l’administration ? A-t-elle décidément résolu de détrôner l’art, et de remettre son 
sceptre, tordu et faussé, aux mains d’industrialisme ?...Dans ce cas, nous aurions un conseil à lui donner.  
Ce serait, pour être conséquente, ou, comme on dit aujourd’hui, pour être logique, de faire faire les tableaux 
par la lithochromie, les bustes et statues par le physionotype, et les gravures par le diagraphe.  Par ce 




on the engraving of objects in the historical museum of Versailles has just been conceded 
to the diagraph of M. Gavard.  It appears that the government has resolved to destroy the 
art of engraving for the profit of the engraving machine.”51
 In contrast to the government’s intention of spinning an accessible narrative of 
national historic glory in the museum space as well as in the guidebook, these two 
monumental efforts became mired in controversy.  The scale and ambition of both 
government projects became signs of their bombast.  For the editors of the Journal, 
Gavard’s publication was bereft of any artistic merit.  Retaliating against what it 
perceived to be a slight against art in his publication, the Journal des Artistes started its 
own publication, contemptuously titled Galeries artistiques de Versailles. The Journal 
des Artistes sought to rectify Gavard’s problematic focus on history by producing a guide 
that was artistic.  The artistic guide to Versailles was inserted into the Journal des 
Artistes on a bi-weekly basis for approximately one and a half months and featured its 
own expertly produced reproductive engravings.  After this brief run, the Galeries 
artistiques de Versailles ran into a major logistical problem: the ability to study the works 
of art on display in the galleries of Versailles and make reproductive engravings of them.  
  What was intended by the 
government to be a purely illustrative guide to Versailles became instead a debased 
object emblematic of the decline of art, a far cry from the positive publicity that the 
government sought.  For the editors of the Journal, the printed reproductions in Gavard’s 
publication became a material sign of the deficiency of the museum as a whole.  
                                                 
51 “Nouvelles des arts,” Journal des artistes, no. 24 (1836): 384.“Le monopole de la gravure des objets 
d’art du musée historique de Versailles, vient d’être octroyé au diagraphe de M. Gavard.  Il paraît que le 




The journal advised their readers that they could no longer continue the publication of 
Galeries artistiques:  
The administrative veto has with all its force inspired the artist named 
Diagraph…The diagraph alone can walk the length and width of the Versailles 
galleries…If we want to make a quick sketch…if we want to take some notes on a 
painting by Gros or by Vandermeulen, a guard instantly comes up to tell us in a 
manner more or less impolite, stating that it is not permitted to draw and that it is 
not permitted to write.  If, near a room we have just seen, we want to see 
something in it again, we are prevented from entering.  Finally, if we spent a bit 
of time in front of this or that work, if we examine it with attention, as to engrave 
it in our memory, not being able to engrave it otherwise, the guard comes 
impatiently around us and has no problem telling us: get along now…The 
galleries of Versailles are made to be visited by the ignorant hordes…the galleries 
were made to be seen and not studied.52
 
 
In an attempt to gather their own information about the art in the galleries at Versailles, 
artists associated with the Journal were prevented from spending any time studying the 
works in those galleries.     
 
The Pitfalls of Abundance: Engraving and Industry  
Gavard’s publication also provoked a well-publicized lawsuit filed by the widow 
of Antoine-Jean Gros and a classically trained reproductive engraver Jean-Auguste 
Philippe Vallot, who had been given the right to engrave Gros’ Battle of the Pyramids 
                                                 
52 “De l’impossibilité de continuer les galeries artistiques de Versailles,” Journal des artistes 2, no. 5 
(1837): 57-58.“Le veto administratif excite dans toute sa force en faveur de l’artiste appelé Diagraphe…le 
Diagraphe seul peut se promener en long et en large dans les galeries de Versailles…si nous voulons 
donner un coup de crayon…si nous vouons prendre quelque note sur un tableau de Gros ou de Vander 
Meulen, un gardien vient à l’instant nous décliner, d’une manière plus ou moins impolie, qu’il n’est pas 
permis de dessiner, qu’il n’est pas permis d’écrire.  Si, après avoir vu une salle, nous voulons revoir 
quelque chose dans la salle précédente, on nous empêche d’y rentrer.  Enfin, si nous nous arrêtons un peu 
de temps  devant telle ou telle œuvre, si nous l’examinons avec attention, comme pour la graver dans notre 
mémoire, ne pouvant la graver autrement, le gardien tourne autour de nous avec inquiétude, et peu s’en faut 
qu’il ne nous dise : passez votre chemin…Les galeries de Versailles sont faites pour être visitées par la 




three years before it entered the historical museum at Versailles.53 Gros had sold the 
rights to engrave the Battle of the Pyramids to Vallot in 1832 and could not have 
anticipated that Gavard would also be charged with its reproduction four years later.  
After Gros’ death by suicide in 1834, Madame Gros became the sole beneficiary of her 
husband’s estate and saw to it that no one infringed upon her rights.  In 1836, Vallot 
learned of Gavard’s intention to engrave the entire contents of the historical museum at 
Versailles, and after the publication of Gavard’s version in 1841, joined ranks with Gros’ 
widow and sued Gavard for what amounted to copyright infringement, avant la lettre.54
Vallot’s engraving was sold in a large folio format which provided ample space to 
display the attributes of a classically rendered reproductive engraving, subtly handled 
gradations with a remarkable tonal range.  By contrast, Gavard’s version, first traced with 
the drawing machine and later finished by the hand of an engraver, was less dazzling.  
(Fig. 4.9).   Its comparatively diminutive size (31 x 23 cm) provided little space to 
display the kinds of tour-de-force effects that a highly studied reproductive engraving 
demanded.  Gavard’s engraving lacked deep contrast and consequently, appeared grey 
  
To fit into its allocated wall space in the museum, the painting was slightly enlarged on 
each side (Fig. 4.7).  Gavard’s reproduction depicts the enlarged painting while Vallot’s 
version represents its original state (Fig. 4.8). 
                                                 
53 The painting had been purchased by the State in 1811 in the amount of 11,000 francs and was displayed 
in the Senate up until the allied invasion of Paris in 1814, when it was put into storage.  After the 1830 July 
Revolution, the Battle of the Pyramids was removed from storage and temporarily loaned to an army 
general, General Bertrand, who in turn gave it back to the State when plans materialized to hang it in the 
new historical museum at Versailles. 
54 The modern conception of “copyright” materialized in the later half of the nineteenth century in France, 
brought about precisely because of the dramatic proliferation of technologies of visual reproduction. A law 
protecting artistic property that would have won the case for Vallot and Gros’ widow was not passed in 
France until 1936.  See Annie Prassoloff, “Le droit de graver et les progrès du droit de l'auteur,” 




and flat (Fig. 4.10).  This lack of contrast was no small matter for a reproductive 
engraving of a painting whose drama revolved around the spatial relationship between 
Bonaparte’s gesture in the foreground and the pyramids in the background.  Moreover, in 
Gavard’s version, the faces of Bonaparte’s generals who stand around him appear puffy 
and generalized, whereas in Vallot’s version they are sharper and more individualized.  
Such formal disparities underscored the very different contexts that shaped the 
production of these engravings.     
 The Gavard vs. Gros and Vallot court case was covered by artistic periodicals and 
by more mainstream press such as the Journal des débats.  At stake was the right of 
artists to protect their intellectual property from being reproduced in a degraded form.  In 
the words of Madame Gros and Vallot’s lawyer, the conflict pitted the immutable values 
of art against purely commercial interests:  
Today, there is a deplorable tendency to speculate on everything, to industrialize 
everything, even the most noble things, the most elevated, those that make for a 
moral life and the glory of a nation.  The fine arts, for example, are no longer 
sheltered from these attempts by material interests.  It is no longer about making 
something beautiful and well done, but rather quickly, in large number and 
cheaply.  In the presence of this sad tendency, take away the painter’s right to 
engraving…and publicly spread an engraving unworthy of his work…and instead 
of Vallot’s engraving, beautiful, but 70 francs, you will have the more common 
engraving of Gavard, terrible, but only 5 francs per copy.55
 
 
                                                 
55 “Droit de gravure d'un tableau vendu sans réserve et acheté sans stipulation, affaire du tableau des 
Pyramides - Madame la baronne Gros et le sieur Vallot, graveur, contre le sieur Gavard, éditeur des 
Galeries Historiques de Versailles,” L'Observateur des Tribunaux, Journal des Documents Judiciaires  
(1842): 21. “Il se manifeste de nos jours une tendance déplorable à spéculer sur tout, à tout industrialiser, 
les choses les plus nobles, les plus élevées, celles qui font la vie morale et la gloire d’une nation, les beaux 
arts, par exemple, ne sont plus à l’abri de ces atteintes de l’intérêt matériel ; il ne s’agit plus de faire bien et 
beau, mais vite, en grand nombre et à bon marché.  En présence de cette triste tendance, enlevez au peintre 
le droit de gravure…et répandre dans le public une gravure indigne de son œuvre, livrer ce droit précieux 
au possesseur matériel du tableau, et au lieu  de la gravure de Vallot, belle mais à 70fr., vous aurez trop 




In the words of the prosecution, price and proliferation functioned as evidence that 
Gavard’s industrial mode of production threatened Gros’ reputation as a skilled, eminent 
artist.  The very signs of Gavard’s engraving’s merit in the eyes of the government, its 
cheapness and its profusion, became the signs of its artistic impoverishment for the 
prosecution.  The charges made by Vallot and Madame Gros’ lawyer, along with the 
complaints aired in the Journal des artistes, revolved primarily around the dubious 
quality of Gavard’s reproductive engravings and were not necessarily political grievances 
against the government.  However, such criticisms implicated Gavard in a malfeasant 
system of overabundant visual reproduction sponsored by Louis Philippe’s constitutional 
monarchy.  The case eventually made its way through several different judicial bodies to 
the Royal Orleans court which ruled, not surprisingly, in favor of Gavard.56
That this conflict revolved around an iconic representation of a Napoleonic battle 
is hardly a coincidence.  One decade into Louis-Philippe’s reign as “King of the French,” 
historical images, and specifically representations of armed combat, had gained an 
importance for the regime that was increasingly incongruous with their perceived artistic 
value.  As Gavard vs. Vallot made clear, both versions of the engraving possessed 
radically different values:  whereas Vallot’s engraving contained a high degree of artistic, 
connoisseurial value and was more firmly ensconced in the academic tradition of 
reproductive engraving, Gavard’s version embodied the production values that it fulfilled 
for the government, as a testament to military glory that was understood to be in short 
   
                                                 
56 This is an oversimplification of a very complex set of court cases that the scope of this chapter does not 
allow me to discuss.  To be precise: the case was first heard at the Cour de Paris, who ruled in favor of 
Gavard.  Madame Gros and Vallot then appealed to the case to the Cour de Cassation (court of appeals), 
who ruled in their favor.  The case was then sent to the Cour Royale d'Orléans, who ruled in favor of 
Gavard.  Madame Gros and Vallot appealed this decision at the Cour de Cassation, who struck down the 




supply during the 1830s.  Because war imagery was inextricably tied to the government’s 
political strategy of publicity and proliferation, it is hardly surprising that a lawsuit 
contesting such a strategy would revolve around a battle painting.   
Gavard’s version of the Battle of the Pyramids functioned in an economy of 
political actuality whose aim was to produce material, public evidence of heroic French 
military glory to serve the interests of the July Monarchy; the aim was to use war imagery 
as a means of bridging a relationship between governing power and bases of support.  In 
the words of François Guizot, “representative government sees itself only in unity, that is 
to say, in the reason to which the multitude ought to reduce itself…representative 
government recognises the fact that all power comes from above…[it brings the people] 
into communication with those who are naturally above them.”57
 
  For the “doctrinaires” 
in charge of the July Monarchy’s representative government, Versailles and its associated 
print publication constituted an attempt to engage the public with the government’s 
official evocation of France’s history.  The court case demonstrated, in the stark terms of 
different modes of visual reproduction, the drawbacks of the government’s attempt to 
conjure national pride through a proliferation of quickly and cheaply made printed 
images. Gavard’s Galeries historiques de Versailles, more than an exercise in official 
propaganda, helps to delineate the contours around which mass culture at the dawn of the 
industrial age took shape.   
Industrial Production, Cultural Production   
            The paintings embedded in the walls at the historical museum and also 
                                                 




reproduced in the pages of Gavard’s Galeries were but two components of a vast 
enterprise.  Of particular concern for Louis-Philippe was the ability of museum visitors to 
access Versailles from Paris.  To respond to this need, not one but two railroad lines were 
built between 1836 and 1840 to link Paris with Versailles, one on each bank of the Seine.  
They became the most expedient way of traveling from Paris to see the historical 
museum and also gave the government an opportunity to connect its ambitious public arts 
project to a symbol of modern industrial progress.  The 1846 edition of Galignani's New 
Paris Guide advised tourists to take the south bank rail line to Versailles and return on 
the north bank line “by which means two magnificent views of Paris and the neigbouring 
country will have been obtained.”58  But just as Gavard’s guidebooks and the historical 
museum attracted negative attention for their outsized ambitions, so too did the railroads.  
Jérôme-Adolphe Blanqui, who held the chair of Political Economy at the Conservatoire 
des arts et métiers, derided the government’s decision to construct two separate railroad 
lines.  In an industrial economics textbook published in 1839, he wrote:  “Do you 
understand?  Two lines, between Paris and Versailles; not between an industrial city and 
a sea port, as with Liverpool and Manchester, but between a city of luxury and a city of 
curiosity; not for businessmen but for idle visitors.”59
The historical museum’s association with a technological marvel of transport 
underscored the important economic changes that took place in France during the July 
Monarchy, namely, the rapid expansion of the country’s industrial capabilities for which 
  
                                                 
58 Galignani’s New Paris Guide: containing an accurate statisticaland historical description of all the 
institutions, public edifices (Paris: A. and W. Gaglgnani and Company, 1846) , v.   
59 Adolphe-Jérôme Blanqui, Cours d'économie industrielle (Paris: L. Mathias Augustin, 1839), 11. “Deux 
chemins, entendez-vous ? entre Paris et Versailles; non pas entre une ville d'industrie et un port de mer, 
comme Liverpool et Manchester, mais entre une ville de luxe et une ville de curiosité; non pour les gens 




the railroad became emblematic.60  However, the railroad out to Versailles was hardly 
affordable for all of the French population; a roundtrip ticket in second class cost 2.50 
francs, almost an entire day’s salary for a worker.61
During the July Monarchy, it was commonly believed that France’s economic 
expansion could only occur during a time of peace.  For this reason, war was to be 
avoided.  Even Ximenès Doudan recognized that war made the bourgeoisie nervous. In a 
letter of 1840, he wrote that “the real canon does little to exalt the imagination.  Sensible 
landlords find themselves surprised by a profound melancholy when thinking about the 
cost of glory.  This is not timidity before material danger, it is the horror of fortune, the 
fear that the teetering soup kettle might tip over, or that it may be disturbed.”
  Railroad transport to Versailles 
would have been available to a particular class of French citizens who could afford the 
train fare or who could afford to hire a carriage.  This was the same group who may have 
also appreciated the visual spectacle of material abundance displayed inside the museum 
and reinforced through the proliferation of Gavard’s printed guide, namely, the 
bourgeoisie.   
62
                                                 
60 France’s industrialization during the July Monarchy depended upon the expansion of the railroads and 
the ability of French companies to acquire raw materials and to transport goods.  See Tom Kemp, 
Industrialization in Nineteenth-Century Europe (London: Longman Group Limited, 1985), 60-64.  
  The 
contention that war threatened to hinder the pursuit of profits also became one of the 
rallying cries of republican opposition to Louis-Philippe.  Louis Blanc, who would later 
become one of the most influential socialist thinkers in France and a lead player in the 
61 Voyage pittoreque de Paris à Versailles, description historique du chemin de fer,  (Paris: Schneider et 
Langrand, 1841), 1. 
62 Lettre LXXXVII, à madame du Parquet, Coppet, 11 octobre 1840 in Doudan, Mélanges et lettres, 358-
59. “Le vrai canon exalte peu l’imagination.  Les propriétaires sensés se trouvent surpris d’une profonde 
mélancolie en pensant à ce que coute la gloire.  Ce n’est pas timidité devant le danger matériel, c’est  





Paris Commune, argued that Louis-Philippe was too much of a bourgeois to risk France’s 
industrial progress for the sake of heroic military engagement:  
The bourgeoisie was not at all tempted by the gleam of heroic adventures.  
Composed mostly of bankers and industrial merchants, of men of independent 
means, of peaceful and excitable landlords, the bourgeoisie almost completely had 
a fear of the unknown.  The grandeur of France was for her war; and in war one 
only gets interruptions of commercial relations, the fall of whichever industry, 
lost opportunities, and bankruptcy.63
 
 
Despite the citizen king’s efforts to align himself with war imagery and France’s recent 
military past, it was understood that the entire July Monarchy government was more 
interested in accumulating capital than propagating national glory through armed 
engagement. 
This also helps to explain why Horace Vernet, as the quasi-official painter of the 
July Monarchy, became caricatured during the period through allusions to industrial 
forms of production.  Though it was Vernet’s prodigious output that caused him to be 
associated with modern industry, the artist participated in a form of modern economic 
activity typical of men of his economic station during the July Monarchy, namely, 
railroad speculation.  Vernet’s account books reveal that he was a shareholder in the 
newly constructed Versailles railroad, the same line that would have transported visitors 
to the historical museum.  In 1837 and 1838, he made 3,084.75 francs from his 
investments in the railroad.64
                                                 
63 Blanc, La révolution française, l'histoire de dix ans, 187. “La bourgeoisie n’était nullement tentée par 
l’éclat des aventures héroïques. Composée en partie de banquiers, de marchands, d’industriels, de rentiers, 
de propriétaires paisibles et prompts à s’alarmer, elle appartenait presque tout entière à la peur de 
l’imprévu. La grandeur de la France, pour elle c’était la guerre et dans la guerre elle ne voyait que 
l’interruption des relations commerciales, la chute de telle ou telle industrie, des débouchés perdus, des 
faillites, des banqueroutes.” 
  Vernet’s investment in the nascent transportation network 
was part of a larger phenomenon of speculation rampant in France at the time considered 




by its critics to be a problematic “epidemic” that encouraged economic and moral 
depravity.65
The connection between Horace Vernet and the railroad was taken up by the 
caricaturist Bertall, who worked for the literary magazine Le Diable à Paris.  Bertall 
represented a modern-day allegory of the arts in France in a lithograph entitled, La 
Musique, la peinture, et la sculpture. Bertall targeted Horace Vernet for satire, 
associating him with his prodigious output and the railroad (Fig. 4.11).  He showed 
Vernet suspended from a railroad car driving across the top of a giant canvas.  The 
immense canvas and the image of the railroad implicated Vernet in an industrially-
oriented mode of production.  The print suggested a striking confluence between the 
industrial symbol of France and Vernet’s seemingly “industrial” manner of artistic 
production.   
   
The observation that Vernet’s practice was akin to the kind of output made 
possible by industry was not unique to Bertall’s print.  Gustave Planche, one of Vernet’s 
most colorful detractors, likened the artist’s prodigious output to that of a baron of 
industry:   
If what they say is true, we should bend down on one knee before M. Horace 
Vernet and ask that he be given a patent; his name deserves to be inscribed next to 
James Watt in the history of European industry.  It is permitted, without 
exaggeration, to see the brush of M. Horace Vernet as a machine with the force of 
160 horses, and when his patent has expired, when, thanks to the fabulous 
fecundity of his methods, he will become the landlord of two or three regions in 
France, I hope that he will publish his secret and deign to train students. If it 
pleases M. Horace Vernet, and if the government, enriched by peace, does not 
skimp, Paris will become the most beautiful city in the world; all the streets will 
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be covered in painting, all the houses from the first to the third floor, will offer to 
the gazes of passersby the most glorious episodes of French history.66
 
   
Planche took aim at the scale of Vernet’s battle paintings as well as the speed with which 
he made them, likening the artist’s brush to a machine.  This sarcastic invocation of a 
ubiquitous Vernet as a greedy landlord, taking over the landscape by covering entire 
facades of buildings was hyperbolic, but it echoes the complaints about Gavard’s sub-
standard machine-enhanced engravings as well as the overabundance of battle paintings 
destined to fill the galleries of the historical museum.  In these cases, the appearance of 
material excess drew attention to the machinations of publicity and propaganda that the 
government would have preferred to pass unnoticed.    
 
 Panoramas as Contemporary Military Encounter 
As we have already seen, the abundance of war imagery during the July Monarchy 
confirmed to many contemporary observers that the nation’s reputation as a militarily 
redoubtable power, already understood to be in jeopardy since France’s defeat at the Battle 
of Waterloo in 1815, was definitively on the wane.  Paradoxically, the proliferation of 
military imagery during the period made it easier to identify and name the lack of heroism 
that was understood to plague contemporary France: it in fact visualized the problem.  By 
the time King Louis-Philippe’s historical museum at Versailles attempted to represent an 
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maisons, depuis le premier jusqu’au troisième étage, offriront aux regards des passants les épisodes les plus 




officially sanctioned idea of military grandeur in the form of didactic, accessible images, 
the difficulty of containing those lofty ideas became apparent.  Victor de Nouvion, 
reviewing the hundreds of battle paintings at the Salon of 1836 destined to fill the galleries 
at Versailles, pointed to the impossibility of representing war through painting:    
I conclude that the painting of a battle is an impossible thing, and that one is 
forcibly restricted to choosing only the most brilliant episodes.  The episode of a 
battle will be at least a combat, and the scene should be animated, imposing, 
majestic, and terrible.  There must be soldiers who fight, dead, wounded, noise, 
disorder, in one word, this dreadful aspect that is inseparable from the idea of a 
combat.  If, instead of this, you represent a general chatting with his staff, or with 
some soldiers, one will have the right to laugh at you.67
 
 
This impossibility of visually conjuring a battle through the medium of painting is at the 
heart of the critical disdain for the battle paintings that were commissioned by Louis-
Philippe and installed in the historical museum at Versailles.  For the most part, these 
paintings were understood to fail to project the grand ideas that were associated with the 
wars of the First Empire.  The overabundance and proliferation of battle paintings only 
made this problem more acute so that this critic, reviewing the Salon of 1836, understood 
that the large-scale representation of battles had degenerated into a series of tired clichés.   
 There was another form of war imagery that was thought to be able to depict war in 
a way that met contemporary expectations of military glory: the panorama.  In contrast to 
the widespread critical view of battle painting’s emptiness and superficiality, panoramas 
that represented battles were understood to make war disarmingly real.  Battle panoramas, 
for those who could afford the entry fee, were immensely popular in France from the July 
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Monarchy up through World War I.68  During the 1830s and 1840s they challenged battle 
painting’s ability to represent modern warfare faithfully.  Even Quatremère de Quincy, a 
staunch Davidian classicist, claimed that for the representation of modern battles, “only the 
vast and special expanse of the panorama can suffice.”69
Jean-Charles Langlois (1789-1871), a student of Horace Vernet and a former 
Napoleonic officer, earned a reputation during the July Monarchy as the foremost maker of 
battle panoramas.  The panorama was originally invented by the Englishman Robert Barker 
in 1787 and quickly gained popularity all over the European continent.  Most of these early 
panoramas represented topographical cityscapes of distant lands.  Langlois, by contrast, 
specialized in representing battles.  His first panorama, the Battle of Navarino, opened in 
Paris in February 1831 and was an instant success.  His chief innovation was to use false 
terrain in front of his 360 degree canvas and extend the illusionism of the circular painting 
into three-dimensional space.  
   
Scholars of visual culture such as Jonathan Crary, Vanessa Schwartz, and the 
French literature scholar Maurice Samuels have emphasized the panorama’s importance 
as one of the constitutive sites of modern spectacular scopic regimes.  According to 
Crary, the panorama was “one of the places in the nineteenth century where a 
                                                 
68 Entry fees for panoramas varied throughout the nineteenth-century.  For Langlois’ first panorama, the 
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modernization of perceptual experience occurs.”70
The panorama of the battle of Navarino, a decisive 1827 battle from the Greek War 
of Independence, offered viewers a tour-de-force illusion of viewing a battle.  It was 
customary for visitors to a panorama to be led through a narrow corridor and emerge on top 
of a viewing platform so as not to be subject to an abrupt transition between the entrance of 
the rotunda and the illusionistic painting displayed on the circular enclosure.  Langlois 
transformed this experience of entering the space of the panorama into part of the historical 
spectacle (Fig. 4.12): instead of using a regular passageway, he procured one of the ships, 
the Scipion, that had actually participated in the battle of Navarino and made the vessel an 
integral part of the experience.  The inclusion of the Scipion was crucial for securing the 
veracity of the illusion of entering into a space of war.  Reviewers of the panorama took 
note of Langlois’ innovation and focused on it in their discussion of the experience of 
viewing the battle:   
  Beyond the panorama’s importance 
for understanding the nineteenth-century origins of spectacle, its status as a material 
embodiment of contemporary actuality must be taken into account.  Critics regarded 
Langlois’s battle panoramas as powerful representations of contemporary war at a time 
when war was perceived as losing its relevance because of the extended peace within 
Europe.   
The inventors of this panorama have imagined to have spectators climb the 
successive levels of the vessel, the Scipion.  At first, you find yourself near a thirty-
six gun battery, at the end of which one sees a part of the crew busy putting out the 
fire caused by a fire ship.  Then one climbs a staircase to the storeroom.  There, you 
can ACTUALLY go through the sleeping quarters of the commanding officer as 
well as the small gallery armed with canons that preceded it.  Finally, a third 
                                                 
70 See Jonathan Crary, “Géricault, the Panorama, and Sites of Reality in the Early Nineteenth Century,” 
Grey Room 9 (2002): 18. See also Maurice Samuels, The Spectacular Past, Popular History and the Novel 




staircase goes all the way up to the rear deck of the Scipion from which you 
discover the entire deck of the ship; and, from there and from all sides, the naval 
combat and the mountains that surround the bay of Navarino.71
 
    
The “crew” putting out the fire that the writer mentioned was actually an elaborately 
constructed diorama placed on the inside of the ship, along with other three-dimensional 
objects.  Another critic noted the placement of navigation manuals and maps on the 
captain’s dining table.  Tools such as a compass and a barometer were placed throughout 
the quarters.72
In the same panorama, Langlois placed a diorama which depicted two sailors 
bringing down the body of an injured man below the deck of the viewing platform.
  These authenticating objects were part of the highly calculated system of 
illusion of the panorama which served to bolster the impression of a battle unfolding within 
the viewer’s space.     
73  
Auguste Jal, who wrote a lengthy review of the panorama, remarked “you did not even 
perceive the diorama, because the transition from the real to the represented is so well 
considered.”74
                                                 
71 “Mélanges, Le Diorama de Navarin,” Petit Courrier des Dames, 5 Février 1831, 35.“Les inventeurs de 
ce panorama ont imaginé de faire monter successivement les spectateurs dans les differens étages du 
vaisseau le Scipion. On se trouve d’abord près d’une batterie de trente-six pièces, à l’extrémité de laquelle 
on aperçoit une partie de l’équipage occupée à arrêter l’incendie que cause un brulot.  Bientôt on monte un 
petit escalier au haut duquel est l’entrepôt.  Là on peut parcourir REELEMENT la chambre du 
commandant, et la petite galerie armée de canons qui la précède.  Enfin, un troisième escalier mène jusqu’à  
la dunette du Scipion, d’où l’on découvre alors tout le pont du bâtiment ; et, au delà et de tous les cotés, le 
combat naval et les montagnes qui entourent la baie de Navarin.” 
  Here, the savvy critic called attention to his own talent for determining the 
workings of the illusion.  This walk through the space of the Scipion produced more 
72 Auguste Jal, “La Bataille de Navarin, Panorama de M. Langlois,” L'Artiste 1, no. 2 (1831). 
73 It is impossible to know what the contents of the diorama were.  Wax figures were commonly used 
during the period, but it is equally possible that the “diorama” to which Jal refers could have been a painted 
one.   
74 Jal, “La Bataille de Navarin, Panorama de M. Langlois,” 24. “Vous ne vous en étiez pas aperçu, tant la 




opportunities to display his aptitude for discerning the illusion of being in the midst of the 
battle from the mechanics that made it possible:  
Here is some blood and the straw hat of the poor sailor who was crushed by a bullet 
against his carronade; he is the unfortunate one that you saw earlier being brought 
down the battery…the ax is doing its job in the middle of the flames, and the three 
dinghies that took you by surprise because you thought they were real, are towing 
the fire ship to detach it from the ship we are on.75
 
 
Viewers would have encountered the bloody drama of the battle below-deck well before 
they saw the painted, circular canvas that represented the naval battle above them.  The 
blood and straw hat served as a powerful synecdoche for the battle itself as well as a 
narrative device that connected the multiple sections of the below-deck drama.  But it was 
the explicitly mimetic properties of red paint masquerading as blood that enabled the 
illusion of violence, injury, and carnage to take full effect.  The ax, the flames, and dinghies 
were most likely to be part of a similar system of illusion that combined three-dimensional 
objects with the illusionistic qualities of paint.  Langlois therefore relied on a whole host of 
visual devices to make the experience of walking through the Scipion as visceral as 
possible.   
The critical discourse surrounding Langlois’ battle panoramas valorized the 
experience of not being able to decipher the multiple layers of illusion and in so doing, 
underscored the tradition of engaged spectatorship that been associated with the “genre of 
battles” since the Napoleonic Empire.  Critics argued that Langlois had discovered a novel 
way to satisfy expectations of experiencing salient dramatic moments of a battle.  While 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 24-25. “Voilà du sang et le chapeau de paille d’un pauvre matelot qu’un boulet a broyé contre sa 
caronade ; c’est le malheureux que vous avez vu tout à l’heure descendre dans la batterie… La hache fait 
son jeu au milieu de la flamme, et les trois canots qui vous frappent d’étonnement parce que vous avez pu 
les croire réels remorquent le bâtiment incendiaire pour le détacher du vaisseau sur lequel nous sommes.  
Vous comprenez bien que la peinture intervient et se mêle à la construction matérielle du Scipion ; mais où 




viewers had long been accustomed to viewing paintings of battles in the space of the Salon, 
Langlois’ battle panoramas opened up an entirely new set of possibilities for depicting a 
battle with more striking authenticity that could be achieved through painting alone.76
Etienne-Jean Delécluze was one of many critics who marveled at the system of 
illusion deployed by Langlois for his Battle of Navarino.  In his opening remarks for the 
Salon of 1831, Delécluze announced to his readers that he would be remiss not to mention 
Langlois’ panorama, despite the fact that it did not appear in the Salon.  While Delécluze 
acknowledged the tour-de-force system of illusion deployed by Langlois, he was wary of 
its implications for traditional “flat” painting:  
  The 
kinds of episodes that Louis-Francois Lejeune and later, Horace Vernet, had specialized in 
painting since the First Empire, such as the burst of canon or the horrific drama of a 
wounded soldier, were transformed by Langlois into a host of mimetic, three-dimensional 
objects that spectators encountered on their way up to view the circular painting of the 
battle.   
M. Langlois, not content to seduce by the ability of his brush and by the horizontal 
circle, has, to better disorient the public, joined reality which will become confused 
with painting. The effect of this composition, half real, half painted, is quite large.  
One can suppose that upon experiencing it again, the illusion would only be 
stronger.  If it is so, and if more efforts follow, what will become of flat, framed 
painting?  God only knows.77
 
 
                                                 
76 For the connection between literature and Langlois’ panoramas, see Maurice Samuels, The Spectacular 
Past, Popular History and the Novel in Nineteenth-Century France 50-62. 
77 Etienne-Jean Delécluze, “Beaux-arts, Ouverture du Salon,” Journal des Débats, Politiques, et Littéraires, 
1 mai 1831, 2-3. “M. Langlois, non content de séduire par l’habileté de son pinceau et par le cercle 
horizontal, a joint encore, pour mieux désorienter le public, la réalité qui va se confondre avec la peinture.  
L’effet de cette composition à moitié réelle, à moitié peinte, a été très grand.  On peut supposer qu’à une 
seconde expérience, l’illusion sera plus forte encore.  S’il en est ainsi, et que les efforts se succèdent 




Delécluze recognized that the system of illusion at work in Langlois’ panorama went well 
beyond the conventional illusionistic limits of “flat painting.”  He viewed the panorama as 
an unwelcome alternative form of painting that pandered to affective optical illusion over 
intellectual engagement.      
Through Langlois’ battle panoramas, war was transformed into an experiential, 
contemporary encounter, a far cry from the clichéd and static images criticized by 
detractors of battle painting.  In stark contrast to the majority of large-scale battle paintings 
on display at Versailles and on view in Salons throughout the July Monarchy, Langlois’ 
panoramas earned the approbation of critics for successfully representing war as a series of 
dramatic, often dangerous encounters.78  Alexandre Lenoir even suggested that one of 
Langlois’ panoramas, the Battle of Moskowa, be transported to the Salon, calling it “the 
most surprising of all battles that have ever been made.”79
 
  In providing paying middle-
class customers with the illusion of dramatic battle, the panorama satisfied the desire for 
access to the glorious military past that was understood to be on the wane since the peace 
of 1815.  
The Absence of Military Glory and Algeria 
In an article dedicated to the Salon of 1845, a critic paused to reflect upon the value 
of military imagery in a time of prolonged peace:    
Next June 18 will be thirty years since the last canon shot was fired from the plains 
at Waterloo, putting an end to the wars of the Republic and the Empire.  Since then, 
thirty years of peace have succeeded more than twenty years of bloody combats; 
                                                 
78 Jal, “La Bataille de Navarin, Panorama de M. Langlois.”  At one point, Jal tells his female reader-
companion: “My god, lower your head, Madame ; a bullet !” 





for, next to these giant combats of our fathers, one can only count the battle of 
Navarino, the capture of Anvers, the capture of Algiers, the last efforts of Poland, 
and our continuous skirmishes in Africa as simple accidents, incapable of shaking 
the harmony that, like it or not, exists between the powers of Europe.  Despite this 
long peace, there has remained in our spirits a warrior sentiment which continues to 
make us prefer looking at subjects that retrace our old glory.80
 
 
The author’s understanding of peace was typical for the period.  “Peace” was something 
that had been achieved in Europe after the fall of Napoleon; all other conflicts were 
understood as minor in comparison with the wars of the Revolution and Empire.  Hence, 
the Polish and Belgian struggles for independence in the 1830s and France’s conquest of 
Algeria were but minor exceptions within an era of uninterrupted peace.  These conflicts 
simply did not qualify as “grand” like the wars of the Empire.  The lack of large-scale 
intra-European armed conflict was a circumstance that needed to be endured, “like it or 
not.”  This sentiment was shared by many in the 1830s and 1840s.  It became a cliché of art 
criticism to marvel at the proliferation of battle painting and then criticize its abundant 
bombast as yet another material indicator of the oppressive peace that had conquered 
Europe.   
Alfred des Essarts, reviewing the Salon of 1839, summed up what the genre of 
battle painting offered contemporary viewers: “this genre offers much pleasure to the 
vulgar and consoles our eyes from the long peace that France enjoys despite herself.”81
                                                 
80 “Tableaux de chevalet, sujets militaires,” Journal des artistes (1845): 185. “Le 18 juin prochain, il y aura 
trente ans que le dernier coup de canon tiré dans les plaines de Waterloo a mis fin aux guerres de la 
République et  de l’Empire.  Depuis lors, trente années de paix ont succédé à plus de vingt années de luttes 
sanglantes ; car, à côté des combats de géant de nos pères, on ne peut compter la bataille de Navarin, la 
prise d’Anvers, la prise d’Alger, les derniers efforts de la Pologne ou nos escarmouches continuelles en 
Afrique que comme de simples accidents, incapables d’ébranler l’espèce d’harmonie  qui, bon gré, mal gré, 
existe entre les puissances de l’Europe. Malgré cette longue paix, il est resté dans nos esprits un sentiment 
guerrier qui nous fait toujours porter de préférence nos regards sur des sujets retraçant notre ancienne 
gloire.” 
  
81 Alfred des Essarts, “Salon de 1839, 1e article,” France et europe, revue politique et littéraire 1839, 595. 
“Voila en résumé ce genre qui plait tant au vulgaire et qui nous console par les yeux de la longue paix dont 




Ulysse Tencé, another art critic, understood the presence of so many battle paintings at the 
Salon of 1836 in similar terms: “At least it is certain that never have more war paintings 
appeared in such a peaceful time.”82  The authors’ characterization of the period as 
peaceful reveals how the conquest of Algeria was rhetorically figured: as a minor 
incursion, a bellicose distraction from the dominant, suffocating peace that existed within 
Europe.  The ability of these critics to dismiss the suffering of the Algerian civilian 
population and minimize the violence and scope of the French colonial project is consistent 
with what Edward Said has identified as Orientalism.  Said’s characterization of 
Orientalism as “the muteness imposed upon the Orient as object…[Europe’s] silent Other,” 
aptly describes the kinds of attitudes displayed by these critics with regard to their 
dismissal of Algeria as insignificant.83
The accusation that Louis-Philippe was a half-hearted colonizer was widely 
circulated and gained political traction at the very moment when battle paintings were 
produced in record numbers for the historical museum at Versailles.  Though Louis-
Philippe did all he could to evoke his support of the glorious military past, it was widely 
understood that his conduct of the war in Algeria was incompetent.  The successful 
conquest of Algeria became crucial for demonstrating Louis-Philippe’s support of France’s 
military glory, but efforts to successfully establish Algeria as a French colony were 
thwarted by an active Algerian resistance to French military presence, led by General Abd-
el-Kader, whose mobile army outwitted the slow and cumbersome French army.  To make 
 For many of Louis-Philippe’s political opponents, 
the war in Algeria spectacularly displayed the government’s incompetence and weakness.   
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pour 1836 (Paris: Thoisnier-Desplaces, 1837), 253. “Il est certain du moins que jamais plus de tableaux 
guerriers n’ont paru à une époque plus pacifique.” 




matters worse, the French failed to locate Abd-el-Kader’s itinerant encampment, known as 
the Smahla. Disease and desertion were endemic among the French army and officers 
found it difficult to discipline their soldiers.       
It was not until 1837 that the French military finally won a significant battle against 
the Algerians at the walled city of Constantine.  The capturing of Constantine offered the 
kind of contemporary military event that Louis-Philippe needed to shore up support for his 
constitutional monarchy and to prove to the public that Algeria was no minor military feat.  
The event was widely reported in the press and was understood as a potential turning point 
for France’s chances of establishing a permanent colony in Algeria.  Constantine was an 
important military victory for Louis-Philippe precisely because it was contemporary.    
The victory at Constantine also held a significant symbolic value for Louis-
Philippe.  One newspaper understood the importance of the victory in terms of its 
consequences for military imagery: “The capture of Constantine, in reviving sympathies for 
the military glory of France, provides a new interest in works of art dedicated to 
perpetuating the memories of the great armed events that immortalize the Empire.  Thus, 
there has been for some days an affluence of curious visitors at the Panorama of 
Moskowa.84
                                                 
84 “Mosaïque,” L’Indépendant, Furet de Paris et de la Banlieue, 5 novembre 1837. “La prise de 
Constantine, en réveillant les sympathies pour la gloire militaire de la France, donne un nouvel intérêt aux 
ouvrages d’art destinés à perpétuer les souvenirs des hauts faits d’armes qui immortalisent l’empire.  Aussi, 
il y a, depuis quelques jours, affluence de curieux au Panorama de la Moskowa.” 
  The same newspaper announced two weeks later that King Louis-Philippe 
also visited the panorama, even though the battle depicted dated from the First Empire.  
The subject matter of the panorama mattered less than the connotations of the panorama 
itself, as a surrogate for the contemporary experience of war.  Langlois’ panorama was 




provided a physical embodiment of military actuality.  The king’s visit to the panorama just 
after the military victory at Constantine helps us understand just how powerful this large-
scale invocation of up to date, contemporary military glory could be.   
Algeria was widely understood by many contemporary commentators as a last 
chance to restore France’s former military prowess.   But after the French victory at 
Constantine, the colonization of Algeria continued to be a difficult undertaking for the 
French military.  To make matters worse, in 1840, France suffered further international 
humiliation when England and Russia made important diplomatic decisions regarding the 
sovereignty of Turkey and Egypt without consulting France; this was understood by the 
Republican opposition - which had been advocating for war against these same European 
powers since France’s humiliating defeat in 1815 - to constitute an act of war on the part of 
Russia and England.  Louis-Philippe’s cabinet maintained their policy of non-intervention 
within Europe, much to the disdain of the Republican opposition.85
This humiliation was widely chronicled by the press and led to a series of very 
public attacks on the legitimacy of the July Monarchy.  The most vehement attack came 
from Edgar Quinet, a member of the Republican opposition.  He published an incendiary 
political pamphlet with the evocative title, 1815 and 1840 (anticipating Marx’s Eighteenth 
Brumaire).  The title itself proposed that the current moment of 1840 was equivalent to 
1815, a moment of deep historical shame for France, the point when Bonaparte was 
defeated at Waterloo and the decades of French military glory came to an end, bringing 
with it the occupation of France by the Allies and the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy.  
For many, 1815 signaled the end of the Revolution and the end of French glory; according 
   
                                                 




to Quinet, 1840 was just as awful for France: “France has been thrust anew in this silent 
solitude that defeat has drawn all around her.  As though she had lost the battle a second 
time, she has found herself yet again at the day after Waterloo.”86
Quinet pointed to the humiliation that France suffered in 1840 in the wake of the 
failed diplomacy and sheepishness to engage in war with other European powers.  He 
argued that the conquest of Algeria was little more than a futile attempt to compete with 
other European nations: “I see Russia marching to conquer the Bosphorus, England Upper 
Asia, France in Algeria, for the conquest of the desert.  Isn’t there something about this that 
makes you think?”
   
87  Quinet accused the government of wasting its time in Algeria, a 
country that he understood as a desert wasteland.  He saw European war as the only path to 
vindicating France’s international position.  Like his contemporaries, Quinet argued that 
“peace has become as disastrous as war.”88  He urged his readers to a call to arms: “accept 
war. Save France!  Save the future!”89
In a similar vein, Alexis de Tocqueville, who has traditionally been understood as 
a great supporter of democracy, saw France’s conquest of Algeria as crucial for the 
success of France’s representative government.
   
90
                                                 
86 Edgar Quinet, 1815 et 1840 (Paris: Chez Paulin, 1840), 14. “La France a été replongée dans cette solitude 
muette que la défaite a tracée autour d’elle. Comme si elle avait perdu une seconde fois la bataille, elle s’est 
trouvée de nouveau au lendemain de Waterloo.” 
  For Tocqueville, the French liberal 
87 Ibid. , 5. Je vois la Russie marcher à la conquête du Bosphore, l’Angleterre à celle de la Haute-Asie, la 
France, par l’Algérie, à la conquête du désert.  N’y a-t-il rien dans tout cela qui vous donne à penser ? 
88 Ibid., 8. “La paix devient aussi funeste que la guerre.” 
89 Ibid., 21 accepter la guerre.  Sauvez la France ! sauver l’avenir ! 
90 The distinction between democracy and representative government is an important one to recognize.  
Democracy, as it was conceived by political theorists in the nineteenth century, was a system of 
government much closer to popular sovereignty than representative government.  Representative 
government, as it was practiced during the July Monarchy, maintained that the leaders are alone sovereign 
through the accord of the people.  That is, the people give their consent to be led by those who are the most 
fit to lead as opposed to directly controlling government through popular vote.  For more on this 
distinction, see Craiutu, “Rethinking Political Power: The Case of the French Doctrinaires.” See also 




state desperately needed a source of national pride connected to military glory.  Writing 
during the tense times of 1840, Tocqueville argued that the sentiment of national pride 
served a crucial, unifying purpose: “The best thing that our country has left is national 
pride, a pride which is often puerile and boastful, but which with all its absurdities and 
weaknesses is still the greatest sentiment that we have and the strongest tie that holds this 
nation together.”91
 
 Tocqueville asserted the importance of glory for maintaining the 
stability of the modern, liberal state and, more importantly, understood that France’s 
status as a powerful European nation in the eyes of the rest of the world was not 
altogether stable.  National pride, in the absence of other, more stable institutions or true 
consensus, would have to suffice.   
The Scale of Victory: Horace Vernet and the Actuality of Battle 
Just days after the French military captured the nomadic encampment of Abd-el-
Kader in 1843, Louis-Philippe wrote to his son, the duc d’Aumale, who had commanded 
the battle, to congratulate him on his heroic conduct.  In an effort to establish his sons as 
deserving of the throne, Louis-Philippe ordered them to participate in the Algerian 
campaigns to gain recognition through distinguished military service.  The duc d’Aumale 
participated in the battle and the duc de Nemours, another one of Louis-Philippe’s sons, 
participated in the Siege of Constantine. Louis-Philippe was acutely aware that the military 
service of his sons was beneficial for government publicity efforts with regard to the visual 
                                                 
91 Alexis de Tocqueville, Selected Letters on Politics and Society, ed. Roger Boesche, trans. James Toupin 
and Roger Boesche (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 144. Cited in Pitts, A Turn to 
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representation of feats capable of bolstering national pride:  “In truth, I can tell you that the 
nation and the army are electrified. I am sending you in this letter three newspapers whose 
articles are the most salient; this time, I’m putting aside my rule of not reading them.”92
This revealing letter demonstrates the extent to which Louis-Philippe valued the defeat of 
Abd-el-Kader in terms of political actuality and the great publicity it would guarantee him.  
The event even prompted the king to break his rule of not reading the newspapers.  Louis-
Philippe’s letter went on to draw an equivalence between two very important physical 
embodiments of government publicity: newspapers and paintings, with the government 
presiding over the production of both forms.
 
93
I also want you to have made for me some sketches of all of these different places 
for a big battle painting, and quite a few small ones for all of these different 
movements and episodes.  I hope that you yourself will guide the painter.  It will 
probably be Horace Vernet who is expected any moment and the place of the 
painting has already been selected for the end of the room adjoining Constantine at 
Versailles.”




As Louis-Philippe recognized, contemporary French victories in Algeria provided subjects 
for visual representation that could provide stunning testaments to the government’s ability 
to restore France to its former military glory.   
The series of battle paintings that Louis-Philippe commissioned from Horace 
Vernet to commemorate France’s victories in Algeria were larger than anything the artist 
had ever painted.  The Siege of Constantine (1839) and the Capture of the Smahla (1845), 
                                                 
92 Louis-Philippe, “À S.A.R.M Le Duc d'Aumale, Neuilly 2 juin 1843,” in Revue rétrospective ; ou, 
Archives secrètes du dernier gouvernement, recueil non périodique ed. Jules Antoine Taschereau (Paris: 
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93 For more on the use of censorship during the July Monarchy, see Richard Terdiman, Discourse/Counter-
Discourse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Goldstein, Censorship of Political Caricature 
in Nineteenth-Century France .   




first displayed at the Salons of 1839 and 1845 respectively, were painted for specially 
designed galleries at Versailles known as the Salles d’Afrique.  The Siege of Constantine 
measures 17 feet tall and 68 feet wide; the Capture of the Smahla measures 16 feet tall and 
70 feet wide.  The epic scale of these two paintings of French contemporary victories 
reflects the degree of importance that the government attached to the task of representing 
contemporary battles.   
As we have already seen, large-scale battle paintings produced under the July 
Monarchy for Versailles drew a great deal of negative attention for their grand scale.  On 
the other hand, when it came to the panorama, another large-scale mode of representing 
war, the critical outcry disappeared.  Horace Vernet, an artist with a longstanding 
penchant for adopting novel modes of artistic production such as lithography and 
photography, was receptive to the possibilities that the panorama offered to the practice 
of battle painting and must have been acutely aware of the reputation of Langlois’s battle 
panoramas, valued for their ability to make war appear disarmingly real.    
While battle panoramas have traditionally been evaluated apart from the 
supposedly separate domain of the fine arts, Vernet’s Siege of Constantine and the 
Smahla relied upon the visual rhetoric of the panorama in terms of scale, formal devices 
and narrative content.  To heighten spectatorial engagement with representations of 
contemporary warfare and vivify the critically lambasted genre of battle painting, Horace 
Vernet deployed a visual language borrowed in part from a mode of visual production 
outside of the domain of art, the panorama.   As we shall see, these two monumental 
paintings received a much warmer critical reaction than any other of Vernet’s battle 




Vernet’s monumental Algerian battle paintings precisely because they invoked a form of 
military imagery that was understood to stand apart from the tired clichés of French battle 
painting epitomized by the battles on view at the historical museum at Versailles.  
 The Siege of Constantine is a triptych (Fig. 4.13) featuring three separate, yet 
related, episodes from the battle at the walled city.  In chronological order, they depict the 
Enemy Pushed Back from the Top of Coudiat-Ati (October 10, 1837), the Preparation of 
the Assault (October 13, 1837), and the Assault (October 13, 1837).95
With such a large amount of surface to work with, Horace Vernet consistently 
deployed subtle pictorial devices to allow the viewer to enter imaginatively into the space 
of the painting.  The most extraordinary one within the largest, middle painting, The 
Columns Prepare for the Assult, occurs in the middle of the foreground: a destroyed wall 
has become a makeshift tomb where a barely visible dead French soldier has been placed.  
At first glance the placement of the corpse in the foreground does not stand out; the body is 
painted in muted browns and grays and looks more like a pile of rubbish than a human 
form.  Upon closer inspection, the body lies underneath a tent, his feet protrude into the 
  The second painting 
is the largest of the three, despite the fact that it represents a moment between two 
decidedly more dramatic episodes in the siege represented in the other two paintings (17 x 
34 ft) (Fig. 4.14).  This middle painting displayed parts of a war to which most viewers 
were not ordinarily privy in a typical battle painting.  Horace Vernet’s reputation was built 
upon his penchant for representing war in all of its mundane, quotidian details, something 
that he took up on a massive scale for the contemporary battle paintings he executed at 
Versailles.   
                                                 
95 Salon critics read the paintings from right to left starting with the Enemy Pushed Back from the Top of 




foreground, and one can even discern the gold buttons on his navy blue uniform (Fig. 4.15).  
Even though the subject depicted in this section of the triptych occurred moments before 
the major assault, the presence of the body instructs the viewer that danger is very present.  
In a study for the composition (Fig. 4.16), Vernet included the tomb but made it much 
narrower, whereas in the final painting he created a certain visual drama by opening it out 
toward the viewer.  In the drawing the body is also much more obscured, hidden behind the 
tall, narrow wall, whereas in the final version, Vernet included the feet, buttons, and 
contour of the corpse.   
The dead soldier also serves as a narrative tie to events that preceded the scene, 
thereby demonstrating that the battle took place over the course of several days.  Vernet 
included these kinds of markers of the elapsed temporality of the battle throughout the 
composition.   In the middle of the painting, to the left of the tomb, a trumpet player is 
depicted in the midst of falling backwards into the foreground (Fig. 4.17); his hands are 
spread outward, clearly taken by surprise, and his head displays a fresh wound: evidence of 
the violent battle which has already started even in a period of preparation before the start 
of the real assault.  The soldier to his immediate left looks at him, as though he too has 
been taken by surprise by the fall.  Violent episodes such as this one are peppered 
throughout the painting, all vying for visual attention.  To look at Constantine is to 
constantly be in competition with the limits of one’s own vision; it is impossible to seize 
the action in a single look or coup d’œil, long the most important criteria for traditional 
large-scale history painting.   
The narrative mode of the Siege of Constantine contrasts distinctly with the 




during the Empire. Instead of subordinating the episodes to a single pregnant, isolated 
moment, Vernet represented his battle in terms of spread out episodic action that took 
place over time and through space.96    Francois Gérard’s Battle of Austerlitz (Fig. 4.18), 
the only battle painting made during the Empire of a battle fought during the Empire that 
was allowed to hang in the Gallery of Battles at Versailles, is a formidable example of the 
narrative mode of history painting and serves as an apt contrast to Vernet’s Constantine.  
In Gérard’s painting, all of the action is subordinated to the exchange between General 
Rapp and Bonaparte, with a clear hierarchy of narrative pictorial organization.  In 
Vernet’s painting, the narrative action is scattered.   This was one of the formal qualities 
observed at the time.  In the words of one critic who reviewed Constantine for the Salon 
of 1839, “It is like a flat surface upon which everything slides.”97
Vernet did not invent this mode of narrative organization for battle painting; as 
we have seen elsewhere, it was used by Louis-François Lejeune during the Empire and 
  Whereas Gérard’s 
composition directs the viewer’s vision to the commanding officers, Horace Vernet’s 
viewer must instead seek out the narrative events and place them together.  There is no 
single one that dominates over the others.   
                                                 
96 Michael Marrinan has similarly argued that Vernet’s Constantine deploys an innovative narrative 
strategy removed from the traditions of the French academic tradition, likening the triptych to a “comic 
strip.”  Marrinan contends that Vernet’s paintings displayed in the Salles d’Afrique depict a series of effects 
which encourage a viewing structure that he calls the “simulation of history.”  Later in the essay, Marrinan 
identifies the panorama as the precedent for this mode of viewing, positioning it firmly outside of the 
domain of the fine-arts, as a popular spectacle from which Vernet borrowed.  Unlike Marrinan, I 
understand Vernet’s monumental battle paintings at Versailles in the context of critical debates surrounding 
battle painting and more generally, the political imperatives which drove the proliferation of war imagery 
during a period when the government actively avoided armed conflicts with its European neighbors.  I 
would like to thank Michael Marrinan for graciously providing me with the original English text of this 
essay.  See Michael Marrinan, “Schaeur der Eroberung: Strukturen des Zuschauens und der Simulation in 
den Nordafrika-Galerien von Versailles,” in Bilder der Macht, Macht der Bilder: Zeitgeschichte in 
Darstellungen des 19. Jahrhunderts, ed. Stefan Germer and Michael F. Zimmermann (Munich: Klinckhardt 
und Biermann, 1997), 267-295. 




offered viewers an alternative form of visual engagement to the academic mode of 
history painting.  Thus, rather than inaugurating a new way of representing battle, the 
achievement of Vernet’s Constantine was to use the episodic mode of battle painting on a 
monumental scale.  Whereas Lejeune confined himself to smaller canvases below the 
scale of history painting, Vernet went well beyond the scale of history painting to almost 
panoramic proportions.  It is also worth recalling that the narrative organization of a 
panorama must necessarily rely upon an episodic narrative due to the circular, extended 
format of the canvas; as in Vernet’s Constantine, a battle panorama’s narrative action was 
distributed around the canvas, and as we have seen, inside the tunnel that led viewers up 
to the platform.  Vernet’s monumental battle paintings shared more with Langlois’s battle 
panoramas than scale alone.  Both forms relied on a wide distribution of narrative, 
dramatic elements to tell the story of the battle without providing a stable narrative 
hierarchy as in a classical history painting.  In the words of one critic who reviewed the 
Salon of 1839 for the artistic journal L’Artiste, Vernet’s Constantine “let us touch victory 
with our gaze and transported us into the melee.”98
The narrative organization of Langlois’s battle panoramas involved an intricate 
play of episodes of the battle that were slowly unveiled as one traversed the interior and 
climbed up to the viewing platform where the circular canvas was displayed; in Vernet’s 
  This critic, and many more, heaped 
praise on Constantine for the painting’s ability to make the battle appear as though it 
were actually in the midst of occurring.  This mode of praise, incidentally, recalls the 
kind used to discuss the positive illusionistic effects of Langlois’s battle panoramas.    
                                                 
98 “Salon de 1839, 2e article,” L'Artiste, no. 17 (1839): 228. “Nous faisait toucher nos victoires du regard, 




Constantine, the drama of the battle unfolded as viewers pieced together the disparate 
moments.  In both cases, viewers participated in a viewing experience that would have 
been defined by piecing together disparate narrative elements.  In the third section of the 
Siege of Constantine, the Assault (Fig. 4.19), the preparations that took place in the 
previous scene are put into action.  In the previous painting, soldiers in the foreground 
fire cannonballs at the walled fortress in the distant background.  In the Assault, Vernet 
moved the walled city into the foreground, providing an up-close view of the formerly 
distant target.  In doing so, the artist located an efficient way of connecting these two 
paintings together as a logical narrative through time and space.  The narrative of the 
battle is also told through the physical marks of violence.  In the right middleground, an 
entire chunk of the brown wall has been torn off (Fig. 4.20); a gray hole in the wall with a 
cannonball inside, attests to the barrage of cannonballs that were fired at the walled city 
in the previous painting.  The hole in the wall is painted with a rich depth of color and 
tonal contrast such that the destructive impact of the cannonball finds a material 
correspondence in paint.   
The cannonball hole is just one of many tour de force visual effects that Vernet 
strategically placed in the composition.  The Assault is a vertically oriented painting, in 
contrast with the long horizontality of the Preparation.  This verticality is emphasized by 
the narrative situation of the painting: the army must literally scale up the mountain in 
order to capture the walled fortress of Constantine.  Thus, there is a literal, physical 
equivalence between the task at hand and the format of the painting.  Vernet also litters 
his composition with the tools needed to scale a wall: ladders.  The ladder that protrudes 




soldiers and the engaged viewer (Fig. 4.21).  As they climb up the hill, the ladder invites 
the viewer to do the same.  Visual bridges abound.  A figure in the middle foreground 
turns around and raises his sword, staring deliberately into the space of the viewer (Fig. 
4.22).  He provides yet another invitation to visually participate in the climb up the hill.   
The visual devices used by Vernet created a new kind of pictorial space that 
actively encourages spectatorial engagement.  The various objects that protrude towards the 
edge of the painting and the figures that beckon out and engage with an imagined viewer 
all provide the ideal conditions for a participatory viewing experience.  The creation of 
these conditions of engaged spectatorship borrowed heavily from Langlois’ battle 
panoramas.  Moreover, Vernet included passages of Constantine where the illusionistic 
qualities of paint are made to masquerade as material objects such as dirt and crumbling 
rock.  This confusion between registers of illusion, between paint and its referent, was an 
important part of the illusions produced by Langlois’ battle panoramas.  For example, 
contemporary reviews mention that in the below-deck portion of Langlois’ Battle of 
Navarino, the artist used red paint to double as the blood of a wounded sailor.  In 
Constantine, Vernet mobilized the mimetic qualities of paint in a similar fashion.  The 
boots of a soldier are covered with a grimy, dirty, brown paint (Fig. 4.23).  These brown, 
scratchy spots do not read as a smooth continuation of the soldier’s boots, but rather as a 
dirty addition on top of the boots.  Boots with “dirt” abound within Constantine.  For both 
Langlois and Horace Vernet, mundane objects were accorded an important role in narrating 
the story of battle.  Another similar passage appears in the Assault, a painting which depicts 
the army’s climb up the rocky hill.  To represent the rock, Vernet relied on a thick impasto. 




referent of the rock. While Vernet did not have recourse to the three-dimensional false 
terrain that Langlois did for his panoramas, he made use of a visual vocabulary which 
sought to heighten the objectness of his depicted objects and bolster the illusion of the 
materiality of warfare.   
The similarity between Vernet’s large-scale Constantine and Langlois’ panoramas 
was not lost on contemporary viewers.  In another monumental painting of a contemporary 
Algerian victory, the Capture of the Smahla (1845), Vernet used an even more panoramic 
format.  The painting consists of a 74-foot horizontal band that stretches across the entirety 
of a room in Versailles, the Salle de la Smahla. (Fig. 4.25)   It depicts the moment when the 
French army, led by Louis-Philippe’s son, the duc d’Aumale, surprises the encampment of 
the Algerian general Abd-el-Kader.  The left part of the painting features the arrival of the 
French army, and the right side depicts the reaction of the men, women, children, and 
animals within the camp.  The entire background consists of a continuous desert landscape 
punctuated by hills, rocks, and patches of translucent smoke.  The viewer is positioned 
within the encampment, in the middle of the chaos, with the French army charging forward.  
The Capture of the Smahla used a horizontal format reminiscent of the panorama, 
something that many critics remarked upon.  The art critic Etienne-Jean Delécluze, whose 
ambivalence towards Horace Vernet had begun during the Bourbon Restoration and 
continued throughout the July Monarchy, changed his tone when he reviewed Vernet’s 
Smahla for the Salon of 1845, where it was displayed prominently in the Salon Carré:          
M. H. Vernet has made the ensemble of this vast scene submit to many points of 
view as in a panorama, and the only way to truly see and seize all of the rich details 
is to precede as though in front of a frieze and to stop at two or three different 
points.  I observed that by starting from left to right, or from right to left, that the 
sensations one receives are reversed; they do not, however, destroy the clarity or the 




from the effects to the cause, and in both cases, the talent of the artist makes you go 
on this voyage with great pleasure for the eyes as well as the intellect.99
 
   
Delécluze, as a partisan of the French classical tradition, admired the Smahla because it 
maintained the unity of the subject despite its extended, horizontal format.  The critic 
marveled at Vernet’s ability to make the narrative remain intact whichever way it was 
viewed, just like in a panorama.  For Delécluze, the Smahla behaved like a panorama, a 
visual form understood to be outside of the domain of fine art.  In 1831 the critic had 
worried that Langlois’ battle panoramas would displace the art of “flat painting” because of 
the panorama’s ability to trick the eye and surround it with a total illusion of battle in the 
midst of occurring.100
                                                 
99 Etienne Jean Delécluze, “Salon de 1845, 1e article,” Journal des Débats, Politiques, et Littéraires, 18 
Mars 1845, 2. “M. H. Vernet a donc soumis l’ensemble de sa vaste scène a plusieurs points de vue comme 
un panorama, et le seul moyen, pour la bien voir et en saisir tous les riches détails, est de précéder comme 
devant une frise, et de faire deux ou trois stations.  J’ai observé qu’en commencent de gauche à droite, ou 
de droite à gauche, et les sensations que l’on éprouvé sont inverses, elles ne détruisent cependant pas la 
clarté ni l’unité du sujet.  Seulement on va de la cause aux effets, ou l’on remonte des effets à la cause, et 
dans l’on comme dans l’autre cas, le talent de l’artiste fait faire ce voyage avec grand plaisir aux yeux 
comme à l’intelligence.”   
  But in 1845, Delécluze argued that the merit of the Smahla rested in 
its ability to depict a battle in the same way that a battle panorama did.  Vernet’s triumph 
consisted in unifying the powerful impressions that a panorama provided with the unity of 
subject that a solid historical painting demanded.  By 1845, the effect of a panoramic 
representation of war was now more than acceptable, it was commendable.  The curious 
evolution of Delécluze’s opinion is related to the important shift that took place during the 
July Monarchy with regard to large-scale battle paintings.  Vernet’s choice of a panoramic 
format for his Smahla mobilized the set of cultural associations between battle panoramas 
and a dramatic, participatory mode of representing war as though it were a contemporary 
event which occurred before one’s eyes.   




Horace Vernet’s “Panoramic” Paintings and the Problem of Contemporary 
Commemoration 
 
The majority of critics writing about Constantine and the Smahla praised the 
paintings for their picturing of distinctly contemporary battles.  For many, these paintings 
provided fresh evidence of France’s renewed military prowess.  As one critic mused,  
It is surely the duty of painting to bend itself to the thousand metamorphoses of 
this chameleon of the present time, of occasion and success, that we call 
actuality…What could be more moving, at the moment when we write this, for 
the curious squeezed into the Salon of the Louvre, than the national question of 
Algeria?  Is it not in Algeria that Europe, and the world has their eyes fixed upon 
us?101
It is hardly a coincidence that the word “actuality” came into prevalent use during the 
later part of the July Monarchy.
     
102
Horace Vernet’s Siege of Constantine and the Capture of the Smahla revisited and 
renewed a longstanding problem of representing contemporary warfare on the scale of 
history painting.  Whereas “actuality” was fleeting, the traditional subjects of large-scale 
history painting were supposed to be immutable; their meanings were intended to 
  To be of one’s own time later became one of the 
cornerstones of the concept of modernity; but here, “actuality” is presented as a 
chameleon, an entity that cannot be controlled, contained, or harnessed.  Though this 
critic thought that Vernet’s immense, battle paintings of Algeria fulfilled their task of 
representing contemporary war, he also recognized that in order to do so, the paintings 
had to “bend” themselves to the contingencies of politics. 
                                                 
101 “Salon de 1845, 2e article,” Moniteur des arts, de la littérature et de toutes les industries relatives à 
l'art, 23 mars 1845, 57. “C’est assurément le devoir de la peinture de se plier elle même aux mille 
métamorphoses de ce protée de l’heure, de l’occasion et du succès, qu’on nomme l’actualité…Quoi de plus 
émouvante, à l’heure où nous écrivons, pour les curieux qui se pressent dans le grand salon du Louvre, que 
la question nationale de l’Algérie ? N’est ce pas effectivement en Algérie que l’Europe, que le monde a les 
yeux fixés sur nous?” 
102 Trésor de la langue française, online edition, s.v. “actualité,” http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/actualite 




transcend historical change and especially politics.  History painting easily 
accommodated historical battles, such as Charles Lebrun’s Battle of Alexander (1665) 
series which suggested an analogy between Alexander the Great and Louis XIV, but 
avoided any overt reference to seventeenth century battles.  Later, under political pressure 
to commemorate Napoleon Bonaparte’s contemporary military encounters, history 
painters were given commissions to represent battles on a scale formerly reserved for 
ancient history.  The controversy surrounding the Prix Décennaux, Napoleon’s 
competition for the best works of art made during his first ten years of rule, reflected this 
unresolved ambivalence between the genre of history painting and the political 
imperative of representing contemporary events on a grand scale.103
Charles Blanc, reviewing the Salon of 1839, argued that the panorama was a more 
acceptable mode of representing contemporary warfare than large-scale battle painting.  
Specifically addressing Constantine, he offered Vernet some advice:  
   
If you have any scruples, you need to count the stones and do what M. Langlois 
has done with his panorama, in an intention otherwise quite commendable.  
Posterity will not have a guidebook to recall this date in the month of October: 
she will think that this is an episode from the wars with Russia.  Art should 
always attach itself to the dominant character of the objects, and not to their 
incidental physiognomy.  It seems to us that one should consider things in a 
manner a bit higher than this. 104
                                                 
103 For more on the Prix Décennaux, see Darcy Grimaldo Grigsby, “Classicism, Nationalism and History: 
The Prix Décennaux of 1810 and the Politics of Art under Post-Revolutionary Empire,” (PhD Dissertation, 
University of Michigan, 1995); and  Darcy Grimaldo Grigsby, “The First Painter and the Prix Décennaux 
of 1810,” in  David after David: Essays on the Later Work, ed. Mark Ledbury (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 18-37. 
   
104 Charles Blanc, “Salon de 1839, 2e article,” Revue du Progrès, Politique, Sociale et Littéraire  (1839): 
348. “Si vous avez tant de scrupules, il faut alors compter les pierres et faire ce qu’a fait M. Langlois au 
Panorama, dans une intention bien autrement louable.  La postérité n’aura pas un livret pour lui rappeler 
cette date du mois d’octobre : elle croira qu’l s’agit d’un épisode des guerres de Russie.  L’art doit 
s’attacher toujours au caractère dominant des objets, et non à leur physionomie accidentelle.  Il faut, ce 





Blanc’s criticism of Vernet’s Constantine directly implicated the painting’s focus on the 
immediate materiality of battle.  If Vernet wanted to show a battle in terms of its 
“incidental physiognomy,” then he was better off making a panorama in the mode of his 
student, Langlois.  Blanc felt that Constantine could be any battle and that it did not go 
far enough in terms of memorializing the event; the mundane details minimized the 
historical significance of the battle and prevented Blanc from being able to understand 
Constantine as a specifically Algerian battle.   
Whereas Langlois’s battle panoramas staged the physical illusion of a battle in a 
rotunda for a paying audience, Vernet’s monumental paintings of the Siege of 
Constantine and the Capture of the Smahla hung in the Louvre and later in a dedicated 
gallery at Versailles.  As Blanc would have known, Langlois’s battle panoramas were 
ephemeral, displayed only as long as there were a steady stream of customers willing to 
pay for the visual experience of battle; afterwards, they were taken down and discarded.  
Conversely, history paintings were, at least in theory, made to endure.  Blanc’s analogy 
between Vernet’s painting and Langlois’s panoramas implied that the contemporary 
battle of Constantine was little more than a current event, hardly the kind of monumental 
example of French heroism that the painting was intended to demonstrate.    
Vernet’s paintings of the Siege of Constantine and the Capture of the Smahla used 
grand scale and panoramic format as a way of visually bolstering the heroism and 
grandness of the French conquest of Algeria for the political benefit of Louis-Philippe. 
But for many, the battles that took place in Algeria were not as grand as their visual 




paintings served only to demonstrate the relative lack of importance of the subjects they 
represented.  In other words, the incongruity between the subject and scale was 
powerfully apparent:  
Who has not already forgotten the episode of the African wars, and who would 
have ever remembered it without the immense canvas of Horace Vernet?...But we 
ask if one can really remember these brilliant skirmishes when our country’s 
history contains so many glorious victories?  And we also ask the artist, if he 
really had to cover canvases of sixty-four feet with our warriors, before looking 
for a dimension proportional to the importance of the capture of the Smahla in a 
frame of two meters.  However, we admire the talent of the painter, who was able 
to vividly embroider such a thankless subject into a history of such length.105
 
 
The wars in Algeria, according to this critic, were hardly memorable, especially if one 
took into account the more glorious military past that preceded them.  Like the newspaper 
articles that covered the latest event in the Algerian conquest, the battle paintings that 
represented the French army’s victories in Algeria were yesterday’s news and therefore 
disposable; the implication was that they hardly merited the massive scale used by 
Vernet.   
The contemporariness of the subject and the overly ambitious scale of the painting 
drew attention to the way that contemporary war during the July Monarchy failed to 
signify as glorious when compared to the wars of Bonaparte.  While the battle paintings 
made by Gros and Gérard during the Napoleonic Empire also represented contemporary 
wars, they did so at a time when France’s military power was at the core of the national 
                                                 
105 Alphonse de Calonne, “Salon de 1845, 3e article,” La Sylphide, revue parisienne, littérature, beaux-arts, 
modes 2 (1845): 207. “Qui n’avait oublié déjà cet épisode des guerres d’Afrique, et qui se le serait jamais 
rappelé, sans l’immense toile de M. H. Vernet ?...Nous le demandons, peut-on bien se souvenir de ces 
brillantes escarmouches, lorsque l’on a dans l’histoire de son pays tant de glorieuses victoires à compter ?  
Et lui aussi, l’artiste, aurait bien des toiles de soixante-quatre pieds à couvrir de nos guerriers, avant de 
chercher dans un cadre de deux mètres une dimension proportionnée à l’importance d’une prise de la 
Smahla.  Aussi admirons-nous le  talent du peintre, qui a pu broder avec éclat, sur cet ingrat sujet, une 




and international imaginary.  But under the July Monarchy, military grandeur was often 
perceived in terms of its absence from contemporary French life.  Horace Vernet’s 
monumental paintings of French military victories served as material responses to this 
perceived void within French civic life.    
 
Conclusion 
In an effort to revivify what most critics considered the tired pictorial language of 
post-Waterloo battle painting, Horace Vernet relied on a series of attention-grabbing 
visual tricks in his large-scale, “panoramic” battle paintings to give the illusion of battles 
in the process of occurring.  The artist attempted to push battle painting to its illusionistic 
limits and make France’s contemporary military encounters in Algeria appear as thrilling 
national events.  His large-scale Algerian battle paintings corresponded to King Louis-
Philippe’s political agenda of using visual representations of war as a means of creating 
affective bonds between viewers and the French government by way of the heroic deeds 
of the French army.  But in one illuminating example, these same tour-de-force visual 
devices that Vernet used in his paintings of contemporary Algerian battles appeared to a 
very different effect in a large-scale painting that the artist made for his most important 
patron, King Louis-Philippe.     
Much like the way that the material proliferation of official war imagery often 
pointed to the absence of contemporary military glory during the July Monarchy, the last 
work that Vernet produced for King Louis-Philippe during his reign unwittingly hinted at 
the monarch’s inefficacy and lack of authority.  At the Salon of 1847, the last one of the 




Gustave Planche deemed “the most deplorable work that Vernet has ever signed his name 
upon,” and a large-scale group equestrian portrait of the king surrounded by his sons (Fig. 
4.26), which received mixed reviews.106
One of the remarkable features of this official portrait is the incongruity of 
Vernet’s treatment between the horses and their riders.  While the king commissioned 
this portrait to represent the stability of his reign and to project a strong image of his 
dynastic aspirations, the attention that Vernet gave to the horses made the riders appear as 
dull and impotent figures of authority.  Louis-Philippe, the human figure in the middle of 
the composition, glances slightly to his right with a reserved gaze.  Neither he nor any of 
his sons make eye contact with the viewer - this runs contrary to the French tradition of 
equestrian portraiture where rulers often look directly out at the viewer, as in Jacques-
Louis David’s Bonaparte Crossing the Alps, painted in 1804 (Fig. 4.27). In Vernet’s 
equestrian portrait, the horses are given a higher degree of psychological complexity than 
  The group portrait depicts the monarch and his 
five sons in front of the gate of Versailles, a building that contained the historical 
museum and Vernet’s many battle paintings within its galleries.  The royals are 
represented in a horizontal row with the gate above their heads and the chateau in the 
background.  The space between the group in the foreground and the background is 
compressed, making the chateau seem as though it were right behind them, when it is 
actually hundreds of meters away – this promotes the illusion that the group of riders is in 
the midst of entering into the space of the foreground, something that Horace Vernet was 
particularly adept at achieving.    
                                                 
106 Gustave Planche, Etudes sur l'école française (1831-1852), vol. 2 (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1855), 
243. “La Judith de cette année est assurément l'ouvrage le plus déplorable que M. Vernet ait signé de son 
nom. La couleur , le dessin, la pantomime, tout est de la même force. Avec la meilleure volonté du monde, 




their riders.  The equines are depicted as active subjects and all, except for one, gaze out 
at the viewer (the exception is the horse ridden by the Prince Royal, who died in a tragic 
accident in 1842; the horse’s closed eyes underscore his sitter’s early death).  A 
comparison between the heads of Louis-Philippe and his white horse underscores the 
unsettling reversal in modes of address between the hoofed and the footed (Fig. 4.28).  
The horse addresses us with a penetrating gaze.  His dandyish locks of golden hair, 
combined with Vernet’s adept foreshortening of his head and body, make him burst out 
into the foreground, anchoring him in time and space.  This treatment contrasts rather 
starkly with the handling of Louis-Philippe, who is comparatively flatter both in terms of 
his modeling and mental interiority as a subject.  The discrepancy between the two, while 
certainly humorous, was also no laughing matter in a time of increasing instability for the 
French government.     
There can be little doubt that the visual prioritization of equine subjectivity was 
an unintended consequence of Vernet’s verisimilitude as a painter and fit into a long 
romantic tradition of displacing human emotions onto animals.  Some critics nevertheless 
took notice and commented upon the fact that the horses outshined their riders.  “The five 
portraits are lifelike and are posed naturally and with remarkable truth,” wrote Alphonse 
Karr, “but the horses are quite simply alive.  The white horse of the king is outside of the 
frame and the canvas and, when you look at him for a bit of time, you see his nostrils 
breathing and snorting.”107
                                                 
107 Alphonse Karr, “Monsieur Vernet et son portier,” Les guêpes  (mars 1847). “Les cinq portraits sont 
ressemblants et posés avec un naturel et une vérité remarquables; mais les chevaux sont tout simplement 
vivants. Le cheval blanc du roi est hors du cadre et de la toile, et, quand on le regarde un peu de temps, on 
voit ses naseaux respirer et fumer.” 
  Another critic completely neglected to speak about the 




seen from the front, they seem to have left the canvas; I do not think I have ever seen 
anything so alive; the king’s white horse, and especially the black horse to his left, are 
masterpieces.”108
                                                 
108 The only mention any of the royal figures is of the strange appearance of the national guard soldier 
behind the duc d’Aumale.  L. Van Roy, “Salon de Paris,” Revue de Belgique: littérature et beaux-arts 2 
(mai 1847): 186. “Les six chevaux sont vus de face, ils semblent sortir de la toile; je ne me souviens pas 
d'avoir rien vu d'aussi vivant ; le cheval blanc du roi, et surtout le cheval noir qui est à sa gauche, sont des 
chefs d'œuvre. Je ne vous parle pas des immenses difficultés de raccourci admirablement vaincues; le 
peintre est Horace Vernet.” 
  While I make no claims that this portrait played a role in the turn of 
Louis-Philippe’s political fortunes in 1848, it vividly illustrates a tension between 
Vernet’s tour-de-force visual effects and the honorific political function of his official 
paintings.  In the end, Louis-Philippe discovered that a proliferation of officially 
commissioned imagery could not save him from growing discontent with his regime over 
its treatment of the nation’s poor, its aggressive press censorship, and an economic 
downturn.  The Revolution of 1848 marked the end of Louis-Philippe’s reign and with it, 











Problems of Proliferation in the Visual Culture of the Crimean War 
 
Introduction 
 After an extended period of critical fatigue with large-scale battle painting during 
the 1830s and 1840s, a new set of representational strategies emerged during the 1850s 
that would transform the representation of contemporary war in the age of high industrial 
capitalism.  From 1854 to 1856, a large-scale multinational armed conflict erupted, the 
Crimean War, the first such war since the Napoleonic Wars at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.  This chapter will argue that through an unprecedented intermingling 
of nascent and established media, a predominantly middle class public wary of armed 
conflict between European nations was provided with a compelling set of reasons to 
engage with the war apart from merely nationalistic or propagandistic ones.  The two and 
a half year war provided the first sustained opportunity for image makers to depict the 
event with a new set of technologies of visual reproduction which had come into social 
use just years earlier, including photographic modes of visual reproduction and the 
illustrated press.    
 Representations of the Crimean War in these emergent modes of visual 




established modes of visual representation of war, including battle painting, had 
previously only hinted at.  In contrast to the practice of battle painting which sought to 
conjure an illusion of an entire battle (or at least its heroic center), woodblock prints that 
appeared in illustrated newspapers and photographs prioritized fragmentary, isolated 
parts of larger military events.  These emergent reproductive technologies were especially 
suited to depicting the Crimean War, which in comparison with previous wars of similar 
scale was more drawn-out and lacked the kinds of decisive military events that were the 
traditional subject matter of battle painting.  As a visual mode, fragmentation was both a 
material consequence of these emergent media as well as their formal affect.  In the pages 
that follow, I will examine the problem of war fatigue just after the Revolution of 1848.  
Then, I will show how newly available forms of visual reproduction exposed a pictorial 
tension that was at the heart of modern battle painting, between the endless constitutive 
parts of a military event and its totalizing whole.  In the first part of this chapter, I will 
attend to the effects of this fragmentary mode for spectators and explore how it 
encouraged a novel form of visual participation with technologically-figured images of 
contemporary war.  Next, I will interrogate how battle painters engaged with the visual 
problem of the fragmentary as part of a larger elusive totality, both in terms of the 
consequences for the production and reproduction of their depictions of the Crimean 
War.  Lastly, this chapter will examine the confluence between the discursive value of 







War Fatigue and the Crimean War 
The Salon of 1852, the first to be held in the wake of Louis-Napoleon’s proclamation of 
the Second Empire, featured a single monumental battle painting from the most popular 
battle painter of the time, Horace Vernet.  Entitled The Siege of Rome, (Fig. 5.1) the 
painting represented a key moment in the first major inter-European armed engagement 
in which the French army had taken part since the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.  In 1849, 
only one year after the bloody revolution of 1848, where thousands of working-class 
French citizens were massacred in the name of maintaining the stability of the newly 
formed Second Republic government, French troops marched into Rome to restore the 
papacy of Pope Pius IX.  Roman revolutionaries led by Garibaldi had declared a Roman 
republic and had forced the ruling pope out of Rome.  The pope called upon the French 
government to help put down a revolution that inconveniently paralleled the one that had 
put the government of the Second Republic into power only a year earlier.   
 In 1850, the French government had asked Vernet to paint three different episodes 
from the siege.  He was allowed to determine the dimensions of the three paintings and 
decided that they would hang on the wall opposite the Capture of the Smahla at 
Versailles and take up the entire wall space.  But in the short span of two years, support 
had withered for the production of the kind of monumental battle paintings that Vernet 
had produced during the July Monarchy for King Louis-Philippe.  In the end, the Siege of 
Rome was downsized into a single painting.  The shift from the original commission to its 
final realization reveals that a miscalculation took place sometime between 1850 and 
1852 on the part of the government, Vernet or perhaps by both parties.  As this 




revolved to a large extent around the broader political climate and contemporary attitudes 
toward armed conflict.  In keeping with this pattern, the issues that impacted the 
production of Vernet’s painting were directly related to the recent revolution of 1848, in 
which the French army had violently put down massive uprisings in what had amounted 
to a civil war within France’s own borders.   
After 1848, war mongering became a political liability.  More problematically for 
Vernet and the government that had commissioned the Siege of Rome, the French military 
intervention in Rome, which quashed a social movement with many parallels to the 
revolution of 1848, found little public support.  This lack of enthusiasm for the French 
army’s actions in Rome caused Vernet to fear that his paintings would be destroyed, a 
thought that would have been anathema during the July Monarchy.1
His unease with the regime change and the impact it would have on his career in 
the wake of the revolution of 1848 and the exile of his most important patron, Louis-
Philippe, reportedly led the aging artist to sell many of his belongings and take up 
residence in a small apartment at the Institute.
  The change in 
political and social circumstances following the revolution of 1848 meant that Vernet’s 
large-scale Siege of Rome risked becoming an emblem of an outdated celebration of war. 
2
                                                 
1 Claudine Renaudeau, “Horace Vernet (1789 - 1863): catalogue raisonné de l'oeuvre peint,” (Thèse de 
doctorat, Université de Paris IV, 1999), 489.  In a letter  held in the private Delaroche-Vernet archives, 
Vernet wrote to Delaroche that “malgré les menaces de destruction de mon œuvre que je trouve dans 
quelques journaux, je n’en ferais moins mon tableau…Le premier tableau dont je m’occuperai sera la prise 
du Bastion n. 8.”     
  Before the establishment of the Second 
Empire in 1852, Vernet’s displeasure with the political events of 1848 led him to paint 
The Scourges of the Nineteenth Century: Cholera and Socialism (now lost), which he 




shied away from exhibiting at the urging of friends.3
Critics were not kind to Horace Vernet’s painting.  The vast majority noted that 
the Siege of Rome lacked a sense of unity and found that it failed to come together to 
form a clear picture of French military achievement:  
  The painter who had staked his 
career on large-scale battle painting could no longer be assured of a steady stream of 
government patronage under the changed political circumstances.   
There are details, many details.  I do not see a whole.  M. Horace Vernet has 
covered an immense canvas: with three such submissions, he would fill a Salon 
all by himself.  It is panorama painting that is extended as long as one likes – 
continued in the next….panel.  It’s a series of episodes, following one another 
from right to left, without any relation … There are partial combats, there is no 
vigorous melee where one feels the shiver, the anger and the enemy souls of two 
clashing peoples.  The painting lacks depth, and after various actions expressed 
lively enough in the foreground, there is no longer any life or interest … With this 
one makes articles [feuilletons] and not books; with this, one goes to the museum 
at Versailles, but not to the Louvre museum!4
 
 
The painting’s failure to picture the grandeur and elevated seriousness of armed combat 
was not due to a shortage of heroic episodes - Vernet had literally filled the composition 
with them - it was because there were too many.  Another critic writing for the 
conservative L’ami de la religion also found the painting disappointing:  “It is surprising 
how little interest is attached to the grand scene that he represents.  The eye, attracted all 
over this immense surface, does not know what to fix itself upon and prevents 
                                                 
3 Gabriel Weisberg, “Cholera as Plague and Pestilence in Nineteenth-Century Art,” in In Sickness and in 
Health: Disease as Metaphor in Art and Popular Wisdom, ed. Gabriel Weisberg and Laurinda S. Dixon 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 92.  
4 G.M., Salon de 1852 (Caen: Imprimerie E. Poisson, 1852), 145, 10-13. “Il y a des détails, beaucoup de 
détails ; je ne vois pas un tout.  M. Horace Vernet a couvert une toile immense : avec trois envois pareils, il 
remplirait à lui seul tout un salon.  C’est de la peinture de panorama, qu’on allonge autant qu’on veut, - la 
suite au prochain…panneau….C’est une série d’épisodes, se succédant de droite à gauche, sans aucun 
lien…Il y a des combats partiels, il n’y a point de ces mêlées vigoureuses, où l’on sent le frémissement, la 
colère et les âmes ennemies de deux peuples qui se choquent.  Le tableau manque de profondeur, et après 
les actions diverses, assez vivement exprimées, du premier plan, il n’y a plus de vie ni d’intérêt…avec cela 





concentration upon a principal point.  For the spectators, the action remains vague and 
indecisive.”5
 Napoleon III, who seized absolute power in a coup d'état in 1851 after being 
elected by popular vote in 1848, sought to associate himself with peacetime prosperity to 
garner political support.  In one the most striking historical paradoxes of the nineteenth 
century, the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, the ruler most associated with warfare in 
French history, promoted himself to the French public as a peace-loving man.  Having 
recently been elected président de la république, Louis-Napoleon proclaimed his 
peaceful intentions in a famous speech given in Bordeaux that immediately preceded his 
coup d’état, in which he also formally declared his desire to proclaim an empire.  In 
keeping with the new war-weary political culture, he couched his announcement in the 
rhetoric of peace and economic prosperity:  
   
There is nevertheless a fear that I must respond to.  In the spirit of defiance, 
certain people say: the Empire means war.  I say: the Empire means peace!  It 
means peace because France wants it, and when France is satisfied the world is 
tranquil.  War is not made for pleasure, it is made out of necessity…I admit 
nevertheless that as Emperor I will have quite some conquests to make….We 
have immense uncultivated territories to clear, roads to open, ports to dig, rivers 
to make navigable, canals to finish, our network of railroads to 




                                                 
5 E de Valette, “Variétés. Salon de 1852,” L'ami de la religion 20 mai 1852. “On est frappé du peu d'intérêt 
qui s'attache à la grande scène qu’il reproduit. L'œil, attiré partout sur cette surface immense, ne sait où se 
fixer ; et faute de se concentrer sur un point principal, l'action reste, pour le spectateur, vague et indécise.” 
6 Guillaumin, “Chronique économique,” Journal des économistes. Revue de la science économique 33 
(1852): 199. “Il est néanmoins une crainte à laquelle je dois répondre. Par esprit de défiance, certaines 
personnes se disent : l'Empire, c'est la guerre. Moi je dis : l'Empire, c'est la paix ! C'est la paix, car la 
France la désire, et quand la France est satisfaite, le monde est tranquille.   La guerre ne se fait pas par 
plaisir, elle se fait par nécessité…J'en conviens, et cependant j'ai, comme l'Empereur, bien des conquêtes à 
faire…Nous avons d'immenses territoires incultes à défricher, des routes à ouvrir, des ports à creuser, des 
rivières à rendre navigables, des canaux à terminer, notre réseau de chemins de fer à compléter…Nous 




Louis-Napoleon assured the public that whereas his uncle conquered countries, his 
conquests would be of the economic variety.  Indeed, as he announced in his speech, and 
thanks to state subsidies, the 1850s became a watershed decade for industrial 
development in France, accompanied by a growth in the centralization of state power.7  
With the institutions of government surveillance under Louis-Napoleon’s control, dissent 
was viciously crushed.  Over 26,000 arrests made in the 1850s alone.8  Those who 
disagreed with the regime, such as Victor Hugo, went into exile; speeches he gave while 
in exile burn with vociferous condemnation of the regime.9
 Louis-Napoleon’s dedication to peace and prosperity did not prevent him from 
instigating a war with Russia, however, which eventually led to the outbreak of the 
Crimean War in 1854.  The conflict erupted when, in a bid to shore up support among 
Catholics after his coup d'état, Louis Napoleon sought to have France control Christian 
sites in the Holy Land, which the Ottomans had allowed the Russian Orthodox church to 
  The projects that Louis-
Napoleon referred to in his speech all pertained to massive public projects that would 
make the land fit for industrial development and aid the process of primitive 
accumulation of primary materials essential for the production of goods and the 
enrichment of national coffers.  This promised increase in France’s productive 
development, which was the focus of the speech, rhetorically justified the need for more 
government power.  It helps to explain why the speech was delivered on the eve of the 
proclamation of the Second Empire.     
                                                 
7 C.A Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World (Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 176.   
8 Ibid. , 145.  
9 For the speeches Hugo gave while in exile, see Victor Hugo, Actes et paroles. Avant l'exil (1841-1851). 
Pendant l'exil (1852-1870), ed. Jean Louis Cornuz, vol. 31, Oeuvres complètes de Victor Hugo (Paris: 




control since the fifteenth century.  The French, acting as defenders of the Roman 
Catholic church, obtained authority from the Ottomans to guard these sites.  To back up 
this claim with a show of force, Louis-Napoleon sent a ninety-gun steamship called the 
Charlemagne through the Dardanelles.10
In the words of the French historian Alain Gouttman, “the Crimean was, in fact, 
an abstract war.”
  The forthcoming agreement between the 
crumbling Ottoman Empire and France amounted to a blunt reproach to the Russians 
who, having lost control of important religious sites in the Middle East, were 
internationally humiliated.  A series of escalating actions in 1853, such as Russia sending 
warships to Constantinople and France sending a fleet of ships in response, brought 
Europe once again into diplomatic and military conflict.  Unlike the wars of the 
Napoleonic Empire, which had been wars of conquest, the Crimean War can best be 
characterized as a war over the contested strategic influence of Russia and France.  As the 
conflict intensified, France secured valuable alliances with Turkey and England.   
11  That is, the objectives of the Crimean war were not to conquer the 
port cities in the Crimea but rather to prevent Russia from exerting too much control over 
the crumbling Ottoman Empire and protect French and English shipping routes, upon 
which their trade and colonial expansion depended.12  The war would last until 1856, far 
longer than initially hoped.  Approximately 675,000 people were killed during the 
conflict, 180,000 of them French, 45,000 British, and 450,000 Russian.13
                                                 
10 Trevor Royle, Crimea. The Great Crimean War, 1854-1856 (London: Little Brown, 2000), 19.  
   
11 Alain Gouttman, “Guerre de Crimée, guerre oubliée?,” in Napoléon III et l'Europe. 1856: le congrès de 
Paris (Paris: Editions Artlys, 2006), 20.  
12 Ibid., 21. 
13 J.A.S. Grenville, Europe Reshaped. 1848-1878 (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976), 203. As Greville 
points out, the death toll from the Crimean War is comparable to that of the American Civil War.  The 




 The outbreak of the Crimean War was widely understood as anachronistic to the 
steady march of industrial progress in Western Europe. It thus also threatened Louis-
Napoleon’s assertion that the Empire meant peace.  As one of the government’s regional 
procurers in Bordeaux noted in an 1854 report,  
the prolongation of the war nevertheless begins, I must not conceal, to cause a 
certain weariness to appear in one part of the population.  But it is noticeable that 
it is neither the agricultural nor laboring classes which seem to feel it so much.  It 
is rather the business and leisure classes which are troubled by it in their 
transactions and speculations and which hope most devoutly for a return of peace 
as a vital factor in their prosperity.14
 
 
These “business and leisure classes” were crucial for maintaining the stability of Louis-
Napoleon’s regime.  They were the same parts of the French population which had 
profited under Louis-Philippe’s reign and did not want a war to interfere with the 
economy.  In 1854, well before the most violent phases of the war, one author pondered 
the damage that the conflict might inflict upon Europe:  “After thirty-eight years of 
relative prosperity, the old world sees its grandest powers engaging in a struggle that will 
only perhaps end with a reshuffling of territorial boundaries, by a shift in equilibrium and 
in influences which will surely compromise interests.”15  France and England officially 
entered the war in March 1854 with French public opinion on the matter sharply 
divided.16
                                                                                                                                                 
casualty figures for the Napoleonic Wars, see Owen Connelly, The French Revolution and Napoleonic 
Empire (New York: Harcourt, 1999), 223.   
   
14 Lynn Case, French Opinion on War and Diplomacy during the Second Empire (New York: Octagon 
Books, 1972), 38.  
15 A Fouquier, Annuaire historique universel ou histoire politique pour 1854 (Paris: Lebrun et Compagnie 
Frères, 1855), 1-2.  “A une paix longue et féconde, va succéder une guerre incertaine.  Après trente-huit ans 
de prospérité relative, le vieux monde voit s’engager entre ses plus grandes puissances une lutte qui ne 
finira peut-être que par un remaniement général des grandes circonscriptions territoriales, par un 
déplacement d’équilibre et d’influences, qui, à coup sur, compromettra bien des intérêts.” 




 As the first major international conflict waged among European nations since the 
Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Crimean War was the 
first to be fought in the industrial age: the steamship, railroad and telegraph all played 
major roles in warfare for the first time. The use of these new technologies of transport 
and communication was mirrored by a new configuration of nascent modes of visual 
reproduction, including photography and the illustrated mass press, that were for the first 
time at the disposal of image makers for the representation of a major contemporary 
armed engagement.  This proliferation of visual products of the Crimean War, in nascent 
and traditional media, engendered a powerful set of political illusions pertaining to 
transparency, stability, harmonious class relations and military might.     
 
Seeing the Whole War in Fragments: Illustrated Newspaper “Reportage”  
In a 1861 letter to Jean-Gilbert Fialin, duc de Persigny, a personal friend of 
Emperor Louis-Napoleon, Charles Baudelaire attempted to secure a pension for his friend 
Constantin Guys, an illustrator who had worked for the Illustrated London News during 
the Crimean War.  Guys had trouble finding steady work after the end of the Crimean 
War but could still count on an occasional assignment from the Illustrated London News 
thanks to the generosity of its founder Herbert Ingram.  But after Ingram drowned in 
Lake Michigan in 1860 while touring the United States, Guys’ prospects for employment 
with the newspaper ended.17
                                                 
17 Pierre Duflo, Constantin Guys. Fou de dessin, grand reporter (1802-1892), vol. 2 (Paris: Editions 
Arnaud Seydoux, 1988), 101.   
  Two years after his appeal, Baudelaire published his 




as the artist who most adeptly captured the transitory essence of modernity.  In an 1861 
letter, Baudelaire counted Guys’ talent for representing war as one of the 
accomplishments that entitled the artist to French government support:  “I have seen the 
entire Crimean campaign drawn by him, from one day until the next, when he followed 
the expedition after the English army, all of his drawings accompanied by the most 
curious of notes.”18
Baudelaire was referring to a series of original sketches that Constantin Guys had 
made while he worked as a correspondent in the theater of war for the Illustrated London 
News.
   
19  Notoriously critical of newspapers, Baudelaire’s encounter with Guys’ original 
ink wash sketches, and not their reproductions, was a privileged one.  He once asserted 
that “I do not understand how a pure hand could touch a newspaper without a convulsion 
of disgust.”20  He bypassed the drawings’ mode of mass diffusion as wood block 
engravings in the Illustrated London News and wrote about the original sketches.  In the 
section of the “Painter of Modern Life” where Baudelaire wrote about these sketches, 
entitled “The Annals of War,” he praised Guys: “I can affirm that no newspaper, no 
written account, no book can better express the grand epic of the Crimean War in all of 
its painful details and sinister scope.”21
                                                 
18 Charles Baudelaire, Nouvelles lettres, ed. Claude Pichois (Paris: Librairie Arthtème Fayard, 2000), 36.  
“J’ai vu toute la campagne de Crimée dessinée par lui, au jour le jour pendant qu’il suivait l’expédition à la 
suite de l’armée anglaise, chacun de ses dessins accompagné des notes les plus curieuse.” 
 As we shall see, the tension implied here between 
19 Many of Constantin Guys’ sketches were owned by Baudelaire’s friend Nadar who purchased them 
directly from the artist.  As Claude Pichois has asserted in the notes to the annotated edition of Baudelaire’s 
writings on art, Baudelaire “a sous les yeux les originaux.”  Keeping in mind his professed dislike of 
newspapers and his friendship with Nadar, it seems likely that his understanding of Guys’ Crimean War 
oeuvre would have been based exclusively on the original drawings.  See Baudelaire, Critique d'art , 652.  
20 Cited in Terdiman, Discourse/Counter-Discourse  “Je ne comprends pas qu’une main pure puisse 
toucher un journal sans une convulsion de dégout.” 
21 Baudelaire, Critique d'art, 360-61. “Je puis affirmer que nul journal, nul récit écrit, nul livre, n’exprime 





the representation of the war’s plentiful details and its overarching ensemble is at the 
heart of the visual culture of the Crimean War.   
Baudelaire interpreted the sketches as series of eyewitness encounters with war:  
their facture, made in quick, autographic lines, signified having been made in the heat of 
battle. This technical sign of improvisation was anathema to the predictable battle 
paintings of Horace Vernet with their careful attention to military costume and other 
denotative details.  Baudelaire once derided Vernet as a “veritable newspaper writer 
instead of a real painter” and was one of his most vocal detractors in the 1840s and 
1850s.22  Guys sketched the charge of the light brigade made famous by Lord Alfred 
Tennyson’s poem of the same name (1864) (Fig. 5.2).  The episode caused a firestorm of 
negative public opinion in England after newspaper reports exposed the incompetent 
English generals who were responsible for leading a cavalry charge against blankets of 
Russian artillery fire.  In Guys’ drawing, a flurry of ink at the top of the composition 
depicts the swirling chaos of artillery fire and smoke.  Below, small flecks of ink denote 
soldiers charging toward their certain deaths.   For Baudelaire, the unevenly covered 
surface riddled with hastily-made brushstrokes, “upon which the tears and spots speak to 
the trouble and tumult in the middle of which the artist put down his daily memories,” 
functioned as a material indicator of its status as an eyewitness transcription of war.23
                                                 
22 Ibid. , 361.  “Véritable gazetier plutôt que peintre essentiel.” 
  
The immediacy of experience of war that Baudelaire felt privy to in Guys’ drawings 
depended on the epistemological authority of the eyewitness, something that illustrated 
newspapers learned to exploit during the Crimean War to sell the news.         
23 Ibid., 362-63. “…dont les maculatures et les déchirures disent, à leur manière, le trouble et le tumulte au 




Coverage of the Crimean War in illustrated newspapers commercialized 
eyewitness experience for the sake of producing a new kind of news commodity with a 
novel technological allure.  The first illustrated newspaper of its kind, the Illustrated 
London News, was founded in 1842 and was quickly emulated in France one year later by 
L’Illustration.  The historian Jean-Noel Marchandiau has estimated that by 1854, the year 
in which France officially entered the Crimean War, L’Illustration had over 14,000 
subscribers.  By 1855, that number had risen to 24,000, which suggests that coverage of 
the Crimean War was an economically lucrative undertaking.24  During the Crimean War, 
L’Illustration and the Illustrated London News printed weekly illustrated dispatches from 
the warfront.  These featured woodblock engravings made after drawings by 
correspondents who sent these visual and textual dispatches from the theater of war.  This 
unprecedented immediacy of pictured reporting had an ideological effect.  By combining 
textual narration with visual representations of important events, these two newspapers 
marketed the illusion of making the entire war representable through a series of episodic 
occurrences. The following pages focus on the visual and textual strategies adopted by 
the French paper, L’Illustration, during the Crimean War to present itself as a 
technologically alluring and indispensable news commodity.25
                                                 
24 Jean-Noel Marchandiau, L'Illustration, vie et mort d'un journal, 1843-1944 (Paris: Bibliothèque 
historique Privat, 1987), 27 
         
25 While the Illustrated London News has been treated extensively by scholars, the French counterrpart has 
received comparatively little attention.  For studies that treat the Illustrated London News See Keller, 
Ultimate Spectacle: A Visual History of the Crimean War; see also Matthew Lalumia, Realism and Politics 
in Victorian Art of the Crimean War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984).  Just as the English 
Illustrated London News has received more scholarly attention than L’Illustration, so too has the visual 
culture of the Crimean War in England as a whole.  Ulrich Keller, in a catalogue essay for a exhibition at 
the Jeu de Paume in 2007, attempted to remedy this situation with a comparison between the visual 
production of France and England during the war: Ulrich Keller, “La guerre de Crimée en images: regards 
croisés France/Angleterre,” in L'Evenément, les images comme acteurs de l'histoire (Paris: Editions Hazan/ 




The authority of the Crimean War coverage in L’Illustration depended upon the 
values attached to the témoin oculaire, or visual eyewitness, a category of witnessing 
that, as discussed in an earlier chapter, had evolved out of early modern juridical 
contexts.26  With regard to the representation of military events, the témoin oculaire was 
understood as the emblematic source for representing war accurately and objectively.  
This authoritative form of subjective vision was the primary source upon which 
secondary knowledge of a more interpretative kind could be based.27
The Crimean War is widely understood as the originary moment of “reportage,” 
owing to the use of eyewitness correspondents by newspapers such as the Illustrated 
London News, The Times and L’Illustration, as well as to the availability of technologies 
  From the early 
years of the French First Republic up through the Second Empire, eyewitness vision 
trumped all other retrospective forms of war narration.  The enterprising editors of 
L’Illustration, in marketing their own eyewitness representations of the Crimean War, 
were well aware of the historical authority of the témoin oculaire as the basis for 
constructing believable accounts of military events.   The newspaper took advantage of a 
preexisting valorization of the expert opinions of visual eyewitnesses (témoins 
occulaires) to sell itself as an indispensable source for authoritative news from the theater 
of war.   
                                                 
26 Chapter 1 of this dissertation treats the emergence of the témoin oculaire in relationship to the 
popularization of topographical engravings of battles and episodic battle painting.   Andrea Frisch’s 
account of the emergence of the epistemological category of the eyewitness has shaped my understanding 
of the role it played during the First Empire and the Crimean War.  See Frisch, The Invention of the 
Eyewitness: Witnessing and Testimony in Early Modern France .  
27 Eyewitness battle accounts constituted a genre of writing that flourished throughout the period that this 




such as the telegraph which sped up the communication of  news across continents.28
Whereas the Napoleonic battle accounts written by eyewitnesses during the First 
Empire took the form of bound books such as General Alexandre Berthier’s Relation de 
la bataille de Marengo (1805) that exuded permanence, illustrated newspapers required 
that their eyewitness information be ephemeral and constantly subject to change like the 
news itself. It is therefore the military bulletins produced by Napoleon Bonaparte during 
the First Empire which are more in line with the ephemeral logic of the illustrated 
  
The discursive development of what has come to be known as “reportage” was deeply 
rooted in the tradition of the témoin oculaire.  Far from an objective reporting of 
eyewitness information from warfront to home front, the modern discourse of “reportage” 
can be more accurately described as a construction by a reading subject that is based on a 
set of claims promoted for the sake of commercial gain by the press.  The imperative of 
the mass press during the Crimean War was to convince readers that they were, in effect, 
privy to a totalizing, comprehensive account based on truthful information.  “Reportage” 
enticed and continues to entice the reading subject to believe in the authority of the 
reported news by claiming to depict the war with insider information not available 
anywhere else, and offers this information for a price.  
                                                 
28 Ulrich Keller’s conception of eyewitness authority is quite different from my own.  Whereas I understand 
the authority of illustrated newspapers within the historical epistemology of the témoin oculaire, Keller 
argues for the primacy of the modern illustrated newspaper as the guarantee of “authenticity”: “it was not 
camera exposures, but newspaper illustrations which first manifested the novel quality of ‘authenticity’ to 
the mid-19th-century public.  This quality was guaranteed not by the quite traditional woodcut medium as 
such, but by the particular mode of its contextualization.”  (Keller, Ultimate Spectable: A Visual History of 
the Crimean War, 71).   As my research has demonstrated, “authenticity” was an integral component of 
earlier forms of war imagery produced after the French Revolution, largely in response to the new bonds 
between the new French ‘nation’ and warfare.  While I disagree with Keller on this point, I am indebted to 
his important study of English visual representations of the Crimean War and his exacting analysis of the 





As Richard Terdiman has argued, “the daily paper was arguably the first 
consumer commodity; made to be perishable, purchased to be thrown away…it sold itself 
first of all.”
  Both Napoleon’s military bulletins, which were circulated between 1805 
and 1812, and illustrated newspaper “reportage” shared a common goal, namely, the 
consolidation of power.  In the case of the bulletins, the speedy dissemination of 
information pertaining to the French army’s activities was intended to bolster 
Bonaparte’s political power by maintaining a level of control over the spread of 
knowledge about his campaigns. For the illustrated newspaper, the imperative of 
commercial gain dictated the modalities of disseminating news about the Crimean War.       
30
In the summer of 1855, which coincided with the Universal Exposition in Paris, 
Jean-Baptiste Alexandre Paulin, the editor in chief of L’Illustration, expressed his 
exasperation with the lack of spectacular, definitive battles in the text of his own paper: 
“The news from Crimea is more worthless than ever.  This grave calm that preoccupies 
  In the particular case of illustrated newspapers, the quality of ephemerality 
adheres to the logic of depicting a narrative of war extended over a period of several 
years: L’Illustration frequently laid bare the questionable veracity of their own 
eyewitness sources in order to alert readers that more authoritative drawings or written 
accounts would appear in the next issue.  While such an editorial strategy seems to 
contradict the logic of authoritative objectivity of the news that the paper wanted to 
impart, it actually worked to ensure that readers would consult next week’s edition where 
the new information would appear.  
                                                 
29 For more on the production and dissemination of Napoleon’s military bulletins, see Joseph J. Matthews, 
“Napoleon's Military Bulletins,” The Journal of Modern History 22, no. 2 (June, 1950). 




everybody, resembles the tranquil weight of the atmosphere and of the elements just 
before a dreadful new world storm.”31
With no shortage of other newspapers available in France during the Crimean 
war, the editors of L’Illustration had to provide solid justification as to why their news 
was the most accurate and informed available.  This was often accomplished by 
lamenting the problematic accuracy of telegraphic dispatches.  As a new technology of 
communication, the telegraph provided information about the war quickly but the 
veracity of the information was thought to depend upon the national allegiances of the 
telegraph operator.  Early on in the war, L’Illustration and other newspapers such as the 
Journal des débats voiced doubts over telegraphic dispatches from Vienna, owing to the 
neutrality of Austria in the Crimean War; the country’s refusal to take sides was 
understood at the time to undermine the authority of the information sent to France and 
England.  As the war progressed, the accuracy of the updates received via telegraph was 
increasingly cast into doubt.   
   Despite frequent protests issued by the editors at 
the lack of dynamic military events between 1854 and 1856, the Crimean war provided 
the nascent illustrated mass press with an opportunity to transform a slow war into a 
sellable news event.  Small news fluctuations became salient, sellable events that were 
packaged as indispensable knowledge, even if there was nothing especially new to report.   
In January 1855, L’Illustration published an excerpt from the Journal des débats 
that explained its refusal to publish news deemed to be untrue.  Several French and 
English papers had reported that Russians had crossed the Danube and that French and 
                                                 
31 Jean-Baptiste Alexandre Paulin, “Histoire de la semaine,” L'Illustration, 18 août 1855.“Les nouvelles de 
Crimée sont plus nulles que jamais. Ce calme pesant, qui préoccupe tant les esprits, ressemble à la lourdeur 




English forces had begun to attack Sebastopol.  These telegraphed reports, according to 
the Journal des débats, were incorrect and the consequences of such erroneous reports 
were multiplied by the unscrupulous editors of newspapers that chose to publish them.  
L’Illustration included the excerpt in its leading article.  The editors at the Journal des 
débats had reached a point of exasperation with the dubious authority of telegraphic 
dispatches:  
We already tried many times to protect the public against the dangers that can 
result from the use of the electric telegraph and the ease with which it can be put 
at the disposition of everybody…We do not know, apparently, how to repeat more 
often to our readers that if they must congratulate themselves to see such a 
powerful instrument function for themselves, it is necessary to know how to make 
use of it.  In the past, the telegraphic dispatch had an official character; today it 
only has as much worth as the intelligence of the person who sent it…In the end, 
interest in circumstances excites a very legitimate curiosity, but this singularly 
facilitates the propagation of error; to this end, we call upon the shrewdness and 
prudence of the reader.32
 
  
Though it was a modern, technological marvel, the electric telegraph could not be trusted.  
Since its invention and subsequent application as a communications technology in the 
1840s, it devolved from an official organ of information into a highly subjective one, 
dependent on individual operators who could well be under the influence of the enemy.  
While the telegraph promised to deliver the news quickly, such speed also opened the 
machine up to the possibility of multiplying false information across the European 
continent. At the time, periodicals such as the Journal des débats and L’Illustration 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 20 janvier. “Nous avons essayé plusieurs fois déjà de prémunir le public contre les dangers qui 
pouvaient résulter de l’emploi du télégraphe électrique et de la facilité avec laquelle il a été mis à la 
disposition  de tout le monde…nous ne saurions, à ce qu’il paraît, répéter plus souvent à nos lecteurs que 
s’ils doivent se féliciter de voir un instrument aussi puissant fonctionner pour leur compte, il faut aussi 
savoir s’en servir.  Autrefois la dépêche télégraphique avait un caractère officiel ; aujourd’hui elle ne mérite 
pas plus de crédit qu’il n’en faut accorder à l’intelligence de celui qui l’a expédiée...En définitive, l’intérêt 
des circonstances excite une curiosité bien légitime, mais qui facilite singulièrement la propagation de 




affirmed the dependability of their sources against what they saw as the unscrupulous 
financial motivations of other international press outlets.   
It might at first appear curious that the editors of L’Illustration should have 
wanted to include a lengthy excerpt from a rival newspaper that inveighed against the 
problematic accuracy of telegraphic dispatches, since both newspapers relied upon them 
to supply the news.  But for L’Illustration, it was a savvy tactic that allowed the paper to 
assert that eyewitness visual reports were more reliable than the telegraph, which was the 
dominant technology for supplying up-to-the-minute news.  This only increased the value 
of the eyewitness visual sources unique to the illustrated press and set such papers apart 
from other non-illustrated rivals in the marketplace.  Modern telegraphic technology was 
certainly fast, but it was no substitute for the visual witness personal testimony of the 
témoin oculaire.  In contrast to the unfamiliar disembodied information conveyed through 
the telegraph, the woodblock engravings translated from original drawings made in the 
theater of war asserted the presence of an authorial subject with which readers would 
have been more familiar in both epistemological and material terms.   
L’Illustration often used eyewitness drawings supplied by its correspondents to 
corroborate official written dispatches supplied by the government.  At a particularly low 
point in the war when hopes of taking the Russian fort of Sebastopol had been dashed yet 
again, the pages of L’Illustration confided in its readers that 
the details published up until now on the operations of the siege are, like all the 
rest, far from having an authentic character; the accounts from St. Petersburg have 
little to do with the ones in London and Paris.  The rapport of General Canrobert, 
published in this edition, gives the exact state of things for the date of April 16.  
With regard to the telegraphic dispatches that have come across Germany, in their 
contradictions one can begin to see the game of speculators who have dictated to 




Frankfurt, Paris and London. It is perhaps time to think about which hands and 
under which influences the European press has found itself today.33
 
  
General Canrobet’s report was printed in the newspaper as a thin horizontal band of text 
set between two larger engravings based on drawings sent from the front that 
corroborated the textual account.  The complete story of this particular event of the war 
was therefore made possible through a doubling of information, textual and visual (Fig. 
5.3).  The artist who made the drawings, Durand-Brager, had received a personal 
audience with Napoleon III just a month prior, a political recognition that further 
bolstered his authority as a competent eyewitness.34
On May 13, 1854, just after the bombing of Odessa, the newspaper claimed that it 
had received several reports, ranging from ones published in German and Belgian 
newspapers to an official report written by a French naval officer, Admiral Hamelin, that 
had appeared in the French government newspaper Le Moniteur universel.  The editors of 
L’Illustration evaluated these written accounts in terms of each other and then in terms of 
a series of drawings they had received with Hamelin’s report and that differed somewhat 
from his written accounts. The conclusion was that the difference between the written and 
visual account posed no problem.   
   
                                                 
33 Ibid., 5 mai. “Les détails publiés jusqu’ici sur les opérations du siège sont, comme tout le reste, loin 
d’avoir un caractère authentique ; les récits de Saint-Pétersbourg ne s’accordent guère avec ceux de 
Londres et de Paris.  Le rapport du général Canrobert, publié dans ce numéro, donne l’état exact des choses 
à la date du 16 avril.  Quant aux dépêches télégraphiques venues à travers l’Allemagne, on commence à 
voir dans leurs contradictions le jeu des spéculateurs qui font dire à ce merveilleux courrier tout ce qui 
convient aux intérêts des bourses de Vienne, de Francfort, de Paris, et de Londres.  Il est peut être temps de 
penser en quelles mains et sous quelles influences se trouve aujourd’hui la presse dans toute l’Europe.” 
34 Paulin, “Histoire de la semaine, “ L’Illustration,  24 mars. “Avant son départ, M. H. Durand-Brager a eu 
l’honneur d’être appelé dimanche soir et reçu en petit comité par Leurs Majestés l’Empereur et 
l’Impératrice, qui ont bien voulu examiner avec le plus vif intérêt les dessins si consciencieux et si vrais 
exécutés à Sébastopol, et jusque sous le feu de l’ennemi, par notre laborieux collaborateur.  Leurs Majestés 
ont paru apporter la plus grande attention à l’examen de ses travaux, et ont témoigné à cet artiste distingué 
toute leur haute et bienveillante satisfaction, ainsi que les encouragements les plus flatteurs pour la 




It must be recognized that the point of the view of the draftsman, and the moment 
when he captured a scene as mobile as this one, sufficiently accounts for this 
difference.  Whatever the case, we did not want to deprive our readers of these 
sketches, received on Wednesday, copied on wood, engraved, and put to press 
Thursday, at the moment when we received other drawings of the same kind, 
more detailed, and by consequence, more complete.  The official report of 
Admiral Hamelin will supply what is lacking in these engravings.35
 
 
The visual accounts were taken as primary in their authority over the multiple written 
accounts.  Readers were assured that the information they were receiving on that day’s 
issue of the paper was as accurate and as recent as possible.  The process of transforming 
the drawings into engravings demanded a great deal of labor by the engravers, who 
worked around the clock to produce several engravings for each issue of the paper.  The 
speed with which engravings were produced ensured the newspaper’s value as a 
superlative source of up-to-date information. 36
                                                 
35 L’Illustration, 13 mai, 1854, 1.  “Il faut reconnaitre que le point de vue du dessinateur, et le moment où il 
saisit une scène aussi mobile que l’est celle-ci, expliquent suffisamment cette différence.  Quoi qu’il en 
soit, nous n’avons pas voulu priver nos lecteurs de ces esquisses reçues mercredi, copiées sur bois, gravées, 
et mises sous presse jeudi, au moment où nous recevions d’autres dessins du même genre plus détaillés et 
par conséquent plus complets.  Le rapport officiel de l’amiral Hamelin suppléera d’ailleurs à ce qui manque 
dans ces gravures.” 
   The editor’s insistence on the incredible 
speed with which the drawings were received and translated into woodblock engravings 
hinted at the temporality of visual news production.  The reader was promised that the 
visual information contained in the drawings was as new as possible.  But in a move to 
spur readers’ curiosity, the editor disclosed that brand new better drawings were received 
at press time, which could not be included in the current issue.  What other choice did an 
inquisitive reader have than to purchase the next issue to view these new and allegedly 
“more detailed” drawings?  Participation in the narrative of war relayed by the newspaper 
was rhetorically figured as under the reader’s control.  At the same time the newspaper 
36 Marchandiau, L'Illustration, vie et mort d'un journal, 1843-1944 , 30-31.  One wood engraving required 




left the narrative intentionally open-ended and inconclusive so as to encourage readers to 
peruse the next issue.   
L’Illustration achieved this illusion of the participation of readers at home 
through a mix of editorial savvy and technological affect.  The editorial strategy of 
signaling better and more complete news to come must be understood as part of the logic 
of “reportage,” which claimed to cover the whole event through a series of constantly 
updated visual and textual reports that were gleaned from specialized “eyewitness” 
sources.  Wartime coverage consisted of an unending succession of better and more 
complete news to come, a perpetual future of news about the war.  The fragmentary 
nature of news production provided a convenient marketing ploy: readers had to purchase 
these weekly news “fragments” continuously so as to follow the war, such that the more 
one read, the more complete the narrative could become.  In this way, the discourse of 
“reportage” describes a mode of commodity consumption just as much as it names a 
technologically and commercially figured rhetoric of eyewitness authority imparted by 
the producers of the news.   
 
Mission Impossible: The Early Aspirations of Military Photography 
L’Illustration’s Crimean War coverage depended on the continuous production of 
eyewitness visual and textual fragments that reader/viewers were encouraged to believe 
would eventually cohere into a seamless and authoritative account of the war.  The same 
impulse toward a complete and authoritative representation of the war lies at the heart of 
the discourse surrounding the military uses of photography during the same period.  In 




Louis-Jacques-Mandé Daguerre and the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, the 
nascent medium of photography rapidly evolved.  Exposure times were reduced, glass 
and paper negatives replaced the metal plate of the daguerreotype, and new printing 
techniques abounded.   The Crimean War, though not the first war to be photographed, 
was the first international conflict to be photographed on a relatively wide scale, resulting 
in the production of several photographic albums and widespread discussion about the 
merits of war photography in the press.  
The following sections examine early theories of military photography in 
relationship to the photographs taken of the Crimean War by French artists for the 
purpose of creating battle paintings.  As we shall see, it was imagined that the new 
medium would picture war in all of its elusive totality by collecting and compiling 
exhaustive eyewitness accounts.  It was hoped that through a material accumulation of 
imagery, a more complete picture of war could be achieved than had ever been possible.  
Such aspirations for totality contrasted sharply with the practice of taking photographs of 
the Crimean War and posed a new set of challenges for artists who wanted to use them as 
source material with which to produce battle paintings.  Photographs not only eroded 
traditional notions of pictorial unity in depicting war as a series of isolated details of a 
larger event but more importantly held out the promise of a totalizing image of war that 
could never be fulfilled.   
There were at least five separate photographic expeditions to the Crimea during 
and immediately after the war, resulting in hundreds of photographs that were sold as 
albums and publicly exhibited in London, Paris and elsewhere.  The Universal Exhibition 




photographs displayed there were taken by the Englishman Roger Fenton and the 
Romanian Charles Szathmari, whose work has been lost.  Charles Lacan, the founder of 
the photography journal La Lumière, published a pamphlet that reviewed the photographs 
on view at the Universal Exhibition and featured an entire section dedicated to the 
Crimean War photography of Szathmari and Fenton.     
As soon as France entered the Crimean War in 1854, photography periodicals 
speculated that the medium would transform the ways in which this new, modern war 
could be represented.  In April 1854, the journal of the Société française de photographie, 
La Lumière, published an excerpt from the English Journal of the Society of Arts 
announcing that the English government had decided to send an official photographer to 
the warfront.  After the article, a French editor commented that the French government 
was also planning to send a photographer to the war, something that never materialized.  
The author then let his imagination run wild with the ways that photography would 
revolutionize the pictorial representation of war:    
A dispatch, accompanied by photographic views, will give much more precise 
information than a simple written document, however voluminous and detailed it 
may be.  One can, with a lens, instantaneously reproduce promontories, coasts, 
forts, dispositions of fleets, armies, military positions, and if the stereoscope can 
be used, nothing could be compared to the results that will be obtained.37
 
 
Photography promised to represent and disseminate military information instantly and 
with greater precision that ever before.  The author envisioned a new era of technological 
progress where war would be represented far more efficiently with photographic images 
                                                 
37 “La photographie et la guerre,” La Lumière, 15 avril 1854, 15. “Une dépêche, accompagnée de vues 
photographiques, donnera des renseignements bien plus précis qu’un simple document écrit, si volumineux 
et si détaillé qu’il puisse être.  On peut, avec un objectif, reproduire instantanément des promontoires, des 
côtes, des forts, des dispositions de flottes, des armées, des positions militaires, et si le stéréoscope peut être 




than with antiquated and imprecise words.  Crisp, instantaneous photographs, in the 
service of representing war, would eventually transform its dominant representational 
syntax from the verbal to the visual and could finally deliver a true and all encompassing 
representation of war. 
In 1861, five years after the Crimean war ended in victory for France and 
England, an important article appeared in the military periodical Le Spectateur militaire.  
Titled “On the Usage of Photography in the Army,” the article outlined the potential 
importance of photography for the French military.  Eugène Disdéri, the famous portrait 
photographer and one of the most successful men in the business of photography in 
France, had just had a proposal accepted by the Minister of War to integrate the 
technology of photography into the “corps of troops” of the French military.38  Within the 
context of the representation of armed combat, photography would act as a boon to 
military knowledge, organizing it and correcting it:  “For the writer who will want to 
recall the splendors of war for posterity, photography will limit laborious research, 
problematic opinions, and will imprint accounts with the sanction of exactitude.”39
                                                 
38 The article states that M. Disderi’s project “fut soumis, dès le commencement de 1860, à son Exc. le 
ministre de la guerre, qui le prit en considération, et, par décision du 19 février 1861, appela M. Disderi à le 
mettre à exécution dans les corps de troupes.”  The article does not specify exactly how photography would 
be integrated into the military.  See Ferdinand de Lacombe, “De l'usage de la photographie dans l'armée,” 
Le spectateur militaire 35 (1861): 145.  For more on Disdéri’s dealings with the Dépôt de la guerre, see 
Elizabeth Anne McCauley, A.A.E. Disdéri and the Carte de Visite Portrait Photograph (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1985), 51-52.  
  
While maps and charts often accompanied the written text of military histories, 
photography was envisioned as an originary form of evidence, outdoing all other types 
with its exact visual information.   
39 Lacombe, “De l'usage de la photographie dans l'armée,” 146. “ A l’écrivain qui voudra rappeler à la 
postérité les fastes de la guerre, elle évitera donc les recherches laborieuses, les appréciations 




The same faith in war photography’s potential to do what no previous medium 
had been capable of pervaded an 1862 book on photography written by Eugène Disdéri.  
He reiterated much of what had been written in the article in the Spectateur militaire and 
promoted the benefits of photographic images for the military’s information gathering 
needs, from which he stood to gain substantial financial profit:  
With the help of photography, it would always be possible to recognize, at a 
distance, all nature of preparations necessary for a siege in the process of 
execution, the placement of battle fields and the thousands of essential details that 
the general needs to know and would corroborate the reports with visible traits he 
would have ordered or could be ordered.  One glance suffices to understand 
instantly that which is long and difficult to explain with words.40
 
 
Like the previous authors, Disdéri understood photography as a medium without 
mediation, a veritable window on the world of armed combat, capable of representing all 
the aspects of war that could only be imprecisely depicted in the past.  Photography did 
not itself give rise to this desire to see a complete, immediate and detailed picture of war 
but it became the site of such lofty aspirations in the 1850s, a period that coincides with 
the rapid commodification of the medium and its concomitant rise as an industrial 
technology of reproduction.   
Unlike the written word, which needed to be read and interpreted, these 
commentators hoped and assumed that photographs of war would be completely 
denotative, requiring no interpretation on the part of the viewer.  This understanding of 
photography’s instantly intelligible signifying power is consistent with that of another 
                                                 
40 Eugène Disdéri, L'Art de la photographie (Paris: Chez l'Auteur, 1862), 152. “A l'aide de la photographie, 
il serait toujours possible de se rendre compte, à distance, des travaux de toute nature ordonnés pendant un 
siège et en voie d'exécution, de la disposition des champs de bataille et des mille détails essentiels que le 
général a intérêt à connaître et qui viendraient corroborer par des traits visibles les rapports qu'il demande, 
ou qui, dans bien des cas, pourraient en tenir lieu. Un coup d'œil suffit pour comprendre en un instant ce qui 




source of objective representation of war, that of the témoin oculaire or eyewitness.  
These early speculations about the military applications of photography equate the 
medium’s role with that of an eyewitness, mechanically substituting the authority of the 
human témoin occulaire with the black-and-white testimony of the photograph.   
Disdéri took the idea a step further and argued that these eyewitness photographs 
would in effect transfer this superior form of vision to anyone who viewed them.  In the 
same way that illustrated newspapers promised new forms of visual participation in the 
reporting of contemporary war, so did photography.  Viewers would participate in 
military events as eyewitnesses thanks to the medium’s immediate intelligibility:   
Next to these grand military struggles, the Magentas and the Solferinos, 
reproduced in their ensemble and in their episodes, will be placed the triumphant 
entry of our soldiers in the Italian cities; we will take part, so to speak, in the 
combats undertaken in China, the capture of Peking, in the thousands of military 




In this passage, Disdéri affirmed that to view a photographic representation of a military 
event was to experience it as an eyewitness.  He argued that photographs of war would 
permit viewers to “take part” in the nation’s illustrious military achievements because the 
camera had recorded them both “in their ensemble and in their episodes.”  No part of the 
conflict would be left unrepresented.  Enchanted by the possibilities of the new medium 
(and the profits that his collaboration with the French military could generate from it), the 
photographer abandoned himself to photography’s seemingly endless potentialities.  
Whereas illustrated newspaper coverage of the Crimean War enacted a form of 
                                                 
41 Ibid. , 150-51. “A côté des grandes luttes militaires, des Magenta et des Solferino, reproduites dans leur 
ensemble et dans leurs épisodes, se placerait l'entrée triomphale de nos soldats dans les villes italiennes; 
nous assisterions, pour ainsi dire, aux combats soutenus en Chine, à la prise de Pékin, aux mille faits 





reader/viewer participation around an ever-elusive quest for completeness and accuracy, 
the camera, acting as a mechanical eyewitness, would enable the participation of viewers 
in this form of an omniscient vision of war.   
Though it would be tempting to ascribe Disdéri’s vision for war photography to 
the special properties of the nascent medium, his assertion that viewers “take part” in war 
through photographic representation needs to be seen in the longer perspective of the 
valorization of eyewitness vision that had long dominated critical expectations 
surrounding representations of war in altogether different contexts, from battle painting 
and battle panoramas to the illustrated press.  This dissertation has argued that the 
possibility of experiencing a military event through viewing visual representations of it 
pervaded the critical writing on war imagery, especially battle paintings and battle 
panoramas, during the first half of the nineteenth century in France.  The exaggerated 
claim that viewers could in effect watch armed combat through its representation was a 
feature of the Salon criticism of the battle paintings of Louis-François Lejeune and 
Horace Vernet, among others, and dominated contemporary accounts of the battle 
panoramas of Jean-Charles Langlois.  The illusion, which was celebrated by the artistic 
press from the early years of the First Empire through the Crimean War, maintained that 
to view an image of a military encounter was to become an eyewitness of the depicted 
event.  This visual magic effected by some representations of war constituted a powerful 
political illusion that purported to transform the multivalent political event called “war” 
into a series of contained and therefore seemingly knowable experiences.  In reflecting 




expectation of war imagery from more traditional media to the nascent medium of 
photography. 
Within this discourse of the potential uses of war photography, the eyewitness 
participation of viewers hinged on the medium’s ability to produce a complete picture of 
war, one that provided minute details as well as a broad and “true” overview.  In the 
passage quoted above, Disdéri paradoxically advocated that photography depict battles 
“in their ensembles and their episodes,” arguing that the medium would represent the 
constituent parts of a battle as well as its totalizing whole.  This ultimate nineteenth-
century representation of war was pictorially impossible to produce.  Yet it was seductive 
as an ideology: any attempt to represent photographically an entire battle as the sum of its 
parts would materially overwhelm any archive and would confound attempts to organize 
the indexical details of the event into a coherent system of knowledge.   
The mechanical nature of the medium gave these early commentators license to 
imagine the possibility of achieving a totalizing photographic representation of armed 
combat through a potentially infinite proliferation of images.  In contrast to the laborious 
process of sketching the battlefield by hand with the aid of perspectival devices, 
photography would allow the military to represent territory quickly and without burden.  
The medium’s utility for war was likened to a weapon:   
Nothing would have escaped the speed of photographic methods, not even the 
appearance of the countries traveled through, of which the artist could assure the 
reproduction with the same kind of liberty and ease that comes with artillery 
fire…Military photography can trace its own annals.42
 
  
                                                 
42Lacombe, “De l'usage de la photographie dans l'armée,” 146. “Rien n’eût échappé à la rapidité des 
procédés photographiques, pas même l’aspect des pays parcourus, dont l’artiste peut s’assurer la 
reproduction avec une liberté et une aisance analogues à celles qui accompagnent le jeu de l’artillerie…La 




The author implied that the camera would be as easy to manipulate as a rifle, a reference 
that would not have been lost on the readers of this military periodical.  But beyond 
photography’s speed, the author also inferred that the medium could represent its 
referents without human labor as a self-acting mechanical tool.  As Steve Edwards has 
forcefully argued with regard to English photography in the Victorian era, the autogenic 
potential of photography was frequently touted as the medium’s greatest quality.  The 
dream of autogenesis “unleashes the possibility of a frenzy of making,” and 
simultaneously substitutes the agency of the mechanical device for human labor in the 
production process.43
Nowhere do these authors pause to take stock of the material consequences of 
autogenesis:  it is regarded positively, as a fantasy of endless production.  Placing a 
positive valuation on the limitless production of material goods was in line with attitudes 
toward industrial production that dominated the period and helped to ensure a political 
consensus for Louis-Napoleon. The process of gathering these photographs would have 
to be in keeping with the vision of limitless proliferation.  The author of “On the Usage of 
Photography in the Army” signaled exactly this kind of strategy for harnessing the 
medium:  “First of all, [Disderi] wants the photographers to be numerous, always present 
everywhere, distributed over the entire line of battle or siege, constantly ready to collect 
  This is precisely what occurs in these texts: the authors envisioned 
a constantly expanding set of visual images of war with the help of the camera.  
Photographs would accomplish what no soldiers or army engineers could ever hope to 
achieve: a military event in all of its multifarious parts as well as its glorious “ensemble.”   
                                                 




everything that interests them in the spectacles that strike their gazes.”44  Though 
photography was supposed to “trace its own annals,” the author recognized that human 
labor would be required.  Paradoxically, the autogenic quality of photography to 
represent military history all by itself must first be set off by the figure of the idealized 
war photographer.  Photography’s self-acting powers would be made possible by 
photographers “always present everywhere,” photographing “everything.”  Disdéri 
planned to blanket the entire field of combat with photographers in order to fulfill the 
directive of covering all aspects of a campaign.  The unending flow of photographs, taken 
by an unending flow of photographers, would finally produce the perfect picture of war, 
as the sum total of all of its multifarious, and potentially infinite, details.  It goes without 
saying that this fantasy, of a totalizing summary image of war, was well beyond the 
bounds of representation.  It was precisely what the photographic historian John Tagg has 
identified as the “phantasy of something more.”45
Photography would produce a new and enlightened viewer who would have the 
benefit of instant access to a broad visual overview of the combat as well as its manifold 
parts.  This illusion of a totalizing, yet detailed, photographic representation of war 
contrasted with the actual technological capabilities of the medium at the time, which 
permitted little more than landscapes and portraits to be made.  Despite these limitations, 
the utopian claims made on photography’s behalf remain significant in terms of the 
   
                                                 
44 Lacombe, “De l'usage de la photographie dans l'armée,” 147. “Il veut d’abord que les photographes 
soient nombreux, toujours présents partout, répartis sur toute la ligne de bataille ou de siège, prêts à 
recueillir sans cesse tout ce qui intéresse dans les spectacles qui frappent les regards.” 
45 John Tagg, The Burden of Representation, Essays on Photographies and Histories (Minneapolis: 




assertion that the complex political operations of war could, through its use, be made 
visible, intelligible and accessible.  
 
French Photography Expeditions to the Theater of War 
Despite the excitement about integrating photographers into the ranks of the army 
that were articulated as early as 1854, no official French government photographers were 
sent to the warfront.  Unlike the English, who sent official photographers, of whom 
Roger Fenton was the most successful and best known, the two French photographers 
who went were on private expeditions unaffiliated with the government.46
  Jean-Baptiste Henri Durand-Brager, an eyewitness correspondent for 
L’Illustration whose letters and images were briefly discussed earlier, and Jean-Charles 
Langlois, the panorama painter, both undertook photography expeditions during the last 
months of the Crimean War.  Neither man had been trained in photography and so hired 
 In contrast to 
Fenton, who traveled to the warfront for the express purpose of taking photographs, the 
two French photographic expeditions were undertaken by artists who were already 
present in the theater of war for other reasons, which will soon become clear.  The 
resulting photographs taken by these two Frenchmen were accordingly used as 
documents for representations of the Crimean war in other media, notably for the 
production of two very different kinds of painted battle panoramas. 
                                                 
46 The English government sent three separate photographers to the front but only the photographs taken by 
Roger Fenton have survived to this day.  The first photographer, Richard Nicklin, along with his crew and 
all the photographs they had taken during their time in the Crimea, were lost at sea after a shipwreck.  The 
photographs brought back to England after the second government-sponsored expedition led by ensigns 
Brandon and Dawson had faded by 1869 and were expunged from government files.  See John Hannavy, 
The Camera goes to War. Photographs from the Crimean War 1854-1856 (Edinburgh: Scotish Arts 




assistants to take photographs for them.  Unlike Roger Fenton, the English photographer 
whose work has garnered the majority of scholarly attention on photographic 
representations of the Crimean War, the photographs of Langlois have received 
comparably less, and those of Durand-Brager practically none at all.  This is partly due to 
the failure of their photographs to achieve any notable commercial or artistic success, and 
to their relatively late date, taken in 1856 after the major hostilities had ceased. But the 
critical factor is the status of their work as documents, for both photographers put their 
photographs to work as documents for paintings. This not only diminished the 
photographers’ role as authors, but relegated their work to preparatory material for an 
altogether different final product.47
The French photographic expedition to the warfront conducted by Durand-Brager 
and his assistant was accompanied by an advertising scheme.  In May 1856, an article 
appeared in the Revue photographique, one of many new journals dedicated to 
photography, titled “French Photography Expedition in the Crimea.”  Written by the 
photographer Lassimonne, the article was sent to the journal and published, according to 
the editors, in its entirety.  Lassimonne stated in the article that he and Henri Durand-
Brager were partners in a photographic expedition in the theater of the Crimea war.  The 
evidence of their photographic expedition is the article, thirty photographs and few 
comments in letters written by other artists working there at the time.  The nature of the 
collaboration remains a mystery, but it is probable that Lassimonne supplied the technical 
   
                                                 
47 Molly Nesbit’s pioneering work on Atget and the problem of the document underpins my analysis of the 
photographs of Durand-Brager and Jean-Charles Langlois.  She argues that the document “functioned in a 
part of visual culture that had few aspirations to greatness or avant-garde revolution; it issued from the 
depths of bourgeois culture; it was the aesthetic Other.”  Molly Nesbit, Atget's Seven Albums (New Haven 




knowledge and Durand-Brager dictated the point from which the views were taken, 
having already spent years in the area reporting on the war for L’Illustration.  Likewise, 
we know very little about Monsieur Lassimonne other than his identity as Durand-
Brager’s assistant on this expedition.  Like many of the budding amateur photographers 
who worked in the 1850s, his name was often cited in connection with technical 
innovations in the burgeoning photographic press. But his name has since disappeared 
from the history of nineteenth-century photography.48
Lassimonne and Durand-Brager formed just one of several groups of 
photographers who hoped to profit from photographic representations of the Crimean 
War.  Roger Fenton’s photographic expedition to the warfront received a great deal of 
attention at the time in the English and French photographic press and his album was 
displayed at the Universal Exposition in 1855.  When Fenton returned from the war, he 
famously published an account of his time there in which he complained of the many 
hardships he faced.  In his account, he took great pains to detail the obstacles he had 
encountered at just about every point in his journey.  After a series of painstaking and 
laborious preparations, Fenton could finally begin to make photographs.  The difficulty of 
the endeavor was almost too overwhelming to describe:  “I need not speak of the physical 
exhaustion which I experienced in work in my van at this period…As soon as the door 
was closed to commence the preparation of a plate, perspiration started from every 
pore…I should not forget to state that it was at this time that the plague of flies 
  Since photographers needed to 
fabricate their own chemical solutions to process their photographs, they often announced 
their discoveries in photographic journals, as Lassimonne did.     
                                                 
48 For example, see M. Lassimonne, “Emploi de l'acide tannique en photographie,” Bulletin de la société 





The account published four months later by Lassimonne in the Revue 
photographique was a direct response to Fenton’s.  Lassimonne began by admonishing 
the journal, in which the translation of Fenton’s account appeared, for scaring away 
potential photographers with such tales of hardship:  “Fearing that you have terrified the 
photography amateurs subscribing to your journal by the account of the things that Mr. 
Fenton had to resort to during his time in the Crimea to avoid being condemned to a 
grievous immobility, we would like to invite them to be reassured by giving them the 
details of our winter expedition in the same place.” 
  Here, hardship functions like a badge of honor.  The narrative of 
difficulties faced by the photographer made the results of` his work all the more 
impressive.  Fenton’s account, published widely in France, reaffirmed his status as 
illustrious author of a body of work - the resulting photographs were made possible 
through the toil of their author and not merely through mechanical processes.      
50  Lassimonne described the relative 
ease with which the two men carried out their expedition:  “We departed, M. Durand-
Brager and myself, only carrying one very small bag, that could rest on the back of a man 
during our excursions.  We did not have a tent, nor a mobile laboratory; we found corners 
and shelters everywhere where we could prepare our plates away from light.  Failing that, 
the dry plate collodion would relieve us this difficulty.”51
                                                 
49 Roger Fenton, “Narrative of a Photographic Trip to the Seat of War in the Crimea,” Journal of the 
Photographic Society of London, January 21 1856, 289. 
  In contrast to Fenton’s 
50 M. Lassimone, “Campagne française de photographie en Crimée “ La revue photographique, 5 mai 1856. 
“Craignant que vous n’ayez épouvanté les amateurs de photographie, abonnés à votre journal, par le récit 
des moyens auxquels M. Fenton a dû recourir pendant son séjour en Crimée pour ne pas se voir condamné 
à une désolante immobilité, nous venons vous inviter à les rassurer en leur donnant les détails de notre 
campagne d’hiver dans le même lieu.”  
51 Ibid., 99-100. “Nous sommes parties, M. Durand-Brager et moi, n’emportant qu’un bagage très restreint, 




notoriously immobile mobile laboratory and heavy equipment, Lassimonne touted the 
ease with which he and his partner prepared the plates with very little equipment and 
practically no shelter.  He explained that during the expedition, they lacked distilled 
water, “an agent considered by a great number of photographers to be completely 
indispensable” but were still able to prepare wet collodion glass plate negatives.52  
Lassimonne’s focus on overcoming the material deprivations he and Durand-Brager 
faced during the expedition allowed him to draw a powerful contrast between their 
ingenuity and Fenton’s lack thereof.  Whereas Fenton suffered under such conditions, the 
Frenchmen flourished.53
The rivalry evident in Lassimone’s text underscores the broader historical rivalry 
that existed between England and France.  After a fractious history, including defeat at 
Waterloo in 1815 and the subsequent occupation of Paris by allied forces, the Crimean 
War was the first time in the modern world that the two empires became allies.  But 
mistrust on both sides still ran high.  Anti-English sentiment remained in the French 
press, despite the fact that Queen Victoria traveled to France and Louis-Napoleon to 
England during the course of the war, the first time in over one thousand years that such 
state visits had taken place.  This national rivalry between France and England, which 
grew out of competition for economic dominance, extended into nearly every domain of 
industry, including photography.    
   
                                                                                                                                                 
laboratoire ambulant ; nous avons trouvé partout des coins et des abris où nous pouvions préparer nos 
glaces à l’abri de la lumière ; s’ils nous avaient manqué, le collodion sec venait nous tirer d’embarras.” 
52 Ibid., 100. “agent considéré  par un grand nombre de photographes comme tout à fait indispensable.”  
53 It is unlikely that Lassimone and Durand-Brager would have been able to produce wet plate collodion 
photographs without some kind of portable laboratory; the process was notoriously difficult to employ 
owing to the fact that the prepared glass negatives had to be used immediately while they were still wet.  
Lassimone’s account is undoubtedly a rather outlandish exaggeration meant to encourage public curiosity 




Beyond the subtext of national and commercial rivalry, Lassimone’s published 
account in the Revue photographique was a thinly veiled attempt to garner a bit of 
advance publicity for the publication of the photographs.  At the end of his text, he 
announced that “in a few days our collection will be delivered to the public and everyone 
will see that without taking with us the enormous bazaar that Mr. Fenton did, we have 
been able to gather an ample and beautiful harvest.”54  The photographs were published 
by Lemercier, one of the largest publishing houses in Paris, which was rivaled only by 
Goupil.55
Much to their disappointment, photographs of the Crimean War were anything but 
profitable, largely because the market quickly became saturated.  Though Roger Fenton’s 
photographs were some of the first of the war to be publicly exhibited, they were by no 
means the only ones available after 1855, nor did they achieve much success 
commercially.  After returning from the war in the summer of 1855, Fenton received 
audiences with the Queen as well as with Louis-Napoleon, both of whom were said to 
delight in his photographs.  Fenton exhibited his Crimean War photographs in the English 
photography section (considered a branch of industry) at the Universal Exposition of 
  There is no evidence to suggest that the photographs were taken with the 
support of the state and every indication points to their having been taken purely for 
commercial profit.  Durand-Brager and Lassimonne, along with other photographers and 
publishers such as Lermercier, evidently believed that photographs of the Crimean War 
would be profitable.   
                                                 
54 Lassimone, “Campagne française de photographie en Crimée “. “Sous peu de jours notre collection sera 
livrée au public, et chacun alors verra que, sans emporter l’immense bazar de M. Fenton, nous avons pu 
recueillir une ample et belle moisson.” 
55 For more on Lermercier see: Corinne Bouquin, “Recherches sur l’imprimerie lithographique à Paris au 





1855 and in three separate exhibitions in England.  With all of this publicity, Fenton’s 
photographs still failed to sell and his negatives were auctioned at the end of 1856.56  The 
negatives of the other English photographer who undertook an expedition in the Crimea, 
James Robertson, suffered a similar fate.  After being exhibited all over England in 1855 
and 1856, his negatives were also sold at auction along with those of Fenton.57
While information on Durand-Brager and Lassimonne’s photographic expedition 
is scant, the purpose of Jean-Charles Langlois’ photographic expedition was much 
clearer. He was there to prepare studies for his panorama of Sebastopol which opened in 
1860 in a new rotunda, built with funds supplied by the French government.  Despite the 
fact that there is no evidence to suggest that Langlois hoped to profit personally from the 
photographic expedition, the purpose of his voyage was nevertheless essentially 
commercial in nature as panoramas were built to attract an audience willing to pay for the 
chance to encounter a representation of a contemporary battle.  The photographs that 
Langlois intended to use as documents for his panorama are therefore equally implicated 
in the logic of commercial profit that was an integral factor in the production of Crimean 
War photography.      
         
Langlois treated his preparatory photographs as valuable property and protected 
them for exclusive use in the construction of his panorama.  His assistant Léon Méhédin 
hoped to sell many of the photographs that he took, and entered into an agreement with 
Langlois to separate the instrumental, documentary views from the “picturesque” views, 
                                                 
56 Sarah Greenhough, “A New Starting Point: Roger Fenton's Life,” in All the Mighty World. The 
Photographs of Roger Fenton, 1852-1860, ed. Malcolm Daniel Gordon Baldwin, and Sarah Greenhough 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), 24.  
57 B.A. and H.K. Henisch, “James Robertson and his Crimean War Campaign,” History of Photography 26, 




of which Méhédin would be the sole proprietor.58   Their relationship deteriorated over 
the course of the expedition and ended with Méhédin leaving Crimea with a written 
contract leaving all of the “military” views to Langlois and taking all of the “picturesque” 
ones for himself. Writing to his wife just after Méhédin’s departure, Langlois viewed his 
former assistant as a greedy schemer: “His nature is so abrupt, so outside of even the 
most common upbringing, that I do not even want to do a minor publication with him, 
neither for gold nor money.  He has, I think, an inextinguishable thirst for riches.”59
Langlois kept up a running correspondence with his wife while he was on his 
expedition. One letter in particular, written by Madame Langlois, warned her husband of 
  
Langlois proceeded to threaten legal action against Méhédin if he dared to publish any 
photograph that was to be used for the panorama.  The famed panorama entrepreneur 
understood his photographs as a unique source of information to which other artists were 
not privy; they were the building blocks of his panorama’s landscape, and needed to be 
protected from careless dissemination by unscrupulous photographers like Méhédin.  Any 
publication, he believed, would limit the public’s interest in his panorama.  His 
photographs were akin to preparatory drawings.  Langlois’ use of a medium that was 
inherently reproductive for the purpose of producing “studies” only bolstered his 
defensiveness over keeping them private.     
                                                 
58 For more on the détails of this distinction see the essay by François Robichon, “Langlois, photographie et 
panoramiste,” in Jean-Charles Langlois; la photographie, la peinture, la guerre, ed. Francois Robichon 
and André Rouillé (Nimes: Editions Jacqueline Chambon, 1992), 24-26.  
59 Jean-Charles Langlois, Jean-Charles Langlois. La photographie, la peinture, la guerre. Correspondance 
inédit de Crimée (1855-1856), ed. François Robichon and André Rouillé (Nimes: Editions Jacqueline 
Chambon, 1992), 210. “Sa nature est tellement abrupte, tellement en dehors de l’éducation la plus vulgaire 
que je ne voudrais pas faire avec lui la moindre publication, ni pour or ni pour argent.  Il a, je crois, pour les 





the pitiful market for photographs in Paris.  She was well informed about the status of the 
market because she frequented photographic supply stores in Paris where she purchased 
materials to send to her husband in the Crimea.  Her letter provided specific examples of 
the poor commercial performance of Crimean War photography and offered a compelling 
theory to explain it, namely, that the market was completely glutted:   
There are no delightful views of Sebastopol that you could do that haven’t 
probably already been explored and reproduced by many artists.  Three months 
ago, when I inquired over a young photographer going to Sebastopol, MM. 
Rittner and Goupil told me that they were inundated with views of this country.  
You will also remember that Englishman [presumably Fenton] who, it was said, 
presented the most curious things to the Emperor and found little success.  Others 
have since come in, and in my last letter I told you about having seen the 
marvelous photographs of Robertson of Sebastopol and of Malakoff.  He had sent 
them as samples to see if they could be put into circulation [jeter dans le 
commerce] with the hope of selling them, and the response was nearly negative.60
 
 
Madame Langlois informed her husband, who was thousands of kilometers away from 
the Parisian market for Crimean War photographs, that he had little hope of selling his 
photographs, even if he had wanted to.   
It is worth pausing here to consider the contrast between this evocation of the 
oversaturated Crimean War photograph market and the idealized notion of endless 
proliferation promoted by war photography’s early supporters.  Photography was 
supposed to enable a complete and exact representation of war through an accumulation 
of photographic images but could only exist outside of the material conditions of market 
                                                 
60 Ibid. , 266. “Il n’y pas de vues charmantes de Sébastopol que vous puissiez faire qui n’aient 
probablement déjà été explorées et reproduites par beaucoup d’artistes.  Il y a trois mois, lorsque je 
m’informais chez MM. Rittner et Goupil d’un jeune photographe pour aller à Sébastopol, ils me disaient 
qu’ils étaient inondés de vues de ce pays.  Tu te rappelles aussi cet Anglais qui, dit-on, avaient présenté à 
l’Empereur les choses les plus curieuses et avaient eu peu de succès.  D’autres sont encore venus depuis, et 
dans ma dernière lettre je te racontais avoir vu de merveilleuses photographies de Robertson de Sébastopol 
et de Malakoff, et il les envoyait comme spécimen pour savoir si on pouvait les jeter dans le commerce 




capitalism.  As the theorists maintained, this limitless photographic archive of war would 
serve the interests of the state and required no buyers; however, the photographers who 
actually photographed the Crimean War were subject to the pressures of the marketplace.  
As Madame Langlois’ letter made painfully clear to her husband, there was simply not 
enough demand for Crimean War photographs to make them profitable.  Moreover, 
photographs were not cheap to purchase.  According to Madame Langlois’ letters, the 
photographs of Roger Fenton sold at Bisson Frères and at Goupil for prices ranging from 
12 to 25 francs.61  To put this figure in perspective, the average worker’s daily wage 
hovered between 3 and 5 francs during the Second Empire, making these photographs 
unaffordable for the vast majority of the public.62
Another factor conditioning the reception of Crimean War photographs was their 
inability to provide an acceptable illusion of a complete picture of war that dominated 
expectations for other forms of war imagery, such as battle paintings and panoramas.  
Whereas painted panoramic battle paintings such as Horace Vernet’s Smahla (1845) and 
Jean-Charles Langlois’ panoramas relied on established conventions which allowed 
salient episodes to provide the illusion of a comprehensive summary of action, 
photographs of the Crimean War could only show isolated and inanimate details of the 
war, or at best views of the battlefield or strategically important parcels of land.  Despite 
  
                                                 
61 Ibid., 270.  In a letter dated February 22, 1856, she wrote”Il n’y en a encore de publiées sur la Crimée et 
Sébastopol que par un Anglais nommé Felton [sic].  J’ai été chez chez Goupil et chez Bisson pour les voir.  
Elles sont assez jolies ; ce sont des scènes de bivouac, des intérieurs de tentes, des troupes en marche, des 
soldats jouant, enfin des scènes de la vie du camp plutôt que des vues pittoresques ; leur prix est élevé…, 
on les vend de 12 à 25 francs.”  Madame Langlois went on to mention that the photography dealers were 
abuzz with excitement over the impending arrival of Robertson’s photographs.  This contradicts her earlier 
statement about the market being glutted with photographs.  It is likely that the market was indeed glutted 
but that these merchants were trying to stir up excitement over Robertson’s work.   
62 Emile Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrières et de l'industrie en France de 1789 à 1870, vol. 2 (Paris: 




the best efforts of their authors, they were fragmentary.  As we have already seen, early 
commentators on military photography imagined that an accumulation of photographic 
details would add up to an “ensemble” of the entire conflict but neglected the very real 
problem of how all of these indexical photographic fragments could achieve this 
“ensemble” effect.  The photographers who represented the Crimean War had no choice 
but to engage with this representational problem.    
A series of three photographs taken by Durand-Brager and Lassimonne depicts 
Fort Nicolas before, during and after its destruction (Fig. 5.4, Fig. 5.5, Fig. 5.6).  The 
series of photographs speaks to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of representing 
historical events with the nascent medium. The fort, which appears as a long white 
building in the background of the images, was a naval fortress held by the Turks since the 
early days of the war.  At the end of the war, when Durand-Brager and Lassimonne were 
taking photographs, the French ordered the fort destroyed so that it could not be used by 
the Russians.  Like many other photographs of the Crimean war, such as those taken by 
Langlois and Robertson, the series of photographs taken by Durand-Brager and 
Lassimonne represent an after-event of war.  
The first photograph of the Fort Nicolas series establishes a temporal baseline, 
depicting the fort as it had stood during the war (Fig. 5.4).  It sets up a sequence through 
which the passage of time and the impact of an explosion can be tracked.  Puffs of white 
smoke set the second photograph apart from the preceding establishing shot.  The white 
smoke in the second image (Fig. 5.5) bears witness to the occurrence of an explosion and 
depicts it in the process of occurring.  Absent the white smoke, the second image is no 




explosion to signify more fully as an event.  Placed between before and after images, the 
explosion is given a temporal location, a place in a narration of events, giving the 
destruction of the fort a sense of having happened.  In the absence of other visual indicies 
of war, the white smoke functioned as a powerful reminder that this was not just a picture 
of ruins but rather a site of explosive conflict, the closest that the camera could get to 
representing events.  Its role as a form of signfication hinted at the representational 
limitations of the medium, which went unacknowledged in the lively discourse 
surrounding photography during and immediately after the Crimean War.   
 
Henri Durand-Brager: Details and Ensembles 
Durand-Brager’s experience as a war artist across a range of media provided him 
with an awareness of the problem of representing a military event in terms of its detailed 
parts and its overarching whole. It is likely that his exposure to different genres and 
techniques of representation as diverse as the illustrated newspaper, photography and 
marine painting permitted him to approach battle painting with a fresh perspective, 
unparalleled by other battle painters working at the time.  For example, the use of white 
smoke to signify the occurrence of a dramatic event in his photographs contrasted to his 
experience making drawings as a war correspondent for L’Illustration (Fig. 5.7).  In the 
January 13, 1855 edition of L’Illustration, he reasoned that the inclusion of white smoke 
would only serve to obscure the scene that he wanted to represent : “I have excused 
myself from placing canon smoke here for the reason that it can be done easily enough 
but hides details.  Those of your readers who value these details will want to pay special 




for details.”63  According to this logic, within the context of an illustrated newspaper 
woodblock engraving, puffs of smoke would prevent readers from fully grasping the 
events depicted in the landscape.  Durand-Brager took care to signal to his editors that 
topographical accuracy should be prioritized over any other consideration and 
admonished his editors to publish the drawings exactly as he had made them: “I strongly 
recommend the view of the camps; it is very exact and must be copied exactly.  Believe 
me, do not try to shorten it; publish it as it as is, one band over the other.  You have no 
idea how many army officers have begged me to do this work so that their families can 
understand the place where they are.”64
 His submission to the Salon of 1857, a “panorama” comprised of twenty-one 
individual rectilinear canvases, entitled The Siege of Sebastopol, transformed 
representational problems from other media (photography and the illustrated newspaper) 
into pictorial solutions for the painted representation of a contemporary military event.  
Though Durand-Brager has been practically erased from the art historical record, his 
  Durand-Brager objected to the inclusion of white 
smoke because he worried that it would hide important details that he believed would 
compromise the image’s ability to picture a unified ensemble.  His experience with the 
banal element of white smoke demonstrates how the artist adapted his representational 
strategies to the particularities of the media he used to depict the Crimean War.  
                                                 
63 Henri Durand-Brager, “Correspondance de Crimée,” L'Illustration, 13 janvier 1855, 26. “Je me dispense 
de mettre dans tout cela de la fumée de canon, par la raison que cela peut faire très bien, mais cache les 
détails.  Ceux de vos lecteurs qui y tiendraient voudront bien faire attention que, sur des dessins ainsi jetés, 
il faut ménager l’espace et tout laisser au détail.” 
64 Ibid. “Je vous recommande bien la vue des camps, elle est très exacte ; il faut qu’elle soit copiée bien 
exactement.  Croyez-moi, ne cherchez pas à la raccourcir ;  publiez-la telle quelle, les bandes les unes au 
dessous des autres.  Vous ne sauriez croire la quantité d’officiers de l’armée qui m’ont prié de faire ce 
travail : que leurs familles puissent se rendre compte de l’endroit où ils sont.”  A week later, on January 20, 
1855, Durand-Brager again referred to his choice to leave out the smoke: “Je me suis abstenu de faire des 
fumées de coups de canon ; je pense que vos lecteurs ne m’en voudront pas d’avoir supprimé ce détail, qui 




engagement with multiple levels of artistic production makes him an important figure for 
examining the new sets of relationships between media that emerged during the 1850s.   
At least one of Durand-Brager and Lassimone’s photographs made its way into a 
painting exhibited in the Salon of 1857.  The View of Kamiesch Taken from the Port (Fig. 
5.8) corresponds almost exactly to a photograph entitled Kamiesch, Panorama of the Port 
and the City (Fig. 5.9).  One curious set of details was transferred from the photograph to 
the painting: two people standing on a dock and a small hut a little distance to the right of 
them (Fig. 5.10 and Fig. 5.11).  In another section of the painting, the flow of the water 
and the lines that delineate the coast also correspond closely to the photograph.  Durand-
Brager’s direct formal borrowing from the photograph demonstrates that he worked 
easily between media. 
Durand-Brager’s twenty-one canvases depicted the most important and drawn-out 
event of the war, the Siege of Sebastopol. While no documentation exists that describes 
how the ensemble of canvases were displayed at the Salon of 1857, it is probable that 
they were organized in one expansive horizontal band to emphasize the panoramic aspect 
of the ensemble.  Two of the twenty-one canvases are much larger than the other 
nineteen.  Each of these larger two canvases measured 56 x 270 cm, about three times the 
length of the other 19 paintings.  The two wide paintings (Fig. 5.12, Fig. 5.13) anchored 
the entire series and provided a broad topographical overview of the port of Sebastopol 
from different points of view, ostensibly providing a complete view of the entire set of 
French fortifications along the coast (Fig. 5.14).  The other nineteen paintings represented 
various locations of strategic importance along the Sebastopol coast, which are pictured 




horizontal canvases therefore depict the coastline as a broad ensemble view that contains 
the details represented in the smaller canvases.   
The smaller component parts are represented in the larger canvases but are not 
intelligible to the eye.  They therefore provide a “zoom-in” effect vis-à-vis the panoramic 
topographical paintings and allow the viewer to take in the smaller parts that comprise the 
larger totality of the siege of Sebastopol.  For example, two of the small paintings, The 
Battery of the Quarantine (Fig. 5.15) and the Clocheton (Fig. 5.16) depict strategic 
locations that are otherwise not visible in the two large canvases.  The Battery of the 
Quarantine was located just outside of the town of Sebastopol, slightly inland from the 
harbor visible in the two large panoramic paintings.  Durand-Brager depicted the Battery 
from the ground-level and emphasized its position within a small valley – information to 
which viewers are not privy in the large panoramas.  Whereas the Battery of the 
Quarantine provides up-close details about topography, the Clocheton focuses upon the 
activities surrounding a military hospital.  The Clocheton was the base of the trench 
ambulance during the first few months of the siege but was later relocated since it was 
within the range of Russian guns.65
                                                 
65 Jean-Baptiste Lucien Baudens, La guerre de Crimée (Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1858), 92.  
 In addition to showing soldiers removing the dead on 
stretchers (Fig. 5.17), the painting depicts two soldiers in the far-right corner running for 
cover from Russian bullets (Fig. 5.18).  Durand-Brager thus dramatizes the relationship 
between the dead soldiers being carried out of the hospital and those who run for their 
lives.  In relation to the two larger panoramic landscapes of Sebastopol, this 
unsentimental image of danger and death reminds the viewer of the human drama 




 Two lengthy and important articles appeared in the press in the months before 
Durand-Brager’s Panorama of Sebastopol was shown at the Salon of 1857, 
foreshadowing the critical interest that the series of painting generated during their public 
exhibition.  Théophile Gautier’s article appeared in L’Artiste one month before the 
opening of the Salon of 1857.  Galoppe d’Onquaire’s article appeared in the March issue 
of Revue des beaux-arts.  In the absence of documentation about the display of the 
twenty-one paintings, these texts provide insight into how these paintings may have been 
viewed as group.  The author of the article in the Revue des beaux-arts examined the 
paintings in Durand-Brager’s studio, well before their completion.  In fact, the author 
noted the presence of only one large panoramic painting, not two.  He nevertheless 
proposed a mode of viewing the series that corresponded to Durand-Brager’s paradoxical 
attempt to represent the siege as a combination of disparate parts as well as a totalizing 
whole:     
On a large canvas, the artist painted an immense panorama of the Sebastopol 
harbor.  It is the entire left side attack seen in its ensemble from headquarters; it’s 
a sort of synoptic painting, of the general map of the siege and of the lines of 
defense.  But one understands that in a work so spread out, the eye cannot seize 
upon the thousand individual details of the coast, also, the painter, in dividing his 
mother panorama, has made a series of paintings where each point of view is 
repeated in larger format.66
 
  
The writer’s recourse to the term “mother panorama” assumes a logic of 
reproduction, whereby the smaller paintings are generated by, or contained within, the 
                                                 
66  Galoppe d' Onquaire, “Promenade à travers les ateliers II,” Revue des beaux-arts 8 (1857): 47. “Sur une 
grande toile, l’artiste a peint un immense panorama de la rade de Sébastopol.  C’est toute l’attaque du côté 
gauche de la place vue dans son ensemble ; c’est une sorte de tableau synoptique, de plan général du siège 
et de la défense.  Mais on comprend que, dans une œuvre aussi disséminée, l’œil ne puisse saisir les mille 
détails particuliers de la côte, aussi, le peintre divisant son panorama-mère, a fait une série de tableaux où 




larger “mother” canvas.  Each of the “thousand individual details” barely visible in the 
“mother panorama” was reproduced as small individual paintings.  The writer directly 
addressed the recurring problem of war imagery during the period, that is, the tension 
between the proliferation of individual details and a visible, totalizing ensemble.  He also 
claimed that no fewer than 130 paintings “will form the ensemble of this gigantic work,” 
thereby invoking the seductive power of an abundance episodic details to secure the truth 
value of the ensemble, as if abundance guaranteed exactitude.67
While the illustrated newspaper and photographs excelled at representing and 
multiplying details, they were materially incapable of producing a summary image, 
something that battle painting was still charged with doing.  In painting his Siege of 
Sebastopol, Durand-Brager carved out a solution where he could represent war through a 
synoptic singular view (the two large paintings) as well as through its fragmented details 
(the nineteen small paintings), thus acknowledging the importance of the ensemble as 
well as the details that comprised it.   The artist’s engagement with this problem of 
historical (and not optical) vision coincided with the rise of new modes of visual 
  This positive valuation 
of material accumulation has been at the heart of image production of the Crimean War 
and, as we have seen, was not limited to one medium in particular.  It was a concept that 
cuts laterally across discourses, audiences and media that should be reinstated in 
interpretations of visual material from this period.       
                                                 




production that were put into the service of producing war imagery during the Crimean 
War by none other than the artist himself.68
Théophile Gautier, who must have seen the work close to its completed state, 
understood the two large canvases as anchors of the entire series: 
     
He starts his campaign with two panoramic views of Sebastopol, long transversal 
canvases that fit together and continue: the form and the elevation of the hills, the 
position of the forts, the look of the town and the harbor, all is expressed with a 
singular precision; no stroke of the brush is done at random; each white mark 
indicates a house, a fort, a bastion…and yet, if you had not been warned, you 
would believe that you had in front of you a simple picturesque view.69
 
 
The notion that Durand-Brager’s panoramas of Sebastopol differed little from standard 
landscapes is significant.  They are so broadly rendered that far-ranging topography takes 
precedence over the historical specificity of the event.  Both lateral paintings do not, at 
first sight, seem to contain obvious signs of battle.  In the Panorama of the Left Attacks 
Seen from the Observatory of Marshal Canrobert (Fig. 5.12), Durand-Brager’s training 
as a marine painter shines through.  The contours of the harbor of Sebastopol are 
delineated with water and bits of smoke clouds are barely perceptible, hinting gently at 
the subject at hand (Fig. 5.19 and Fig. 5.20).  He also included one more mid-sized 
landscape, View Taken from the Sea (Fig. 5.21) in which a small cloud of smoke in the 
background and the fortifications along the coast are the only indications of a conflict 
taking place.  Otherwise, the azure sea remains calm.  These large landscapes resemble in 
                                                 
68 I borrow the theoretical insight that vision is historically conditioned from Jonathan Crary’s important 
work on nineteenth-century modes of viewing.  See Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision 
and Modernity in the Nineteenth-Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).  
69 Théophile Gautier, “Le Siège de Sébastopol, tableaux de M. Durand-Brager,” L'Artiste, 26 Avril 1857, 
61. “Il commence sa campagne par deux vues panoramiques de Sébastopol, longues toiles transversales qui 
s’ajustent et se continuent : la forme et la hauteur des collines, la position des forts, l’aspect de la ville et de 
la rade, tout est exprimé avec une précision singulière ; pas un coup de pinceau n’est donné au hasard ; 
chaque touche blanche  indiquant une maison , un fortin, un bastion…et cependant si vous n’étiez prévenu, 




the ambiguity of their scenes several of the panoramic landscape photographs taken by 
Lassimonne and Durand-Brager: without the captions, it is impossible to tell that the 
landscapes are ones where a bloody armed conflict took place.  The nineteen smaller 
paintings, however, make it clear that the subject matter has little to do with picturesque 
landscapes.    
 Durand-Brager’s paintings exemplified the new character of modern warfare as it 
became evident during the Crimean War, the first conflict in which new industrial 
advances in artillery and small arms played a decisive, and deadly, role.  While the 
Russians used outdated smoothbore muskets, the French and the English were equipped 
with state of the art Minié rifles which could project up to 1200 meters and be fired with 
more precision.70  The war was also the first in which both sides used large numbers of 
rockets.71  Artillery was fired from large guns positioned in batteries at unprecedented 
rates.72  According to a French government report, the French fired over 1,100,000 canon 
shots and used over three million kilograms of gun powder.73
                                                 
70 For more on the the way a Minié rifle functions and on its impact on the Crimean War, see Jeremy Black, 
Western Warfare, 1775-1882 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2001), 122-24 and J.B.A. Major 
General Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004),  188-89.  The 
Minié rifle was exhibited at the 1855 Exposition Universelle in Paris.  A guide to the exhibition of firearms 
noted that the Minié riffle “est devenue la terreur des Russes, par la justesse et la portée de son tir.”  See 
Henri Edouard Tresca, Visite à l'exposition universelle de Paris, en 1855 (Paris: Librarie Hachette, 1855), 
558.  
   Nineteenth-century and 
contemporary commentators have noted that the Crimean War differed from wars of the 
71 Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 190.  
72 According to the military historian John Terraine, “In Sebastopol itself, the Russians has some 3,000 
pieces of heavy artillery – far more than they could mount or man, but guaranteeing constant replacement 
of losses.  By the time of the fourth bombardment (17 June 1855), they had 10,697 artillery men in the 
fortress (compared with 43,000 infantry).  The Allies deployed 588 siege guns for this occasion; for the 
final bombardment (5-8 September), this number had risen to over 800 of which 183, including the heaviest 
and most powerful, were British – 57 supplied by the Royal Navy.  These batteries produced the greatest 
bombardments the world had yet seen.” See John Terraine, White Heat. The New Warfare, 1914-1918 
(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1982), 10.   
73 The report noted that these high figures were “without any example in history.” See Jean-Baptiste 
Philibert Maréchal Vaillant, “Report on the French Troops and Material Sent to the Crimea in 1854 and 




past.  The defining event of this new kind of war was the siege of Sebastopol.  Unlike a 
military charge or a conventional battle between armies, the siege became a long, drawn-
out series of events with both sides firing blankets of long-range artillery at one another.  
According to the military historian Bruce Watson, the siege set an ominous precedent for 
future wars of attrition and “tactical stagnation,” including World War I.74
The Russians dug into the city of Sebastopol and concentrated their defenses at 
the Malakoff tower.  The siege lasted one year, from September 1854 through September 
1855, and resulted in heavy losses for all sides.  This agonizingly slow military event 
posed new problems in terms of its representability: how to represent a historical event 
with no particular center of action, neither temporal nor spatial?  The problem was noted 
by one critic at the Salon of 1857, who doubted whether such an event could ever be 
painted:   
  As we shall 
see, the consequences for visual representation were just as notable.  
Is this a battle?  Yes, says the historian, and the strategist sees in it a conflict of 
the first order.  The attacker lost 9,000 men.  Yes, this supreme effort is truly a 
battle…But, for the painter, where is this battle?  From where will it be taken?  At 
Tchorgoun?  At Traktir?  These are episodes, bridge crossings, outpost affairs.  It 
is really just a matter of artillery…so show me an artillery event on the canvas.75
 
 
Just as Durand-Brager’s paintings represented war as a series of scattered episodes, 
mimicking the visual idiom of illustrated newspaper reportage and photography’s 
fragmentary but plentiful details, the new character of warfare lacked a definable center 
                                                 
74 Bruce Watson, Sieges: A Comparative Study (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1993), 81 
75 Bois-Robert, “La Guerre au Salon de 1857,” Musée Universel, no. 14 (1857): 111. “Est-ce que là une 
bataille? Oui, dit l’historien, et le stratège y voit une action de premier ordre; l’assaillant y a perdu au moins 
9,000 hommes. Oui, c’est bien une bataille que cet effort suprême…Mais, pour le peintre, où est-elle cette 
bataille ?  où la prendra-t-il ? à Tchorgoun ?  à Traktir ?  ce seront là des épisodes, des passages de pont, 





of action.  The critic challenged his audience to tell him how to represent in a battle 
painting the barrage of gunpowder explosions volleyed from a distant location.  The 
Panorama of the Siege of Sebastopol contends with this new kind of artillery war.  The 
artist, having personally experienced barrages of artillery fire during the two years he 
spent working as a naval officer and correspondent for L’Illustration, understood that the 
shortage of definable heroic events required a new kind of representational strategy.   
Théophile Gautier believed that Durand-Brager’s series of paintings were the first 
to represent the new modern condition of warfare:  
A hero nowadays is made up of 2,500 men and is called the 24th line or the 32nd 
demi-brigade, and seen on the battlefield from the top of the hill where the 
general stands spyglass in hand, produces the effect of small red and blue stripes. 
Death, managed through scientific means, happens to the soldier from afar, 
anonymous like him, through the haze [flocons] of smoke.76
 
   
Gautier emphasized the de-centralized aspect of artillery war, with the general directing 
action from afar.  The “scientific” character of the operations, which Gautier understood 
to be related to the advances of modern weapons technology, produced a new social 
relationship between war and individual soldiers that revolved around anonymity and 
detachment.  Modern warfare alienated the soldier from the process of war; it 
disconnected him from direct combat with his enemy.  Such an understanding of the new 
sets of social relationships ushered in by modern warfare is strikingly similar to the 
definition of modernity promoted by Baudelaire, and later by Walter Benjamin, that 
emphasized the deracination and alienation endemic to modern existence.   
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 Many of the smaller paintings that purported to represent the fragmentary details 
of the siege are unprecedented within the history of war imagery in the nineteenth 
century.  They represent the terrifying character of artillery warfare emphasized by 
Gautier.  In contrast to the heroic charging armies represented Horace Vernet’s battle 
paintings such as the Capture of Constantine (1837) or in most battle paintings from the 
First Empire, where the army moved as a unified mass of men united in a common goal, 
Durand-Brager’s paintings are devoid of such displays of unity.  They represent the 
parcels of strategically important land from which the French forces waged the war.  
Instead of focusing on heroic encounters between men, these paintings describe the 
physical properties of specific areas of land, depicting the impact of artillery-fueled 
trench warfare on the land.  Durand-Brager included human figures in many of these war-
torn landscapes but they are miniscule in comparison to the land they inhabit.  In the 
words of Gautier, Durand-Brager “has placed man on the scale of the landscape and the 
soldier in proportion with war.”77
In a painting titled Craters in Front of the Bastion du Mat (Fig. 5.22), the land has 
been transformed into a black, craggy wasteland.  The painting represents the aftereffects 
of a Russian artillery bombardment during which the French fired at the Russians, killing 
a general, but the Russians returned fire and destroyed an entire French magazine and 
produced the black rocky landscape depicted in the painting.  Durand-Brager obliterated 
any sign of undisturbed nature and traded a horizon line for a line of yellow fire and 
twisted lumps of destroyed earth.  This is hardly a zone capable of supporting human life 
and yet, the presence of yellow explosions signal that the fight is not yet over.  This 
 
                                                 




scorched earth landscape recalls the corpus of works done by artists who served in World 
War I, often understood as the first trench war.  The two wars shared much in common.  
At the time they were fought, each one was understood to be a distinctly modern kind of 
war fought with new tactics and weapons.  George Leroux’s Hell (1916) (Fig. 5.23) and 
Otto Dix’s Shell Holes illuminated by Flares near Dontrien (1924) (Fig. 5.24) with its 
landscape destroyed by a  barrage of artillery, are more akin to Durand-Brager’s Craters 
(Fig. 5.22) than to any other image from the nineteenth century.  All three of these 
images announce the destruction of earth’s surface by man’s own doing, with the help of 
modern weapons technology, and they were all significantly made by artists who served 
in the conflicts represented.  Their affect comes from a metonymic use of the ravaged 
landscape to stand in for the human cost of war.  All of these images are too dark and 
scorched to decipher the presence of human bodies.   
While it is impossible to see bodies in Craters, other paintings depict the human 
cost of war.  In two more of the smaller paintings, Lunette de Droite of the Bastion 
Central (Fig. 5.25) and Right View of the Bastion du Mat (Fig. 5.26), small figures are 
represented that are either dead, running from danger, or trudging through impossible 
terrain, a far cry from the heroic masses of French soldiers that audiences had come to 
expect from battle paintings (Fig 5.27).  The landscape provides an appropriate setting for 
this dim human drama to play out.  Like the people who occupy it, the land is decimated 
by modern weaponry.  In Right View of the Bastion du Mat, dead tree roots mingle with 
small cannon balls, the debris of the combat that occurred at that site.  Durand-Brager 
discovered a pictorial economy based on the color brown, using its various shades to 




In Durand-Brager’s unprecedented series of blasted-land war paintings, the 
destruction of the landscape limits our ability to view the destruction of human subjects, 
which in turn denies a sense of scale and prevents the viewer from negotiating their 
spatial layout.  All that remains in these paintings are torn mounds of earth and horizons 
of destroyed earth, often illuminated by explosions.  In contrast to the broad overview in 
the larger landscapes (Fig. 5.12, Fig. 5.13, Fig. 5.21), these bleak smaller canvases plunge 
the viewer into a ground-level view of the horrors of modern warfare.  This is radically 
different from the vantage point of the larger, more picturesque landscapes, which hover 
above the conflict without disclosing the grisly details unfolding below.  The calm 
detachment of the panoramic landscapes was crucial for containing the disquieting affect 
of modern artillery warfare in his destroyed-earth paintings.   
Durand-Brager’s paintings were exceptional for their time because they insisted 
upon war as an event absent a heroic center.  In so doing, they foreshadowed the 
challenges that future twentieth-century wars would pose for artists relative to the 
traditional mode of battle painting as practiced by Horace Vernet and others during the 
nineteenth century.  In his L’art pendant la guerre, 1914-1918, the art historian Robert de 
la Sizeranne’s description of the difficulties of creating battle paintings of World War 
One could just as easily apply to Durand-Brager’s Sebastopol series: 
Even on the battlefield, we find hardly any visible ruins, if only some ruins of plant 
matter.  The shell has made a tabula rasa.  After several days of bombardment, 
there is nothing left.  It is upon this “nothing” that the modern painter must display 
the action of his combatants.78
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The Promise of Something More: The Siege of Sebastopol’s Incredible Expansion   
Given how horrifying these painting are in their evocation of modern warfare, it is 
interesting that the critical reaction to Durand-Brager’s Panorama of the Siege of 
Sebastopol was overwhelmingly positive.  The idiom of reproduction pervaded much of 
the discourse, with the metaphor of photography used to invoke the paintings’ capacity to 
reproduce the real.79  But by far, the most pervasive current within the criticism of 
Durand-Brager’s Siege of Sebastopol was the idea that the series constituted a complete 
representation of the siege.  Etienne-Jean Delécluze, who had consistently reviewed 
battle paintings in Salon exhibitions since he began writing criticism in the 1820s, noted 
that Durand-Brager’s series was one of the most popular works of art on view and 
emphasized its depiction of the siege in its entirety:  “One of the parts of the exhibition 
that has particularly attracted the attention of the public is the one where the twenty [sic] 
panoramas and paintings represent the views of Sebastopol, taken from every side and 
every accident of its siege.”80
Durand-Brager’s strategy of representing the siege as an ensemble view and as a 
series of detailed smaller paintings spurred the critical imagination.  Critics recognized 
the work as representing the siege in its entirety.  Many thought that the paintings should 
  The critical success enjoyed by the Siege of Sebastopol has 
to do with the simultaneous strategies of proliferation on the one hand (the nineteen 
smaller paintings) and the claim to totality on the other (the two large “panoramas” and 
the title of the entire work).     
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be made on a larger scale outside of the official exhibition space of the Salon.  The 
twenty-one paintings were simply not enough to satisfy the peaked critical expectations 
suggested by the titillating word “panorama.”  One writer claimed that the series should 
take the form of an elaborate diorama, like the ones made by Daguerre in the 1820s and 
1830s:   
M. Durand-Brager has just received the authorization to construct an immense 
diorama near the Palais de l’Industrie that will contain no less than 24 paintings.  
This building, whose proportions will be relatively immense, will become a 
permanent theater where the grand events of contemporary history will be shown 
to spectators.  The battles of the Crimean War will inaugurate this new stage, 
followed by episodes from the war in Kabylie, alternating with various events 
from our national history.81
 
 
No diorama was ever built and there is no evidence to suggest that plans for one were 
drawn up.  Yet this author was captivated by the promise of the work’s expansion, like 
the writer who claimed that Durand-Brager’s series would be composed of over 130 
paintings.  Instead of increasing the number of paintings, here the paintings would be 
large enough to fill an “immense” diorama.   
By calling his series a “panorama,” as he did in the official Salon guidebook, 
Durand-Brager invited critics to imagine the Siege of Sebastopol as a much larger work, a 
true panorama.  In the context of a Salon exhibition, the word “panorama,” especially 
when applied to a contemporary military event, carried powerful connotations.  As we 
have already seen, battle panoramas were understood to be the domain of actualité, or 
contemporary events, not fine art.  For the price of admission, panoramas provided the 
                                                 
81 Pierre Marchandon de la Faye, “Mosaïque,” Revue des beaux-arts  (1857): 298. “M. Durand-Brager vient 
d’obtenir l’autorisation de construire, près du palais de l’Industrie, un immense diorama, qui ne contiendra 
pas moins de vingt-quatre tableaux.  Cet édifice, dont les proportions seront relativement immenses, 
deviendra un théâtre permanent où l’on présentera successivement aux spectateurs tous les grand faits de 
l’histoire contemporaine.  Les batailles de Crimée inaugurent cette scène nouvelle ;  puis viendront les 




illusion of war in the process of unfolding and gave spectators license to imagine 
themselves in the midst of a heroic encounter of national import.  The illusion depended 
upon the large-scale round canvas and its inclusion of an abundance of details from the 
battle.  One critic writing for a newspaper loyal to the government went so far as to claim 
that plans to transform the series of paintings into a panorama were already underway:  
It is said that Durand-Brager, in making an alliance with the colonel Langlois, 
will build a panorama on the Champs-Elysees, and that we will see the 
reproduction of his paintings there.  All the better.  Anything that can rekindle and 
maintain patriotism suits us, and in this new enterprise, we wish Durand-Brager 
and the author of the Battle of the Pyramids panorama the best of luck.82
 
  
The author was not far off.  A new panorama rotunda was being built on the Champs-
Elysees.  But it was built uniquely for Jean-Charles Langlois to replace the one that the 
government had destroyed after it commandeered the building for the Universal 
Exposition of 1855.  No evidence supports the existence of a Langlois-Durand-Brager 
alliance.  As we shall see, Langlois was protective of his enterprise.  He opened his new 
panorama in August 1860 which represented the capture of the Malakoff tower, the event 
that ended the siege of Sebastopol.   
Gautier, in his article on Durand-Brager, was the third critic to suggest that the 
series be turned into a panorama.  He sardonically linked the building of a new panorama 
rotunda for Durand-Brager to the contemporary destruction of Paris: “His paintings of 
Crimea are excellent studies for a panorama of Sebastopol that we would like to see 
executed in some vast rotunda on the Champs-Elysees or somewhere else.  Space is not 
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lacking with all of this land left empty by the demolition of Paris.”83
Innumerable armies organized according to mathematical schemes attack like 
formidable engines of collective destruction, under fortifications evacuated out of 
earth, without towers, dungeons, ramparts…that the canon would destroy in five 
minutes. – The artist must therefore, under threat of ridiculous falsity, bend 
himself toward the requirements of modern strategy.
  But unlike the other 
two writers who promoted the expansion of Durand-Brager’s Sebastopol, Gautier 
examined the most somber parts of Durand-Brager’s series and highlighted their 
extraordinary bleakness, characteristics that he thought would have been anathema to a 




Masses of men in strategic formations, and not individual acts of heroism on the 
battlefield, should now occupy artists who specialized in representing war.  Accordingly, 
in advocating the expansion of Durand-Brager’s twenty-one paintings into a large-scale 
panorama, Gautier was aware that the final product would represent this modern, 
impersonal face of warfare.   
Gautier’s vision for Durand-Brager’s Sebastopol panorama was more than just a 
musing.  He asserted that the panorama and the degree of totalization it provided was the 
form that most appropriately conformed to new modes of perception.  Whereas 
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tordent sur le sol comme des cadavres végétaux, mutilés, hachés, retournés, ébranché, réduits à l’état de 
squelettes par les volées de l’artillerie et de la mitraille.  Boulets, obus, éclats de bombes, jonchent la terre 
émiettée. – Ce qui s’est dépensé de sang et d’héroïsme pour enlever cette butte blanchâtre, ce tas de gypse 
blafard, on n’y songe qu’en frémissant…L’intérieur d’un volcan en éruption fournirait une idée assez juste 
du fourneau de mine esquissé par M. Durand Brager ; c’est un chaos de pierres, de roches, de mottes qui 
sautent, qui éclatent, qui volent en l’air parmi des fumées et des flammes.” From the previous 
note : ”D’innombrables armées rangées d’après les combinaisons mathématiques s’attaquent au moyen de 
formidables engins de destruction collective, sous des fortifications à ras de terre, sans tours ni donjons, ni 
remparts…que le canon raserait en cinq minutes.  – L’artiste doit donc se plier sous peine de fausseté 




traditional landscape painting was, according to Gautier, outmoded, the visual language 
of the panorama emerged from new modern technologies, specifically from locomotion.  
Steam ships and trains both played a major role in the operations of the Crimean war and 
radically altered the way that human beings experienced the land.85
Gautier argued that these new ways of moving human bodies impacted visual 
perception to the point that a new visual form, the panorama, became appropriate for 
representing land:  
   
When rapid and perfected locomotion will permit us to visit all of the corners of 
the planet, do you think that a frog pond by the woods at Bas-Bréau, a tree near a 
country hut with a pigeon on the roof, a chicken incidentally perched upon a pile 
of manure will still be interesting?  The public will demand grand points of view, 
immense horizons, bird’s eye views of an entire country, of an entire mountain 
chain…and the landscape will take the form of the panorama.86
 
 
The minute details of the picturesque French landscape would be rendered useless in the 
age of mechanical locomotion.  According to Gautier, who was himself an avid travel-
writer, the panorama was destined to become the form par excellence of a scopic regime 
characterized by a new demand to see more, to picture wider vistas, vaster horizons and 
greater expanses of land.  It delivered the promise of totality in a way that the cabinet-
sized, conventional landscape painting could not.  With regard to the subject matter of the 
Crimean War, Gautier’s position is unambiguous.  Like the thatched huts of the French 
countryside and the perched chickens, conventional heroic encounters between two 
armies that had long dominated the painted representation of war were now historically 
                                                 
85 For more on this argument see Green, The Spectacle of Nature, Landscape and Bourgeois Culture in 
Nineteenth-Century France .  
86 Gautier, “Le Siège de Sébastopol, tableaux de M. Durand-Brager,” 63. “Lorsque la locomotion rapide et 
perfectionnée permettra de visiter tous les recoins de la planète, croyez-vous qu’une mare à grenouilles, au 
dessous de bois au Bas-Bréau, un arbre auprès d’une chaumière avec un pigeon sur le toit, un tas de fumier 
incidenté d’une poule, seront bien intéressants ? Le public demandera de larges perspectives, d’immenses 
horizons, des vues à vol d’oiseau de tout un pays, de toute une chaine de montagnes…et le paysage prendra 




anachronistic.  It was time for a new kind of battle panorama, one that was true to the 
modern experience of artillery and trench warfare.    
Despite the distinct lack of conventional military encounters in Durand-Brager’s 
paintings, the series was purchased by Napoleon III’s liste civile for the historical 
museum at Versailles after its exhibition at the Salon of 1857. 87
 
   Reproductive 
engravings were made by the same firm, Lemercier, that had published Durand-Brager 
and Lassimonne’s photographs.  These reproductions were published to coincide with the 
unveiling of the new Salle de Crimée in the historical museum at Versailles, which 
represented Napoleon III’s continuation of Louis-Philippe’s didactic museum project.  
Significantly, the three most somber small paintings were not among those reproduced.  
Lemercier decided instead to publish the more picturesque reproductions, a decision 
which implies that Durand-Brager’s depressing war-torn images were not good for 
business.   
The Crimean War and Problems of Large-Scale Battle Painting 
Lacking a center of decisive action, Durand-Brager’s Siege of Sebastopol stood 
firmly outside of the tradition of nineteenth-century battle painting.  This was a new 
manner of battle painting for an unprecedented form of artillery-fueled, siege warfare, 
with a lack of direct clashes between armies.  The warm critical reception that his series 
met with indicates a willingness on the part of contemporary audiences to accept its 
illusion of a totalizing depiction of the siege through a summary of its manifold parts. As 
                                                 
87 Catherine Granger, L'empereur & les arts. La liste civile de Napoléon III (Paris: Ecole des Chartes, 
2005), 513-14.  Napoléon paid Durand-Brager 20,000 francs from his liste-civile; there is no record of any 




I have already suggested, the intriguing pictorial and material form that Durand-Brager 
adopted to represent the siege was indebted to his experience working with emergent 
technologies of visual reproduction during the Crimean War.  As a correspondent for 
L’Illustration and as an amateur photographer in the theater of war, Durand-Brager made 
use of modes of visual production which held out a new kind of technologically-figured 
promise of arriving at a totalizing picture of contemporary war through a potentially 
endless proliferation of parts.  His engagement with this possibility through the medium 
of painting resulted in a form of battle painting that hinted at the difficulty, if not the 
impossibility, of representing the Crimean War as a large-scale singular image of two 
clashing armies.  At the Salon of 1857, which featured several battle paintings of the 
traditional kind, this difficulty was explicitly manifested.  While the definition of what 
constituted a complete and successful large-scale battle painting had been hotly debated 
since the First (Napoleonic) Empire, the question was renewed under the political 
exigency of producing large-scale paintings from the first “great power” conflict of the 
modern industrial age.       
The Salon of 1857, where Durand-Brager’s Panorama of the Siege of Sebastopol 
was exhibited, featured several large-scale battle paintings of the war.   Altogether there 
were sixty-six paintings, engravings and drawings of the war shown at the Salon of 1857.  
One illustrated guide to the Salon, by the caricaturist Cham, satirized the profusion of 
Crimean War battle paintings and the prominence of the battle of Sebastopol in 




She asks why he neglected to purchase the guidebook, to which he replies “Why bother?  
It’s all the same subject this year: the capture of Sebastopol.”88
One monumental battle painting elicited the bulk of the critical attention: Adolphe 
Yvon’s Capture of the Malakoff Tower (Fig. 5.29), which depicted the most decisive 
battle of the Crimean War.  The capture of the Malakoff tower marked the end of the 
drawn-out siege of Sebastopol and signaled to the French public that the war would soon 
be over.  It was one of the few battles of the war which featured direct man-to-man 
combat; as the historian Geoffrey Wawro has argued, the decision on the part of the 
French to storm the Malakoff tower was made by Louis-Napoleon, who wanted to 
produce a spectacular military event “worthy of his uncle.”
   
89
                                                 
88 [Amédée de Noé] Cham, Le salon de 1857 (Paris: Le Charivari 1857).  
  The subject thus presented 
the artist with the opportunity to focus on a heroic center of action, something that the 
siege of Sebastopol did not.  At the same Salon, Horace Vernet exhibited an almost 
universally despised painting of one of the first battles of the Crimean War, the Battle of 
Alma (Fig. 5.30).  Compared to Yvon’s Malakoff, which measured 600 x 900 cm, 
Vernet’s Alma was much smaller, 190 X 298 cm, well below the scale reserved for 
history painting and close in size to the series of the battle paintings that Vernet had 
executed for the duc d'Orléans during the Bourbon Restoration.  In terms of the 
composition, bereft of clashes between opposing armies, the painting hearkened back to 
the series of works that Vernet had made for the Gallery of Battles at Versailles which 
focused on the commanding presence of Napoleon Bonaparte instead of the feats of the 
army.  The painting featured a gaping absence of activity in the empty middleground and 
89 The choice to surprise the Russians and take Malakoff went against the British strategy of destroying 
Russia’s naval fleet and the town of Sebastopol with large guns.  Geoffrey Wawro, Warfare and Society in 




a proliferation of episodes spread out in the background and left foreground.  The Battle 
of Alma’s critical reception was not helped by the fact that the commanding figure of 
authority in the center of the painting, Louis-Napoleon’s cousin, Prince Jerome Napoleon 
Bonaparte, had earned the derisive nicknames “craint- plomb” (lead-fearer) and “César 
déclassé” for his reported cowardly conduct during the Crimean War.90
The Salon of 1857 marked a generational shift in terms of France’s battle painters.  
Adolphe Yvon was an up and coming history painter, quickly supplanting Horace Vernet 
as the new darling of the imperial regime.  During the course of the Second Empire, he 
received several official commands from Emperor Napoleon III.  It was during this 
period that Vernet encountered increased critical hostility with a series of poorly received 
paintings and later, following the Universal Exposition of 1855, a very public feud with 
Théodore Silvestre in which Vernet appeared as a publicity-hungry sycophant.
  
91  In an 
1852 letter to his son-in-law, Paul Delaroche, Vernet mentioned that the time would soon 
come to “close up shop” [fermer la boutique].92
By exhibiting a monumental painting of the most decisive French victory of the 
Crimean War at the Salon of 1857, Yvon effectively outshone Horace Vernet, who had 
produced a comparatively diminutive painting of a less important subject.  But 
significantly, Horace Vernet played an important role in this turn of events by having  
declined Emperor Napoleon’s commission for a battle painting of the capture of the 
   
                                                 
90 Charles Virmaître, Dictionnaire d'argot fin-de-siècle (Paris: A. Charles, Libraire, 1894), 121.  The Prince 
Napoleon was the cousin of Napoleon III and the son of Jerome, Napoleon Bonaparte’s brother. See also, 
Pierre Malardier, Un césar déclassé à la recherche d'un empire. Lamentables mésaventures 
politiques et sociales de M. Napoléon-Bonaparte (Jérôme) : fin tragique du héros (London: Librarie 
Universelle, 1861).  
91 For more on the trial see Michèle Hannoosh, “Théophile Silvestre’s Histoire des artistes vivants: Art 
Criticism and Photography,” The Art Bulletin LXXXVIII, no. 4 (2006). 
92 Amédee Durande, Joseph, Carle et Horace Vernet. Correspondance et biographies. (Paris: J. Hetzel, 




Malakoff tower after he found out that Yvon had been asked to make a battle painting of 
the same subject.  In 1856, Vernet learned that Yvon had been given the command by the 
Ministre d’état and had already traveled to the Crimea to undertake preparatory studies.  
Vernet subsequently declined Louis-Napoleon’s command and discussed the matter with 
Yvon, incredulous that the government would ask two painters to depict the same subject 
for the same Salon exhibition.93  He is reported to have remarked to Yvon, “What do they 
take us for? Do they think that artists should be put in competition with each other like 
cinnamon sellers?”94
Even though Yvon was the only artist to represent the subject of the capture of the 
Malakoff at the Salon exhibition of 1857, his ability to produce a successful battle 
painting of the most pivotal event of the Crimean War was challenged even before he had 
completed it.  Yvon had been sent to the theater of war by the French government to 
make preparatory studies for his monumental battle painting.  His visit coincided with 
Langlois’ own trip to the area as well as with those of the English photographer James 
Robertson and the war correspondent, photographer and painter Henri Durand-Brager.  
The importance of the capture of the Malakoff Tower as a subject for visual 
representation also determined Langlois to use it for the panorama for which he was 
collecting visual material in the theater of war.  Langlois’ objections to Yvon’s efforts to 
depict the capture of the tower in the form of a large-scale battle painting provide insight 
  
                                                 
93 Vernet subsequently executed a painting of the Capture of the Malakoff for the village of Autun, the 
birthplace of the commanding general, Marie Edme Patrice Maurice de McMahon, who would later 
become the first president of the Third Republic.  The painting was not exhibited at the Salon of 1857.  For 
more on this painting and its photographic reproduction by Robert Jefferson Bingham, see Bann, Parallel 
Lines, Printmakers, Painters, and Photographers in Nineteenth-Century France , 122-124.  
94 Henri Jouin, “Adolphe Yvon. Souvenirs du maître,” L'artiste, no. VI (1893): 183. “Pour qui ces gens 





into the sets of problems, pictorial and material that faced battle painters during the 
Second Empire.  
Langlois dismissed Yvon’s pretensions of representing the subject of Malakoff 
because he felt confident that it was an event so epic that only the panorama could 
represent it.  His criticisms of the young painter primarily revolved around the 
impossibility of producing anything other than an insignificant fragment of the entire 
event.  In letters to his wife, Langlois consistently derided the younger painter as a 
dilettante, a battle painter who knew nothing about war.  Langlois, it must be recalled, 
was not only a panorama painter but also a colonel in the army.  Speaking from a doubly 
authoritative position, he possessed a wealth of knowledge about the waging of war, 
something that he thought made him more qualified to represent the event.  
On more than one occasion, Langlois remarked to his wife that there was no need 
for Yvon to have traveled so far to make useless studies.  The battle had already 
happened and all Yvon could do was sketch the detritus: “Yvon has not been delayed in 
making many studies that he could have well done in Paris rather than here.  But it will 
always be this way when one makes battles of convention and fantasy, of imitations of 
little wars with a few injuries and large reinforcements of drummers and trumpeters.”95
                                                 
95 Langlois, Jean-Charles Langlois. La photographie, la peinture, la guerre. Correspondance inédit de 
Crimée (1855-1856), 228. “Yvon n’a pas tardé à en faire autant après quelques études qu’il aurait tout aussi 
bien faites à Paris qu’ici.  Mais toujours il en sera ainsi quand on fera des batailles de convention et de 
fantaisie, des imitations de petite guerre avec plus ou moins d’accidents et grand renfort de tambours et de 
trompettes.  Mais il compte sur Robertson et ses photographies, et il était assez étonné que, sans les avoir 
vues, je n’en fisse pas grand cas, et que surtout je ne voulusse pas les accepter pour guide en ce qui 
regardait Malakoff.”  
  
Temporarily playing the role of a Salon critic, Langlois rehearsed a common complaint 




If Yvon was going to make such a battle painting, he did not need to travel all the way to 
Crimea.  He could have spent an afternoon at the historical museum at Versailles instead.   
To add insult to injury, Yvon had chosen exactly the same point of view as 
Langlois had for his composition, from the center of the Malakoff tower.  In the final 
painting, General MacMahon is pictured on the summit of the tower.  In Langlois’ 
panorama, which he based on the photographs he took, the viewer was placed at this 
point, looking out over the entire 360 degree panorama and emulating the authoritative 
gaze of the general.  Langlois understood Yvon’s choice as a very poor one: the center of 
the tower would make for an excellent panorama platform for the viewer to experience all 
sides of attack but the same point of view would make for a pathetic battle painting.  
Langlois attributed Yvon’s poor choice of location to his lack of knowledge about war:     
It is true, I do not assume that a man who does not know war can very well 
choose the point of view the most suitable for making the forces of the obstacles 
and the efforts of fighting armies best seen and best understood.  M. Yvon will 
certainly prove this true yet again as the three points that he chose to obtain the 
best result from were, without a doubt, the worst, and he did not understand the 
others.96
 
    
Langlois, who had exhibited several battle paintings at Salons during the Bourbon 
Restoration and the July Monarchy, relished watching Yvon fail at selecting a suitable 
point of view for his painting.97
                                                 
96 Ibid.  “Il est vrai que je n’admets pas qu’un homme qui ne connaît pas la guerre puisse bien choisir le 
point de vue le plus convenable pour le mieux faire voir, mieux faire comprendre les forces des obstacles et 
les efforts des armées combattantes.  M. Yvon en sera certainement une preuve de plus, car de trois points 
qui se présentaient pour obtenir le meilleur résultat, il a pris sans contredit le plus mauvais et n’a pas 
compris les autres.”  
  Importantly, Langlois recognized a crucial divide 
97 Francois Robichon has aptly characterized Yvon as Langlois’ “bête noire.”  Save for Robichon’s brief 
mention, their rivalry has entirely escaped art historical inquiry.  I know of no other occasion when such a 
conflict between a battle painter and a panorama painter occurred over a contested subject matter.  The 
conflict also helps us to understand the fissures and overlaps of these two practices which were both 
integral to the production and reception of war imagery in the nineteenth century.  See Robichon, 




between battle painting and panorama painting.  The two demanded separate subjects, 
points of view and completely different compositional approaches.   
In letters to his wife, Langlois continued to excoriate Yvon.  He argued that 
Yvon’s chosen point of view would only exacerbate the inability of battle painting to 
depict the totality of the armed combat because they viewer would easily detect that other 
important parts of the battle were being left out of the frame.  He asserted his objectivity 
in assessing the young painter:     
I am truly quite impartial with regard to the question since he positioned himself 
at the same point as I had chosen for the panorama; this is exactly what he is 
criticized for, because what is a battle painting if not a condensed panorama in the 
proportions of a single painting.  It should be the idealization in a limited frame of 
this immense ensemble, but for this, another point of view must be chosen, 
because despite whatever you do, you will only have a very small, totally 




Langlois, like many nineteenth-century observers, consistently asserted that only battle 
panoramas could successfully depict the totality of battle.  The accusation that Yvon 
could not distinguish between making a panorama and making a battle painting is 
germane to the critical problem of battle painting’s center of action devolving into a 
series of poorly related incidental details.  This problem was all the more acute for the 
subject of the Malakoff Tower: it was one of the few events of the Crimean War which 
possessed a heroic center of action and lent itself to the traditional practice of battle 
painting.  
                                                 
98 Langlois, Jean-Charles Langlois. La photographie, la peinture, la guerre. Correspondance inédit de 
Crimée (1855-1856)  “Je suis certes bien désintéressé dans la question puis qu’il s’est placé au même point 
que j’avais choisi pour le panorama ; c’est justement ce qui fait la critique de ce qu’il a fait, car, qu’est-ce 
qu’un tableau de bataille, c’est un panorama condensé dans les proportions d’un simple tableau.  Ce 
devrait être l’idéalisation dans un cadre restreint de tout cet immense ensemble, mais pour cela il faut 
choisir un autre point de vue, car du même, vous n’aurez quoi qu’on fasse qu’une très petite partie tout 
incomplète d’un tout immense avec l’illusion de moins et des disparates choquantes en plus.” Italics are for 




Langlois was, in effect, pointing out that the isolated parts of Yvon’s battle 
painting would fail to cohere into an acceptable image of its entirety.  As a panorama, the 
capture of the Malakoff Tower would benefit from the powerful illusion produced by the 
round, monumental canvas, which would have literally surrounded viewers by occupying 
their entire field of vision.  Unlike Langlois’ panorama, Yvon’s “flat painting” could only 
mimic but never truly duplicate the visual impact of the round format.99
 
  His choice of 
the middle of the tower as the focus of his painting would, according to Langlois, only 
exacerbate the discrepancy between the part and the whole.  Yvon was trying to summon 
the illusion of panoramic totality into the confines of a framed battle painting, something 
that would ultimately expose the limitations of the genre.  A battle painter needed to 
make hard choices and reduce the amount of dramatic action to focus on an emblematic 
moment that could synecdochally depict the dramatic totality of the battle; a partial 
episode that expressed a larger ideal was the best battle painting could do.  More to the 
point, Langlois’ idea that Yvon’s Capture of the Malakoff was nothing more than a failed 
and futile attempt at panorama painting was echoed in the actual Salon criticism in 1857, 
a point to which I now turn.   
Adolphe Yvon’s Capture of the Malakoff Tower at the Salon of 1857 and the Work of 
Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility  
 
As a panoramist, Langlois’ objective was to produce an illusion of a battle in its 
totality, aided by the physical enclosure of a large, round canvas.  It is therefore not 
surprising that Langlois would have taken issue with the conventions of battle painting 
                                                 
99 I borrow the term “flat painting” from Etienne-Jean Delécluze, who used it in an article written in 1831 





and Yvon’s apparent pretension of depicting a summary representation of the capture of 
the Malakoff Tower in a comparatively limited physical format.  But significantly, the 
gap between the painting’s constitutive parts and its status as a coherent “whole” was also 
taken up by Salon critics who contended that an excessive amount of detail and an 
overreliance on violent episodes within the compressed compositional space of Yvon’s 
Capture of the Malakoff Tower produced a confused and decentered picture of war.  Yet, 
as we shall see, Yvon’s work was able to achieve a measure of success apart from the 
criteria used to determine the aesthetic merit of a painting exhibited at the Salon.  As a 
graphic and photographic reproduction across wide range of media, Yvon’s Malakoff 
achieved an alternative form of success as a representation of a contemporary military 
event the value of which derived not from its status as an exalted history painting, but 
rather from its availability and visibility outside of the gallery walls.         
In Yvon’s Malakoff (Fig. 5.29), several groups of figures are distributed around 
the foreground and middleground, engaging in direct combat.  Whereas the top half of the 
painting features a deep horizon and a few soldiers standing on top of the fort, an 
abundance of figures in the bottom half of painting makes the composition appear 
overcrowded and spatially uneven.  A trench that diagonally cuts across the hill (Fig. 
5.31) from the foreground to the middleground is filled with a proliferation of small, 
almost indistinguishable heads.  This signals the presence of a large mass of men without 
showing their entire bodies, an effect that augments the sense of compression in the 
painting.   In the middleground (Fig. 2.32), General MacMahon stands on top of the 
summit of the Malakoff tower, ostensibly directing the action unfolding below him.  To 




picture since it emphasized the contribution of soldiers to the successful capture of the 
tower.  The entire foreground is dominated by direct combat betweeen French and 
Russian soldiers.  Yvon painted two other large canvases for the Salon of 1859 that 
served as pendants to the Capture of the Malakoff.  These two paintings, the Malakoff 
Gorge and the Malakoff Courtine, represented other actions of the battle from different 
points of view; all three were eventually exhibited at the historical museum at Versailles 
in the Salle de Crimée.   This arrangement of multiple paintings of the same event 
mimicked the installation of Horace Vernet’s Constantine series in the Salle de 
Constantine, which was located in the neighboring gallery.100
The majority of critics who reviewed Yvon’s Malakoff focused upon its failed 
attempt to produce the illusion of panoramic totality, arguing that the artist had not been 
selective enough in composing his painting: 
   
The melee has retreated and the panorama has been put up on the canvas.  The 
painter has allowed himself to be conquered by the dispatch…We are on the 
platform that dominates the old Malakoff tower, half destroyed…This pell-mell 
has an effect; there is sound in this painting, one is quite agitated, and no detail 
belies the official reports…Yvon’s painting hardly speaks to the imagination.  
This pell-mell does not capture any reality; this large machine lacks unity, and is 
without any real grandeur.101
 
 
The charge that Yvon was merely painting the official military account of the battle was a 
familiar one within battle painting criticism and, as we have seen, had been frequently 
leveled against Horace Vernet throughout his lengthy career.  But here, as in Langlois’ 
                                                 
100 Granger, L'empereur & les arts. La liste civile de Napoléon III , 352.   
101 Bois-Robert, “La Guerre au Salon de 1857,” 105-12. “La mêlée a reculé et le panorama s’est installé sur 
la toile.  Le peintre s’est laissé vaincre par le bulletin…Nous sommes sur la plate-forme qui domine la 
vielle tour Malakof, à demi rasée…Tout ce pêle-mêle est à effet ; il y a du bruit dans cette toile, on s’y agite 
beaucoup, et pas un détail ne dément les rapports officiels…la toile de M. Yvon parle peu à l’imagination.  





letter, the critic asserted that Yvon’s battle painting was attempting to be something that 
it was not: a panorama.  More troubling than the painting’s panoramic aspirations was its 
failure to achieve the ineffable quality of “grandeur,” which can be taken here to mean 
two different things. On the one hand, this referred to the set of timeless universal values 
associated with the genre of history painting.  On the other hand, the critic’s notion of 
“grandeur” implicated the complex ideological operation through which a bloody battle 
between opposing armies over a small parcel of land could be interpreted as a noble and 
virtuous event of national importance.     
The failure of Yvon’s battle painting to produce either of these related ideas was 
widely noted.  One of the ways that this was seen to have been formally translated was 
through an overabundance of episodes within the painting.  The meaning of the painting, 
which was ostensibly to represent France’s military prowess, buckled under the saturation 
of episodic detail.  “When one’s eyes are cast upon the large canvas of M. Yvon, one is 
tempted to go over to the reverse side [of the canvas] to look there for France’s 
glory…You will find a little bit of everything in Yvon’s painting, but this everything is 
not enough, and one desires something else.”102
                                                 
102 Edmond About, Nos artistes au salon de 1857 (Paris: Hachette, 1858), 341. “Quand on a promené les 
yeux sur la grande toile de M. Yvon, l'on est tenté de la retourner sur l'autre face pour y chercher la gloire 
de la France…Vous trouverez un peu de tout dans le tableau de M. Yvon, mais ce tout n'est pas assez, et 
l'on y désire autre chose.” 
  Here, the language of having to “walk 
around” the painting and search on the backside of the canvas is symptomatic of the 
critics’ difficulties with seeing a painting that they found to be overloaded with episodes.  
Despite Yvon’s choice of taking a central viewpoint, as critiqued by Langois, the 




pictured the ineffable ideal of French military “grandeur” expected within a large-scale 
battle painting.  The epic quality of the battle was sorely missed:   
I want to see the grand figure of the army personified in a mass of men, and I do 
not find it.  A single spirit, a single heart, a single courage incarnated in the 
thousands of beings who sacrifice themselves for peace within Europe: that is 




For the majority of critics, Yvon had made a painting of particulars that did not coalesce 
into any form of higher meaning; as such Malakoff hinted at an incommensurability 
between the image of French military heroism depicted by Yvon and the widely received, 
idealized notion of it. 
More problematically, many of the episodes were interpreted by critics as 
excessively violent and only added to the impression of the painting’s disconnect from 
the larger, universalizing meaning it was supposed to depict.  “No primordial thoughts 
enhance this painting, through none of these episodes can the public see anything other 
than a horrid melee of victors and vanquished!...Only the generals and captains in the 
melee give the country, the king, or the emperor` the example of heroic devotion.”104
                                                 
103 Ibid. , 341. “Je voudrais voir la grande figure de l'armée personnifiée dans une masse d'hommes, et je ne 
la trouve pas. Un seul esprit, un seul cœur, un seul courage incarné dans des milliers d'existences qui 
s'immolent à la paix de l'Europe, voilà Malakoff. Une collection de portraits estimables et d'épisodes 
ingénieux, voilà le tableau de M. Yvon.” 
  
The episode that most critics focused on was in the foreground (Fig. 5.33).  It featured a 
group of three French soldiers firing upon a fleeing Russian soldier. They face the viewer 
with their weapons still pointed in firing position while the Russian falls out toward the 
space of the viewer, head down, in mid air.  A bloody spot on his back marks the impact 
104 “Le Salon de 1857,” L'Art du Dix-neuvième Siècle, 25 juillet 1857, 121. “Ce tableau n’est relevé par 
aucune pensée primordiale, par aucun épisode où le public puisse voir autre chose qu’une affreuse mêlée de 
vainqueurs  et de vaincus ! …il n’y a pas que les généraux et les capitaines qui, dans la mêlée, donnent au 




of the bullet.  A group of Russian soldiers to the right of their fallen comrade try to flee, 
knowing that the battle is already lost, but a Russian officer holds them back to continue 
fighting.  In the words of one critic, “If the attackers only had to fight against fleeing 
men, what sort of glory could we ever collect from victory?”105
Though Yvon’s painting failed to satisfy Salon critics, it was a resounding success 
in an altogether different context.  As a graphic and photographic reproduction across a 
startling variety of established and emergent media, Yvon’s Capture of the Malakoff 
fulfilled a different set of expectations that had little in common with the traditional 
aesthetic criteria that dictated the painting’s critical reception at the Salon of 1857.  This 
dissertation has shown how over the course of the nineteenth century, battle painting 
came to be associated with mass availability and the genre’s capacity to be disseminated 
to as broad an audience as possible.  This had been the case since the beginning of the 
century and was especially pertinent to the career of Horace Vernet starting in the 1820s.  
The 1850s, however, mark a period when the options for reproducing a work of art 
expanded largely because of the emergence of photomechanical technologies, in addition 
to the rise of illustrated newspapers which routinely reproduced artwork.
  Yvon appeared to have 
overstepped the bounds of decorum by including an episode that reeked of too much 
French pride. 
106
                                                 
105Charles Perrier, L'Art français au Salon de 1857 (Paris: Michel Levy Frères, 1857), 167. “Si les 
assaillants n'avaient eu à combattre que des fuyards, quelle gloire aurions-nous donc recueillie de la 
victoire?” 
  In addition 
106 Stephen Bann has explored the proximity of the practice of reproductive engraving to that of 
photography during the 1850s.  He demonstrates how the cultural values attached to photography in France 
were guided by earlier standards established by reproductive engraving.  See Chapter 3, “The Inventions of 
Photography,” in Bann, Parallel Lines, Printmakers, Painters, and Photographers in Nineteenth-Century 
France , 88-125.  See also Dominique de Font-Réaulx, The Work of Art and Its Reproduction, trans. Isabel 
Ollivier (Paris: Musée d'Orsay, 2006) and Pierre-Lin Renié, “De l’imprimerie photographique à la 




to being reproduced as a lithograph, a woodcut engraving and an etching, emergent 
photomechanical technologies reproduced Yvon’s Malakoff as a photogravure and as 
several photographs by different photographers.  Perhaps more than any other battle 
painting that preceded it, Yvon’s Capture of the Malakoff became synonymous with the 
fact of its reproducibility. 
In his 1933 essay, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen 
Reproduzierbarkeit, Walter Benjamin distinguished between a work of art that can be 
reproduced and a work of art the defining quality of which is its relationship to the 
process of its reproduction in the age of high industrial capitalism.  Benjamin’s essay, 
recently translated as “The Work of Age in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility,” is especially germane to the sets of expectations that became attached 
to battle painting during the nineteenth century.  As a form of visual production, the 
ideological value of battle painting derived not from its status as a unique form of fine 
art, but rather from its ability to circulate in abundance through reproductions.   
No artist did more to bolster expectations of battle painting’s reproducibility than 
Horace Vernet.  He was the crucial precedent in this respect for Yvon.  Over the span of 
his career, Horace Vernet’s reputation became  equated with the reproduction of his 
work, as though two sides of the same coin.  In an appraisal of Vernet just after the 
artist’s death in 1863, Henri Delaborde contended that while his contemporaries reserved 
their best work for reproduction, Vernet was not as selective.  “The minor compositions 
of the painter of the Smahla, reproduced as best as they could be as soon as they came out 
of his studio, proceeded to spread the fame of this extravagant talent or rather constantly 





Unlike his contemporaries, Horace Vernet eschewed the esteemed art of 
reproductive burin engraving for the comparatively less prestigious and more expedient 
method of aquatint, a form of etching.
  Significantly, the widespread dissemination of Vernet’s work was made 
possible by a form of printmaking that the artist consistently employed to reproduce his 
paintings, the aquatint.   
108 Vernet’s nearly life-long collaboration with 
Jean-Pierre Marie Jazet, a prolific aquatint printmaker, suggests that the painter was more 
concerned with his work’s rapid dissemination than with its aesthetic canonization 
through the rarefied medium of burin engraving.  As Stephen Bann has argued, burin 
engraving’s value within the French academic tradition grew in importance during the 
nineteenth century.109
In the words of the nineteenth-century print connoisseur and historian Henri 
Béraldi, Vernet’s recourse to expediency and efficiency for the reproduction of his work 
   
                                                 
107 Henri Delaborde, “Horace Vernet. Ses oeuvres et sa manière,” Revue des deux mondes XLIV (mars 
1863): 76. “Tout au contraire les moindres compositions du peintre de la Smala, reproduites tant bien que 
mal à mesure qu'elles sortaient de l'atelier, allaient répandre partout la renommée de ce talent prodigue de 
lui même ou plutôt incessamment rajeunir une gloire que les chaumières, comme les palais, avaient depuis 
longtemps appris à connaître.” Delaborde implied that through their reproduction, Vernet’s paintings 
crossed deep class divisions.  He was one of many writers who used class-based language to characterize 
the popular appeal of Vernet’s work.  Baudelaire is one notable example.  In his Salon of 1846, he wrote : 
“Tels sont les principes sévères qui conduisent dans la recherche du beau cet artiste éminemment national, 
dont les compositions décorent la chaumière du pauvre villageois et la mansarde du joyeux étudiant, le 
salon des maisons de tolérance les plus misérables et les palais de nos rois.” See Baudelaire, Critique d'art, 
129.  These characterizations emphasize Vernet’s reputation as an eminently “national” artist.   Vernet’s 
work was widely recognized as appealing to all classes of French citizens, a fact that polarized opinion of 
him in the nineteenth century, depending on one’s political position.  Vernet’s mass appeal is at the very 
heart of the kinds of political illusions that this dissertation has interrogated.  The seeming ability of his 
work to cross France’s deep class divisions supported the illusion of a common set of national bonds 
premised upon the powerful ideology of militarism.   
108  The difference between an aquatint and a burin engraving was vast, both in terms of formal qualities as 
well as the sets of values attached to each technique during the nineteenth century.  Stephen Bann’s work 
on the ways in which different print media were valued during the nineteenth century has informed my 
understanding of Vernet’s engagement with the aquatint process.  Stephen Bann, “Ingres in Reproduction,” 
in Fingering Ingres, ed. Adrian Rifkin Susan Siegfried (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 56-76.  




set him apart from other important artists of the period: “In contrast to Ary Scheffer and 
Paul Delaroche, whose works were engraved by elite burin engravers, Vernet was 
reproduced only by approximate engravings: second order burins, washes by Jazet, 
summary plates from [Gavard’s] Galeries de Versailles or the mechanical engraving of 
Burdet.”110  Vernet’s embrace of less eminent (and more mechanical) forms of 
reproduction over the art of reproductive burin engraving is crucial for understanding the 
critical reception of the artist’s work in the nineteenth century.  It helps to explain why 
Vernet gained a reputation for his speed and facility and not for the refinement of his 
ideas.  In contrast to his contemporaries such as Ingres, the elevation of of Vernet’s life’s 
work came through its material proliferation in a variety of reproductive formats of 
varying quality, not through its labored translation into an esteemed academic form of 
reproductive printmaking.111
Yvon would have known that Vernet’s reputation had been built around the 
circulation of his monumental battle paintings in print form.  It is likely that in accepting 
the commission from the Ministre d’état for the Capture of the Malakoff, Yvon would 
have understood well before he began to work on it that his painting’s value depended 
just as much on its ability to circulate as a reproduction as it did on its status as an 
original work of art.  It is no mere coincidence that out of the six different techniques 
used to reproduce Yvon’s Malakoff, not a single one of them was burin engraving.    By 
  
                                                 
110 Henri Béraldi, Les graveurs du 19e siècle: guide de l'amateur d'estampes modernes, vol. 12 (Paris: 
Librarie L. Conquet, 1892), 223. “A la différence de Paul Delaroche et d'Ary Scheffer, qui ont été gravés 
par l'élite des burinistes, — il n'a été reproduit que par des gravures à peu près : burins de second ordre, 
lavis de Jazet, planches sommaires des Galeries de Versailles, ou gravure mécanique de Burdet.”   
111 Stephen Bann has argued that Ingres was “mainly seduced by the unequalled prestige of the burin 
engraving” despite the artist’s occasional use of other nineteenth-century reproductive media – including 
lithography and photography, both of which failed to produce an acceptable translation of the artist’s 




following the pattern of dissemination established by Horace Vernet, which prioritized 
expediency and availability, the circulation of Yvon’s Malakoff in its varying 
reproductive forms affirmed a dual ideological role for large-scale battle painting.  In 
addition to the importance of producing an image of the nation’s military prowess, the 
abundance of reproductions of Yvon’s monumental battle painting in a variety of 
emergent and established media demonstrated the strength of France’s productive (and 
reproductive) powers.  This affirmation of productive might went against doubts 
expressed before the outbreak of the Crimean War that the waging of armed conflict 
would harm France’s economic expansion.  If anything, the war itself and the energy 
invested in depicting it were evidence that war and a strong capitalist economy went hand 
and hand.112
Under the dominion of capitalism and of the world market, [war] assumed an 
economic role in the accumulation process…We are confronted by the 
paradoxical fact that the centuries-old space of wars, instead of shrinking into 
social oblivion, became the rich and thickly populated space that incubated 
capitalism.
  As Henri Lefebvre has argued in The Production of Space, war played a 
formative role in the historical development of capitalism:  
113
 
   
While Lefebvre directly implicated the role of war in the process of primitive 
accumulation and the opening of channels of trade, he was more broadly concerned with 
the spatial and material consequences of the close relationship between warfare and the 
acceleration of the productive capacities of European economies.  While Yvon’s painting 
of the Capture of the Malakoff may not have made for great Salon art, its circulation in a 
                                                 
112 According to the political economist Mehrdad Vahabi, the Crimean War also led directly to the 
industrialization of warfare in the later nineteenth century.  He writes: “Mass production came to Europe’s 
small arms business between 1855 and 1870 as a direct byproduct of the Crimean War.” See Mehrdad 
Vahabi, The Political Economy of Destructive Power, ed. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, New Horizons in 
Institutional and Evolutionary Economics (Northhampton: Edward Elgar Publishing), 212.    
113 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell 




variety of different forms was bound up with contemporary understandings of and hopes 
for France’s emerging industrial economy.   
  In the years immediately following the painting’s debut at the Salon of 1857, 
three different graphic prints of Yvon’s Malakoff were made, two etchings and one large 
format lithograph.  The lithograph (Fig. 5. 34) was made by the hand of a distinguished 
reproductive lithographer, Louis-Emmanuel Soulange-Teissier, who also reproduced the 
two pendants to the Capture of the Malakoff Tower.  The quality of its translation of 
Yvon’s Malakoff earned the lithograph a second class medal at the Salon of 1859.  It was 
the most graphically refined of all of the reproductions, but still well below the level of 
prestige of a burin engraving.  The two etchings were comparatively less refined.  The 
first was published in the periodical L’Artiste as the featured reproduction (Fig. 5.35) for 
the September 5, 1858 issue.  The editors claimed that the “exact and fine” reproduction 
would serve a double duty “for the painter and for the heroes who provided his 
subject.”114
The second etching (Fig. 5.36), by the virtually unknown Marthe, is quite small, 
measuring 5.4 x 8.4 cm – akin to the scale of a carte-de-visite.  Because of its size and 
lack of refined tonal detail, this print would have been sold cheaply, ensuring a wide base 
of diffusion. As one Belgian critic remarked, Marthe’s etching was all the more of an 
achievement because it reduced “the colossal butchery of Yvon’s painting,” with its 
dozens of figures, into a diminutive format which still managed to accommodate the 
  The print is made up by a series of black hatch marks and gray tones; the 
drama is equalized: nothing stands out except for the tonal divisions between the parapet 
and the hill upon which the French officers and the heroic zouave stand.   
                                                 




monumental original:  “With heads no larger than the head of a pin, M. Marthe has able 
to not only recall but also to maintain the resemblance of the primary characters in 
Yvon’s painting…Its simple format, its minimal price and above all else, the talent with 
which it is made will guarantee this print lasting popularity.” 115
Unlike any battle painting that had come before it, Yvon’s Malakoff was available 
as three different photomechanical reproductions soon after it was shown at the Salon of 
1857.  These included a Salon installation view by Pierre-Ambroise Richebourg, a 
reproductive photograph by Robert Jefferson Bingham that was sold in two different 
formats (a 27.8 x 42 cm print as well as a carte-de-visite), and finally a héliogravure by 
Charles Nègre based on Bingham’s photograph.  In one of a series of photographs that 
Richebourg took of the Salon of 1857 (Fig. 5.37), Yvon’s Malakoff is at the center of the 
image and dwarfs the other paintings underneath and to the sides of it.
 Marthe’s print reduced 
Yvon’s overcrowded painting into manageable proportions and better yet, transformed 
the original into an inexpensive, portable print which was in keeping with the values of 
availability associated with contemporary large-scale battle painting. 
116
                                                 
115 “Iconographie,” Journal des beaux-arts et de la littérature, no. 9 (15 mai,1862): 75. “Dans des têtes 
moins grosses qu'une petite tête d'épingle, M.Marthe a su, non-seulement rappeler, mais encore conserver, 
la ressemblance des principaux personnages du tableau d'Yvon….Cette petite gravure aura un succès 
énorme; son format facile, son prix très minime, et, au-dessus de tout cela, le talent avec lequel elle est 
traitée, lui garantissent une vogue durable.” 
  While the 
photograph captures the enormous scale of the painting, it obscures the individual details 
of the painting.  In defiance of its reproductive duties, the photograph merely 
contextualizes Yvon’s painting in terms of its size, one painted object among many 
116 An early practitioner of daguerreotypes, Richebourg took up the reproduction of works of art in late 
1840s and photographed the Salons of 1857, 1861 and 1865.  See Elizabeth Anne McCauley, Industrial 
Madness. Commercial Photography in Paris, 1848-1871 (Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 
1994), 282-86, and Quentin Bajac, “Pierre Ambroise Richebourg,” in Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century 




smaller ones.  The painting’s depicted clash between the French and Russian armies is 
obscured in the generalized grey of the photographic image.  The episode of the three 
French soldiers shooting a fleeing Russian in the back, which many critics found to be 
excessively violent, appears in the photograph as a smudge of brown.  Even the 
foreground, thought to be overloaded with detail, is blurred.  The photograph indicated 
the space where a battle painting was displayed but cannot account for the particulars of 
the composition. 
While the focus of Richebourg’s photograph was the installation of the Malakoff 
within the space of the Salon, Robert Jefferson Bingham’s photograph (Fig. 5.38) was 
devoted to reproducing the painting.117  Out of the many reproductions of Yvon’s 
Malakoff, Bingham’s received the most critical attention.  Along with Gustave Le Gray, 
Bingham was one of the most prominent practitioners of photographic reproduction of art 
and one of the few to have achieved a measure of commercial success at it in France.118
                                                 
117 As Anne McCauley has demonstrated, photographic reproductions of works of art comprised 5.5 percent 
of all photographs entered into the depôt légal in 1853.  By 1860, the figure had jumped 28.5 percent. As 
these statistics show, the trade in reproductions of works of art quickly assimilated itself to the nascent 
medium of photography.  But this by no means rendered established forms of reproduction, such as 
engraving and lithography, obsolete.  Rather, photography competed alongside reproductive engraving and 
lithography for commercial and artistic eminence.  McCauley, Industrial Madness. Commercial 
Photography in Paris, 1848-1871, 270. 
  
Several critics who reviewed Yvon’s painting at the Salon of 1857 mentioned Bingham’s 
photograph, confirming that it was in circulation during the course of the Salon 
exhibition, something which would have contributed to its commercial success.  This was 
the first time that a photographic reproduction of a major contemporary battle painting on 
118 For more on Bingham’s career in photographic reproductions of art, see Bann, Parallel Lines, 
Printmakers, Painters, and Photographers in Nineteenth-Century France, 118-25.  Bann is chiefly 
concerned with the absence of critical expectations governing the judgment of photographic reproductions 
of art.  He examines how one emerged from the pre-existing discourse of reproductive engraving.  See also 
Laure Boyer, “Robert J. Bingham, photographe du monde de l'art sous le Second Empire,” Études 




view at the Salon was available for purchase during the course of an exhibition.  Critics 
repeatedly referred to it in their reviews of the painting: “For those who find that they do 
not have enough information, I will say in addition that the photograph of the painting, 
the exclusive property of M. Bingham, is for sale at his shop for a modest price, namely 
twenty francs for civilians, and fifeteen francs for the military men.”119
A detail of Bingham’s photograph was also reproduced in an illustrated weekly 
newspaper, the Musée des familles.  The paper’s critic adored Yvon’s painting.  At the 
end of the article, the critic paused to consider the implications of the photographic 
dissemination of Bingham’s photograph:  
  Bingham 
apparently discounted the photograph for members of the military, something that the 
government would force Jean-Charles Langlois to do when he reopened his panorama of 
Sebastopol on the Champs-Elysées in 1860.  
One guesses that photography has taken possession of M. Yvon’s work.  M. 
Bingham has rendered it with justice of ensemble and a finesse of details which 
assures the popularity of this national page.  One hundred thousand copies will be 
printed by the sun, and this living bulletin of Malakoff will spread itself 
throughout the workshops and the country huts.120
 
 
Much in the same way that the dissemination of Horace Vernet’s work was described in 
the language of social leveling and mass availability, the reproduction of Yvon’s painting 
by Bingham’s photograph was described in similar terms.  Here, as with the critics who 
                                                 
119 Chaud-de-Ton, “Salon de 1857, Lettres de Chaud-de-Ton,” Les Contemporains, 14 Juillet 1857, 3. 
“Pour les personnes qui ne se trouveraient pas suffisamment renseignées, je dirai, de plus, que la 
photographie du tableau, propriété exclusive de M. Bingham, se vend chez lui à des prix modérés, savoir : 
vingt francs pour les pékins, et quinze francs pour messieurs les militaires.” 
120 “Le tableau de M. Yvon : Prise de Malakoff “ Musée des familles, octobre 1857, 11. “On devine que la 
photographie s’est emparée de l’ouvrage de M. Yvon.  M. Bingham l’a rendu avec une justesse d’ensemble 
et une finesse de détails, qui assurent la popularité de cette page nationale.  Elle sera tirée par le soleil à 





touted the dissemination of Vernet’s work across classed-lines, the working class and 
rural peasants are imagined as the beneficiaries of the “spread” of Bingham’s photograph, 
and by extension, all reaches of French society.  It goes without saying that the 
prohibitive cost of the photograph, twenty francs, would have prevented the groups 
mentioned by the critic from acquiring it.  The invocation of France’s poor was therefore 
a rhetorical device which represented, through class-based language of inclusivity, a form 
of visual production that would have appealed to class of consumers capable of affording 
Bingham’s photograph, the bourgeoisie.  The exaggerated figure of 100,000 copies of the 
photograph printed “by the sun,” and therefore without human labor, emphasized the 
positive valuation of material proliferation, which as we have already seen was also a 
feature of the discourse on early military photography.  
 Yvon’s Malakoff was also reproduced as a héliogravure based on Bingham’s 
photograph.  This photomechanical process, invented by Nicéphore Niépce and later 
perfected by the photographer Charles Nègre, produced intaglio plates obtained from 
photographic images.  In 1856, Nègre received a patent for his process of transforming 
“printed photographic images into engraved plates.”121  Shortly after receiving his patent, 
Nègre wrote to Bingham to arrange for the use of his Malakoff photograph.  By early 
October, the two men had come to an agreement to share in the profits generated by the 
héliogravure, demonstrating that they both understood the representation of war to be a 
financially lucrative enterprise.122
                                                 
121 La Revue photographique, 5 aout (1858). “transformation des images photographiques plaquées en 
planches gravées.”   
   Nègre’s reproduction (Fig. 5.39) distributes a fine 
sandy grain all over the image and resembles the visual syntax of a reproductive etching, 




save for the extreme uniformity of the pattern of the grain, lending something of the 
syntax of an intaglio print.  The photographic press celebrated Nègre’s photogravure 
process as a technical achievement that created a commercially viable way to produce 
photographs and ensure that they did not fade.  Moreover, like Bingham’s photograph of 
Malakoff, Nègre’s héliogravure attracted critical recognition and praise.  According to 
the photography journal La lumière, Nègre’s Malakoff “has already provided 1500 proofs 
of a very nice effect…Printed with ordinary ink, these prints are moreover indelible.”123
 Nègre’s héliogravure of Malakoff, as one reproduction among many, was yet 
another indication that the value of contemporary images of war was inseparable from 
their status as reproducible visual objects.  While this kind of value is apparent through 
the proliferation of Yvon’s painting in an astounding variety of reproductive forms, it was 
made explicit in a photograph taken by Charles Nègre in 1858 (Fig. 5.40). It depicts a 
figure, who is probably a studio assistant of Nègre’s, holding a copy of the Malakoff 
héliogravure at an angle which permits it to come into full view.  The photograph stages 
a chain of viewing relationships through which the viewer beholds the worker beholding 
the object of his labor, the Malakoff print.  It is not by mere coincidence that Malakoff 
appears at the center of this self-reflexive image.  In this photograph, Nègre attempted to 
depict, through the medium of photography, the practice of viewing and producing 
reproducible images at a time when the modalities of such practices were being 
constantly redefined.  Indeed, Nègre’s choice to feature his own reproduction of Yvon’s 
   
                                                 
123 “Académie des Sciences ; Séance du lundi 1er mars “ Cosmos, 5 mars 1858, 280. “On admire surtout la 
planche qui reproduit le tableau de la prise de Malakoff par Yvon, elle est sans retouche aucune, et a donné 





battle painting in the photograph (and not any of the other photogravures of other subjects 
made in his studio) suggests that by the 1850s, image makers such as Nègre, Bingham, 
Yvon and Vernet had internalized the idea that representations of war, and especially 
battle paintings, were, by definition, visual objects produced to be reproduced.  Nègre’s 
photograph of a studio assistant handling the print of the Malakoff is thus extraordinary 
for the way that it gives visual form to the discursive value of war imagery’s 
reproducibility and to the idea of war as a productive enterprise.   
 
Conclusion: “A Very Complete and Very Beautiful Illusion” 
 In “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” Walter Benjamin introduces the 
concept of the phantasmagoria as a historical method of inquiry that is particularly suited 
to the nineteenth century: 
The new forms of behavior and the new economically and technologically based 
creations that we owe to the nineteenth century enter the universe of a 
phantasmagoria.  These creations undergo this “illumination” not only in a 
theoretical manner, by an ideological transposition, but also in the immediacy of 
their perceptible presence.  They are manifest as phantasmagorias.124
 
 
Benjamin identified the arcades, World Exhibitions and Haussmann’s Paris, among 
others, as expressions of the phantasmagoria.  In this space of phenomenological 
subterfuge, “commodity-producing society” surrounds itself with a system of illusions 
built around the appearance of material things.  The visual representations of war that 
have been the focus of this chapter functioned both materially and discursively as a form 
of phastasmagoria which maintained the illusion of war as a heroic endeavor and an 
                                                 
124 Walter Benjamin, “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century. Exposé <of 1939>,” in The Arcades 
Project, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 




exalted form of nationalized unity.  During the 1850s, this political illusion was bolstered 
through the proliferation of new modes for representing war, many of them possessed 
with the allure of technological “progress.”  As this chapter has shown, the material 
abundance of war-related images in a variety of media opened up new possibilities for 
engaging as a reader/viewer with contemporary war.   
 The discourse that this chapter has tracked was a hegemonic one: the production 
and reproduction of war imagery did not contest power but rather supported it.  The 
phastasmagoria of war imagery helped to obscure the moral contradiction between state-
sanctioned, permissible violence in war and forms of illegal violence, not permitted by 
the state, such as revolution (civil war).  In an extraordinary piece of writing from 1853, 
the writer Alphonse Karr called attention to the duplicitous system of political illusions 
which made such a contradiction possible.  Karr’s neighbor happened to be the panorama 
painter Jean-Charles Langlois, whose panorama of the Battle of the Pyramids had opened 
in March 1853.  The panorama remained opened through February 1855, a particularly 
low point in the Crimean War, when victory was not at all ensured.  Karr admired 
Langlois’ achievements and his status as the nation’s foremost panoramist.  He was, 
however, wary of the deeper meaning of such imagery:    
From a certain point of view, grand victorious battles pass for titles of glory for all 
– those who are scared of them and those who did not partake in them are as 
proud as others. This aspect maintains the military spirit of a nation, this form of 
patriotism that consists much more in hate for foreigners than in love of 
compatriots; this convention which allows ferocious and savage instincts which 
man only conceals to be satisfied honestly, and allows one to indulge in a love of 
carnage from time to time that can be called brigandage, a horrible and punishable 
crime when you kill those who, like you, have red pants, but an honorable, 
glorious thing admired by all when you cut to pieces, crush and mutilate only 
those men with white or blue pants…Thus, from an ordinary and patriotic point of 




is one of the grand pages of France’s history, - and the painting of M. Langlois is 
a very beautiful  and very complete illusion.125
  
 
The “very beautiful and very complete illusion” produced by Langlois’ panorama was not 
just pictorial but more importantly, ideological.  As a material phenomenon in the 
nineteenth century, war imagery was capable of propagating a system of belief which 
guaranteed the state’s monopolization of violence to support its own causes and bolster 
its grip on power.  This problem is not unique to the nineteenth century; it endures well 
beyond the period covered in this dissertation to the present day.     
                                                 
125 Alphonse Karr, “À propos d'une vielle femme qui faisait de la charpie “ in Oeuvres complètes 
d'Alphonse Karr (Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1864), 276-78. “A un certain point de vue, les grandes 
batailles gagnées passent pour des titres de gloire pour les peuples ; - ceux qui y ont peur, et ceux qui n’y 
ont pas assisté, en sont à peut près aussi fiers que les autres. – Cet aspect entretient l’esprit militaire chez 
une nation, cette espèce de patriotisme qui consiste bien plus dans la haine de l’étranger que dans l’amour 
des compatriotes ; cette convention qui permet de satisfaire honnêtement les instincts féroces et sauvages 
que l’homme ne fait que dissimuler, de se  livrer de temps en temps à l’amour du carnage, qui s’appelle 
brigandage, crime punissable et horrible, quand ceux que vous tuez ont comme vous des pantalons rouges, 
mais qui est une chose honorable, glorieuse et admirée de tous, si vous ne sabrez, broyez, mutilez que des 
hommes à pantalons bleus ou blancs…Donc, au point du vue ordinaire et patriotique, dans l’acception 
usitée du mot, la bataille des Pyramides est une des grandes pages de l’historie de France, - et le tableau de 
















“The closer we supposedly approach the real 
or the truth, the further we draw away from 
them both, since neither one nor the other 
exists.  The closer we approach the real time 
of the event, the more we fall into the illusion 
of the virtual.  God save us from the illusion 
of war.” 





 This dissertation has examined how the meaning of nineteenth-century war 
imagery depended not only on its particular subject matter but also on its proliferation in 
a variety of emergent and established media.  The visibility of nineteenth-century 
representations of war enabled them to play a pivotal role in debates about the status of 
warfare in the post-revolutionary French state, about the relationships between 
individuals and governing authority and about the representability of armed conflict.  In 
addition to these issues, this dissertation has also shown how the proliferation of war-
related imagery encouraged a powerful illusion of mediated participation in national 
military exploits.  Paintings, prints, photographs and panoramas were often celebrated as 
transparent depictions of armed combat and art critics consistently affirmed that it was 
                                                 
1 Jean Baudrillard, “The Gulf War: Is It Really Taking Place?,” in The Gulf War Did Not Take Place 




possible to experience a battle through viewing its visual representation.  The discourse 
that surrounded nineteenth-century war imagery depended on the suppression of the 
possibility that, as the literary scholar Jan Mieszkowski has contended, “any war will 
necessarily be misrepresented, because war is a system of misrepresentation.”2
The flourishing of the war film as a cinematic genre in the twentieth century is 
just one sign that the tradition of engaged spectatorship which prevailed in the nineteenth 
century continues to endure.  In keeping with this dissertation’s focus upon the inter-
relationships between different forms of media used to represent war, it is worth noting 
that one of the first war films to be made in France, directed by Geogres Méliès in 1897, 
was based on a well-known painting of an episode of the Franco-Prussian War by the 
military painter Alphonse de Neuville.  The painting, The Last Cartridges (Fig. 6.1), was 
exhibited at the Salon of 1873 and represents the last stand of a group of French soldiers 
in the interior of a destroyed home (later turned into the musée de la Maison des 
  The need 
to make war visible and assert its representability drove the production and reception of 
war imagery the nineteenth century and thereafter.  This sustained resolve to claim war as 
a stable object of representation continued to grow during the colonial wars and armed 
conflicts of the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which the participation of 
civilian populations at home became an important strategic component of victory.  Over 
the past two centuries, war has become more spectacular, temporally immediate and 
widely disseminated as photography, film and television have taken up the representation 
of armed combat.   
                                                 






Dernières Cartouches in Bazeilles, France, where the painting is conserved today) who 
have come under Prussian attack.  De Neuville began the painting shortly after France’s 
defeat in 1871 and through its reproduction and circulation in print and photographic 
media, it became a well-known symbol of the defeat.  The short film, just over one 
minute in length, was shot from the same point of view used by De Neuville, from inside 
the house.  Méliès transformed the frozen temporality of the painting into an extended 
series of episodic actions and employed a series of special effects to make the battle 
appear dangerous and compelling.  Among other techniques, Méliès depicted a series of 
explosions through a white powder which falls from above the actors (Fig. 6.2). This 
invoked the convention of white puffs of smoke that had been associated with the 
representation of explosions in battle painting for centuries.  Other episodic actions in the 
film, such as a soldier who falls toward the camera as a result of an explosion (Fig. 6.3), 
recall the kinds of pictorial devices employed by Horace Vernet in his battle paintings.   
It is hardly surprising that Georges Méliès looked to the conventions of 
nineteenth-century war imagery in order to heighten the visual drama of his short film.  
Though the nascent medium of film allowed for the unfolding of a temporally extended 
chain of episodic actions, nineteenth-century modes of visual production would have 
shaped the way that these episodes were understood.  As this dissertation has shown, 
conventions of representation (such as the episode) shaped beliefs in the veracity of a 
representation of war.  Méliès thereby exploited the tradition of engaged spectatorship 
that late nineteenth-century viewers would have associated with war imagery and applied 




Whereas it took several days for Henri Durand-Brager’s sketches from the theater 
of the Crimean War to reach Paris for publication as woodblock engravings in the pages 
of L’Illustration, the speed with which a war can be represented is now instantaneous.  
This has accordingly enabled the illusion of mediated participation in war to grow 
stronger over the past 150 years.   As Susan Sontag has argued, after the Vietnam War, 
the first war that was regularly televised,  
battles and massacres filmed as they unfold have been a routine ingredient of the 
ceaseless flow of domestic, small-screen entertainment…The understanding of 
war among people who have not experienced war is now chiefly the product of 
the impact of these images…Something becomes real - to those who are 
elsewhere, following it as “news”- by being photographed.3
 
   
Despite the capability and availability of digital image technologies to produce images of 
war on a scale which would have been inconceivable to any artist in the nineteenth 
century, the relationship between the political and physical activity known as “war” and 
its representability is more obscure than at any point in the last two hundred years.
                                                 






Figure 1.1: Charles Nègre, An Apprentice of Charles Nègre Examining a Proof in the 
Courtyard of the Studio, c. 1857. Albumen print, 16 x 11.8 cm. Essonne, Musée français 






Figure 1.2: Robert Jefferson Bingham, The Capture of the Malakoff Tower, after Adolphe Yvon, 1857. Albumen print, 27.8 x 42 cm. 












Figure 2.1 : Villeneuve, Food for Thought for Crowned Charlatans, c. 1793. Engraving. 















Figure 2.3: Adam-Franz Van der Meulen, The French Army Crossing the Rhine at 





































Figure 2.4: Jean-Antoine Constantin, The Siege of Toulon, 1794. Pen and ink wash. 





Figure 2.5: Anonymous, The Battle of Gemappe, c. 1792-1793. Engraving. Paris, 
Bibliothèque nationale de France 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Anonymous, The Victory of the French at the Battle of Gemmappe, c. 1792-





Figure 2.7: Pierre-Gabriel Berthault, Victory of Jemmapes, 1797. Engraving after a 
drawing by Jacques François Joseph Swebach-Desfontaines, 17.7 cm x 24.2 cm. Paris, 
Bibliothèque national de France.  
 
 
Figure 2.8: Louis-Albert Guislain Bacler d’Albe, frontispiece for the General Map of 









Figure 2.9: Louis-Albert Guislain Bacler d’Albe, Passage of the Po at Plaisance, 1798. 
Watercolor, 66 x 43.2 cm. Vincennes, Service historique de l’armée de terre. 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Mercoli fils, Passage of the Po at Plaisance, after Louis-Albert Guislain 







Figure 2.11 : Claude Niquet and Paquet, frontispiece for Général Alexandre Berthier’s 
Relation de la bataille de Marengo, 1805. Etching after a watercolor by Carle Vernet, 












Figure 2.13 : Antoine-Jean Gros, Plan of the Battlefield of Nazareth, 1800.  Pen, ink, and wash. Nantes, Musée des Beaux-Arts 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Antoine-Jean Gros, Schematic Drawing of the Battle of Nazareth, 1800.   





Figure 2.15: Louis-François Lejeune, The Battle of Marengo, 1800. Oil on canvas, 180 x 
250 cm. Versailles, Musée national du Château. 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Choffard, The Battle of Maringo, after Louis-François Lejeune in Histoire 
des guerres des gaulois et des françaises en Italie, c.1800. Engraving. Paris, Bibliothèque 





Figure 2.17: François Tardieu, Map of the Campaign of the Reserve Army in Italy, after 
Pierre Lapie, in Histoire des guerres des gaulois et des français en Italie, c. 1800. 






Figure 2.18 : Louis-François Lejeune, The Battle of Aboukir, 1804-1805. Oil on canvas, 185 x 255 cm. Versailles, Musée  






 Figure 2.19 : Louis-François Lejeune, The Battle of Mont Thabor, 1804-1805. Oil on canvas, 180 x 260 cm. Versailles,  













Figure 2.21 : Anonymous, Bonaparte, 1st Consul and His Captains, on the Tallest 
Pyramid in Egypt, c. 1800. Etching. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France.  
 
 
Figure 2.22 : Dominique-Vivant Denon, Battle Plan for the Battle of Aboukir won by 
Bonaparte on 7 Thermidor of Year 7 from Voyage dans la basse et haute Égypte,1802. 






Figure 2.23 : Dominique-Vivant Denon, The Peninsula of Aboukir, from Voyage dans la basse et haute 
 égypte, 1802. Etching. Paris, Bibliothèque de l’institut national d’histoire de l’art. 
 
 









Figure 2.25: Dominique-Vivant Denon, The Battle of Aboukir, from Voyage dans la basse et haute Égypte, 1802. Etching, 16 x 49.5 


























Figure 2.28: Detail, Louis-François Lejeune, The Battle of Aboukir. 
 
 






  Figure 2.30 : Detail, Dessalaux, The Battle of Aboukir, after Louis-François Lejeune, 









Figure 2.31 : Lameau and Misbach, View of the Right of the Russian Battlefield in front of 
Pressisch-Eylau, Drawn on site by Le Jeune, c. 1807. Engraving, 41 x 69 cm. Montreal, 











Figure 3.1: Etienne-Jean Delécluze, Wounded Soldiers of the Garde Impériale Entering Paris in 1814, 1814. Ink drawing with grey 





Figure 3.2: Etienne-Jean Delécluze, Russian Prisoners Marching on the Boulevard Saint 
Martin in 1814, 1814. Ink drawing with grey and brown wash and watercolor with pencil 
tracing, 650 x 350 cm. Versailles, Musée national du Château. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Detail, Etienne-Jean Delécluze, Wounded Soldiers of the Garde Impériale 






Figure 3.4: Antoine-Jean Gros, Bacchus and Ariadne, 1820. Oil on canvas, 90 x 105 
cm. Phoenix Art Museum. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Louis-François Lejeune, View of the Monastery and Bulls, antiquites of 
Guisando, on the banks of the Alberge, in Castille, 1817. Oil on canvas, 210 x 260. 





Figure 3.6: Detail, Louis-François Lejeune, View of the Monastery and Bulls, 






 Figure 3.7: Louis-Francois Lejeune, View of the Attack on the Grand Convoy, near 





                   
 








Figure 3.11: Pauquet and J. Mécou, Review of the First Consul (Review of Quintidi) after an original drawing by Eugène Isabey and 





Figure 3.12: Horace Vernet, The Tomb of Napoleon, 1821. Oil on canvas, 54 x 80 cm. 
London, Wallace Collection. 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Horace Vernet, The Wounded Trumpeter, 1819. Oil on canvas, 53 x 64 






Figure 3.14: Horace Vernet, The Dog of the Regiment Wounded, 1819. Oil on canvas, 











Figure 3.16: Horace Vernet, The Atelier of Horace Vernet, 1820-1821. Oil on canvas, 





Figure 3.17: Horace Vernet, Napoleon Crossing the Bridge at Arcole, 1826-27. Oil on 
canvas, 260 x 198 cm. Private Collection. 
 
 
Figure 3.18: Antoine-Jean Gros, Bonaparte at the 
Bridge of Arcole, 1796. Oil on canvas, 130 x 94 cm. 





Figure 3.19: Charles Thévenin, Augereau on the Arcole Bridge, 15 November 
1796, 1796. Oil on canvas, 362 x 268 cm. Versailles, Musée national du Château 
 
 






Figure 3.21: Detail, Horace Vernet, Detail, Horace Vernet, Napoleon 












Figure 3.23: Horace Vernet, The Barrier at Clichy, 1820. Oil on canvas, 97.5 x 130.5 
cm. Paris, Musée du Louvre. 
 
 
Figure 3.24 : Horace Vernet, The Childhood of Napoleon from Vie Politique et 
Militaire de Napoléon (Paris : Émile Babeuf, 1822-1826). Lithograph, 44 x 57 cm.  





Figure 3.25 : Horace Vernet, The Bridge at Arcole from Vie Politique et Militaire de 




Figure 3.26: Anonymous, The Bridge at Arcole from Précis de Napoléon du Consulat et 






Figure 3.27: Pierre-Marie Jazet, Napoleon Crossing the Bridge at Arcole, after Horace 
Vernet, 1829. Aquatint, 56 x 66 cm. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France. 
 
 
Figure 3.28 : Louis-François Charon, Battle of Arcole, c. 1828-1830. Mezzotint, 





Figure 3.29: Horace Vernet, Near a Village Fete, 1818. Lithograph, 28 x 37 cm. 





Figure 3.30: Nicolas-Toussaint Charlet, They Say You Were Born with a Wooden Leg, 






Figure 3.31: Nicolas-Toussaint Charlet, The Merchant of Lithographic Drawings, c. 
1819. Lithograph, 21.6 x 30 cm. Boston, Museum of Fine Arts. 
 
 
Figure 3.32: Nicolas-Toussaint Charlet, “Seriez-vous sensible,”  





Figure 3.33: Carle Vernet, Delpech Lithographic Shop, 1819. Lithograph, 17 x 24 cm. 






















 Figure 4.2 : Installation shot of Horace Vernet’s three battle paintings made for the Gallery  






Figure 4.3: Cover of the 11th installment of Charles Gavard’s Galeries historiques de Versailles, 
1837, printed book, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris. 
 
 





Figure 4.5: Napoleon Crossing the St. Bernard Pass, after Jacques-Louis David, 
published in the 1fr. edition of Charles Gavard’s Galeries historiques de Versailles, 
1837-38. Engraving. Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris.  
 
Figure 4.6: Napoleon Crossing the St. Bernard Pass, after Jacques-Louis David , published in the 
5fr. luxury edition of Gavard’s  Galeries historiques de Versailles, 1837-38. Engraving. 







Figure 4.7: Antoine-Jean Gros, Napoleon Haranguing the Army before the Battle of the Pyramids, 1810. Extensions added in 1835. 






Figure 4.8: Jean-Auguste Philippe Vallot, The Battle of the Pyramids, after 






Figure 4.9: The Battle of the Pyramids, after Antoine-Jean Gros, published in Charles Gavard’s Galeries historiques de 





   
 







   
Figure 4.11: Bertall, La Musique, La peinture, et la sculpture, 1846. Wood engraving. 





Figure 4.12 : Jean-Charles Langlois, Rotunda of the Panorama of the Battle of Navarino, 1831. 















Figure 4.14 : Horace Vernet, Siege of Constantine, The Columns Prepare for the Assault, October 10, 1837, 1839, 512 x 1039  






Figure 4.15: Detail. Horace Vernet, Siege of Constantine, The Columns Prepare for the 
Assault, October 13, 1837. 
 
 
Figure 4.16 : Horace Vernet, The Siege of Constantine in October, 1837, c. 1838. 







Figure 4.17 : Detail, Horace Vernet, Siege of Constantine,  
The Columns Prepare for the Assault, October 10, 1837. 
 
 
Figure 4.18: François Gérard, The Battle of Austerlitz, 1810. Oil on canvas, 510 x 958 cm. 





Figure 4.19 Horace Vernet, Siege of Constantine, The Assault, October 10, 1837. 



























Figure 4.23: Detail, Horace Vernet, Siege of Constantine, The Columns Prepare for the 
Assault, October 10, 1837. 
 
 











Figure 4.26: Horace Vernet, Louis-Philippe and His Sons on Horses in front of the Gate of 






Figure 4.27 : Jacques-Louis David, Bonaparte Crossing the Alps at  
Grand-Saint-Bernard, 1801. 259 x 202. Musée national des châteaux de  





     
Figure 4.28: Detail, Horace Vernet, Louis-Philippe and His Sons on Horses in front of the 







Figure 5.1: Horace Vernet, Episode of the Siege of Rome: the Capture of the 8th Bastion at the San Pancrazio Gate, June 30 1849, 1850-






Figure 5.2: Constantin Guys, The Charge of the Light Brigade, 1855. Pencil, ink, wash and  












Figure 5.4: Henri Durand-Brager and Lassimonne, Sebastopol: The Fort St. Nicolas. Albumen print after a glass negative, 21 x 32 cm. 






Figure 5.5: Henri Durand-Brager and Lassimonne, Sebastopol: The Fort St. Nicolas During Its Destruction. Albumen print after a 






Figure 5.6: Henri Durand-Brager and Lassimonne, Sebastopol: The Fort St. Nicolas After Its Destruction. Albumen print after a glass 












Figure 5.8: Henri Durand-Brager, View of Kamiesch Taken from the Port, 1856-1857. 
170 x 173 cm. Versailles, Musée national du Château. 
   
 
Figure 5.9 : Henri Durand-Brager, Kamiesch : Panorama of the City and of the Port, 






Figure 5.10:  Detail. Henri Durand-Brager, View of Kamiesch Taken from the Port and 
Kamiesch : Panorama of the City and of the Port. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Detail.  Henri Durand-Brager, View of Kamiesch Taken from the Port and 






Figure 5.12: Henri Durand-Brager, Siege of Sebastopol. Panorama of the Left Attacks Seen from the Observatory of Marshall 







Figure 5.13: Henri Durand-Brager, Siege of Sebastopol. Panorama of the Left Attacks Seen from the Extreme Left, 1856-1857. 56 x 





Figure 5.14: Diagram showing the two points from which Henri Durand-Brager painted 




Figure 5.15: Henri Durand-Brager, Bastion de la Quarantine. Oil on canvas, 64 x 113 





Figure 5.16: Henri Durand-Brager, The Clocheton. Oil on canvas, 56 x 88 cm. Versailles, 
Musée national du Château.   
 
 










Figure 5.19 : Detail. Henri Durand-Brager, Siege of Sebastopol. Panorama  
of the Left Attacks Seen from the Observatory of Marshall Canrobert. 
 
 
Figure 5.20: Detail. Henri Durand-Brager, Siege of Sebastopol. Panorama 













Figure 5.22: Henri Durand-Brager, Siege of Sebastopol, Craters in Front of the Bastion du Mat, 1856-1857. 56 x 88 cm. Versailles, 









Figure 5.24:  Otto Dix, Shell Holes illuminated by Flares near Dontrrien, from the 







Figure 5.25: Henri Durand-Brager, Siege of Sebastopol. Lunette de Droite of the Bastion Central, 1856-1857. 56 x 88 cm. Versailles, 






Figure 5.26: Henri Durand-Brager, Siege of Sebastopol. Right View of the Bastion du Mat, 1856-1857, 56 x 88 cm.  






Figure 5.27: Detail. Henri Durand-Brager, Siege of Sebastopol. Lunette de Droite of 
the Bastion Central. 
 
 




















Figure 5.31:Detail. Adolphe Yvon, The Capture of the Malakoff Tower. 
 
 











Figure 5.34: Louis-Emmanuel Soulange-Teissier, The Capture of the Malakoff Tower 




Figure 5.35: Ferdinand Lefman, The Capture of the Malakoff Tower, after Adolphe 





Figure 5.36: Marthe, The Capture of the Malakoff Tower, after Adolphe Yvon, c. 1857. 
Etching (??), 8.5 x 5.4 cm. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France.  
 
 
Figure 5.37: Pierre-Ambroise Richebourg, View of a Room at the Salon of 1857, 1857. 






Figure 5.38: Robert Jefferson Bingham, The Capture of the Malakoff Tower, after Adolphe Yvon, 1857. Albumen print, 27.8 x 42 cm. 






Figure 5.39: Charles Nègre, The Capture of the Malakoff Tower, after Adolphe Yvon, c. 1857. Heliogravure, 28.6 x 41.8 cm. Essonne, 





Figure 5.40: Charles Nègre, An Apprentice of Charles Nègre Examining a Proof in the 
Courtyard of the Studio, c. 1857. Albumen print, 16 x 11.8 cm. Essonne, Musée français 





Figure 6.1: Alphonse de Neuville, The Last Cartridges, 1873. Oil on canvas, 109 x 165 
cm. Bazeilles, musée de la Maison des dernières cartouches.  
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